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Abstract 
Petroleum maintains a primary role in the world energy market as well as in 
the daily life and livelihood of Arab petroleum countries, since these countries are 
highly dependent upon revenues from the exploitation and export of this resource. 
Therefore, the petroleum industry is fraught with conflicts of interests, primarily 
between developing petroleum exporting countries and petroleum companies 
sustained by their home states, most of which are developed countries. The majority 
of disputes have been settled by arbitration, most of which have been controversial. 
The question of the applicable law to the merits of a dispute is intimately 
related to the controversies surrounding arbitral tribunals. The prevailing perspective 
of western scholars during the 20`h century, and still to an extent today, was that host 
state law was inadequate, and host state courts were partial. Therefore, these scholars 
held any dispute arising between a host state and a petroleum company should be 
dealt with as an international dispute and should be settled far away from the host 
state's court and governed by laws or rules other than that of the host state. 
This thesis examines the past and present of petroleum arbitration, the 
perceptions and the practice, and aims to suggest a modified method of determining 
the applicable law to petroleum disputes. It argues that contrary to the previous 
allegations, the legal infrastructure of host states has developed over the years and 
today offers an adequate law to govern the merits of petroleum disputes. It further 
suggests a semi-localisation approach. The thesis focuses only on arbitration as a 
method of resolving such disputes, and limits itself to Arab petroleum countries. 
The thesis argues that petroleum contracts have their own characteristics and 
therefore should not automatically be subject to the ICSID Convention or to other 
principles of investment arbitration. The time is ripe for the establishment of a 
specialised institution to undertake the settlement of disputes arising out of petroleum 
transactions. 
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adopted by the United Nations Commission on international trade law on 21 
June 1985). 
" UNIDROIT Principles of International Commercial Contracts (Rome), 1994. 
" Vienna Convention on the Law of Treaties between States and International 
Organisation, 1986. 
" Washington Convention on the Settlement of Investment Disputes between 
States and Nationals of other States (the ICSID Convention), 1965. 
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General Introduction - The Issue Stated 
It is an undisputed fact that petroleum has a considerable influence upon the 
welfare of people and economies in both developed, and to an even greater extent 
developing countries. It is not an exaggeration to state that for petroleum developing 
countries, petroleum constitutes their most significant economic resource. 
Most developing countries, especially Arab countries, have traditionally 
relied on agriculture and fishing as a source of income before they became 
petroleum-exporting countries. Since the petroleum era, perceived by many as the 
golden era, everything in these countries has changed. The income derived from 
petroleum exportation is so high that the accompanying modernisation has affected 
all aspects of the community. 
Hence, it comes as no surprise that developing nations will do whatever is 
necessary to protect this vital resource; these countries regard petroleum as the 
natural resource which enables them to achieve a high standard of life for their 
citizens. 
At the same time, industrial plants and factories in the western world require 
petroleum, most of which is imported from developing countries. In fact, petroleum 
is fundamental for the industrialised world and competes with the farming industry 
for most important "traditional" industry relating to natural resources. For instance, 
petroleum provides about 40% of the energy Americans consume, 97% of 
transportation fuels and in the United States alone petroleum industry employs nearly 
1.4 million people. 
These facts clearly illustrate the reasons for the conflict over petroleum 
between developing and developed countries. This conflict intensified after World 
War II, when most developing countries struggled to liberate themselves from 
colonialism. Control over their natural resources was among the first struggles of 
developing countries, in view of the fact that petroleum companies, which were all 
established in western countries, were controlling and exploiting this natural resource 
on their terms and in their favour leaving only crumbs for host states. 
The struggle of developing countries to gain control over their own natural 
resources led in many cases to petroleum disputes between host states and petroleum 
companies. Arbitral tribunals, which consisted of exclusively western arbitrators, 
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resolved all these conflicts by applying western rules of law, since these arbitrators 
considered the host state law to be incapable of dealing with such sophisticated 
contracts. Moreover, the decisions of these tribunals invariably tended to fall in 
favour of the petroleum companies. The scepticism of western countries towards the 
host state law continues even nowadays due to historical allegation that the local law 
is insufficient and that unilateral change of the contract and the relevant law by the 
host states are always possible. 
This, in return, made developing countries suspicious of international 
arbitration, as they considered it as only an umbrella for protecting the interests of 
developed countries and the petroleum companies. Consequently, developing 
countries voiced objections against petroleum arbitrations and insisted on resolving 
any petroleum disputes in national courts. 
Although the issue of state contracts, in general, and petroleum contracts, in 
particular, has received extensive and thorough analysis by distinguished scholars 
and experts from different countries all over the world, there remain some points in 
petroleum contracts and disputes that require further discussion and analysis, 
especially the issue of applicable law in the light of the experience gathered in the 
last fifty years and procedural and substantive law reforms in the region in question. 
Hence, the overriding aim of this thesis is to challenge, discuss and analyse 
one of the most controversial issue in petroleum disputes, i. e. applicable law. The 
thesis aims to suggest a method of determining which law is most appropriate for 
such disputes. To achieve this goal the study is divided into three main parts, each of 
which is subdivided into chapters, and a conclusion. 
The first part is an introduction to this study. Chapter one discusses the 
themes, the working hypothesis and the methodology of the thesis. The second 
chapter examines the evolution of petroleum arbitration, and offers a more general 
history of petroleum. 
Part two analyses the determination of the law applicable to the merits of 
petroleum disputes, in two chapters. Chapter one offers a detailed analysis of the case 
law in petroleum arbitration, in particular the Abu Dhabi, Qatar, and Aramco cases. 
The second chapter of this part discusses theories of determination of applicable law 
by parties as well as determination of the applicable law by the arbitrators, when 
there is no determination by the parties. Reference is also made to public 
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international law, and general principles of law, both national and anational, such as 
the UNIDROIT Principles of International Commercial Contracts. 
The third part of the thesis analyses new trends concerning petroleum 
arbitration. This part is divided into three chapters. The first chapter deals with 
doctrinal background, in particular state sovereign immunity and public policy. 
Chapter two discusses the role of the International Centre for Settlement of 
Investment Disputes (ICSID). Chapter three discusses the development of host states 
laws at national and international level. 
A couple of points should be highlighted. First, this thesis undertakes a 
thorough examination of one of the most controversial issues in petroleum 
arbitration: applicable law. It will be argued that the law of petroleum exporting 
countries has developed over the years and offers an adequate law to govern the 
merits of petroleum disputes, should the parties so agree. 
The thesis focuses only on arbitration as a method of resolving disputes in the 
petroleum arena, as arbitration has become one of the most common methods of 
dispute resolution. This is because arbitration is considered to be faster compared to 
national court procedures; it is a neutral and private method of resolving disputes 
where the contracting parties can choose their arbitrators, law, and the place of 
arbitration; it also provides a final and binding decision. It will also be argued that 
petroleum contracts are sui generis investment contracts and that they should not 
automatically be subject to the ICSID Convention or to other principles of 
investment arbitration. 
There is no discussion of the system of the Bilateral Investment Treaties 
(BITs) or the Energy Charter Treaty (ECT). There are several reasons: first, there are 
hardly any treaties in the petroleum industry particularly, between Arab petroleum 
exporting countries and the home states of major petroleum companies (USA for 
instance); second, territorial scope of the ECT is limited to the Europe and Central 
Asia. Where useful conclusions can be drawn from BIT or ECT practice and are 
relevant to this thesis will be discussed. Finally, this thesis is limited to the study of 
petroleum disputes related to Arab countries. 
This thesis aims to achieve a resolution of the tension between developing 
and developed countries by finding a consensus in the settlement of disputes relating 
to exploiting this vital natural resource for the benefit of both. Moreover, it is hoped 
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that this solution would not only be restricted to the petroleum disputes in the Arab 
world, but would also be used in resolving petroleum and other natural resources 
disputes in different parts of the world. It will also be suggested that the time may 
have come for the establishment of an arbitration institution for the resolution of 
petroleum disputes. 
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PART ONE 
INTRODUCTION 
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Chapter One: Themes, Hypothesis and Methodology 
One of the most important trends in international economic and commercial 
relations in the late 20th century was the rapid and unprecedented growth of 
arbitration, ' which can be simply defined as a consensual agreement between parties 
to refer their dispute to a third neutral party, arbitrator(s), who is authorised to render 
a binding decision after a hearing at which both parties have an opportunity to be 
heard. 2 In other words, arbitration is a private justice system which operates, at least 
with the tolerance, or preferably with the support and assistance of national and 
international legislation and national courts. In many countries arbitration has 
become the favoured method of settling disputes between parties in commercial 
matters with or without an international element. 3 The increase in disputes which 
have been resolved by arbitral tribunals, whether by ad hoc or institutional 
arbitration, highlights the fact that arbitration plays an indispensable role in the 
effective resolution of commercial disputes. 
However, the success of arbitration has been mainly in the field of 
commercial disputes where the parties to the disputes arguably have an equal 
bargaining position, being in the same line of business and having similar levels of 
experience. Where the arbitral tribunal finds an initial consent between parties to 
refer their dispute to arbitration, then as a matter of course the parties should avoid 
resort to any national courts and should be compelled to arbitration; the parties are 
bound by the decisions of the tribunal, the arbitral award. Yet, in the field of 
I Stephen J. Toope, Mixed International Arbitration: Studies in Arbitration between States and 
Private Persons, (Cambridge: Grotius Publications Limited 1990), at 1. 
2 Black's Law Dictionary, (6th ed., St. Paul / Minn: West 1990), at 105. 
3 Christian Hausmaninger, "Civil Liability of Arbitrators: Comparative Analysis and Proposals for 
Reform", 7 (4) J Int'l Arb 7-48,16 (1990); Martin Domke, "Arbitration", 28 New York University 
Law Review 835-851,835 (1953). 
4 For example, the case load of the International Chamber of Commerce (ICC) increased from 250 
in 1980 to 466 in 1998; a similar trend can be observed with the London Court of International 
Arbitration (LCIA), where there were 70 new cases in 1998, see Julian D. M. Lew, "Achieving the 
Potential of Effective Arbitration" 65 Arbitration 283-290 (1999); it was reported that there are 
well over 2000 arbitrations a year under the auspices of the better known arbitration institution, 
Julian D. M. Lew/ Loukas A. Mistelis/ Stefan M. Kröll, Comparative International Commercial 
Arbitration, (The Hague: Kluwer Law International 2003), at 33. 
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petroleum, the situation is entirely different to both the pure commercial arena, and 
arbitration between states. 5 
Where petroleum is concerned, the situation is frequently complex because 
the parties to the contract are invariably a state or a state entity on the one side and a 
private company on the other side. Hence, the relationship between the host states 
and the petroleum companies differs from the traditional commercial ones mentioned 
above. This relationship would have generally started during the period of 
colonialism when developing countries were dominated and controlled by western 
countries. 
This type of international arbitration involving disputes between sovereign 
states and foreign private companies is a relatively recent phenomenon. 6 The 
international arbitration of disputes between states and foreign companies started at 
the beginning of the 20th century, first in relation to concession agreements between 
private entities and the succession state of Tsarist Russia. 7 It then exploded in the 
second half of the twentieth century when colonialism was retreating and the use of 
gun boat diplomacy to settle investment disputes was unwise in the context of the 
nationalist movements sweeping Asia and Africa. 8 At that time western countries 
supported international arbitration as the preferred method to provide a new form of 
protection for international investment contracts. 9 
The consequence of this protection was to tie up the natural resources sector 
of the economies of developing countries in chains of "unequal contracts. s10 Under 
5 F. A. Mann, "State Contracts and International Arbitration", 42 BYIL 1-37,6 (1967). 6 A. H. Hermann, "Disputes between States and Foreign Companies" in: Julian D. M. Lew (ed. ), 
Contemporary Problems in International Arbitration, (1987 the Netherlands: Martinus Nijhoff 
Publishers), 250-263,250, he later added that, "the need for it springs from the increasing role 
played in the world economy by the multinational corporations, on the one hand, and by state 
traders, the new merchant princes, on the other"; see also Virtus Chitoo Igbokwe, "Developing 
Countries and the Law Applicable to International Arbitration of Oil Investment Disputes: Has the 
Last Word been Said" 14 (1) J Int'l Arb 99-124,100 (1997); for a historical survey, see J. Gillis 
Wetter, The International Arbitral Process: Public and Private, vol. 1 (Dobbs Ferry/ New York: 
Oceana Publications 1979), at 407. 
7 See V. V. Veeder, "Lloyd Gerorge, Lenin and Cannibals: The Harriman Arbitration", 16 
Arbitration International 115-139 (2000). 
8 M. Sornarajah, International Commercial Arbitration: The Problem of State Contracts, 
(Singapore: Longman Publishers (Pte) Ltd. 1990) at 9. 9 Ibid., at 9. 
10 Virtus C. Igbokwe, "Developing Countries and the Law Applicable to International Arbitration of 
Oil Investment Disputes: Has the Last Word been Said", supra note 6, at 100; these contracts were 
described as following: "The classical contractual framework in the extractive sector (petroleum, 
hard minerals, timber, etc) was the concession [... ] It excluded the host government from 
participating in the ownership, control, and operation of the undertaking. The transnational 
26 
such agreements, petroleum companies received the exclusive rights to explore, 
produce, market and transport petroleum. Moreover, these agreements were extended 
for a long period of time, typically between 40 and 75 years, 11and the royalties due to 
the host state were commonly so ridiculously low that they did not exceed 3 Indian 
Rupees (75 cents) per ton or about 10 cents per barrel. 12 For instance, such a clause 
found in the Agreement of 1937 between the Sultan of Oman and a petroleum 
company, provides that 
In consideration of the payments described in Article (***) the Sultan 
hereby grants to the company for the remainder of the period of this 
Agreement the exclusive right to explore, search for, drill for, produce, win, 
refine, transport, sell, export, and otherwise deal with or dispose of the 
substances and to do all things necessary for all or any of the above 
purposes within the Leased Area. 13 
Petroleum contracts have fundamental effects on the economic and social life 
of developing countries, in particular, in view of the fact that the petroleum sector is 
considered a vital resource to these countries and most of them rely upon it as a sole 
resource as will be explained below. 
Unequivocally, the contractual relationships between host states and 
transnational corporations were badly negotiated, and the two parties were arguably 
of unequal bargaining power. 14 As a consequence, this apparent inequality and the 
scepticism of western investor states towards the courts of the host state impacted 
upon the attitude of developing countries towards international arbitration in 
investment contract disputes, especially in petroleum disputes. Arbitration was 
corporation was given exclusive, extensive, and plenary rights to exploit the particular natural 
resource and was in effect assured ownership of that resource at the point of extraction. " Samuel 
K. B. Asante, "Restructuring Transnational Mineral Agreements", 73 AJIL 335-371,338 (1979). 
Yinka Omorogbe, The Oil and Gas Industry: Exploration and Production Contracts, (Lagos/ 
Benin/ Ibadan/ Jos/ Oxford: Malthouse Press Ltd. 1997), at 58. 
12 Mana Saeed Al-Otaiba, The Petroleum Concession Agreements of the United Arab Emirates, 
(London & Canberra: Croom Helm 1982), at 3; or as Asante argued that "in many cases the 
companies paid a nominal rent of, say, £150 for a whole concession, plus one or two bottles of 
rum, " Samuel K. B. Asante, "Restructuring Transnational Mineral Agreement", supra note 10, at 
339. 
13 Blin Duval Le Leuch and Pertuzzio, (1986), at 56 quoted by Yinka Omorogbe, The Oil and Gas 
Industry: Exploration and Production Contracts, supra note 11, at 59, (this agreement is still in 
effect until 24 June 2012). 
14 See the next chapter. 
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unwelcome by developing countries, 15 since these countries perceived international 
arbitration to be biased in favour of western countries or investor companies. 16 The 
refusal of Latin American countries to settle disputes by tribunals other than 
domestic courts is the best example of developing country scepticism and suspicion 
towards international arbitration. '? 
The success of arbitration in other fields, such as the sale of goods as 
Sornarajah argues, 18 cannot be transferred to petroleum disputes. Nor can the trade, 
investment or commercial relationships between private parties from different 
countries be transferred to the area of petroleum where the disputing parties are in 
different positions. Indeed, it may be argued that petroleum contracts and petroleum 
disputes have their own features which distinguish them from the familiar investment 
agreements and consequently from normal international arbitration. These features 
are elaborately discussed at the end of the second chapter of this part. 
The lack of success in state contract arbitration, notably in petroleum 
disputes, is ascribed by some scholars19 to the bias of the early arbitration cases, such 
as the Abu Dhabi case20 and the Aramco case21, towards the private investor. Thus, 
an advocate of arbitration concedes that, "it may be true that in the beginning of this 
century, and until the 1950s, arbitrations conducted by various `international' 
tribunals or commissions evidenced bias against developing countries. 1122 
In this thesis it is argued that petroleum arbitration is a method of settling 
disputes which normally arise out of petroleum matters. In particular, under the 
scope of petroleum disputes we understand exploration and exploitation transactions, 
invariably between a petroleum producing country and a petroleum company outside 
15 M. Sornarajah, International Commercial Arbitration: The Problem of State Contracts, supra note 
8, at 5. 
16 Ibid., at 5. 
17 Jose Luis Siqueiros, "Arbitral Autonomy and National Sovereign Authority in Latin America", in: 
Thomas E. Carbonneau (ed. ), Lex Mercatoria and Arbitration: A Discussion of the New Law 
Merchant, (1998 Dobbs Ferry/ New York: Transnational Juris Publishing), at 219. 
18 M. Sornarajah, International Commercial Arbitration: The Problem of State Contracts, supra note 
8, at 5. 
19 See for example M. Sornarajah, ibid.; Virtus C. Igokwe, "Developing Countries and the Law 
Applicable to International Arbitration of Oil Investment Disputes: Has the Last Word been Said", 
supra note 6; Ahmed A. El-Kosheri/ Tarik Riad, "The Law Governing a New Generation of 
Petroleum Agreement: Changing in the Arbitration Process", 1 ICSID Review: Foreign Investment 
Law Journal 257-288,258 (1986). 
20 See Petroleum Development Ltd. v. The Sheikh ofAbu Dhabi (1951) 18 ILR 144. 21 See Saudi Arabia v. Arabian American Oil Co. (ARAMCO) (1963) 27 ILR 117; see also the Ruler 
of Qatar v. International Marine Oil Co. Ltd. (1953) 20 ILR 534. 
22 See Jan Paulsson, "Third World Participation in International Investment Arbitration" 2 ICSID 
Review: Foreign Investment Law Journal 19-65,21 (1987). 
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the specific national jurisdiction. This thesis does not aim at classifying or discussing 
the whole range of petroleum disputes, such as those relating to finance, 
construction, joint venture, sale and marketing, etc. 
1.1 Themes 
It is an understatement to say that international arbitration in petroleum 
disputes was unwelcome in the 20th century as far as developing countries were 
concerned. However, in the 215` century, with all the legal and economic 
developments that have occurred, especially in developing countries, has the attitude 
of these countries towards international arbitration remained the same? Is the fear 
and uncertainty which prevailed throughout the 20th century in petroleum arbitration 
still present and if so, why? More precisely, what was the main conflict factor in 
previous petroleum arbitrations? Moreover, has the discussion in the context of 
petroleum arbitration been completed? 
At the same time, other questions must be raised from another point of view, 
such as whether western countries are still suspicious of the legal infrastructure and 
the legal systems in developing countries, and whether petroleum companies still 
fear unilateral amendments in the petroleum contracts by legislative reforms in the 
host state. Are such fears justified? It is necessary to examine the relationships 
between developing petroleum countries and petroleum companies in the present day 
and in the light of economic and legal reforms world-wide. Undoubtedly better, more 
equitable relations than the past regime are required. 
Some western lawyers and arbitrators suggest that such contracts between 
states and a foreign company for exploitation of mineral resources must be governed 
by laws other than those of the host state. 23 The consequence would be that the terms 
of the contract cannot be changed unilaterally by the legislation of the host state. 24 
The same lawyers and arbitrators have further argued that the violation of these 
contracts would be considered a violation of (public) international law, since these 
contracts may be characterised as international treaties. 25 Therefore, a "stabilisation 
23 See for instance, Richard B. Lillich, "The Current Status of the Law of State Responsibility for 
Injuries to Aliens", [1979] Proceedings ASIL 244; F. A. Mann, "The Consequences of an 
International Wrong in International and National Law", 48 BYIL 1-65 (1976-77). 
24 M. Sornarajah, "The Myth of International Contract Law", 15 Journal of World Trade Law 187- 
217,187 (1981). 
25 Ibid., at 187. 
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clause" is considered to be implied in state contracts, especially in petroleum 
contracts, in order to provide a guarantee that such contracts will not be subject to 
any unilateral change. 26 
The significance of the above in legal terms must be assessed; scholars of 
western countries were expressing the view that concession agreements were to be 
treated as an international treaty, rather than a mere commercial agreement or 
contract. 7 The power of petroleum companies and their home states to make this 
assumption a reality, in terms of imposing their conditions on the petroleum industry, 
is clear. Yves Dezalay and Bryant Garth argue that, "these huge companies became 
so much the bastions of the establishment that they considered themselves in one 
sense above the state and in another quasi-statelike. "28 
In addition those lawyers and arbitrators think that the host state governments 
while applying their municipal law may not at any time act impartially toward 
foreign investors, so that foreign companies felt that relying on host state's law 
exposed foreign companies investment to a variety of risks. 29 
Because of this sidelining of the host state's law as well as the creation of a 
very strong aegis to protect state contracts, which ultimately protects foreign 
companies, a form of "delocalisation" or "internationalisation" of investment 
contracts has emerged. 
The justification for such delocalisation is based on the assumption that a 
number of smaller countries lack a comprehensive legal system which is appropriate 
for the settlement of disputes between foreign investors and governments, as well as 
26 Ibid., at 187. 
27 Cf. M. Somarajah, "Power and Justice in Foreign Investment Arbitration" 14 (3) J Int'l Arb 103- 
140,108 (1997). 
28 Yves Dezalay/ Garth G. Bryan, Dealing in Virtue: International Commercial Arbitration and the 
Construction of a Transnational Legal Order, (Chicago/ London: The University of Chicago Press 
1996), at 77; it was reported that "the annual budget of a transnational oil company is likely to 
exceed the entire gross national product of its Third World host nation", the Central Intelligence 
Agency (CIA), The World Fact Book 1999, quoted by Amr A. Shalakany, "Arbitration and the 
Third World: A Plea for Reassessing Bias under the Specter of Neoliberalism", 41 Harvard 
International Law Journal 419-468,467 (2000); the Royal Dutch/ Shell Group (Shell) for 
instance, operates in 145 countries and employs more than 115,000 people, see the Shell Report 
2002 <www. shell. com> last visited 6 October 2003. 
29 Jeswald W. Salacuse, "Bit by Bit: The Growth of Bilateral Investment Treaties and Their Impact 
on Foreign Investment in Developing Countries", 24 International Lawyer 655-675,659 (1990); 
Professor Brigitte Stem for instance, stated at her lecture "International Law as Applicable Law 
under ICSID" which was introduced at a conference on `Public International Law in Commercial 
Disputes' held at the British Institute of International and Comparative Law, London on 7-8 June 
2002 that the application of public international law is only to protect the foreign companies in 
contracts between states and private parties even with sufficient of the home state's law. This 
statement was an answer to a question raised by a participant at the conference. 
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on the widespread fear of foreign investors of local allegedly biased, court and 
administrative procedures. 30 Foreign investors argued that host states would fail to 
perform their obligations under the contract by invoking their own legislative or 
executive law to justify non-performance. 1 These assumptions were articulated in 
the famous petroleum arbitrations namely the Abu Dhabi case, 32 the Qatar case33 and 
the Aramco case. 34 In these three tribunals, arbitrators agreed unanimously that these 
developing countries do no have any legal principles which can be employed to deal 
with complex contracts. 
For instance, in the Abu Dhabi case, Lord Asquith of Bishopstone after 
asking "what is the `proper law' applicable in constructing this contract", he stated 
that 
This is a contract made in Abu Dhabi and wholly to be performed in that 
country. If any municipal system of law were applicable, it would prima facie 
be that of Abu Dhabi. But no such law can reasonably be said to exist. The 
Sheikh administers a purely discretionary justice with the assistance of the 
Koran; and it would be fanciful to suggest that in this very primitive region 
there is any settled body of legal principles applicable to the construction of 
modem commercial instruments. 35 
The same assumption can be found in the Qatar case; Sir Alfred Bucknill 
stated in the pertinent part 
There is nothing in the Principal or Supplemental Agreements which throws a 
clear light upon the intention of the parties on this point. If one considers the 
subject matter of the contract, it is oil to be taken out of the ground within the 
jurisdiction of the Ruler. That fact, together with the fact that the Ruler is a 
party to the contract and had, in effect, the right to nominate Qatar as the 
place where any arbitration arising out of the contract should sit, and the fact 
that the agreement was in Arabic as well as English, points to Islamic law, 
30 Joy Cherian, Investment Contracts and Arbitration: The World Bank Convention on the Settlement 
of Investment Disputes, (Leyden: A. W. Sijthoff 1975), at 13. 
31 F. A. Mann, "State Contract and State Responsibility" 54 AJIL 572-591(1960). 
32 Petroleum Development Ltd. v. The Sheikh ofAbu Dhabi (1951) 18 ILR 144. 
33 The Ruler of Qatar v. International Marine Co. Ltd. (1953) 20 ILR 534. 
34 Saudi Arabia v. Arabian American Oil Co. (ARAMCO) (1963) 27 ILR 117. 
35 Petroleum Development Ltd v. The Sheikh ofAbu Dhabi (1951) 18 ILR 144,149. 
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that being the law administered at Qatar, as the appropriate law. 
On the other hand, there are at least two weighty considerations against that 
view. One is that in my opinion, after hearing the evidence of the two experts 
in Islamic law, Mr. Anderson and Professor Milliot, there is no settled body 
of legal principles in Qatar applicable to the construction of modem 
commercial instruments. 36 
He later added that, 
I have no reason to suppose that Islamic law is not administered there strictly, 
but I am satisfied that the law does not contain any principles which would be 
sufficient to interpret this particular contract. 37 
Consequently, arbitrators applied other laws and principles, such as general 
principles of law and public international law. 38 This premise, as Sornarajah argues, 
is based on a false assumption which implies some sort of racial superiority. 39 
If we examine petroleum contracts between European or American states or 
state entities and petroleum companies, the law of the host state is normally applied. 
As Somarajah points out 
This reasoning concedes that in foreign investment disputes which arise in 
western states, the law of the host state is the only relevant law but that the 
situation is different in the case of developing countries. The justification for 
this is said to be found in the policy reason that flow of foreign investment 
into developing countries will not take place unless such investment is given 
a better standard of protection than is to be found in uncertain local law. 440 
That simply means "Take it or leave it. "41 Delaume explained "if one of the 
parties is in a strong bargaining position, the temptation is great to solve the problem 
36 The Ruler of Qatar v. International Marine Co. Ltd. (1953) 20 ILR 534,544. 
37 Ibid., at 545. 
38 M. Somarajah, "Power and Justice in Foreign Investment Arbitration", supra note 27, at 107. 39 Ibid., at 108. 
40 Ibid., at 110. 
41 Julian D. M. Lew, Applicable Law in International Commercial Arbitration: A Study in 
Commercial Arbitration Awards, (Dobbs Ferry/ New York: Oceana Publications 1978), at 78. 
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in its favour. One judge, one law, preferably my own. 142 
Any validity in this line of reasoning must be based on the asserted 
inadequacies of local law. However, this law has developed and can offer 
nowadays an adequate framework to govern the merits of petroleum disputes. It 
will also be argued in part two of this thesis that Islamic law, even at that time, 
was not lacking principles which may be sufficiently sophisticated to deal with the 
complex contracts involving the petroleum industry. 
In any event, the conviction of western arbitrators and scholars of the 
incapacity or incompetence of the host state's law to deal with petroleum contracts, 
and the `need' for other norms to deal with this matter, provided the origins of what 
is today called internationalisation of foreign investment contracts. 
Such internationalisation raises many legal issues. The first is the important 
doctrine in international commercial arbitration of `party autonomy', i. e. whether the 
parties to the contract can freely choose the law which they believe is most 
appropriate to govern their contract and any dispute that may arise in the future. The 
second is the doctrine of the state sovereign immunity, and whether this is relevant in 
the context of petroleum contracts. These questions will be analysed fully in part two 
and part three of this thesis. 
1.2. Hypothesis 
Although there has been considerable debate relating to state contracts in 
general and petroleum contracts in particular, especially from an applicable law 
perspective, since the mid-20th century, it appears that the final word has not yet been 
said. On one hand, scholars from developing countries argue that the municipal law 
of the host state should govern these contracts. 43 This is based on the fact that the 
legal validity of the investment contract made by a foreign entity is assessed by the 
law of the host state, since the foreign entity, as Somarajah stated, accepted to come 
into the host state to engage in the transaction and like any alien, is subject to the 
host state's law. 44 In other words, municipal law is the law of the place where the 
42 Georges R. Delaume, Transnational Contracts Applicable Law and Settlement of Disputes: Law 
and Practice, A Study in Conflict Avoidance, (Dobbs Ferry/ New York: Oceana Publications. 
Booklet 1 1988), at 6. 
43 Virtus C. Igbokwe, "Developing Countries and the Law Applicable to International Arbitration of 
Oil Investment Disputes: Has the Last Word been Said", supra note 6, at 109. as M. Sornarajah, International Commercial Arbitration: The Problem of State Contracts, supra note 
8, at 11; concerning a provision in the Mexican Constitution which provides that "foreigners must 
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contract was made and the law of the place where it is to be performed, and foreign 
companies do not have any personality in this sense in international law. 45 
Consequently, the law applicable to the contract has to be a domestic system, i. e. 
host state law. 46 On the other hand, some scholars from western countries argue that 
the host state's law is inadequate to deal with such sophisticated contracts. 7 
The application of host state law to petroleum disputes is widely supported by 
developing countries because of two fundamental considerations. 48 First, the 
performance of the contract occurs in the host state and the contract itself physically 
exists in that state so it is reasonable to apply the municipal law of that state, rather 
than applying another law. 49 Second, once the foreign investor has entered into an 
investment contract in another state it is presumed to have consented to the law of 
that state. 5° 
The case law in this regard defends this perspective; for instance, the 
Permanent Court of International Justice, in the Serbian loans case stated that, "any 
contract which is not a contract between states in their capacity as subjects of 
international law is based on the municipal law of some country. s51 The International 
Court of Justice advocated the same perspective in the Anglo-Iranian Co case. 52 
Moreover, in the case of Alsing v. Greece, the law of Greece was applied. 53 
It is well established in many jurisdictions that the law of the country of the 
agree before the Mexican government to consider themselves as Mexicans regarding their 
property, and to bind themselves not to invoke the protection of their governments with respect to 
such property", Professor Enriquez argues that "the rationale, in my view of this provision, is that 
any foreigner wishing to invest in another country must accept the legal standards of such other 
country", Raymundo E. Enriquez, "Expropriation under Mexican Law and its Insertion into a 
Global Context under NAFTA", 23 Hastings International and Comparative Law Review 385- 
392,388 (2000). 
45 Ibid., at 11. 
46 Ibid., at 11. 
a' Lord Asquith of Bishopstone in the Abu Dhabi case for instance, stated that "It would be fanciful 
to suggest that in this very primitive region there are any settled legal principles applicable to the 
construction of modem commercial instruments. " Petroleum Development Ltd. v. The Sheikh of 
Abu Dhabi (1951) 18 ILR 144,149. 
ag Virtus C. Igbokwe, "Developing Countries and the Law Applicable to International Arbitration of 
Oil Investment Disputes: Has the Last Word been Said", supra note 6, at 109. 
49 Ibid., at 109. 
50 Ibid., at 109; see also supra note 76. 
s' Serbian loans Case [1929] PCIJ series. A. no. 20, at 41. 
52 Anglo-Iranian Co. case, supra note 61, at 115. 
53 The International Law Reports states however that, "this case does not raise issues of international 
law in the accepted sense, and it has been included in this volume because of two reasons. The first 
was as it is concerned with the interpretation of agreements concluded between governments and 
foreign nationals and companies, and as a consequence "[T]his applies in particular, to the 
question of the nature and interpretation of so-called administrative contracts concluded by a 
government" 23 ILR 623-682,658 (1956). 
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party with the closest connection to the contract should be applied, since most of the 
contractual performances would be in this country. For example, in Article 4(1), the 
Rome (EC) Convention on the Applicable Law to Contractual Obligations, which 
opened for signature in Rome on 19 June 1980 asserts that the applicable law is the 
law of the country with which the contract is most closely connected, in case of non- 
determination of law by choice of the parties. The same rule has been reiterated in 
the Inter-American Convention on the Law Applicable to International Contracts, in 
Article 9. 
It is therefore surprising to find that investors are advised by their home states 
to divorce as far as is possible the provisions of the contract from the law of the host 
state. 54 Therefore it is easy to see the ignorance of the host state's laws. An example 
of this ignorance in a slighting way was found in Libyan cases. 55 The choice of law 
clause was the same in different concession agreements. 56 However, if this was the 
intention, it was not fulfilled, because not one of those arbitrators who dealt with 
these cases gave sufficient importance to the law of Libya, which, according to the 
clause, should be the first choice of legal system. 57 On a plain reading of this clause, 
as Redfern and Hunter argue 
It seems clear that the intention was that the concession agreement should be 
governed by the principles of the law of Libya, to the extent that these were 
in accordance with the principles of international law, and that the role of 
Libyan law should be ignored or overridden, to the extent that it failed to 
comply with those established principles. 58 
54 Paul E. Comeaux/ Thompson & Knight & N. Stephan Kinsella, Duane, Morris & Heckscher, 
"Treaty Provisions Regarding the Protection of Investment", in: Charles E. Stewart, Rogers & 
Wells (eds. ), Transnational Contracts, (New York: Oceana Publications INC. 2001), Binder 1, at 
p. Com. 1.1-31 
ss Libyan cases: Texaco Overseas Petroleum Company (U. S. ) and California Asiatic Oil Company 
(U. S. ) v. The Government of the Libyan Arab Republic, (1978) 17 ILM 3-37, reprinted in (1979) 4 
YBCA 177-187; Libyan American Oil Company (LIAMCO) (USA) v. The Government of the 
Libyan Arab Republic, (1981) 6 YBCA 89-117; and The British Petroleum Company (Libya) Ltd. 
v. The Government of the Libyan Arab Republic, (1979) 53 ILR 297-388, reprinted in (1980) 5 
YBCA 143-167. 
56 This clause, which was a part of clause 28, reads as follow: "This concession shall be governed by 
and interpreted in accordance with the principles of the law of Libya common to the principles of 
international law and in the absence of such common principles then by and in accordance with the 
general principles of law, including such of those principles as may have been applied by 
international tribunals", ibid., at 181. 
57 Alan Redfern/ Martin Hunter, Law and Practice of International Commercial Arbitration, (3'd ed., 
London: Sweet & Maxwell 1999), at 106. 
58 Ibid., at 106. 
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Hence, some scholars consider the Libyan petroleum arbitrations as the most 
flagrant proof of bias in the arena of international commercial arbitration, 59 and as 
important landmarks in the theory of internationalisation of foreign investment 
agreements. 60 
Clearly, there are two conflicting opinions upon the applicability of the 
municipal law as the proper law in petroleum contracts. Or is it a case of a difference 
between theory and practice? 
It is necessary to ask whether it is the case that developing countries cannot 
fully perform their rights and duties relating to their mineral resources. There is no 
doubt that petroleum companies, sustained by their home states, have used 
developing countries' need for technology and know-how to coerce these countries 
into accepting_their terms and conditions. The propaganda which prevailed in the 
1950s and 1960s provides an insight into how these companies perceive petroleum 
states, perceptions which still exist today. 
What we did for Saudi Arabia is a story that's never been told. We brought 
them into the world. We buried them. Oil was almost just a sideline. I've 
never seen anything so paternal61 
Hence, should this propaganda prevail nowadays with all change which 
occurred in Arab petroleum exporting countries? Moreover, should those decisions in 
the old petroleum arbitrations still be considered as a dogma in the sphere of natural 
resources arbitration particularly in petroleum arbitration or not? Furthermore, to 
what extent arbitration is considered as a favourable method in the settlement of 
petroleum disputes? 
It could be argued that it is no more accepted that decisions were rendered 
during the era of colonialism be considered as a guidance or a dogma to arbitration 
practice in the 21st century when almost all nations have achieved an advanced legal 
59 Amr A. Shalakany, "Arbitration and the Third World: A Plea for Reassessing Bias under the 
Specter of Neoliberalism", supra note 28 at 425. 
60 M. Sornarajah, "The Climate of International Commercial Arbitration" 8 (2) J Int'l Arb 47-86,61 
(1991); see also in general M. Sornarajah, International Commercial Arbitration: The Problem of 
State Contracts, supra note 8. 
61 Quoted by Yves Dezalay/ Bryant G. Garth, Dealing in Virtue: International Commercial 
Arbitration and the Construction of a Transnational Legal Order, supra note 28, at 77 from 
Robinson Jeffrey, Yamani: The inside Story, (London: Fontana 1988), at 86 (when I checked the 
latter reference I did not find the above quotation). 
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system, and Arab petroleum exporting countries are among these nations. So, the 
allegation that these countries lack an advanced legal system appropriate for the 
settlement of disputes arising out of complicated contracts such as petroleum 
contracts is no longer tenable. In addition, despite the fact that, arbitration was not 
welcomed by developing countries during the 20th century, arbitration may be 
considered an appropriate method to settle disputes which invariably arise out of 
petroleum transactions if this mechanism (arbitration) remains just and neutral. 
It may also be stated that petroleum contracts are sui generis investment 
contracts and that they should not fall directly under the jurisdiction of the ICSID 
Convention or to other principles of investment arbitration. Therefore, the petroleum 
industry needs a specialised forum or an arbitration institution to undertake the 
settlement of disputes which arise out of its transactions. 
1.3. "Institutional" approach (reflection) 
The United Nations Assembly gave developing countries absolute sovereign 
rights over their natural resources. Moreover, the early arbitrations in petroleum 
disputes state that the host state's laws should apply to the petroleum investment 
contracts if such laws are available. It was stated that the arbitrators themselves, in 
the Abu Dhabi, Qatar and Aramco cases, "acknowledged that if there were sufficient 
laws applicable to the petroleum contracts in the host state, such laws would have to 
be applied by the arbitrator. s62 So, their resort in practice to laws other than the host 
62 M. Sornarajah, "Power and Justice in Foreign Investment Arbitration", supra note 27, at 109; in 
the Aramco case, Sauser-Hall, the Referee for instance stated that "[T]he arbitration tribunal is 
thus called upon to reconstruct, not the choice of law which the parties might have had in mind or 
intended, but, in an abstract manner, the choice of law which reasonable persons would have made 
and intended. In other words, the tribunal must resort to objective criteria in order to connect 
certain matters regulated by the contract with a specified place and a specified legal system. [T]he 
Aramco Concession Agreement signed by the Government of Saudi Arabia and an American 
corporation has, because of its parties and of its ramifications, an international character. The law 
expressly by chosen by the parties must be taken into consideration, therefore, provided this choice 
is reasonable, that is to say, provided the parties have selected a legal system connected with their 
transaction. This is undoubtedly so here, for many reasons. The Contract was signed at Jeddah, 
Saudi Arabia; the lex loci contractus, then is the law of that state [... ] lastly, the contract is, for the 
most part, to be performed in this state. its performance entails the exploitation, in a direct manner, 
of the hidden wealth of the subsoil of Saudi Arabia and the creation of proprietary rights in 
immovables [immovable] situated in the territory of that state. [T]he law in force in Saudi Arabia 
should also be applied to the content of the concession because this state is party to the Agreement, 
as granter, and because it is generally admitted, in private international law, that a sovereign state 
is presumed, unless the contrary is proved, to have subjected its undertakings to its own legal 
system. This principle was mentioned by the Permanent Court of International Justice in its 
Judgment of July 12th- 1929 concerning the Serbian and Brazilian Loans (Judgment no. 14, PCIJ, 
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state's laws should only be because these laws lacked sufficient principles to cope 
with the problems that arose from large and complex contracts. 63 
After World War II, in the 1960s new countries emerged and started their 
fight to liberate themselves from the constraints and patrimony of colonialism, by 
asserting their economic independence and struggling for control over their natural 
resources. These countries generally sustained that the western countries had 
exploited their natural resources without any consideration during the colonial 
period, and it was time to start controlling their resources for the benefit of their own 
citizens. Moreover, they argued that western countries had, without any participation 
in or consent of these new countries, developed these unequal principles, especially 
the principle of state responsibility. Therefore, these principles were considered 
unjust, inequitable and essentially colonial in character. 64 In addition 
The era of colonialism did not provide any such basis of reciprocity between 
the colonial power on one hand and their victims on the other. The 
relationships between them were being [sic] principally those between the 
exploiter and the exploited. 65 
Therefore, large scale and widespread movements of expropriation/ 
nationalisation took place after the Second World War in developing countries, 
concerned with asserting their right to self-determination and their sovereignty over 
natural resources. 66 
The doctrine of sovereignty over natural resources was one of the principal 
issues in international relations in the 20th century since developing countries 
considered themselves to have absolute rights to restructure their political and 
economic system in order to ensure their economic independence. 67 
The United Nations supported these attempts of developing countries to 
protect and control their natural resources. The United Nations, in an attempt to reach 
an agreement which could satisfy all nations, adopted several resolutions. The most 
Series A, no. 20, at 41 and Judgment no. 15, PCIJ, Series A. no. 21, at 121). " Saudi Arabia v. 
Arabian American Oil Company (ARAMCO), (1963) 27 ILR 117,166-167. 
63 Ibid., at 108. 
64 Samuel K. B. Asante, "International Law and Foreign Investment: A Reappraisal" 37 ICLQ 593 
(1988). 
65 Ibid, at 594. 
66 mid, at 594. 
67 Ibid., at 594. 
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relevant resolutions were: 
0 General Assembly Resolution 523 (VI) 1952 "Integrated 
Economic Development and Commercial Agreements" 
This resolution was the first instrument to consider the rights of developing 
countries to control their natural resources. Poland, on 26 November 1951, 
introduced a draft resolution on integrated economic development and long-term 
trade agreements. This draft was under the auspices of "Economic Development of 
Under-Developed Countries. 9M Poland pointed out that such agreements `must not 
contain any economic or political conditions violating the sovereign rights of the 
economically under-developed countries or conditions which are contrary to the aims 
of the plans for economic development of these countries. 69 
This draft asserted that these countries have the right to control freely their 
natural resources in accordance with the right to development 70 The relevance of this 
resolution, as Schrijver stated, lies in the fact that, 
1. For the first time the (sovereign) right, of `under-developed 
countries' to determine freely the use of their natural 
resources; 
2. for the first time the obligation to utilise such resources in 
order to be in a better position to further the realisation of 
their plans of economic development in accordance with their 
own national interests; and 
3. for the first (and last! ) time the obligation to utilise such 
resources not only in their own national interests, but also in 
order to further the expansion of the world economy. 7' 
0 General Assembly Resolution 626 (VII), 1952 
This resolution was adopted after a draft proposed by Uruguay on 5 
November 1952 under the heading `Economic Development of Under-Developed 
68 Nico Schrijver, Sovereignty over Natural Resources: Balancing Rights and Duties, (Cambridge: 
Cambridge University Press 1997), at 39. 
69 Ibid., at 39; see also UN. Doc. A/C. 2/L. 81,21 November 1951; and A/C. 2/L. 81/Corr. l. 
70 Nico Schrijver, Sovereignty over Natural Resources: Balancing Rights and Duties, supra note 68, 
at 40. 
71 Ibid., at 41. 
39 
Countries'. 72 Uruguay's argument in this draft was logical and legitimate, that, 
Foreign financing in the form of aid, loans or private investments was 
certainly a valuable and indeed an essential factor in the development of 
under-developed countries but it was not the ideal situation. The ideal for an 
under-developed country was to attain economic independence, to dispose 
freely of its own resources, and to obtain foreign exchange by selling its 
products to buyers of its own choice. 73 
This proposal expressed the desire of developing countries to protect their 
weak economies, and utilise and exploit their own natural resources. This was the 
first time developing countries had expressed such views in the United Nations; this 
was after the first decisive step taken by the Iranian Government on 1 May 1951. On 
this day, Dr. Mossadegh, the Prime Minister of Iran, announced the official decision 
to nationalise the Anglo-Iranian Oil Company. 74 This step has been called the first 
major economic "North-South clash" in the post-war period. 75 
With this announcement, Iran annulled the 1933 petroleum concession 
agreement which granted the Anglo-Iranian Oil Company the exclusive rights to 
extract and process petroleum in a specified area in Iran up to 1993.76 A very 
important issue has been raised from this case relating to the competence of the 
International Court of Justice over petroleum contracts. On 22 July 1952 the ICJ 
concluded that it had no jurisdiction over this case, 77 since concession contracts did 
not fall within the meaning of the term `international conventions' of Article 38(1) of 
the ICJ Statute. 78 
The said proposal, which was suggested by Uruguay, was adopted after a 
72 Ibid., at 42; see also UN Doc. A/C. 2/L. 165,5 November 1962. 
" Nico Schrijver, Sovereignty over Natural Resources: Balancing Rights and Duties, supra note 68, 
at 43; see also UN Doc. A/C. 2/SR. 231,6 December 1952, at 253. 74 Nico Schrijver, Sovereignty over Natural Resources: Balancing Rights and Duties, supra note 68, 
at 41. 
75 Ibid., at 41. 
76 Ibid., at 41; see also the Anglo-Iranian Oil Co. case (UK v. Iran) (1952) (jurisdiction) Judgment 
of 22 July 1952 ICJ Rep at 93. 
77 Ibid., at 42, and the Anglo-Iranian Judgment, ibid., at 115, the court's decision was by nine votes 
to five. 
78 Alan W. Ford, The Anglo-Iranian Oil Dispute of 1951-1952: A Study of the Role of Law in the 
Relations of States, (Berkeley/ Los Angeles: University of California Press 1954), at 179. 
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major debate between United Nations members, 79 in which many members supported 
the right of developing countries to freely manage their wealth and natural resources. 
" General Assembly Resolution 1314 (XIII), 1958 
This resolution established the Commission on Permanent Sovereignty over 
Natural Resources and instructed it to conduct a full survey of the status of 
permanent sovereignty over natural resources as a basic constituent of the right to 
self-determination. 80 The main outcome of this Commission was General Assembly 
Resolution 1803 (XVI). 81 
9 General Assembly Resolution 1803 (XVII), 1962 
In this resolution two important facts were restated. First, people and nations 
have the full right of permanent sovereignty over their wealth and resources. Article 
1 asserts that these rights must be exercised in the interest of national development 
and the well-being of the people of the state concerned. Second, the resolution 
provides the grounds or reasons for nationalisation or expropriation of domestic or 
foreign investments: public utility and national interest. Article 4 stipulates that 
appropriate compensation shall be paid to the owner. 82 Article 7 of the resolution 
asserts that 
Violation of the rights of peoples and nations to sovereignty over their natural 
wealth and resources is contrary to the spirit and principles of the Charter of 
the United Nation and hinders the development of international co-operation 
and the maintenance of peace. 83 
Moreover, this resolution obliged foreign investment agreements to respect 
the sovereignty of people and nations over their natural resources (Art. 8). 84 
79 For more details see Nico Schrijver, Sovereignty over Natural Resources: Balancing Rights and 
Duties, supra note 68; and the UN Docs. 
S° See Ian Brownlie (ed. ), Basic Documents in International Law, (4th ed., Oxford: Oxford University 
Press 1995), at 236. 
81 Nico Schrijver, Sovereignty over Natural Resources: Balancing Rights and Duties, supra note 68, 
at 59. 
82 Ian Brownlie (ed. ), Basic Documents in International Law, supra note 80, at 238. 
93 UN Doc. A/5217 (1963), reprinted in 2 ILM 223-226 (1963). 
84 Ibid. 
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" Charter of Economic Rights and Duties of States, 1974 
On 12 December 1974 by a vote of 120 in favour, 6 against (Belgium, 
Denmark, German Federal Republic, Luxembourg, United Kingdom, United States), 
and 10 abstentions, the General Assembly of the United Nations adopted a new 
resolution on the rights of states to manage and freely control their economic 
resources. 85 
The initiative for this resolution occurred during the United Nations 
Conference on Trade and Development III (UNCTAD), when President Echeverra of 
Mexico proposed the drafting of this Charter. 86 Chapter One of this Charter concerns 
the fundamentals of international economic relations, and focuses on sovereignty. 87 
However, the most relevant issues were raised in Articles 1 and 2 in Chapter Two. 
These Articles assert each country's permanent sovereignty over their natural 
resources. They confirm that every state has the sovereign right to choose its 
economic, social and political system in accordance with the will of its people, 
without any outside intervention (Art. 1). 88 Article 2 asserts every state's right to 
exercise full permanent sovereignty over all its wealth, natural resources and 
economic activities, including possession, use and disposal. 89 It also asserts that the 
state has the following rights: 
- To regulate and exercise authority over foreign investment within its 
national jurisdiction in accordance with its laws and regulations and in 
conformity with its national objectives and priorities. No state shall be 
compelled to grant preferential treatment to foreign investment; 
- To regulate and supervise the activities of transnational corporations within 
its national jurisdiction and take measures to ensure that such activities 
comply with its laws, rules and regulations and conform with its economic 
and social policies. Transnational corporations shall not intervene in the 
internal affairs of a host state... 
- To nationalise, expropriate or transfer ownership of foreign 
property, in which case appropriate compensation should be paid 
85 Ian Brownlie (ed. ), Basic Documents in International Law, supra note 80, at 244. 86 Nico Schrijver, Sovereignty over Natural Resources: Balancing Rights and Duties, supra note 68, 
at 100. 
87 Ian Brownlie (ed. ), Basic Documents in International Law, supra note 80, at 244. 
88 Ibid., at 244. 
89 Ibid., at 244. 
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by the state adopting such measures ... 
90 
Prior to this Charter, the Organisation of the Petroleum Exporting Countries 
(OPEC), at its Sixteenth Conference which was held in Vienna on 24-25 June 1968 
endorsed a resolution entitled "Declaratory Statement of Petroleum Policy in 
Member Countries. "91 These countries stipulated in the preamble of that declaration 
that hydrocarbon resources constitute the main basis for their economic development 
and they have full rights to exercise permanent sovereignty over their natural 
resources in the interest of their national development. 92 The declaration also 
determines the method of settling petroleum disputes. It provides that 
Except as otherwise provided for in the legal system of a Member Country, 
all disputes arising between the Government and operators shall fall 
exclusively within the jurisdiction of the competent national courts or the 
specialised regional courts, as and when established. 93 
. 
It follows that the integration of natural resources, especially the petroleum 
sector, into the national economy has become accepted as an important principle 94 
and is a key demand of developing countries. 
1.4. Methodology 
The claim which was dominant in the 20`h century that developing countries 
lack a well developed legal system to deal with petroleum contracts needs to be 
reviewed. While western countries view the political and legal systems in developing 
countries with suspicion, at the same time developing countries are wary of 
international arbitration, since these countries perceive international arbitration, 
especially in petroleum investments, to be a legal method of protecting a foreign 
(western) investor. As a consequence, some scholars from these countries argue that 
the success which has been recorded in the context of commercial arbitration cannot 
90 Ibid., at 245. 
91 "Resolution of the Sixteenth OPEC Conference `XVI. 90': Vienna, 24-25 June 1968", OPEC 
Official Resolutions and Press Releases 1960-1983, (Oxford: Pergamon Press 1984), at 61. 92 Ibid., at 61. 
93 Ibid., at 63; for more details see part three, chapter three of this thesis. 94 Ahmed S. E1-Kosheri/ Tarek F. Riad, "The Law Governing a New Generation of Petroleum 
Agreement: Changing in the Arbitration Process", supra note 19, at 258. 
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and should not be applied to petroleum disputes. 95 
However, the most controversial issue in petroleum contracts and disputes is 
the determination of applicable law. 
Hence, the overriding goal of this thesis is to examine the determination of 
applicable law in petroleum arbitration. This will be explored not only from the 
perspective of developing countries - most of them insist upon applying their 
domestic laws and argue that the allegation of insufficiency of the host state's law no 
longer exists today, since these countries have in place appropriate legal systems 
which can govern all contracts and disputes - but also from as neutral a viewpoint as 
possible. This thesis aims to provide a comprehensive discussion based on analytical 
and critical research, and to explore the hypothesis of the competency of domestic or 
host law as an applicable law in petroleum arbitration. This will be examined 
alongside other theories which have been applied in previous petroleum arbitrations, 
such as lex mercatoria, or public international law. 
To achieve this, we must examine arbitral practice, i. e. awards from 
institutional bodies and ad hoc arbitration, especially all relevant major cases of the 
20`h century, such as the Abu Dhabi case, the Qatar case, the Aramco case, the 
Libyan cases and the Aminoil case, which constitute the main case studies of this 
thesis, along with a comparative study of the legal systems in some Arab countries. 
This should help us answer the controversial question of the most appropriate 
applicable law in petroleum arbitration. This should also shed light on applicable law 
in other state contract disputes. 
However, first we must turn to the history of petroleum in order to provide 
the context for our study. 
95 M. Sornarajah, International Commercial Arbitration: The Problem of State Contracts, supra note 
8, at 5. 
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Chapter Two: The Development of Petroleum Arbitration 
This chapter aims at providing a factual basis for the assessment of the impact 
of the petroleum exploration companies upon the Arab petroleum countries, and the 
influence of these companies upon petroleum arbitration. This brief historical survey 
is divided into two periods: 1859-1950,1950-to the present. 
1.1859 to 1950 
Petroleum has changed many features of the world and will continue to do so 
for many years. The question of who shall control this `newborn' and who shall 
decide and determine all aspects of this liquid has been considered one of the most 
controversial issues in this recent history. The conflict in some instances and the co- 
operation in many others between the great powers in the world to gain exclusive 
control or possession of petroleum is the distinctive feature of this period. As 
Engdahl has written, "no other element has shaped the history of the past one 
hundred years so much as the fight to secure and control the world's reserves of 
petroleum. "' 
Indeed, petroleum is not purely an economic matter, it is undoubtedly also a 
political matter. 2 As Mohr stated, 
World-wide fight for oil has gone on with a vigourous ruthlessness, and a 
fury which can be understood only by bearing in mind the importance 
attached to it by the various governments concerned. 3 
The interest of western countries in the domination of petroleum resources 
was clear. Mohr quoted a letter which was written by the French senator, Henri 
Berenger, to Clemenceau in 1919. Berenger writes 
He who owns the oil will own the world, for he will rule the sea by means of 
F. William Engdahl, A Century of War: Anglo-American Oil Politics and the New World Order, 
(Germany: Dinges & Frick 1992), at 8. 
2 Anton Mohr, The Oil War, (London: Martin Hopkinson & Co. Ltd. 1926), at 29. 
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the heavy oils, [... ] by reason of the fantastic wealth he will derive from oil 
the wonderful substance which is more sought after and more precious today 
than gold itself. 4 
Mohr himself argued that 
It is doubtful, indeed, whether any other chapter in contemporary history can 
show so many biased statements and wilfully falsified documents of a more 
or less `official' character as the story of the oil war. 
He added that 
This is due, of course, primarily to the character of the war and the secrecy 
with which it is being waged. It is all going on behind drawn blinds, as it 
were. The government of the various countries very seldom appear openly in 
the field; not infrequently they act under cover of private companies, whose 
capital and management are more or less controlled by them. 5 
1.1. The early period -19th century 
Petroleum was known by some old nations. Egyptians, for instance, used 
petroleum in the process of mummification; the Romans also used petroleum to light 
the temple of Jupiter. Petroleum was a divine substance for Native American, and 
was a nuisance for the white settlers. China was the first nation to know the secret of 
the extraction of petroleum from the sub-earth. 6 
However, the first evidence of the modem importance of petroleum can be 
traced back to the 19th century, when the first petroleum producing well was drilled 
in Pennsylvania in the United States of America in 1859 by Edwin I. Drake. 7 Some 
years later, John D. Rockefeller, with his business associates, entered the petroleum 
refining business when he formed in 1870 Standard Oil (Cleveland, OH) to produce 
8 kerosene for lighting purposes. Demand for petroleum in the United States of 
3 Ibid., at 29. 
° Quoted in ibid., at 30. 
5 Ibid., at 31. 
6 E. B. Brossard, Petroleum Politics and Power, (Tulsa/ Oklahoma: Penn Well Books Publishing 
Company 1983), at 1. 
7 Ibid., at 1. 
8 <www. encyclopedia. com/html/RfRockLf last visited 20 March 2002. 
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America during the nineteenth century grew considerably as the car industry grew. 9 
Efforts to discover new sources of petroleum moved outside the United States 
of America. In 1873 Alfred Nobel's family drilled in Baku in Russia (today's 
Azerbaijan)1° and in this year Russia became a petroleum producer. A few years 
later, in 1898 petroleum was discovered in Romania. " Between 1900 and the 
number of 1914 petroleum producers increased and new sources of petroleum were 
detected in Mexico, Peru, Egypt, Galicia (now part of Poland and Ukraine) and 
Persia (modem Iran). 12 
The practice of controlling petroleum resources from outside the land in 
which they were located was initiated by the United Kingdom at the end of the 19th 
century. Ruling the world seas was the primary objective of the British Navy. 
Admiral Lord Fisher, who held the office of First Sea Lord Admiralty, was a 
powerful advocate for the use of petroleum in the navy. 13 
1.2. Early 20th century 
Controlling the petroleum resources in different parts of the world became 
increasingly important to western countries, especially the United Kingdom, at the 
beginning of the 20th century. To achieve this goal, Winston Churchill continued 
what Lord Fisher had started. Churchill, on 17 July 1913 put forward a policy before 
the House of Commons which later became the basis of Britain's petroleum strategy. 
This policy was based on government control of British petroleum companies by 
purchasing the majority of shares in these companies. " 
The Arab countries and Persia were the focus of Churchill's policy, since 
Britain had preceding interests in this area. British presence in this area for petroleum 
purposes started in 1900 when William Knox D'Arcy discovered petroleum in the 
9 E. B. Brossard, Petroleum Politics and Power, supra note 6, at 2. 
10 <www. encyclopedia. com/html/R/Rockefj. asp> last visited 20 March 2002. 
11 Derek Fee, Petroleum Exploitation Strategy, (London / New York: Belhaven Press 1988), at 7. 12 Ibid., at 7. 
13 For more details see for instance: Anton Mohr, The Oil War, supra note 2; H. E. Davenport/ 
Russell Sidney Cooke, The Oil Trust & Anglo-American Relations, (London: Macmillan and Co. 
Limited 1923); F. William Engdahl, A Century of War: Anglo-American Oil Politics and the New 
World Order, supra note 1; E. D. Shaffer, The United States and the Control of World Oil, 
(London/ Canberra: Croom Helm 1983); and Ted Wheelwright, Oil & World Politics: from 
Rockefeller to the Gulf War, (Sydney: LEFT Book Club Co-operative Ltd. 1991). 
14 See in general F. William Engdahl, A Century of War: Anglo-American Oil Politics and the New 
World Order, supra note 1. 
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desert of southern Persia. 15 D'Arcy was granted a concession agreement by the Shah 
of Persia, which "still reads like musical comedy". 16 By this concession agreement, 
D'Arcy was given the exclusive right for sixty years to drill for, produce, pipe and 
carry away petroleum and petroleum products throughout 500,000 square miles of 
the Persian Empire. '7 
The Anglo-Persian Oil Company was formed in 1909 (the name changed in 
1935 to the Anglo-Iranian Oil Company, then later to the British Petroleum 
Company). Two of its directors were represented in the Admiralty, and they had the 
last word in all strategic issues. 18 The speech of Churchill in the House of Commons 
on 17 July 1913 clearly disclosed the policy of the British government in relation to 
petroleum resources. He said that 
Our ultimate policy is that the Admiralty should become the independent 
owner and producer of its own supplies of liquid fuel. [... ] We must become 
the owners, or at any rate the controllers at the source [... ] to draw oil supply, 
so far as possible, from sources under British control or British influence, and 
along those sea or ocean routes which the Navy can most easily and most 
surely protect. 19 
To achieve such an objective, considerable tactics were employed; Britain 
collaborated with France and the Netherlands to subvert the international reputation 
of the American government and American companies. In addition, the British 
Foreign Office was ordered to strengthen its diplomatic ties in the Arab region and 
elsewhere in terms of gaining concession agreements, and at the same time, British 
companies were encouraged to become more aggressive in seeking and obtaining 
petroleum concessions in foreign countries. 20 
1.3. The American Factor and the Post-World War One Distribution 
Prior to 1920 the United States of America and its petroleum companies were 
excluded from the Arab region and Persia, and the region was dominated by Europe. 
15 H. E. Davenport/ Russell Sidney Cooke, The Oil Trust & Anglo-American Relations, supra note 
13, at 11. 
16 Ibid., at 11. 
17 Ibid., at 11. 
18 Ibid., at 16. 
19 Quoted in ibid., at 18-20. 
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However, after the First World War, the American attitude towards overseas business 
changed, the United States began to break the European monopoly. 
From that time on, obtaining control of oil became one of the cornerstones of 
US foreign policy. It became the essential ingredient in the expansion and 
consolidation of the American Empire. 21 
The United States State Department was a considerable supporter of 
American petroleum companies. 
The State Department has often taken its policies right out of the executive 
suites of the oil companies. When Big Oil can't get what it wants in foreign 
countries, the State Department tries to get it for them. In many countries, the 
American Embassies function virtually as branch offices for the oil combine 
[sic]. 22 
The above statement illustrates the intimacy of the relationship between 
politics and business in relation to petroleum, in the 20`h century and some would 
argue the 2 1st as century as well. As a US State Department bulletin suggests 
A review of diplomatic history of the past 35 years will show that petroleum 
has historically played a large part in the external relations of the US than any 
other commodity. 23 
American history in the Arab region started in the late 1920s. In 1927 the 
petroleum war was resolved in favour of the `Major' petroleum companies or `Seven 
Sisters'. 24 Five of these companies were American, i. e. Standard Oil of New Jersey 
(Exxon), Gulf Oil Corporation (Gulf), Texas Oil Company (Texaco), Standard Oil 
20 Abdulaziz Al-Sowayegh, Arab Petro-Politics, (London/ Canberra: Croom Helm 1984), at 16. 
21 E. D. Shaffer, The United States and the Control of World Oil, supra note 13, at 37. 
22 Jack Anderson, "Washington Exposed", Public Affairs Press, Washington, [1967] at 202 quoted 
by Ted Wheelwright, Oil & World Politics: from Rockefeller to the Gulf War, supra note 13, at 6. 
23 John Loftus, "US Department, in `Petroleum in International Relations", XIII US Department of 
State Bulletin 173-175 [5 August 1945], cited in Engler, quoted by, Ted Wheelwright, ibid., at 7. 
24 "The peace agreement was formalised in 1927, at the Achnacarry, Scottish castle of Shell's Sir 
Henri Deterding. John Cadman, representing the British Government's Anglo-Persian Oil Co. 
(British Petroleum), and Walter Teagles as president of Rockefeller's Standard Oil of New Jersey 
(Exxon), gathered under the pretence of a grouse shoot, to conclude the most powerful economic 
BML 49 " 
Company of California (Socal or Chevron) and Mobil Oil Company (Mobil). One of 
these companies was British; i. e. British Petroleum Company (BP). One of them was 
Anglo-Dutch, Royal Dutch-Shell Group (Shell). There is another petroleum company 
normally named the `eighth' which is Compagnie Francaise des Petroles (CFP) 
(France). 
The aim which was formalised on that day between American British, Dutch 
and French petroleum companies was to divide the booty `plunder' between the 
`victors' and to control the petroleum resources in the Arab region. In fact, this 
agreement was between the United States of America and the United Kingdom in 
order to determine the influence of each in this region. 
The terms of this agreement, which is formally called "As Is Agreement of 
1928" or the "Achnacarry Agreement" were kept secret. 25 Moreover, in order to 
perform this agreement the perspective countries only ratified this private pact in the 
same year, in what became known as the "Red Line Agreement .,, 
26 Since this time, 
"with minor interruption the Anglo-American grip over the world's oil reserves has 
been hegemonic. "27 
This American accomplishment was a consequence of the power of American 
petroleum companies, supported by American public opinion and Congress, to 
persuade Washington to intervene on their behalf against European discrimination: 28 
"America insisted on a share in the fruit of victory. "29 The following words of the 
State Department illustrate the intentions of western countries in the Arab region and 
elsewhere. 
This government has contributed to the common victory, and has a right, 
therefore, to insist that American nationals shall not be excluded from a 
reasonable share in developing the resources of territories under mandate. 30 
After American attendance in 1927 which was a result of British and French 
cartel in modem history. The Seven Sisters were effectively one institution. " F. William Engdahl, 
A Century of War, supra note 1, at 87. 
2$ Ibid., at 87. 
26 Ibid., at 87. 
27 Ibid., at 87. 
28 Abdulaziz Al-Sowayegh, Arab Petro-Politics, supra note 20, at 17. 
29 Ibid., at 16. 
30 United States Foreign Policy, State Department Paper, [10 February 1944] quoted in ibid., at 17. 
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agreement, this region became oligopolised by these three countries. 31 By virtue of 
the `As Is Agreement' or `Achnacarry Agreement', the region in question was 
divided between these three countries as follows; Iraqi concession agreements for 75 
years went to the control of British Petroleum, the Royal Dutch Shell group and the 
French Compagnie Francaise des Petroles, along with the Rockefeller group. Control 
of Kuwait's resources was given to British Petroleum and the American Gulf Oil 
Company. 32 American companies monopolised control over both Saudi Arabia and 
Bahrain petroleum resources. 33 
After the cartel of these `Major' companies or `Seven Sisters' had been 
organised, they initiated tactics to deal with other companies which were not 
members ('outsiders') in relation to all the aspects of petroleum in the region. 34 
Thus, the Anglo-American conflict relating to petroleum resources was 
resolved by the `Special Relationship' which had been formed to control this area by 
both of them. It is worth recalling the argument of the American ambassador to the 
Netherlands when he stressed the importance of petroleum to his country's economy. 
He said that 
... Ample supplies of petroleum 
have become indispensable to the life and 
prosperity of my country as a whole, because of the fact that the United States 
is an industrial nation in which distance renders transportation difficult and 
agriculture depends largely on labor-saving devices using petroleum 
products. The reserve of oil, wherever and in whatever country they existed, 
had to be controlled by US companies 35 
1.4. World War Two Period 
World War II reinforced the significance of petroleum, and the battle over the 
control of petroleum resources started again. For instance, during the war, Germany 
31 "A red line from the Dardenelles down through Palestine, to Yemen, up through the Persian 
[Arabian] Gulf, encompassing Turkey, Syria, Lebanon, Saudi Arabia, Jordan, Iraq, and Kuwait 
was drawn. Inside the line, the oil interests of the three countries worked out iron-clad divisions of 
territory, which have largely held to this day, " F. William Engdahl, A Century of War, supra note 
1, at 88 
32 Ibid., at 88. 
" Burton I. Kaufman, The Oil Cartel Case: A Documentary Study of Antitrust Activity in the Cold 
War Era, (London: Greenwood Press 1978), at 20. 
34 Ibid., at 88. 
35 E. D. Shaffer, The United States and the Control of World Oil, supra note 13, at 55. 
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attempted to cut off the petroleum supply from Iran to the Allies. 36 The United States 
of America became increasingly concerned about the depletion of American 
petroleum reserves. Consequently, the United States of America doubled its efforts to 
guarantee the future supplies. 37 
To conclude, the `Major' petroleum companies, supported by their home 
countries, were gluttonously exploiting the petroleum resources in the Arab region 
and Persia, and they continued their efforts to obtain new concession agreements in 
order to tighten their grip upon the petroleum sector across this region. The sole aim 
of these companies was to gain as much profit as possible while the petroleum 
producing countries themselves received only crumbs. Iran, for instance, calculated 
that the Anglo-Iranian Oil Company (British Petroleum) made a profit of 
$320,000,000 in 1948 on its production of 23 million tons of Iranian petroleum, 
while paying Iran a royalty of $36,000,000.38 
In fact, Arab petroleum countries during this period played a very small role, 
limited only to competing with each other to sell concession agreements to petroleum 
companies which controlled all aspects of petroleum in the Arab region. 39 However, 
in the following decades the situation was to change at least to an extent as is 
detailed below. 
2.1951 - to present 
2.1. Post World War Two Period 
Petroleum history after the Second World War shows a marked change in 
favour of the producing countries. Two particular events related to this period 
deserve special attention. 
Following the end of World War II most developing countries began their 
efforts to disentangle themselves from colonialism. They focused first on the 
economy. Control of the petroleum sector, as the most significant factor in their 
economy, became the first priority. 
Before discussing the efforts of developing countries to gain control of their 
36 Ted Wheelwright, Oil & World Politics: from Rockefeller to the Gulf War, supra note 13, at 8. 
37 E. D. Shaffer, The United States and the Control of World Oil, supra note 13, at 75. 
38 F. William Engdahl, A Century of War, supra note 1, at 108. 
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economy, it is worth mentioning that the Second World War altered the positions of 
western countries in the petroleum game. As discussed above, Britain, prior to the 
eve of World War II, was the first and strongest ruler of this region's petroleum 
resources, and the position was maintained up to the end of the war. 44% of the 
Arab/ Iranian petroleum industry was owned by Britain, where the United States of 
America owned only 40% and France and the Netherlands 8% each. 40 However, a 
few years later, the scales tipped up in favour of the United States of America, as it 
became the dominant world power. By 1959 the United States owned 50% of the 
petroleum industry compared to Britain's 18% al 
Several factors contributed to this change among them that after World War 
II the United State of America increased its efforts to control foreign petroleum 
resources. William C. Bullitt, Under Secretary of the Navy, in his speech to President 
Roosevelt, illustrated that petroleum was the most vital element in the American 
economy: "To acquire petroleum reserves outside our boundaries has become, 
therefore, a vital interest of the United States. %942 
In 1943 the United States of America gained `an unprecedented Lend-Lease 
Agreement' from the Saudi King Abdulaziz whereby Saudi Arabia ensured that it 
would favour American petroleum interests after the war. 43 Consequently, five of the 
`Major' American petroleum companies were exploiting the Saudi petroleum sector 
after World War II. 
2.2. The Early Nationalisation 
In order to achieve their goal of independence developing countries attempted 
to gain control of their natural resources, especially the petroleum sector. These 
countries began to nationalise the ridiculous petroleum concession agreements. Iran 
provides the best example in this regard. Iran's attempt started a few months after 
Mohammed Mossadegh became the Iranian Prime Minister, when he submitted a 
recommendation to the Iranian Parliament, `the Majlis', that Iran should nationalise 
the Anglo-Iranian Petroleum Company (British Petroleum Company). The Iranian 
39 See in general: Jacques Cremer/ Saleh Djavad-Isfahani, Model of the Oil Market, (London: 
Harwood Academic Publishers 1991); see also Morris A. Adelman, The World Petroleum Market, 
(Baltimore/ London: The Johns Hopkins University Press 1972). 
40 Ted Wheelwright, Oil & World Politics: from Rockefeller to the Gulf War, supra note 13, at 10. 
41 Ibid., at 10. 
42 US Senate, A Documentary History of the Petroleum Reserves Corporation, at 3 quoted by E. D. 
Shaffer, The United States and the Control of World Oil, supra note 13, at 84. 
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Parliament voted to accept Mossadegh's recommendation, with fair compensation to 
the company. 44 
The consequences of this event illustrate the reaction of western countries 
towards any attempt by developing countries to control their natural resources. Iran, 
prior to voting for nationalisation had asked for an equal share in petroleum profits, 
whereby it would receive 50% of the Anglo-Iranian Petroleum Company's profits, 
and Iranian participation in the management of the company. The Anglo-Iranian 
Petroleum Company rejected the Iranian claims and the British Foreign Office 
refused to intervene in this matter claming that `governments are not interested in 
private matters'. This is despite the fact that the British government owned 53% of 
the Anglo-Iranian Petroleum Company. 45 
However, once Iran nationalised the company, the British government 
suddenly became more interested in what it had previously considered a `private 
matter. ' 
Iran, on one hand, has the right to control its natural resources. On the other 
hand, it also offered just compensation to the British government. Iran not only 
agreed to pay just compensation, it also guaranteed a similar level of petroleum 
supply to Britain compared to that supplied before nationalisation, and agreed to 
employ British nationals in the Anglo-Iranian Company. 46 However, the British 
government, as Engdahl has argued, not only intervened in the negotiation but went 
further. The British government dispatched units from the Royal Navy to Iranian 
waters and threatened the occupation of Abadan, because Iran had committed the 
unforgivable sin of putting British interests at risk. 47 Furthermore, in 1951 Britain 
declared full economic sanctions against Iran. 48 
The consequences of the British action had a great impact upon the Iranian 
economy and even upon Iranian sovereignty. Iranian petroleum income declined 
sharply from $400 million in 1950 to less than $2 million in July 1951 and 
43 F. William Engdahl, A Century of War, supra note 1, at 102. 
as Ibid., at 109. 
as Ibid., at 109. 
46 Ibid., at 109-110. 
47 Ibid., at 109. 
48 "By September 1951 Britain had declared full economic sanctions against Iran, including an 
embargo against oil shipments, as well as a freeze on all Iranian assets in British banks abroad. 
British warships were stationed just outside Iranian coastal waters; land and fair forces were 
dispatched in Basrah in British-controlled Iraq, close to the Abadan refinery complex. The British 
embargo was joined by all major Anglo-American oil companies", ibid., at 110. 
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Mohammed Mossadegh fell in August 1953.49 This was the first example of the 
harmful consequences developing countries faced when attempting to regain control 
of their natural resources. 
2.3. The establishment of OPEC 
The formation of the Organisation of the Petroleum Exporting Countries 
(OPEC) provides a second example of the developing countries struggling to regain 
control of their natural resources. The formation of OPEC is considered as a 
significant development in the relationships between petroleum countries and 
petroleum companies as well as their home states. The creation of this organisation, 
as discussed above was an attempt of petroleum countries to control their vital 
resources (petroleum) for development. Since the petroleum sector is the sole natural 
resource for most of these countries, it constitutes the main source of wealth for their 
development. As the secretary general of OPEC stated, 
The fact that many of our Member Countries earn more than 90 per cent of 
their foreign exchange from hydrocarbon [petroleum] sales thus makes them 
so highly vulnerable. 
OPEC was created in Baghdad (Iraq), on 14 September 1960 by five 
petroleum countries (Iran, Iraq, Kuwait, Saudi Arabia and Venezuela). At present 
OPEC consists of eleven petroleum-producing and exporting countries, the other six 
are Algeria, Indonesia, Libya, Nigeria, Qatar and the United Arab Emirates. 
The principal aim of OPEC as stated in its Statute is the coordination and 
unification of the petroleum policies of Member Countries and determination of the 
best means of safeguarding their interests individually and collectively. sl 
2.4. Bilateral Investment treaties 
Bilateral investment treaties (BITs) provide the framework for the promotion 
and protection of foreign investment. They were proposed by developed countries 
49 Ibid., at 110. 
50 Rilwanu Lukman, Secretary General of OPEC, "OPEC: Past, Present and Future Perspectives", the 
Seminar for the Media on the II Summit of OPEC Heads of State, Caracas, Venezuela: 20 July 
2000 <www. opec. org/Newslnfo/Speech/sp2000/spluCaracasJul, 0v 0. htm> last visited 16 November 
2001. 
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after the Second World War (in the period of decolonisation) in order to ensure 
protection for their investment in developing countries. 52 The treaty which was 
negotiated in 1959 between the Federal Republic of Germany and Pakistan is 
considered as the first new BITs which concluded between developed and 
developing countries. 53 
It was stated that most BITs typically include disciplines in the following 
area: 
9 national and most-favoured- nation treatment; 
" fair and equitable treatment; 
" guarantees in respect of expropriation and compensation for war and civil 
disturbances; 
" guarantees of free transfer funds and repatriation of capital and profits; 
" subrogation of insurance claims; and 
dispute settlement provisions, both state-to-state and investor-to-state. 54 
However, although the number of these treaties increased dramatically during 
the twentieth century, 55 the involvement of Arab petroleum exporting countries in 
these treaties particularly between these countries and the home states of major 
petroleum companies, United States for example, is relatively limited. 56 The 
following chart proves this fact. 
51 Art. 2 (A) of OPEC Statute, (Vienna, Austria: published by the secretary of OPEC; for more 
details about OPEC and its aims see part three, chapter three of this thesis. 
52 See Bilateral Investment Treaties in the Mid-1990s, United Nations Publication 1998, at 1-8. 
53 Ibid., at 8; Rudolf Dolzer/ Margrete Stevens, Bilateral Investment Treaties, (The Hague: Martinus 
Nijhoff Publishers 1995), at 1; see also <www. worldbank. org/icsid/treaties/intro. htm> last visited 
9 December 2003. 
54 Luke Peterson, "Changing investment Litigation, Bit by BIT", 
<www. iisd. org/pdf/2001/trade inv liti ation. pdf last visited 12 December 2003; also, it was 
stated that "BITs have a number of provisions that afford security to foreign investment. In 
general, these provisions establish both substantive and procedural rules that protect foreign 
investment", for more details see Kenneth J. Vandevelde, "Investment Liberalisation and 
Economic Development: The Role of Bilateral Investment Treaties", 36 (3) Columbia Journal of 
Transnational Law 501-527,506 (1998). 
55 It was stated that "in the last ten years alone, the number of BITs quintupled - going from 385 to 
1857", Luke Peterson, "Changing investment Litigation, Bit by BIT", ibid. 
56 See for example U. S. Bilateral Investment Treaty Programme <www. ustr. gov/pdf/bit. pdf> last visited 
12 December 2003. 
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USA UK France Germany Italy Japan China 
Algeria x X X Signature Into x X 
force 
Libya x X X X X X X 
Iraq x X X X X X X 
Kuwait x X Into Signature Into X Into 
force force force 
Oman X Signature Signature Into Signature X Signature 
force 
Qatar x X X Signature x X X 
Saudi x X X Signature x X X 
Arabia 
United X Into Signature X Signature X Into 
Arab force force 
Emirates 
" Source: ICSID 57 
9 X: no agreement. 
The very fact that no such agreement exists has the consequence that there is 
hardly any arbitration practice based on BITs. As it will be shown later in the thesis 
most arbitrations relating to petroleum disputes were ad hoc and were based on 
contract rather than treaty. 
2.5. The Energy Charter Treaty 
The Energy Charter Treaty (ECT) is a multilateral treaty, limited in its scope 
in respect of the energy sector. 58 The ECT signed in Lisbon on 17 December 1994 
after three years of negotiations started in 1991 by the Conference on the European 
Energy Charter, and entered into force in April 1998.59 The Treaty was born as a 
57 For more details see <www. worldbank. org/icsid/treaties> last visited 9 December 2003. 
58 Craig S. Bamberger, "An Overview of the Energy Charter Treaty", in: Thomas W. Wälde (ed. ), The 
Energy Charter Treaty: An East-West Gateway for Investment & Trade, (1996 London: Kluwer Law 
International), 1-33,1. 
59 Thomas W. Wälde, "Editor's Preface", in: Thomas W. WAlde (ed. ), The Energy Charter Treaty: An 
East West Gateway for Investment & Trade, ibid, at xix; Mirian Kene Omala, NAFTA and the Energy 
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reaction to the collapse of the Soviet Union and the end of the Cold War which 
offered an unprecedented opportunity to overcome the previous economic divisions 
on the European continent. 60 
Establishing a close economic collaboration between Western Europe, mainly 
the European Union and the states emerging in Eastern Europe and Central Asia 
from the former Soviet Union was the focal aim of this Treaty. 61 Wälde has stated 
that the ECT connects two significant strands of international economic policy and 
law: First it is an attempt to commit the states of the former USSR to "a model of 
liberal international economic policy, with respect to investment, trade and transit. " 
Second, it is "one link in a long chain of efforts to create an international investment 
and trade regime. q162 
According to the recent report of the Secretariat of the Treaty, its provisions 
focus on five broad areas 
The protection and promotion of foreign energy investments, based on the 
extension of national treatment, or most-favoured nation treatment 
(whichever is more favourable); free trade in energy materials, products and 
energy-related equipment, based on WTO rules; freedom of energy transit 
through pipelines and grids; reducing the negative environmental impact of 
the energy cycle through improving energy efficiency; and mechanisms for 
the resolution of state-to-state or investor-to-state disputes. "63 
The ECT consists of two principal bodies: First, the Conference, -an inter- 
governmental organisation- which is the governing and decision-making body for the 
ECT, therefore, all states who have signed or acceded to the Treaty are members of 
Charter Treaty: Compliance with, Implementation and Effectiveness of International Investment 
Agreements, (The Hague: Kluwer Law International 1999), at 51-55; see also <www. encharter. org> 
last visited 8 December 2003. 
60 See <www. encharter. ore> last visited 8 December 2003. 
61 Thomas W. Wälde, "European Energy Charter Conference: Final Act, Energy Charter Treaty, 
Decisions and Energy Charter Protocol on Energy Efficiency and Related Environmental Aspects: 
Introductory Notes", 33 ILM 360 (1995); it was reported that "[T]he fundamental aim of the Energy 
Charter Treaty is to strengthen the Rule of Law on energy issues, by creating a level playing field of 
rules to be observed by all participating governments, thus minimising the risks associated with 
energy-related investments and trade", Energy Charter Secretariat, "Introduction to the Energy 
Charter" <www. encharter. org> last visited 8 December 2003. 
62 Thomas W. Wälde, "Editor's Preface", in: Thomas W. Wälde (ed. ), The Energy Charter Treaty: An 
East-West Gateway for Investment & Trade, supra note 59, at xix. 
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the Conference. 64 Second, the Secretariat, which is based in Brussels, staffed by 
energy sector experts from different countries of the Conference's constituency, and 
it is headed by a Secretary General. 65 
It is worth mentioning that the participation of Arab petroleum countries to 
the ECT is considerably limited, since these countries are just observers at the ECT's 
Conference. 
Petroleum arbitration cannot be discussed separated from petroleum history 
in the Arab region, and both must be considered together. Therefore, the next part of 
this chapter will be devoted to examining the development of petroleum arbitration. 
Which normally consists of two different parties petroleum country or countries as 
an international law body and foreign petroleum company or companies as a private 
body. 
3. The Development of Petroleum Arbitration 
In terms of petroleum arbitration, especially between developing petroleum 
producing countries and foreign petroleum companies, many questions are raised. It 
is necessary to consider where petroleum arbitration derives its force from; whether 
or not from the contractual obligation of both parties, specifically at the first stage of 
petroleum concession agreements at the beginning of the last century. We must also 
ask whether the parties to the agreement were at that time in the same position and of 
equal bargaining power; whether the host states exercised free will and free choice 
which would enable them to effectively negotiate the agreement terms. Yet we know 
that all these countries were colonised and controlled by petroleum companies' home 
states, and where the free will of one contractual party is not available we normally 
declare the contract prima facie `null and void'. It is well established that the will 
and consent of the parties is the cornerstone of arbitration. We must therefore 
examine the (non) consensual character of these past agreements. 
63 Energy Charter Secretariat, "Introduction to the Energy Charter", <www. encharter. ore> last visited 8 
December 2003. 
64 Art. 34 of the Treaty; for more details about the function of the Conference see Art. 34 (3); also, for the 
latest members of the Energy Charter Conference see <www. encharter. org> last visited 8 December 
2003. 
65 For the Secretariat functions, see Art. 35 of the Treaty, <www. encharter. org> last visited 8 December 
2003. 
59 
3.1. Notion of petroleum arbitration 
Petroleum arbitration is a method of settling disputes which normally arise 
out of petroleum matters, particularly, exploration and exploitation transactions, 
invariably between a petroleum producing country and a petroleum company outside 
the specific national jurisdiction. 66 
The idea of international arbitration in disputes between states and foreign 
companies arose from the theory of `delocalisation' of the procedural and substantive 
law issues, in order to avoid submission to national jurisdiction and also to protect 
the contract from any unilateral change that may be brought about by the contractual 
state. In fact, international arbitration proved to be simply a defender of foreign 
companies. It has been said that investment contracts are long-term, therefore 
international arbitration between states and companies is considered to be a 
safeguard for these companies if a dispute arises. 67 As Cahier states 
If a dispute arises, one of two courses can be followed. One is to file suit in 
the local courts. The result is uncertain because the local courts will enforce 
local law, which may have changed since the contract was made. The state 
immunity to suit may also make the court proceeding stillborn. The second 
course is to claim the diplomatic protection of the state under whose laws the 
company is incorporated. This is no more satisfactory than the first 
alternative, since it may leave the company unprotected in certain cases. 68 
Or as Böckstiegel notes 
66 It was stated that "there are two basic arrangements for exploration and exploitation of petroleum 
around the world: concessions and contracts. Contracts can be divided into three types: production 
sharing, risk service, and pure (non risk) service contracts. The basic difference between 
concessions and all types of contracts lies in the division of oil and gas production. [... ] The 
concession was the original system used in the world petroleum arrangements. It is still the most 
widely used system", for more details see Gordon H. Barrows, Worldwide Concession Contracts 
and Petroleum Legislation, (Tulsa/ Oklahoma: Penn Well Books 1983), at 1,4. 
67 See Philippe Cahier, "The Strengths and Weakness of International Arbitration Involving a State 
as a Party", in: Julian D. M. Lew (ed. ) Contemporary Problems in International Arbitration, (1987 
Netherlands: Martinus Nijhoff Publishers), 241-249,241; Delaume also argues that, "it is thus 
understandable that investors seek to escape this danger by various means. One of these is to resort 
to `stabilisation' clauses that are intended to protect the investor against further changes in the 
content of the host state's law. Another device is more radical in approach in the sense that it seeks 
to remove the relationship from the reach of the host state law by placing it under the aegis of 
international norms. " Georges R. Delaume, Trasnational Contracts Applicable Law and 
Settlement of Disputes: Law and Practice, A Study in Conflict Avoidance, (Dobbs Ferry / New 
York: Oceana Publications. INC. booklet 1 1988), at 15. 68 Philippe Cahier, ibid., at 241. 
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In investment contracts arbitration is often chosen because foreign 
investments are specifically open to the risk of interference by public 
authorities of the host state and legal procedure of protection may either not, 
or sufficiently, be available in that host state or may at least not be 
satisfactory for the confidence of the prospective investor. 69 
This assumption has been articulated by the majority of western scholars, as 
we have seen in the first chapter, from the early days of investment history in 
developing countries up to the present day. 70 
3.2. "Early" Disputes 
The type of arbitration involving a state and a private entity (as a typical 
petroleum arbitration is) started at the beginning of the 20`h century. One of the first 
recorded instances of international arbitration was between the USSR and an 
American investor called Harriman. '' 
This arbitration resulted from the failure of a concession agreement between 
the USSR and Harriman. In 1925 the USSR granted Harriman a concession 
agreement concerning a vast manganese deposit in Chiatura. This concession 
agreement contained an arbitration clause in Russian and English. 
However, a few years later Harriman faced several obstacles in exploiting 
this concession, such as international competition and the decision of the USSR to 
violate Harriman's monopoly by opening new manganese mines in the Ukraine. 
Consequently, Harriman, in order to avoid financial crisis, opted for recourse to the 
concession agreement's clause. 72 
In the field of petroleum, the conflict between the Iranian government and the 
Anglo-Iranian Oil Company in 1932 was the first discord between a state and a 
petroleum company. Iran, on 27 November 1932 notified the company that its 
69 Karl-Heinz Böckstiegel, "The Legal Rules Applicable in International Commercial Arbitration 
Involving States or State-Controlled Enterprises" in: 60 Years of ICC Arbitration A Look at the 
Future, (1984) at 124. 
7° See for instance, the latest lecture in this subject, The Freshfields Bruckhaus Deringer Arbitration 
Lecture, which was given by Elihu Lauterpacht, on 27 November 2001. 
71 "The Harriman arbitration was one of the first international arbitrations to which the USSR was a 
party, and it was certainly the first arbitration between the USSR and any American firrrm, " V. V. 
Veeder, "Lloyd George, Lenin and Cannibals: The Harriman Arbitration", 16 Arbitration 
International 115-139,117 (2000). 
72 Ibid., at 130-138, "the Harriman arbitration clause was considered as a long clause providing 
detailed rules on the composition of the arbitration tribunal. " 
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concession agreement which was signed at the beginning of the 20th century was 
annulled. 73 
Then there are the famous petroleum arbitrations, such as the arbitration 
between the Sheikh of Abu Dhabi and Petroleum Development Ltd. 74, the arbitration 
between the Ruler of Qatar and International Marine Oil Company75, and the 
arbitration between Saudi Arabia and the Arabian American Oil Company 
(Aramco). 76 All these arbitrations, and other arbitrations such as the Libyan 
arbitrations, 77 and the Aminoil- Kuwait arbitration, 78 were ad hoc arbitrations. These 
cases are discussed in part two, chapter two of this thesis. 
3.3. From ad hoc to institutional arbitration - ICSID 
Administration of petroleum arbitrations by institutions commenced in the 
second half of the 20th century. The International Centre for Settlement of Investment 
Disputes (ICSID) for instance, registered the first request for arbitration in a 
petroleum dispute on 4 November 1977 between AGIP SpA and the Government of 
the People's Republic of the Congo. The Centre was formed under the `Washington 
Convention' or the Convention on the Settlement of Investment Disputes between 
States and Nationals of Other States of 18 March 1965 79 A detailed analysis of the 
73 Alan W. Ford, The Anglo-Iranian Oil Dispute of 1951-1952: A Study of the Role of Law in the 
Relations of States, (Berkeley / Los Angeles: University of California Press 1954), at 17. 
74 See Petroleum Development Ltd. v. The Sheikh ofAbu Dhabi (1951) 18 ILRI 44. 
75 See The Ruler of Qatar v. International Marine Oil Co. Ltd. (1953) 20 ILR 534. 
76 See Saudi Arabia v. Arabian American Oil Co (ARAMCO) (1963) 27 ILR 117. 
77 Libyan cases: Texaco Overseas Petroleum Company (U. S. ) and California Asiatic Oil Company 
(U. S. ) v. The Government of the Libyan Arab Republic, (1978) 17 ILM 3-37, reprinted in (1979) 4 
YBCA 177-187; Libyan American Oil Company (LIAMCO) (USA) v. The Government of the 
Libyan Arab Republic, (1981) 6 YBCA 89-117; The British Petroleum Company (Libya) Ltd, v. 
The Government of the Libyan Arab Republic, (1979) 53 ILR 297-388, reprinted in (1980) 5 
YBCA 143-167. 
79 Government of the State of Kuwait v. American Independent Oil Co. (AMINOIL) (1984) 9 YBCA 
71, (1982) 21 ILM 976-1053. 
79 From the establishment of ICSID to the present, only ten petroleum disputes have been registered 
at ICSID. Six cases were concluded i. e. AGIP S. P. A. v. People's Republic of the Congo, 
registered on 4 November 1977, Scimitar Exploration Limited v. Republic of Bangladesh and 
Bangladesh Oil, Gas and Mineral Corporation, registered on 3 November 1992, Tesoro 
Petroleum Corporation v. Trinidad and Tobago (conciliation), registered on 26 August 1983, 
Occidental of Pakistan, Inc. v. Islamic Republic of Pakistan, registered on 7 October 1987, Societe 
Kufpec (Congo) Limited v. Republic of Congo, registered on 27 January 1997 and Mobile 
Argentina S. A. V. Argentine Republic, registered on 9 April 1999, see 
<www. worldbank. org/icsid/cases/cases htm> last visited 13 January 2004. The other four pending 
cases are: Repsol YPF Ecuador S. A. v. Empresa Estatal Petroleos del Ecuador (Petroecuador), 
registered on 5 October 2001, F-W Oil, Inc. v. Republic of Trinidad and Tobago, registered on 29 
November 2001, Plama Consortium Limited v. Republic of Bulgaria, registered on 19 August 
2003 and TG World Petroleum Limited v. Republic of Niger (conciliation), registered on 9 
December 2003, see <www. worldbank. org/icsid/cases/pending. htm> last visited 13 January 2004. 
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ICSID arbitration is given in part three of this thesis. 
3.4. Main characteristics of petroleum arbitration 
It was argued that petroleum arbitration is based upon two principles: 
`separability of the arbitration clause' or what is sometimes called `the autonomy of 
the arbitration agreement', and the `stabilisation clause'. The first principle, 
`separability' simply means that the arbitration agreement is completely different 
from the main contract in which it is found, because it functions autonomously. 
Consequently, if there is an allegation that the contract is invalid or null and void, the 
arbitration agreement shall remain immune from such allegation. 8° 
The case law of petroleum arbitration served this argument. The arbitral 
tribunal in Libyan American Oil Company (LIAMCO) v. Government of the Libyan 
Arab Republic for instance, stated that 
It is widely accepted in international law and practice that an arbitration 
clause survives the unilateral termination by the State of the contract in which 
it is inserted and continues in force even after that termination. 
Then the tribunal added that 
This is a logical consequence of the interpretation of the intention of the 
contracting parties, and appears to be one of the basic conditions for creating 
favourable climate for foreign investment. 81 
The tribunal in this case justified its conclusion by referring to two points; the 
`intention of the contracting parties' and by expressing that the separability of the 
arbitration clause is `one of the basic conditions for creating a favourable climate for 
foreign investment'. However, the tribunal's justification appeared slightly 
contradictory, because there is potential tension between these two points. It would 
seen that the tribunal was only concerning about the second point irrespective of the 
intention of the contracting parties. 
8o See in general R. Doak Bishop, "International Arbitration of Petroleum Disputes: The 
Development of a Lex Petrolia" 23 YBCA1131-1210 (1998); about the autonomy of the 
arbitration agreement in general see for instance, Emmanuel Gaillard! John Savage (eds. ), 
Fouchard Gaillard Goldman on International Commercial Arbitration, (London: Kluwer Law 
International 1999), at 198-240. 
81 LIAMCO v. Libya, (1981) 6 YBCA 89-118,96. 
63 
The same approach was articulated in the arbitration between Elf Aquitaine 
Iran (France) and National Iranian Oil Company (Iran) (NIOC). 82 The Iranian claim 
was that the agreement between the parties was null and void ab initio and that the 
Iranian government was not bound to this agreement since it was signed by a Special 
Committee rather than government. The sole arbitrator argued that 
It is a generally recognised principle of the law of international arbitration 
that arbitration clauses continue to be operative, even though an objection is 
raised by one of the parties that the contract containing the arbitration clause 
is null and void [... ]. 83 
The second principle as it has been argued in petroleum arbitration is the 
`stabilisation clause, ' which means 
Contract language which freezes the provisions of a national system of law 
chosen as the law of the contract as of the date of contract, in order to prevent 
the application to the contract of any future alteration of this system. 84 
The aim of this clause or clauses, as Bishop argues, was to ensure that the 
concessions would be effective for the full periods which had been agreed in the 
contract. However, the modem consequence of the classic stabilisation clause, as 
Bishop states, "is not to invalidate nationalisation, but to make it unlawful, which in 
s85 turn affects the amount of compensation that may be awarded. 
The stabilisation clause was found in the first generation of the concession 
agreements of exploitation of natural resources, especially those of petroleum 
contracts. 86 The general aim of these clauses is in fact to create a special regime 
applicable to the foreign company by derogating from the host state's law. 
However, it could be argued that petroleum arbitration differs from other 
arbitration in which the principle of confidentiality which is considered as an eminent 
feature in international commercial arbitration should not prevail in petroleum 
arbitration. In other words, the host state's citizens should have knowledge 
82 ElfAquitaine Iran (France) v. National Iranian Oil Company (Iran) (NIOC) (1986) 11 YBCA97. 
83 Ibid., at 102. 
84 Amoco International Finance v. Iran, Iran- US CTR 189 at 239. 
85 R. Doak Bishop, "International Arbitration of Petroleum Disputes: The Development of a Lex 
Petrolia" 23 YBCAl131-1210 (1998). 
86 For more details see ibid., at 1158. 
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concerning any petroleum arbitration proceedings. This argument derives its 
authority from two points. First, petroleum is domain of the host state's citizens and 
therefore arbitration proceedings which concern this resource should be conducted 
under the knowledge of citizens. Second, the state in petroleum agreements and 
accordingly in petroleum arbitrations only acts on behalf of its citizens and therefore 
it is a significant matter to be aware of their rights and obligations. 
3.5. Are petroleum disputes investment disputes? 
We must ask ourselves whether petroleum agreements are distinct from other 
types of investment contracts, consequently, petroleum arbitration differs from 
normal international commercial arbitration. On one level the answer would be no, it 
functions procedurally in the same way as other commercial or investment 
arbitrations. The pattern is the same: request for arbitration, appointment of arbitral 
tribunal, preliminary proceedings, hearing, and award. 87 Indeed, the peculiarities or 
the differences of petroleum arbitration are derived from the nature of the petroleum 
industry itself, which can pose special problems, and the nature of petroleum 
agreements, rather than from the arbitral process. 88 
Undoubtedly the petroleum industry is an international, global industry by 
nature, and political issues have more influence on this industry than any other. 89 
Furthermore, petroleum affects the daily life of all nations, whether the petroleum- 
producing countries who are concerned about the availability of petroleum, as well as 
the industrialised countries concerned about supply. In addition, although the 
petroleum industry is a high risk one, it also very profitable one. 
However, on a second level it could be argued that petroleum agreements do 
have their own particular characteristics. Generally, normal investment agreements 
are: time definitive, namely they exist or are in effect for a specific agreed time only; 
their scope is specified; and these agreements are based on feasibility studies which 
enable the investors to calculate their profits and also their losses. Moreover, these 
kinds of investment are normally organised and controlled according to the local law 
87 W. R. Bentham, "Special Features in Oil and Gas Arbitration, " a paper was submitted to the 
Symposium on Oil and Gas Disputes, London: Court of International Arbitration (LCIA), 23 
November 2001; the fundamental aspects of petroleum arrangements as Barrows argues are: risk 
and financing, economic return (profit), and management, Gordon H. Barrows, Worldwide 
Concession Contracts and Petroleum Legislation, supra note 66, at 2-3. 88 Ibid. 
B9 
Ibid. 
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of the receiver country. 90 That said, the risk lies with the investor. 
The petroleum agreements are different in several respects. First, the period 
of time of these agreements is lengthy extending to several decades. For example an 
agreement was signed on 24 June 1937 between the Sultan of Oman and Basil Henry 
Lermitte on behalf of Petroleum Concession Limited for the exploration and 
exploitation of petroleum in the Sultanate of Oman. This agreement started on 24 
June 1937 and is in effect until 24 June 2012.91 
More recent petroleum agreements are not much shorter. The agreement 
which was signed on 15 March 1987 for the exploration, development and 
production of petroleum between the Government of the Syrian Arab Republic, and 
Syrian Petroleum Company, Tricentrol Exploration Overseas Limited, and Norsk 
Hydro A. S. provides in Article 3 (F) that 
90 Most Arab countries enacted codes in order to regulate foreign investments, see for instance Oman 
Foreign Capital Investment law, issued on 16 October 1994. 
Art. 1 "without prejudice to the provisions of the Royal Decree No. 57/93, non-Omani - whether 
natural of (sic) juridical persons - shall not conduct any commercial, industrial or tourism 
businesses or otherwise participate in an Omani company except with a licence from the Minister 
of Commerce & Industry to be issued in accordance with the Provisions of this law. Art. 2 "[T]he 
licence referred to in the preceding Article shall be granted after the following conditions have 
been met: 
a) The business shall be conducted by an Omani company with capital of not less than R0 
150,000 [$388.600 approximately] and the foreign share therein shall not exceed 49% of the total 
capital. 
However, the above percentage may be increased up to [up to] 65% of the company's capital by a 
decision from the Minister of Commerce & Industry following a recommendation from the 
Foreign Capital Investment Committee. 
The percentage referred to in above paragraph may be further increased up to 100% of the 
company's capital for the projects which contribute to the development of national economy upon 
the approval of the Development Council following a recommendation from the Minister of 
Commerce & Industry, provided that the project's capital shall not be less than R0 
500.000[$1,295,336] 
b) [... ] 
Art. 3 "Exemptions from the conditions specified in the above Article for obtaining the licence 
shall be granted to the following: 
1) Companies which conduct business in the Sultanate of Oman by virtue of special contracts or 
agreements with the Government of the Sultanate or which are established by virtue of a Royal 
Decree. (Reference will be given in part three on foreign investment laws in some Arab countries). 
91 A concession agreement between Sultanate of Oman and Petroleum Development (Oman) Limited. 
Some amendments only occurred to the agreement. The first amendment was on 20 October 1937 
when Petroleum Concession Limited transferred its obligations and benefits under the said agreement 
to Petroleum Development (Oman and Dhofar) Limited, which changed its name on 27 March 1951 
to Petroleum Development (Oman) Limited. The second amendment was on 7 March 1967 when the 
Sultan of Oman (Sultan Said bin Taimur) resigned the same agreement "[I]n the exercise of his 
powers as Sultan of Muscat and Oman on his own behalf and in the name and on behalf of his 
successors" with the same company (Petroleum Development `Oman' Limited). It was provided that 
"[T]his agreement shall as from the date of signature replace the Existing Convention (which shall 
hereafter be no effect) and shall subsist until 24th June, 2012 or such later date as the Sultan and the 
Company may agree, unless terminated in accordance with Articles 17,18, or 23 of this agreement" 
(Art. 1), (unpublished). 
66 
The development period of any development contract shall be twenty (20) 
years from the date of Commercial Discovery which relates to such 
development contract. Subject to the approval of COMPANY this period may 
be renewed for an additional period of ten (10) years at the option of 
CONTRACTOR upon six (6) months prior written notice to COMPANY. 92 
A similar article can also be found in the Qatar Model Offshore Exploration 
and Production Sharing Agreement of 1986. "Article (4) Term" provides that "the 
term of this Agreement shall be a period of twenty five (25) years from the Effective 
Date. , 93 In addition, the current Omani Exploration and Production Sharing 
Agreement is for a period of over thirty years. 94 
The second particular feature of petroleum agreements is the negotiation 
power of the petroleum companies, which is reflected in the agreement, especially in 
terms of the scope of the agreements or the size of the concession area. As with the 
above agreements, it appears that the petroleum companies have a wide range of 
rights which may be not provided for in any other kind of investment agreement. For 
instance, in the Omani Agreement with the Petroleum Development (Oman) 
Limited, 95 Article 3 (1) provides that 
The Company shall have during the currency of the Agreement: 
1. the exclusive right to explore, search and drill for, produce and 
win Petroleum within the Leased Area; 
2. the exclusive ownership of all Petroleum produced and won 
within the Leased Area; 
3. the right by such means as the Company selects, to refine and 
transport and sell for use within the Sultanate or for export and 
to export freely, or otherwise to deal with or dispose of any 
and all such Petroleum and the products thereof; 
92 MIDDLE EAST. " Basic Oil Laws and Concession Contracts, (New York: Barrows) Supplement no. 
XCVII (97). 
93 Ibid., Supplement no. XCII (92). 
94 Art. 2(1) provides that, "The Government hereby grants to the Company, subject to the terms of this 
Agreement, the exclusive right to explore for, develop and produce Petroleum within the Contract 
Area, and sell or dispose of its share of Petroleum hereunder. The initial term of this Agreement shall 
be for a period of three (3) years from the Effective Date hereof, extendable at the Company's option 
pursuant to the conditions set forth in Article 3.2 below for two (2) consecutive additional periods of 
two (2) years each following the initial term. However, in the event of a Commercial Discovery 
hereunder, the term of this Agreement shall be extended for a period of thirty (30) years from such 
Discovery Date, (unpublished). 
95 See supra note 91. 
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4. the right subject as is hereinafter provided to do all things 
necessary or desirable for the purpose of the above operations. 
The same could be said of the size of the concession area; some of these 
concession agreements cover the entire state's lands, mainland and sea. One such 
agreement is the Omani Agreement. 96 
The third distinguishing character of the petroleum business and petroleum 
agreements is what is called "the Costs Recovery, " which simply means that all 
petroleum companies have the right to cover all their exploration costs once 
petroleum has been discovered. 97 
Hence, considering all these aspects, it is possible to conclude that petroleum 
arbitration has its own particular features which make it different from any other kind 
of arbitrations in other fields of investments, such as debt, or between private parties. 
Indeed, it could be said that petroleum disputes require specific forms and substance 
because of two main reasons; peculiarity of petroleum agreements; and role and 
impact of the petroleum industry in the economy of many countries especially 
developing countries. 
4. Concluding remarks 
By examining the history of petroleum on the one hand and the development 
of petroleum arbitration on the other, it becomes evident that western countries have 
shaped this history in their favour, and the petroleum companies were their 
instruments. Hence, it is no surprise if some scholars argue that the origins of 
arbitration in the petroleum field particularly and in other investment fields in 
general is tainted. 98 
Therefore, we need to examine the possibility for arbitration to divorce itself 
from its reputation as a method of protecting western interests in developing 
countries, and return it back to a system of resolving disputes in a neutral manner, 
96 Art. 2 (1) provides that, "[T] he area to which this Agreement applies (hereinafter referred to as 
"the Sultanate") is the mainland of Muscat and Oman, all islands appertaining thereto, and such 
parts of the territorial waters as are situated within 3 nautical miles of the said mainland and of the 
said islands", ibid. 
97 See for instance the Omani Exploration and Production Sharing Agreement, Art. 10; Qatar Model 
Offshore Exploration and Production Sharing Agreement of 1986, Art. 12 "subject to the auditing 
provisions under this Agreement, contractor shall recover petroleum costs", see supra note 93. 
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namely acquire a new reputation as securing justice and neutrality rather than power. 
We need also to examine how western scholars can contribute in finding principles 
that consider the interest of both parties of petroleum agreement. This is imperative 
given that 
Justice is the refuge of the weaker states whereas power is the weapon of the 
stronger states as well as stronger entities in the process of globalisation that 
is currently afoot. 99 
It may be possible that the arbitration mechanism becomes the favoured 
system for the settlement of disputes in the petroleum sphere, but only if this system 
ceases to be a method of protecting foreign investment and becomes more justice. '°° 
If arbitration achieves this, developing countries will freely accept it, and 
their acceptance will not be based, as has been the case in the past, or their need for 
foreign investment, or to become members of a convention or part of a club and the 
global economy. '01 Or as Walde accurately argues, 
If you want the benefits, you have to accept the disciplines [sic]. If you don't, 
you are an "out" state, a pariah; your reputation suffers, and everybody will 
do less business with you and then only with much higher security 
margins. '02 
98 See for example M. Sornarajah, "Power and Justice in Foreign Investment Arbitration", 14 (3) J 
Int'l Arb 103-140,103 (1997)., 
99 Ibid., at 106. 
100 Ibid., at 140 "such a change can only take place if arbitration moves away from the view that it 
exists to create principles which protect foreign investment and into a position in which it evolves 
as a system that evinces neutrality, which indicates that principles favourable to the interests of the 
host states also receive a balanced acceptance", ibid., at 105. 
101 Thomas Wälde, "Current Issues in Investment Disputes `comments"', a paper was submitted to the 
London Court of International Arbitration (LCIA) seminar, London on 23 November 2001. 
102 Ibid. 
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Part Two: The Applicable Law to the Merits of Petroleum 
Disputes 
Introductory remarks 
It is undisputed that the determination of the precise applicable law to the merits 
of a dispute is one of the most complicated tasks facing an arbitrator and a national 
judge. However, the dilemma of the national judge is less complex compared to that of 
an arbitrator at an international tribunal. In the former situation, the judge at the national 
court has no choice other than applying the forum's conflict of laws rules. The 
complexity occurs in the case of the international arbitrator, who does not have any lex 
forit, since the arbitrator does not derive his authority from a nation but from the 
agreement between the parties2. This principle has been firmly accepted even in 
countries that are considered to be relatively unfamiliar with arbitration. The Cassation 
Court in Kuwait for instance, asserted this principle, in its judgement on 30 November 
1993, "the arbitrator derives its power from the contract". 3 Consequently, in this case the 
arbitrator examined several methods related to the issue to reach a decision. 4 However, 
numerous questions arise in this regard, such as what are these methods? Which conflict 
of rules should the arbitrator apply? Which conflict of laws system should an arbitrator 
choose and why? Is it necessary to choose a specific law or conflict of laws system? And 
if he does not choose any specific conflict of laws or rules could he apply a non- national 
system? 
See for example Julian D. M. Lew, Applicable Law in International Commercial Arbitration: A Study in 
Commercial Arbitration Awards, (Dobbs Ferry, New York: Oceana Publications 1978), at 67. 
2 Carlo Croff, "The Applicable Law in an International Commercial Arbitration: Is it Still a Conflict of 
Laws Problem? " 16 International Lawyer 613-645 (1982). 
See an extract of this case in the Directory of Lawyers & Jurists in the GCC States, first version (2000- 
2001), at 158 (the Arabic Section). 
° A. F. M. Maniruzzaman, "State Contracts and Arbitral Choice-of-Law Process and Techniques: A 
Critical Appraisal", 15 (3) J Int'l Arb 65-92,65 (1998); Mistelis for instance, argues that "there are two 
sources of determination and two main systems. The law may be determined as a matter of party 
autonomy or as a default or express power by the tribunal", Loukas A Mistelis, "Arbitration Involving 
States Applicable Law: Can the Arbitral Tribunal Apply the Law of another Country to a State? A paper 
was submitted to the School of International Arbitration/ ICC Institute of World Business Law 17th 
Annual Symposium of Arbitrators on 17 March 2003. 
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Where state contracts in general, and petroleum contracts in particular, are 
concerned the matter may be more controversial, because petroleum contracts often 
involve fundamental public interests for the contracting state. The most disputed issue in 
state contracts is the doctrine of state sovereign immunity. Does the involvement of a 
state in a contractual relationship result in a waiver of its immunity or not? Another 
important question is raised here, does state immunity from jurisdiction should be 
treated the same as immunity from execution? In a dispute between Creighton Limited v. 
Government of the State of Qatar, brought before the United States Court of Appeals for 
the District of Columbia Circuits, the claimant insisted that "Qatar, by agreeing to 
arbitrate in France, implicitly waived its sovereign immunity. " A full analysis of 
sovereign immunity will be given in part three of this thesis. 
The classical approach in state contracts is to give priority to national law, i. e. 
"substantive law determined through national conflict of laws rules. s6 This perspective 
has already been upheld by case law. The highly distinguished judgment of the 
Permanent Court of International Justice in the Serbian loans case in 1929 is a 
significant example. This court decided that "all contracts not concluded between states 
as subjects of public international law are governed by a national law. " 7 
However, this approach has been questioned. First, it has been argued that some 
national law is incapable of governing disputes such as those arising out of state 
contracts, especially petroleum disputes or other disputes involving natural resources. In 
other words, these national laws lack the quality and sophistication required to deal with 
international petroleum contracts. 8 An alternative argument is that it is unacceptable to 
rely only upon municipal law in a state contract, because the rights of the private party 
would be at the mercy of the contracting state, since the state can amend its law 
unilaterally. Therefore, according to the perspective of most western jurists and 
practitioners, state contracts must be extracted from the jurisdiction of the contracting 
Creighton Limited v. Government of the State of Qatar, 337 U. S. App. D. C. 7; 181 F. 3d 118 1999 U. 
S. App. LEXIS 14856, reprinted in (2000) 39 ILM151. 
6 Horacio A. Grigera Naön, Choice-of-Law Problems in International Commercial Arbitration, 
(Tubingen: J. C. B. Mohr (Paul Siebeck) 1992), at 114. 
7 Serbian Loans Case, [1929] PCIJ Series A, no. 20, at 41. 
8 See for example: Petroleum Development Ltd v. Sheikh ofAbu Dhabi, (1951) 18 ILR 144; Saudi Arabia 
v. Arabian American Oil Company (ARAMCO), (1963) 27 ILR 177. 
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state, and be governed by other laws or rules. In this situation, is party autonomy, which 
is considered as a cornerstone in international arbitration, affected? Many other 
questions arise here, such as why a state which is considered as an international legal 
subject cannot exercise its rights and apply its rules in its contractual relationships with 
private parties? Are the powers and privileges of a private party greater than that of a 
contracting state? In order to answer these questions concerning applicable law, this part 
will be divided into two chapters. The first chapter examines a practical approach, 
whereas the second chapter provides a theoretical discussion. 
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Chapter One: The Practice Examined-The Case Law 
Introductory remarks 
This chapter examines some famous arbitral decisions in the sphere of petroleum 
disputes in Arab Countries, in order to determine whether these decisions can be 
considered as a dogma in petroleum arbitration, especially in the method of determining 
the applicable law to the substance of a dispute because of the following reasons. First, 
most of these decisions were rendered during the era of colonialism. Second, most of the 
arbitrators who determined these disputes were appointed by petroleum companies or by 
virtue of their requests. 
Thus, it may be argued that the petroleum companies' interests, were well 
protected, since it is believed by some that the arbitrator should first consider his 
appointee's interests while he is performing his task. 9 However, it is worth mentioning 
that the reason which stands behind the choice of these specific cases, was the impact 
and the influence of arbitrators' decisions which were rendered in these disputes 
especially which concerns the method of determining the applicable law to the substance 
of a dispute in state contracts in general and in petroleum contracts in particular, 
although it may be argued that there were other petroleum cases in Arab Countries. 
Delocalisation theory of a contract between a state and a foreign company may be one of 
outputs of these decisions. 10 
Hence, this chapter will summarise the facts and the nature of the dispute of 
these significant cases, then analyse the issue of the applicable law. 
9 See for instance, Alan Redfern, "Dissenting Opinions in International Commercial Arbitration: The 
Good, the Bad and the Ugly", the Freshfields Bruckhaus Deringer Arbitration Lecture, which was given 
on 4 November 2003. On the duties of arbitrators see for instance Alan Redfern/ Martin Hunter, Law 
and Practice of International Commercial Arbitration, (3`d ed., London: Sweet & Maxwell 1999), at 
251-260; see also Michael J. Mustill/ Stewart C. Boyd, Commercial Arbitration (2°d ed., London: 
Butterworths 1989), at 220. 
10 See the next chapter. 
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2.1. Petroleum Development Ltd. v. Sheikh of Abu Dhabi 
(a) The facts 
On 11 January 1939 Sheikh Shakhbut bin Sultan, the ruler of Abu Dhabi, signed 
an agreement with Steven Hemsley Longringg, the general manager of Petroleum 
Development (Trucial Coast) Ltd, a British company registered in London. " Under 
Article 3 of this Agreement, the Sheikh granted the Company the exclusive right to drill 
for and produce petroleum within a specified area in Abu Dhabi. 12 Article 2 determined 
the concession's area, which included the whole territory under the rule of the ruler of 
Abu Dhabi, its islands and territorial waters. 13 In exchange for the aforesaid rights, the 
Company would pay to the Rule the following royalties: 14 
Sum of Rs. [Indian Rupees] 300,000 within thirty days of the date of signature of this 
Agreement; 
Mana Saeed Al-Otaiba, The Petroleum Concession Agreements of the United Arab Emirates 1939-1971 
(Abu Dhabi), (vol. 1, London & Canberra: Croom Helm 1982), at 11. It is worth mentioning that the 
Agreement was written in Arabic, several efforts to find the original copy of the Agreement have not 
been successful, and therefore the following Agreement's Articles will be cited from the above 
reference. 
12 Article 3 provided that "the Ruler by this Agreement grants to the Company the sole right, for a period 
of seventy-five years from the date of signature, to search for, discover, drill for and produce mineral 
oils and their derivatives and allied substances within the area, and sole right to the ownership of all 
the substances produced, and free disposal thereof both inside and outside the territory: provided that 
the export of oil shall be from the territory of the Concession direct without passing across any 
adjacent territory. 
And it is understood that this agreement is a grant of rights over oil and cannot be considered an 
Occupation in any manner whatsoever", ibid., at 12. 
13 Article 2 reads "a) the area included in this Agreement is the whole territory subject to the rule of the 
Ruler of Abu Dhabi and its dependencies, and all its islands and territorial waters. And if in the future 
there should be carried out a delimitation of the territory belonging to Abu Dhabi, by arrangement with 
other governments, then the area (of this Agreement) shall coincide with the boundaries provided in 
such delimitation. 
b) If in the future a Natural Zone should be shared be formed adjacent to the territories of Abu Dhabi 
and the rights of ruler over such Neutral Zone be shared between the Ruler of Abu Dhabi and another 
Ruler, then the Ruler of Abu Dhabi undertakes that this Agreement shall include all the mineral oil 
rights which belong to him in such a zone. 
c). The Company shall not undertake any works in areas used and set apart of places of worship or 
sacred buildings or burial grounds", ibid., at 11. 
14 Art. 4, ibid., at 12. 
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Sum of Rs. 100,000 at the end of each year until discovery of petroleum in commercial 
quantities, at which time the royalty may be increased in accordance with Article 5 (d). '5 
In addition the Company would pay to the ruler a lump sum of Rs. 200,000 upon the 
discovery of petroleum in commercial quantities. 
After the discovery of commercial quantities of petroleum the ruler would be paid a 
royalty of three Rupees per ton of petroleum instead of an annual sum. 
According to Article 12 (a) the ruler has the right to grant to a third party a 
concession for any substances other than those which have been given by virtue of this 
Agreement to the Company. It is worth noting that Article 11 and Article 14 of the 
Agreement constitute a considerable example of non-equivalence in bargaining power 
between the contracting parties. Article 11 conferred upon the Company the full right to 
terminate this Agreement after three years with only six months written notice 
(Paragraph (a)). In addition, the Company had the right to transfer its movable and 
immovable property without any payment of any charges or tax to the Ruler within 
thirty years of the singing of the Agreement (Paragraph (b)). 16 At the same time, Article 
14 contained a stabilisation clause which prevented the ruler from making any 
amendments or terminating the Agreement during its course. '7 
However, Article 5 (b) required the Company to present to the ruler an annual 
clear and intelligible statement regarding petroleum production, and the ruler had the 
right to examine that statement as well as to inspect the Company's petroleum 
production. 18 The question here is whether the ruler can invoke this Article and observe 
or control the Company's operations. The Agreement also contained an arbitration 
clause in which it was stated 
15 Art. 5 (d) provided that "if the Company does not succeed in discovering a drilling location within four 
years from the date of signature, then it must either surrender all its rights as provided in this Agreement or 
must increase by twenty-five per cent the annual amounts payable under para. (b) of Art. 4. And thereafter 
at the end of each period of three years these amounts shall be increased by a further twenty-five per cent 
until the commencement of drilling or until the Company shall surrender its rights", ibid. at 13. 
16 Ibid., at 14. 
" Art. 14 (a): "The Ruler shall not by any special or general legislation or by any administrative measures or 
by any other means cancel this Agreement otherwise than as provided in Para. (b) of this Article. No 
alteration in the conditions of this Agreement shall be made either by the Ruler or by the Company except 
after agreement between the two parties that such alteration is in the interests of both", ibid., at 15. 
18 Art. 5 (b), ibid., at 12. 
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a) If any time during the currency of this Agreement there should be any 
difference or dispute between the two parties as to the interpretation or execution 
of any provision thereof, or anything herein contained or in connection herewith, 
such dispute shall be referred to two arbitrators, one selected by each of the two 
parties, and a referee to be chosen by the arbitrators before proceeding to 
arbitration. 
b) Each party shall nominate its arbitrator within sixty days after the delivery of a 
request so to do by the other party, failing which its arbitrator may, at the request 
of the other party, be designated by the British Political Resident in the Persian 
Gulf [Arabian Gulf]. In the event of the arbitrators failing to agree upon the 
referee within sixty days of being chosen or designated, the British Political 
Resident in the Persian Gulf [Arabian Gulf] may appoint a referee at the request 
of the arbitrators or of either of them. 
c) The decision of the arbitrators, or in case of a difference of opinion between 
them, the decision of the referee, shall be final and binding on both parties. 
d) In giving a decision the arbitrators or the referee shall specify an adequate 
period of delay during which the party against whom the decision is given shall 
conform thereto, and that party shall be in default only if he has failed to conform 
to the decision prior to the expiry of that period, and not otherwise. 
e) The place of arbitration shall be such as may be agreed by the parties, and in 
default of agreement shall be London or Baghdad. 19 
Article 17 declared that both parties intended to execute the Agreement in a spirit 
of good intentions and integrity, and to interpret the Agreement in a reasonable 
manner. 20 
(b) The nature of the dispute 
The dispute between the parties arose in 1949 when the ruler sought to grant a 
concession to another company, an American Company (Superior Corporation), for the 
"Art. 15, ibid., at 15. 
20 Ibid., at 16. 
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exploitation of petroleum of the subsoil of the continental shelf, after the American 
President Truman had initiated the doctrine of the continental shelf in 1945.21 The 
Petroleum Development Company claimed that the ruler could not do so, since this right 
had already been granted to it under the 1939 Agreement22. Therefore, the conflict 
between the parties concerned the area of the Concession, whether it included the sea- 
bed and subsoil of Abu Dhabi's territory. 
The parties failed to solve their dispute amicably so they referred it to arbitration. 
Lord Asquith of Bishopstone (the Umpire), who rendered an award in the dispute 
reported that "certain disputes [... ] have arisen under this agreement and were in fact 
referred to arbitration; the said arbitrators did differ, and appointed me as Umpire. , 
23 He 
specified the nature of the dispute as follows 
The nature of the dispute referred to arbitration and the subject matter of this 
award are formulated in a letter from the claimants [the Company] to the 
respondent [the Ruler] dated the 18th July 1949. The letter runs as follow: 
The arbitration is to determine what are the rights of the Company with respect to 
all underwater areas over which the Ruler has or may have sovereignty, 
jurisdiction, control or mineral oil rights. The Company claims that the area 
covered by the Agreement of the 11th January 1939 (notably Article 2 and 3 
thereof), includes in addition to the mainland and islands: 
(1) All the sea-bed and subsoil under the Ruler's Territorial Waters (including 
the Territorial Waters of his islands), and 
(2) All the sea-bed and subsoil contiguous thereto over which either the Ruler's 
sovereignty jurisdiction or control extends or may hereafter extend, or which 
now or hereafter may form part of the area over which he has or may have 
mineral oil rights. 24 
21 See Petroleum Development Ltd. v. Sheikh of Abu Dhabi, (1951) 18 ILR 144-161,147,153, reprinted in 
(1952) 1 ICLQ 247-261; Juha Kussi, The Host State and the Transnational Corporation: An Analysis of 
Legal Relationships, (England: Saxon House Teakfield Limited 1979), at 71; see also Alan Redfern/ 
Martin Hunter, Law and Practice of International Commercial Arbitration, supra note 9, at 114. 
22 Petroleum Development Ltd. v. Sheikh ofAbu Dhabi, 18 ILR 144-161,146 (1951). 
23 Ibid., at 145. 
24 Ibid., at 145. 
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The Umpire, after examining the doctrine of the continental shelf, rendered the 
following Award: 
I am of the opinion that the prima facie construction of the Agreement, which in 
my view excludes from the Concession the shelf, is not modified so as to include 
it by the negotiation incident to the Agreement any more than by the (in my view 
incompletely established) doctrine of the shelf itself. 25 
However, the most important matter here is how the Umpire determined the 
applicable law. 
(c) Applicable law 
In the process of determining the applicable law to the substance of the dispute, 
Lord Asquith of Bishopstone began by asking "what is the `proper law' applicable in 
construing this contract? "26 He answered 
This is a contract made in Abu Dhabi and wholly to be performed in that country. 
If any municipal system of law were applicable, it would prima facie be that of 
Abu Dhabi. But no such law can reasonably be said to exist. The Sheikh 
administers a purely discretionary justice with assistance of the Koran; and it 
would be fanciful to suggest that in this very primitive region there is any settled 
body of legal principles applicable to the construction of modem commercial 
instruments. 27 
He further added that Article 17 of the Agreement rejected the application of 
municipal law, it in fact invited "the application of principles rooted in the good sense 
and common practice of the generality of civilised nations. "Z$ Moreover, he concluded 
that both parties had intended to reject the application of any municipal law: "I do not 
25 Ibid., at 160. The proceedings of the arbitration were held at 5 Rue le Tass, Paris, France, from Tuesday, 
21 August 1951 to Tuesday, 28 August 1951,1 ICLQ 261 (1952). 
26 Ibid., at 149. 
27 Ibid., at 149. 
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think that on this point there is any conflict between the parties .,, 
29 As a consequence of 
this conclusion he set aside the law of Abu Dhabi and applied what is called the general 
principles of law. On the ground that Abu Dhabi did not have any legal system that may 
be considered applicable to govern this type of commercial contracts. In fact he 
precisely said, "but no such law can reasonably be said to exist. "30 
(d) Concluding remarks 
This Agreement was concluded at a time when Abu Dhabi and all of the Arabian 
Gulf was under the colonial rule of Britain, so any basis for party autonomy is doubtful, 
because the host state was the weak bargaining party and this weakness was clearly 
apparent in the terms of the Agreement, especially Articles 11 and 14. Regarding the 
applicable law, Lord Asquith not only declared that Abu Dhabi was a very primitive 
region so it was difficult to find any settled body of legal principles, he also added that 
the Arabic language in the Gulf (which was the language of the Agreement) was "an 
archaic variety of the language". 31 These two points seem to contradict each other: the 
conclusion that there was a clear agreement between the contracting parties to exclude 
any municipal law, and the allegation that the language of the Agreement was an archaic 
language. 
As mentioned above, Lord Asquith rejected the application of the municipal law 
of Abu Dhabi because he considered that it was difficult to find any body of legal 
principles in this region because it was ruled by the Qura'an, and then he relied upon 
Article 17 of the Agreement which he said contained "principles rooted in the good 
sense and common practice of the generality of civilised nations". 32 In fact, Article 17 
provided that both parties intended to perform the Agreement "in a spirit of good 
28 Ibid., at 149. 
2' Ibid., at 149. 
30 Ibid., at 149; see also Juba Kussi, The Host State and the Transnational Corporation: An Analysis of Legal 
Relationships, supra note 21, at 72; Alan Redfern/ Martin Hunter, Law and Practice of International 
Commercial Arbitration, supra note, 9, at 114; Virtus Chitoo Igbokwe, "Developing Countries and the Law 
Applicable to International Arbitration of Oil Investment Disputes: Has the Last Word been Said? ", 14 (1) 
J Int'l Arb 99-124,111 (1997); Lawrence Atsegbua, "International Arbitration of Oil Investment Disputes: 
the Severability Doctrine and Applicable Law Issues Revisited", 5 African Journal of International and 
Comparative Law 634-660,650 (1993); M. Somarajah, "The Climate of international Arbitration", 8 (2) J 
Int'l Arb 47-86,63 (1991). 
31 Petroleum Development Ltd. v. Sheikh ofAbu Dhabi, 18 ILR 144-, 149 (1951). 
32 Ibid., at 149. 
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intentions and integrity, and to interpret it in a reasonable manner". 33 It cannot be 
inferred from this Article that the parties had intended to exclude the application of 
municipal law. Hence, it could be concluded that the rejection of the application of Abu 
Dhabi law was due to a lack of knowledge of that law and its language, or it was simply 
a technique to circumvent that law to apply principles other than the host state's law. 34 
33 Mana Saeed Al-Otaiba, The Petroleum Concession Agreements of the United Arab Emirates 1939-1971 
(Abu Dhabi), supra note 11, at 16. 
34 See M. Sornarajah, International Commercial Arbitration: The Problem of State Contracts, (Singapore: 
Longman Singapore Publishers 1990), at 18. 
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2.2. Ruler of Qatar v. International Marine Oil Company Ltd. 
(a) The facts 
On 5 August 1949, the Sheikh of Qatar, hereafter called the Ruler, signed an 
agreement called `the Principal'35 with Sir Hugh Weightman on behalf of the Central 
Mining and Investment Corporation, and Robert Morton Allan Jr. on behalf of the 
Superior Oil Company. Under this agreement both companies gained exclusive rights 
for a period of 65 years from the date of signature to explore for, drill for, develop, 
produce, transport and dispose of petroleum within a specific area of Qatar's territory. 36 
This area was specified by Article 3 of the Agreement which stated 
The area covered by the exclusive rights described in Article 2 shall include all 
of the sea-bed and subsoil underlying the waters of the Persian [Arabian] Gulf 
which fall within the jurisdiction and control of the Ruler of Qatar and which lie 
beyond the territorial waters, contiguous to the mainland and islands of Qatar. 37 
The Ruler assigned his rights to his son, Sheikh Ali Bin Abdullah Al-Thani; 
Weightman and Allan assigned their rights and obligations to the "the International 
Marine Oil Company" (for whom they were dealing as agents). 38 
According to the Agreement, the Ruler would receive the following rights: the 
sum of Rupees 500,000 on the date of signature of the agreement, non returnable under 
any circumstances; 39 an annual payment of the sum of Rupees 1,000,000, to start one 
year after the date of signature of the agreement 40 
35 Ruler of Qatar v. International Marine Oil Co., (1953) 20 ILR 534, the Agreement was written in Arabic 
and English, Art. 30 stated that "this Agreement has been written in the Arabic and English languages, 
each of which has equal validity, but it is understood that the Ruler will refer to the Arabic text", ibid., at 
536. 
36 Art. 2, ibid., at 535. 
37 Ibid., at 535. 
38 Ibid., at 534. 39 Art. 4 of Principal agreement. 
ao Art. 5 provided that "the Company shall pay to the Ruler annually the sum of Rupees 1,000,000, the first 
payment to be made one year after the date of signature of this Agreement. Upon discovery of oil in 
commercial quantities this annual rental shall cease, but the amount payable thereafter to the Ruler as 
Royalty under the terms of Article 8 hereof shall in no circumstances be less than the sum of Rupees 
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The Principal Agreement contained an arbitration clause, in line with other 
petroleum agreements. The clause provided that any doubt or dispute arising between 
the parties concerning the rights or liabilities of either party under the Agreement should 
be referred to two arbitrators, and to a referee who should be chosen by the arbitrators. 4' 
The Agreement produced a definition of the term `discovery of petroleum in commercial 
quantities', in which the term means `the time when a well or wells are drilled, tested 
and found capable of producing no less than 15,000 barrels of petroleum of satisfactory 
quality per day, for thirty consecutive days, according to good petroleum field 
practice' 42 The Agreement also gave the Company the right to terminate the Agreement 
at any time at which point both parties would be free from any further obligations, 
except that the Company would have to pay all amounts due to the Ruler up to the actual 
date of termination. 43 
(b) The nature of the dispute 
The dispute between the parties arose in 1952 as the Company had not 
discovered petroleum in commercial quantities. On 3 May 1952 the Company sent a 
notice to the Ruler stating that it would terminate the Agreement after three months of 
the date of the notice, on 3 August 1952 44 A meeting took place in Doha, the capital of 
Qatar, on 4 May 1952 to discuss the issue. The representative of the Ruler insisted that 
the Company was liable to pay the sum of Rupees 1,000,000, which was due on 5 
August 1952, but the representative of the Company rejected this allegation. The parties 
decided to resort to arbitration to solve the dispute. The parties appointed their 
arbitrators then the latter appointed Sir Alfred Bucknill as the referee. 5 The fundamental 
issue before the arbitral tribunal was 
1,000,000, annually. For this purpose calculations shall be made on the expiry of each period of twelve 
months from the date of signature of this agreement. When oil is discovered in commercial quantities in 
the concession area the Company shall, if the Ruler so desires, make a loan to him of Rupees 1,000,000. 
The Company shall have the right to recover such a loan by deduction from up to one half of the royalties 
accruing thereafter to the Ruler, provided that the amount paid to the Ruler in any one year shall not in 
consequence be reduced below the sum of Rupees 1,000,000 as provided above", ibid., at 535. 
41 Ibid., at 534. 
42 Ibid., at 535. 
a; Ibid., at 543. 
as Ibid., at 539-540. 
45 Ibid., at 534. 
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Whether the parties intended that the first payment of Rupees 1,000,000 to be 
made one year after 5`h August 1949 was to be a payment in respect of the year 
5th August 1949 to 5th August 1950, or a payment in respect of the year 5th 
August 1950 to 5`h August 1951 46 
Hence, the difference between the parties regarded the annual payment: whether 
the sum of Rupees 1,000,000 which was payable on each 5t' August was the rent for the 
past twelve months as the claimant (the Ruler) argued, or it was a payment for the future 
twelve months as the respondent (the Company) argued. 7 
(c) Applicable law 
The tribunal asked "whether the proper law to be applied in the construction of 
the Principal agreement is Islamic law or the principles of natural justice and equity. " 
The referee referred to the case of Bearman v. Dux Oil Co. which concerned a petroleum 
concession agreement which was decided in 1917 by Mr. Justice Hardy, a Member of 
the Supreme Court of Oklahoma [as it was cited by the referee]. Mr. Hardy stated in his 
judgment that 
On the construction of contracts, it is the duty of the court to place itself as far as 
possible in the situation of the parties at the time their minds met upon the terms 
of the agreement, and from a consideration of the writing itself ascertain their 
intention, and if this cannot be done by the instrument itself, the circumstances 
under which it was made and the subject matter to which it relates may be 
considered, and with these aids, it is the duty of the court so to interpret the 
contract as to give effect to the mental intention of the parties as it existed at the 
time of contracting, so far as that intention is ascertainable and lawful 48 
46 Ibid., at 536. 
47 Ibid., at 536. 
48 Ibid., at 544; see also Bearman v. Dux Oil & Gas Co. et. al., 64 okla, 147; 166p. 199; 1917 okla. 
LEXIS 602. 
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In his mission to determine the applicable law in the Principal Agreement, Sir 
Alfred asserted that the contracting parties had never submitted any indication upon this 
point. Thus, he considered the law of Qatar to be the applicable law. He stated 
If one considers the subject matter of the contract, it is oil to be taken out of the 
ground within the jurisdiction of the Ruler. That fact, together with the fact that 
the Ruler is a party to the contract and had, in effect, the right to nominate Qatar 
as the place where any arbitration arising out of the contract should sit, and the 
fact that the agreement was written in Arabic as well as English, points to Islamic 
law, that being the law administered in Qatar, as the appropriate law. 49 
So, Sir Alfred first considered the law of Qatar was the applicable law according 
to a number of facts: the subject matter of the contract; the Ruler himself was a party to 
the contract and Islamic law was the law which administrated in Qatar. However, he 
later ignored these facts, stating that "there are two weighty considerations against that 
view. , 50 After he had listened to two experts in Islamic law, he reported that "there is no 
settled body of legal principles in Qatar applicable to the construction of modem 
commercial instruments. "51 He added 
I have no reason to suppose that Islamic law is not administered there [Qatar] 
strictly, but I am satisfied that the law does not contain any principles which 
would be sufficient to interpret this particular contract. 52 
Furthermore, Sir Alfred stated that "both experts agreed that certain parts of the 
contract, if Islamic law was applicable, would be open to the grave criticism of being 
invalid". 53 
49 Ibid., at 544. 
so Ibid., at 544. 
51 Ibid., at 544. 
52 Ibid., at 545. 
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(d) Concluding remarks 
Sir Alfred considered Islamic law insufficient to govern petroleum contracts, so 
he excluded it and applied instead the principles of `justice, equity and good 
conscience. ' He arrived at this conclusion by asking experts in Islamic law. However, 
Islamic law is dominated by the idea of equity as Professor Milliot, one of the two 
experts, pointed out: "equity is the basis of Muslim law". 54 The referee did not give any 
explanation for his decision, except in stating that this law is not capable of governing 
petroleum contracts. 
However, the disputed matter in this case was only about the principle of 
apportionment, and it was stated during the arbitral process that Islamic law includes this 
principle. Sir Alfred reported that 
These sums were apportionable in respect of time according to the principles of 
justice, equity and good conscience. I may here point out that the two expert 
witnesses called before me both agreed that Islamic law, although mediaeval in 
55 origin and development, laid down the principles of apportionment. 
Therefore, it may be argued that the exclusion by Sir Alfred of Qatar law, was in 
order to avoid resorting to any municipal legal system, not because that law did not 
contain any principles may suitable to govern the dispute. 
53 Ibid., at 545. 
54 Ibid., at 546. 
ss Ibid., at 546. 
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2.3. Saudi Arabia v. Arabian American Oil Company (ARAMCO) 
(a) The facts 
On 29 May 1933 the Saudi Arabia Government granted a petroleum concession 
agreement to Standard Oil Company of California, which later changed its name to the 
Arabian American Oil Company. 56 According to Article 1 of the Agreement, Saudi 
Arabia granted the company exclusive rights to explore, prospect, drill for, extract, treat, 
manufacture, transport, deal with, carry away and export petroleum and its derivatives 
for a period of 60 years. Article 1 reads as follow 
The Government hereby grants to the Company on the terms and conditions 
hereinafter mentioned, and with respect to the area defined below, the exclusive 
right, for a period of sixty years from the effective date hereof, to explore, 
prospect, drill for, extract, treat, manufacture, transport, deal with, carry away 
and export petroleum, asphalt, naphtha, natural greases, ozokerite, and other 
hydrocarbons, and the derivatives of all such products. It is understood, however, 
that such right does not include the exclusive right to sell crude or refined 
products within the area described below or within Saudi Arabia. 57 
In exchange for these rights, the Saudi Government would acquire royalties from 
the Company, determined according to Articles 5,6,7,11,12,14,15,17 and 18, at the 
same time the Company would be exempt from all direct or indirect taxes, charges, fees 
and duties including import and export duties 58 Article 28 gave to the Company the 
right to terminate the Agreement at any time by giving the Government thirty days' 
advance notice in writing. In such circumstances the Company's immovable property 
became the property of the Government free of charge, and the movable properties 
56 Saudi Arabia v. Arabian American Oil Company (Aramco), (1963) 27 ILR 117-233. The Agreement was 
signed by Abdullah Suliman, Minister of Finance in Saudi Arabia, on behalf of the Saudi Arabia 
Government and Mr L. N. Hamilton, on behalf of Standard Oil Company of California, J. D. N Anderson, 
First Memorial ofArabian American Oil Company (Aramco) in Arbitration, Annex 1, at 1. 
57 Ibid., at 1. 
58 Art. 21, ibid. 
87 
remained property of the Company unless the Government wished to buy them. Any 
dispute would be settled by arbitration. The Agreement comprised an arbitration clause 
which reads as follows 
If any doubt, difference, or dispute shall arise between the Government and the 
Company concerning the interpretation or execution of this contract, or anything 
herein contained or in connection herewith, or the rights and liabilities of the 
parties hereunder, it shall, failing any agreement to settle it in another way, be 
referred to two arbitrators, one of whom shall be chosen by each party, and a 
referee who shall be chosen by the arbitrators before proceeding to arbitration. 
Each party shall nominate its arbitrator within thirty days of being requested in 
writing by the other party to do so. In the event of the arbitrators failing to agree 
upon a referee, the Government and the Company shall, in agreement, appoint a 
referee, and in the event of their failing to agree they shall request the President 
of the Permanent Court of International Justice to appoint a referee. The decision 
of the arbitrators, or in the case of a difference of opinion between them, the 
decision of the referee, shall be final. The place of arbitration shall be such as 
may be agreed upon by the parties, and in default of agreement shall be The 
Hague, Holland. 59 
(b) The nature of the dispute 
The dispute between the contracting parties (the Government and the Company) 
arose at the beginning of 1954, when the Government of Saudi Arabia concluded an 
agreement with Mr A. S. Onassis and his companies on 29 January 1954.60 Under this 
agreement, the Government of Saudi Arabia granted to Mr. Onassis the right to 
constitute and own a company at Jeddah in Saudi Arabia called `Saudi Arabian Maritime 
s9 Art. 31, ibid. 
60 J. D. N. Anderson, First Memorial ofArabian American Oil Company (Aramco) in Arbitration, supra note 
48, Annex 2, at 81, it is worth mentioning that the Agreement amended on 7 April 1954, for the full text of 
the Agreement see ibid. at 81-103; see also the original Memorial and Exhibits of Royal Government of 
Saudi Arabia, at 9-13. 
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Tankers Company Ltd (Satco), 61 to transport Saudi petroleum62 for a period of thirty 
years, renewable for a further period with the agreement of both parties. 63 
The Arabian American Oil Company (ARAMCO) disputed Satco's Agreement 
on the grounds that they had the exclusive right to carry on all activities, in all forms, 
relating to the petroleum industry with respect to the Concession area according to the 
1939 Agreement. 64 Efforts were made by the parties to solve the conflict amicably, but 
they did not succeed. 65 The two parties agreed to refer this dispute to arbitration on 23 
66 February 1955. 
The subject matter of the dispute, as cited in the Arbitration Agreement, was 
The Government has requested Aramco to implement the Onassis Agreement, 
and Aramco claims that Article 4 of the said Onassis Agreement as amended 
conflicts with the Aramco Concession Agreement, and thereby a dispute has 
arisen between the Government and Aramco as to the rights and responsibilities 
of the Government and Aramco under the Aramco Concession Agreement, and 
as to the true interpretation of the Aramco Concession Agreement. 67 
During negotiation, the parties were unable to agree upon the questions which 
should be submitted to arbitration, however, they agreed that each party has the right to 
61 Art. 1, ibid., at 81. 
62 Art. 4, ibid., at 82. 
63 Art. (15), ibid. at 85. 
64 See the Saudi Government Memorial, at 12. 
65 See J. D. N. Anderson, First Memorial ofArabian American Oil Company (Aramco) in Arbitration, supra 
note 48, at 36, see also the Saudi Government Memorial, at 15, it was reported in the latter that "in fact, it 
became clear that there was no prospect of a settlement by direct negotiation between the Company and 
Mr. Onassis and by letter dated 26`1, October 1954, in answer to a request from the Minister of Finance for 
a definite statement of his attitude, Mr. F. A. Davies (Chairman of the Board of Aramco) wrote: `if no 
solution is found, Aramco will cooperate with His Majesty's Government in the preparation of terms of 
reference and in the submission of the issues to a Board of Arbitration in accordance with the Concession 
Agreement'. No agreed solution could in fact be found, and matters therefore proceeded on the lines 
referred to by Mr. Davis", at 15. 
66 The Saudi Government Memorial cites that several meetings between 25`h January and 10th February 1955 
were held between the two parties to reach agreement about the subject matter of the dispute, and it 
became clear that "the arbitration was being sought by the two parties in the most friendly spirit and with 
the sole object of determining, for their future guidance, their respective rights and obligations under the 
Concession", at 16; see the Arbitration Agreement in ibid., Exhibit 1, at 1-6. 
67 J. D. N. Anderson, the Award, at i. 
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submit any questions they choose. 68 It was also agreed that the arbitral tribunal should 
consist of two arbitrators and an umpire, and that the umpire should not be of the same 
nationality as either party or either of the arbitrators (Art. 1). 69 Furthermore, it was 
agreed that the seat of arbitration should be Lucerne, Switzerland (Art. 5). 70 
Accordingly, the Government submitted to the Arbitral tribunal the following questions 
- Whether the Company has, by virtue of the Concession, and if so, 
what right in connection with the transportation by sea of oil and 
other products which Aramco produces and sells. 
- If the Company has any such right 
a) Where, and to what extent, the Company was or is entitled in the absence of 
consent by the Government to transfer any right in connection with transportation 
by sea of oil obtained under the concession to any other person, company or 
corporation (for example to its buyers) having regard to the provisions of Article 
32 of the Concession Agreement, or otherwise. 
b) Whether the Company, by virtue of its concession, has acquired any right to 
refuse or deny a Government requested preferential treatment to tankers flying 
the Saudi Arabia flag, particularly bearing in mind the letter and the spirit of 
Article 23 of the Concession Agreement, and, in the event of the Company not 
having acquired such right, whether it has, by its letters of July 31st and August 
3`d 1954 or otherwise, by refusing such preference to Saudi Arab tankers, 
violated its obligations under the Concession Agreement. 
- Whether in any event, the Concession Agreement entitles the 
Company to deny preference or priority to national tankers, especially 
when the cost of transportation of the oil it produces and sells is not 
68 The Arbitration Agreement Art. (3). 
69 The Arbitral Tribunal consisted of Sauser-Hall, Referee; Badawi/ Hassan, Habachy, Arbitrators. Dr. 
Badawi died during the proceedings and was succeeded by H. E. Mahamoud Hassan, see digest of the 
Award, at 1. 
70 The Arbitral Tribunal commenced first sessions in Geneva on Monday, 9t' July 1956, J. N. D. Anderson, 
Sessions of the Tribunal Verbatim Transcript Vol. 1, at 1. The seat of Arbitration was changed to Geneva 
rather than Lucerne, by virtue of an agreement concluded between the Parties on 13 September 1955, see 
the Award, the Arabic version, at 6. 
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going to be higher than the annual average cost of transportation of 
the Company in using non-national tankers. 1 
Aramco submitted the following questions: "is Article 4 of the agreement 
between the Government and Mr A. S. Onassis as amended April 7,1954, in conflict 
with the Aramco Concession? "72 
(c) Applicable law 
Since the Concession Agreement of 1933 did not contain any reference to the 
applicable law, the parties agreed in the Arbitration Agreement that Saudi Arabian law 
would be the applicable law and also any law that the tribunal deemed to be applicable. 
Article 4 of the Arbitration Agreement specifically provided that 
The Arbitration Tribunal shall decide this dispute 
(a) in accordance with the Saudi Arabian law, as hereinafter defined, 
insofar as matters within the jurisdiction of Saudi Arabia are 
concerned; 
(b) in accordance with the law deemed by the arbitration tribunal to 
be applicable insofar as matters beyond the jurisdiction of Saudi 
Arabia are concerned. 
Saudi Arabian law, as used herein, is the Muslim law as taught by the school of 
Imam Ahmed ibn Hanbal as applied in Saudi Arabia. 3 
In its efforts to determine the applicable law, the arbitral tribunal concluded that 
it should take into account any indication given by the parties. However, failing 
adequate indication of the parties, the tribunal would take all the circumstances of the 
case into account, basing its decisions on the general doctrine of private international 
law. In order to perform this duty, the arbitral tribunal should first examine the legal 
71 See Saudi Memorial, at 16-18; see also the Award, at 39-40. 
72 See Aramco Memorial at 5; see also J. N. D. Anderson, the Award at 40. 
73 See Saudi Memorial, Exhibit 1, at 3; see also J. N. D. Anderson, the Award, at iv. 
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nature of a concession in municipal law, as the law of nations did not contain any 
principles regarding the characterisation of this legal institution. 4 
Consequently, the tribunal began by examining the law of Saudi Arabia in order 
to ascertain whether the petroleum Concession Agreement which had been granted by 
the Government to Aramco should be characterised as a unilateral act of public law, or 
as a public or administrative contract, or as a contract of private law, or a lease, or as a 
`profit a prendre', or as an institution `sui generis', partly public and partly private. 75 
According to the Arbitration Agreement concluded by the parties this question should be 
solved according to the principles of Muslim law, as taught by the Hanli School 76 
However, Aramco contended that Saudi Law was not sufficiently developed to 
determine the legal nature of petroleum agreements. 77 The Government responded by 
stating that according to the Islamic law, Aramco's Concession Agreement has a 
contractual character. Furthermore, the Memorial and the oral hearing of the 
Government argued that this Concession must be regarded as a sui generis contract. 
Moreover, the rule `pacta sunt servanda' is fully recognised by Muslim law. 8 
The tribunal reasserted the principle of private international law concerning party 
autonomy, emphasised that in any "contract presenting an international character, the 
law expressly chosen by the parties should first be applied and failing such a choice, the 
law presumably intended by the parties is applicable. 9 The tribunal in this regard relied 
upon Article 4 (b) of the Arbitration Agreement which gives the tribunal the discretion 
to choose a system of law other than Saudi law. The tribunal decided to construe this 
provision in a broad way, concluding 
As the parties to the Arbitration Agreement left to the arbitrators a broad 
discretion in this respect, the tribunal is free to choose one or the other of these 
74 The Award, at 59. 
75 J. N. D. Anderson, The Award. at 62. 
76 This School is the former school in Saudi Arabia, it belongs to Imam Ahmed ibn Hanbal (745-792 AH). 
77 J. N. D. Anderson, the Award, at 62. 
78 See the Government Memorial, at 20-32. 
79 J. N. D. Anderson, the Award, at 65. 
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multiple theories, provided its choice is objective and is justified by the 
circumstances of the dispute submitted to it. 80 
At the same time, the tribunal decided to resort to objective criteria in order to 
connect certain matters which have been already regulated by the contract with a special 
place and a special legal system. 81 In this regard the tribunal perceived that the 
Concession Agreement because of its parties and its ramifications has an international 
character. 82 Therefore, the law expressly chosen by the parties must be taken into 
consideration, since the parties have chosen a legal system connected with their 
transaction. 83 The contract was concluded in Saudi Arabia, the effective date was the 
date of its publication in Saudi Arabia and the contract was, for the most part, to be 
performed in Saudi Arabia, so is it the law of Saudi Arabia that should be applied. 84 The 
tribunal also discussed the following statement 
The law in force in Saudi Arabia should also be applied to the content of the 
Concession because this state is a party to the Agreement, as grantor' and 
because it is generally admitted, in private international law, that a sovereign 
state is presumed, unless the contrary is proved, to have subjected its 
undertakings to its own legal system. As for the law to be applied to matters 
which are not governed by the law expressly chosen by the parties, according to 
Article IV of the Arbitration Agreement, the Tribunal adopts the following 
solution. The Tribunal decides to apply the law which corresponds best to the 
nature of the legal relationship between the Parties, without looking for the tacit 
or presumed intention of the contracting parties. Relying on objective 
consideration, the Tribunal believes that the governing law should coincide with 
the economic milieu where the operation is to be carried out. Guided by this 
criterion, the Arbitration Tribunal comes to the conclusion that some of the 
effects of the Concession Agreement cannot be governed by the law of Saudi 
80 J. N. D. Anderson, the Award, at. 66. 
81 Ibid., at 66. 
82 Ibid., at 66. 
83 Ibid., at 66. 
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Arabia, both because of objective considerations and because of the subsequent 
conduct of the Parties. 
The Concession Agreement derives therefore its juridical force from the legal 
system of Saudi Arabia, the Shari 'ah, the Divine law of Islam, supplemented by 
Royal Decree No. 1135. 
Finally, the tribunal observed that the law which was in force in Saudi Arabia did 
not contain any defined rule concerning the exploitation of petroleum resources, because 
no such exploitation existed in Saudi Arabia prior to 1933, so this lacuna in Saudi law 
was filled by the 1933 Concession Agreement "whose validity and legality under Saudi 
law are not disputed by either side. "8S Consequently, the tribunal decided that public 
international law should be applied to the effects of the Concession, as no municipal law 
can govern all matter. It concluded 
Lastly, the tribunal holds that public international law should be applied to the 
effects of the concession, when objective reasons lead it to conclude that certain 
matters cannot be governed by any rule of the municipal law of any state, as is 
the case in all matter relating to transport by sea, to the sovereignty of the state 
on its territorial waters and to the responsibility of states for the violation of its 
international obligations. 86 
(d) Concluding remarks 
The tribunal, in its task of determining the applicable law to the merits of the 
dispute examined several questions, i. e. the nature of the agreement and its subject, the 
nature of the contracting parties (a state and a private company in this case), municipal 
law and the doctrine of private international law. In the end, the tribunal decided to 
apply public international law. However, why did the tribunal decide to apply public 
international law rather than the host state's law, which had been expressly chosen by 
84 Ibid., at 66. 85 Ibid., at 67. 
86 Ibid., at 69-70. 
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the parties? Was it because of the lacuna in Saudi Arabian law? Or was it because that 
law was deemed incompetent to govern petroleum contracts? 
Undoubtedly, that in the process of determining the applicable law, an arbitral 
tribunal should consider different factors such as party autonomy in which whether there 
was any express or implied choice of law by the parties and theories of private 
international law. In this case, Article 4 (a) of the Arbitration Agreement was clear in the 
point of party autonomy: the parties had expressly chosen Saudi law. Regarding theories 
of private international law, the tribunal observed these theories; however, it did not 
consider the doctrine of most connected factors to the transaction. 
What about the competency of Saudi law? Aramco's memorial details the 
opinions of a number of scholars on the company's rights according to the 1933 
Concession Agreement: 
Under the applicable Muslim law, the Aramco Concession Agreement gives 
Aramco the exclusive, absolute and unrestricted right to do anything by way of 
sale or export that Aramco may choose with the oil Aramco produces; that this 
includes the right to take the oil out of Saudi Arabia and to put it into export 
markets by any means that Aramco may deem advisable; that it includes the right 
to sell the oil to buyers on any sales terms and conditions Aramco may decide, 
and the buyers are likewise free to take the oil out of Saudi Arabia by any means 
they may choose; and that the Aramco Concession Agreement gives Aramco the 
absolute ownership of the oil it produces, free from any limitation or restraint. 
Under Hanbali law, these scholars say, the exclusive and absolute right of 
ownership by Aramco of the oil necessarily implies the right of Aramco to 
dispose of the oil as it wishes, there being no limitation found in the Agreement. 
They say, too, that even though Aramco had not been given such an exclusive 
right, by the clear intendment of the Concession Agreement, it would 
nevertheless possess it; and that the Government is under an obligation to 
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observe the rights of Aramco and to place no restriction or limitation upon 
them. 87 
Thus, according to these opinions, Islamic law gave complete rights to the 
Company, and was in no way insufficiently competent to govern the dispute. Moreover, 
the tribunal itself argued at the beginning of its award that "the law of nations did not 
contain any principles regarding the characterisation of [the legal nature of the 
concession]. i88 It then contradicted itself by deciding that public international law 
should be applied to the effect of the concession. Given the adequacy of Islamic law to 
govern the dispute and the above contradiction, it is not clear why the tribunal avoided 
the application of municipal law, Saudi law. It would therefore seem that it was an 
attempt to avoid any recourse to any municipal law. 
87 See the Aramco memorial, at 51, the memorial mentioned the opinions in Annex 16: Abu Zahra, at 345- 
368, J. N. D. Anderson, at 369-376 and Joseph Schacht, at 526-534. 
se The Award, J. N. D. Anderson, at 59. 
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2.4. Libyan Cases 
Introductory remarks 
The three important Libyan cases: BP v. Libya89, Texaco and California Asiatic 
v. Libya90 and Libyan American Oil Co. (LIAMCO) v. Libya91, arose out of the attempts 
of the Libyan Government to control its petroleum resources after Colonel Muammar 
Qaddafi overthrew the monarchy and established a Social People's Arab Republic. The 
arbitral awards that were rendered in these cases were controversial. On the one hand, it 
has been argued that these awards created a remarkable feature in the arena of contracts 
between states and foreign companies. 92 However, on the other hand, they have been 
considered as the most flagrant proof of bias in the era of international commercial 
arbitration. 93 The details of these cases will be discussed bellow. 94 
2.4.1. BP Exploration Company (Libya) Limited v the Government of the 
Libyan Arab Republic 
(a) The facts 
On 18 December 1957 the Government of Libya (Petroleum Commission) 
granted a concession to Mr. Nelson Bunker Hunt, who was a citizen of the United States 
of America. The Concession was, for the most part, in the form set out in the Second 
89 BP Exploration Company (Libya) Limited v. The Government of the Libyan Arab Republic, (1979) 53 ILR 
297; (1980) 5 YBCA 143. 
90 Texaco Overseas Petroleum Company and California Asiatic Oil Company v. The Government of the 
Libyan Arab Republic, (1979) 53 ILR 389; (1978) 17 ILM 1; (1979) 4 YBCA 177. 
91 Libyan American Oil Company (LIAMCO) (USA) v. The Government of the Libyan Arab Republic, (1982) 
62 ILR 140; (1981) 20 ILM 20; (1981) 6 YBCA 89. 
92 Christopher Greenwood, "State Contracts in International Law - The Libyan Oil Arbitrations ", 53 BYIL 
27-81,27 (1982). 
93 See for example, Amr A. Shalakany, "Arbitration and the Third World: A Plea for Reassessing Bias under 
the Specter of Neoliberalism", 41 Harvard International Law Journal 419-468,425 (2000). 
94 In these cases the arbitration clause contained the following provision on the applicable law: 
"this concession shall be governed by and interpreted in accordance with the principles of law of Libya 
common to the principles of international law and in the absence of such common principles then by and 
in accordance with the general principles of law, including such of those principles as may have been 
applied by international tribunals" see supra note 98. 
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Schedule of the Libyan Petroleum law of 1955 95 According to the Concession 
Agreement Clause (1), Mr. Hunt was granted the exclusive right for 50 years to search 
for and extract petroleum within the designated area. The Company shall also have the 
right to take away such petroleum whether by pipeline or otherwise from the concession 
area and to use, process, store, export and dispose of the same. 96 The Libyan rights in 
exchange were cited in Articles 6,7,8, and 9. Article 6 specified that 
The Company shall in accordance with Article 13 of the Law and Clause 9 (2) of 
this Concession pay the following rents for each 100 square kilometres: Five 
Libyan Pounds for each of the first eight years; Ten Libyan Pounds for each of 
the next seven years, or until petroleum is found in commercial quantities 
whichever is the earlier; 2,500 Libyan Pounds for each year thereafter. 97 
The Concession Agreement included an arbitration clause, taken from the Libyan 
petroleum law of 1955, Article 28, which was inserted in all subsequent concession 
agreements. The original text of the law was amended by a Decree Law of 3 July 1961. 
Paragraph (1) of Article 28 reads 
If at any time during or after the currency of this concession any difference or 
dispute shall arise between the Government and the company concerning the 
interpretation of this concession, or its annexes or the rights or obligations of 
either of the two contracting parties hereunder, and should such parties fail to 
agree as to the settlement of such difference or dispute, the same shall, failing 
any agreement to settle it in any other way, be referred to two arbitrators, one of 
whom shall be appointed by each party, and an umpire who shall be appointed by 
the arbitrators immediately after their appointment. In the event of the arbitrators 
failing to agree upon an umpire within 60 days from the date of appointment of 
the second arbitrator either party may request the president or, if the president is 
95 BP Memorial, part one, at 5. 
96 Ibid., Annex 2, at 133. 
97 Ibid., Annex 2, at 103. 
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a national of Libya or of the country where the company was first incorporated, 
the vice-president of the International Court of Justice to appoint the Umpire. 98 
Paragraph (7) of the same Article which deals with applicable law, was amended 
several times. In the petroleum law no. 25,1955 it read 
This concession shall be governed by and interpreted in accordance with the laws 
of Libya and such principles and rules of international law as may be relevant, 
and the umpire or sole arbitrator shall base his award upon those laws, principles 
and rules. 99 
This paragraph was then amended by the Decree law of 3 July 1961, as follows 
This concession shall be governed by and interpreted in accordance with Libyan 
laws and such principles and rules of international law as may be relevant to the 
extent that such principles and rules do not conflict with or are contrary to 
Libyan laws. '°° 
The Decree of 20 November 1965 introduced the third amendment to Paragraph 
(7) of Article 28, and it is this amendment which is taken into account in the 
examination of this case and other Libyan cases. The alteration read 
This concession shall be governed by and interpreted in accordance with the 
principles of law in Libya common to the principles of international law, and in 
the absence of such common principles then by and in accordance with the 
general principles of law, including such of those principles as may have been 
applied by international tribunals. 101 
98 Anis Mustafa Qasem, Petroleum Legislation in Libya, Thesis 1969, at 211, published as Principles of 
Petroleum Legislation, The Case of a Developing Country, (London: Graham & Trotman 1985). 
99 Ibid., at 217. 
10° Ibid., at 218. 
99 
The above Paragraph means, as Qasem argued 
If there is a principle of law in Libya, whether it be found in the civil code 
(governing private contracts) or in administrative law or in principles of law 
established by the Libyan Supreme Court (governing administrative contracts) 
and such a principle is applicable to the dispute, then such a principle will have 
the first call on the attention of the arbitrators, and it may not be disregarded 
unless such a principle is found to be not in common with principles of 
international law. '°2 
(b) The nature of the dispute 
The new Libyan regime which came to power in 1969 made efforts to protect 
and gain control over Libyan natural resources for the benefits of Libyan citizens, 
pursuant to the relevant United Nations Resolutions. 103 For this purpose, several 
petroleum agreements were amended or terminated by nationalisation laws, at the same 
time Libya offered compensation to these petroleum companies. Accordingly, the 
Libyan Government issued on 7 December 1971 a law nationalising the BP 
Concession. 104 Article 1 of this law provided that 
The operations of BP Exploration (Libya) Limited in Oil Concession number 65 
shall be nationalised. Ownership of all funds, rights, assets and shares relating to 
the abovementioned operations, shall revert to the state, including specifically the 
facilities and installations for exploration and drilling for, and production of, 
crude oil and natural gas, as well as for transportation, processing, refining, 
storage and export and other assets and rights relating to the aforementioned 
operations. 105 
101 Ibid., at 218. 
102 Ibid., at 219. 
103 For more detail on these Resolutions see part one, chapter one of this thesis. 
104 Text of Libyan Law Nationalising British Petroleum's Interests in Concession no. 65, Selected 
Documents of the International Petroleum Industry 1971, (Vienna: OPEC 1973), at 183. 
105 Ibid., at 183. 
100 
However, the same law provided a method of paying compensation to BP. 
Article 5 clearly stated that 
The state shall pay compensation to the concession holder for the funds, rights 
and assets reverting to it by virtue of Article 1. The determination of the amount 
of such compensation shall be undertaken by a Committee to be formed by a 
decision of the minister of petroleum in the following manner: 
a) One judge of the court of appeal as president, to be nominated by the minister 
of justice. 
b) One representative of the national oil corporation as a member, to be 
nominated by the minister of petroleum. 
c) One representative of the ministry of treasury as a member, to be nominated 
by the minister of treasury. The Committee may seek the help of whatever 
employees or others, as it deems necessary in the performance of its task. 106 
BP immediately rejected the Libyan policy, sending a letter on 11 December 
1971 threatening the Libyan Government. The letter stated that the interests of BP 
cannot be altered without its consent, and if this occurred, BP would "take such steps as 
it may consider necessary or desirable to assert or protect all its rights". 107 In a separate 
letter of the same date, BP informed the Libyan Government that they had already 
instituted arbitration proceedings. 108 BP began arbitration proceedings only five days 
after the nationalisation law was issued, though Article 5 of this law determined a period 
of three months for the initiation of compensation proceedings. 
Since there was no response from the Libyan Government, BP addressed a letter 
on 15 March 1972 to the president of the International Court of Justice, asking him to 
invoke Article 28 of the Concession Agreement and designate a sole arbitrator to 
determine the dispute. 109 The president of the International Court of Justice appointed on 
28 April 1972, Judge Gunnar Lagergren president of the Court of Appeal for Western 
106 Ibid., at 184. 107 See the complete Letter in BP Memorial, at 12 and also Annex 22. 
108 Ibid., at 13. 
109 Ibid., at 13. 
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Sweden, as a sole arbitrator. "" The presence of both parties was requested on 4 July 
1972, however Libya did not attend this meeting, nor any further meeting. ll' The 
arbitrator declared inter alia that the place of arbitration would be Copenhagen, 
Denmark; he also decided that copies of all correspondence and documents in the case 
would be sent to Libya. 112 
At the first stage of the arbitration proceedings BP asked the arbitrator to declare 
inter alia that the Libyan nationalisation law was a breach of the Concession Agreement, 
and it is entitled to be resorted to the full enjoyment of its right under the Concession. It 
also asked the arbitrator to declare that it is the owner of any petroleum extracted from 
the Concession area after, as well as before the date of nationalisation. 113 
The arbitrator held inter alia that the Libyan nationalisation law was a breach of 
the Concession, and BP is entitled to damages arising from the wrongful act of Libya. 114 
(c) Applicable law 
We now turn to examine how the applicable law was determined in this case. 
During the first stage of the arbitration proceedings BP declared that its Concession 
Agreement is considered a contractual relationship, and that there is nothing to preclude 
a state from entering into a binding contractual relationship, whether in international 
law, in general principles of law or, indeed, in the law of Libya. ' 15 BP then later argued 
that this contract "is no ordinary contract" because it is between a state and a foreign 
corporation. Moreover, BP argued that the contract contains clauses which in fact 
protect it from any unilateral alteration. 116 Indeed, BP argued that the contract is 
110 5 YBCA 143,145 (1980). 
1" Ibid., at 145. 
112 Ibid., at 145. 
113 53 ILR 297,299 (1979). 
14 53 ILR 297,299 (1979); see the Tribunal decisions on these issues, which was delivered at 
Copenhagen on 10 October 1973,53 ILR 297,355-357 (1979); see also the full Award (Merits) in 
ibid., at 300-357. It was reported that "according to a statement issued by BP on November 25,1974, 
the case was settled on 20 November 1974. The settlement agreement provided that the Government of 
Libya would make BP an immediate cash payment of approximately UK £17.4 million. This figure 
was arrived at by deducing from the sum of UK £62.4 million, agreed to be due to BP, taxes, royalties 
and other claims by the Government of Libya amounting to UK £45 million. The payment has been 
received by BP (statement issued by BP on January 31,1975). On March 24,1975, the arbitrator 
ordered the discontinuance of the arbitration proceedings", 5 YBCA 143 (1980). 
BP Memorial (Merits), Part Two, Para 73, at 13. 
116 Ibid., Para 81, at 16. 
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governed by a proper law clause, which excludes the direct application of Libyan law, 
because the contract contains an arbitration clause, although the whole performance of 
the contract would take place within Libyan territory. "? BP proposed three choices of 
applicable law. First, it stated that the Concession is governed by public international 
law; second, alternatively, that the Concession itself constitutes the sole source of law 
controlling the relationship between the parties; and third, that the legal position of the 
parties should be decided by reference to `general principles of law'. 118 
In order to determine the applicable law to the substance the arbitrator concluded 
that 
While the provision generates practical difficulties in its implementation, it offers 
guidance in a negative sense by excluding the relevance of any single municipal 
legal system as such. To the extent possible, the Tribunal will apply the clause 
according to its clear and apparent meaning. Natural as this would be in any 
event, such an interpretation is the more compelling as the contractual document 
is of a standardised type prescribed by the Respondent. The governing law clause 
moreover was the final product of successive changes made in the Libyan 
petroleum legislation in the decade between 1955 and 1965 by which the 
relevance of Libyan law was progressively reduced. 
In Paragraph 7 of Clause 28, reference is made to the principles of law of Libya 
common to the principles of international law, and only if such common 
principles do not exist with respect to a particular matter, to the general 
principles of law. The Claimant argues, in the first of three alternative 
submissions, that international law alone is applicable. 119 
The arbitrator examined the reasoning behind BP's assertion that the Concession 
was governed by international law alone. The first argument of BP was that the 
acceptance of a principle should be upheld by both Libyan and international law if it is 
to govern the Concession. Hence, if the performance of a contracting party cannot be 
1 17 Ibid., at 16. 
18 Ibid., Para 95, at 19. 
119 53 ILR 297,327 (1979). 
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justified by the principles of both Libyan law and international law, it is not justified 
under the Concession. Thus BP argued that an action which is a violation of the 
principles of international law must necessarily be considered as a violation of the 
Concession, even if not in violation of the principles of Libyan law. 120 However, the 
arbitrator considered this reasoning to be incomplete, since it entirely ignores the content 
of Clause 28 Paragraph (7). 121 He further added 
In the last analysis [the case] should be tested by reference to the general 
principles of law. It is not correct to say that "a principle must be supported by 
both Libyan law and international law in order to be justifiable under the 
Concession" and that conduct "is justifiable only if principles of both systems of 
law-Libyan and international- support it". The principle may still be acceptable, 
and the conduct justifiable, if supported by the general principles of law. 
If a particular action by a party amounts to breach of contract under one system 
but not under the other, the issue is one which can only be decided by reference 
to the general principles of law. Thus, the first part of the Claimant's argument 
must be rejected. It is not sufficient for the Claimant to show that the conduct of 
the Respondent is a breach of international law as a basis for maintaining a claim 
based on breach of contract. In the event that international law and Libyan law 
conflict on that issue, the question is to be resolved by the application of the 
general principles of law. '22 
The second argument submitted by BP was that since the parties have expressly 
excluded the direct and sole application of Libyan law, but have made reference to the 
general principles of law, and since "a" system must be govern, "the only system that is 
left is public international law". 123 Eventually, the arbitrator concluded his decision 
regarding the applicable law by stating 
120 Ibid., at 328. 
121 Ibid., at 328. 
122 Ibid., at 328. 
123 Ibid., at 329. 
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The tribunal cannot accept the submission that public international law applies, 
for Paragraph 7 of Clause 28 does not so stipulate. Nor does the BP Concession 
itself constitute the sole source of law controlling the relationship between the 
Parties. The governing system of law is what that clause expressly provides, vis 
in the absence of principles common to the law of Libya and international law, 
the general principles of law [must be applied], including such of those principles 
as may have been applied by international tribunals. 
2.4.2. Texaco Overseas Petroleum Company and California Asiatic Oil 
Company v. the Government of the Libyan Arab Republic 
(a) The facts 
Between 1955 and 1968 the Government of Libya granted two American 
companies, Texaco Overseas Petroleum Company (Topco) and California Asiatic Oil 
Company (Calasiatic) 14 petroleum Concession Agreements. 124 Most of these 
agreements were modified between 1963 and 1971 with the consent of the Government 
and the Companies. 125 The purpose of the modifications was to bring these Concessions 
in line with the amendments to Libya's petroleum laws. 126 These Concession 
Agreements contained the same provisions concerning the mechanism for solving 
disputes as the previous case, arbitration was a last resort, and the arbitration provisions 
were the same as above. 127 
(b) The nature of the dispute 
The dispute between the Government and the Companies arose in 1973, as a 
consequence of Libya's attempts to gain control over its petroleum resources. Libya 
promulgated law no. 66/1973, by which it nationalised 51% of the properties, rights and 
124 53 ILR 389 (1979). 
125 4 YBCA 177 (1979). 
126 See 53 ILR 389 (1979); 4 YBCA 177 (1979). 
127 See supra notes 94,98-101. 
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assets of both Companies (Topco and Calasiatic). 128 In return, the same law provided for 
compensation to be paid by the Government to the Companies. Article 2 of the Decree 
established a special committee to determine the compensation. In 1974, another decree 
of nationalisation (law no. 11/1974) was issued by the Libyan Government which 
nationalised the remaining 49% of the properties, rights and assets of both Companies, 
relating to all 14 Deeds of Concession they were holding. 129 
The Companies rejected the Libyan action and refused to accept the offer of 
compensation that had been suggested by the Government. Accordingly, they 
commenced arbitration procedures according to Article 28 of the deed of the 
Concession. On 2 September 1973 the Companies informed the Libyan Government that 
they had already designated an arbitrator and they asked the Libyan Government to do 
the same. As the Libyan Government refused, the Companies requested the president of 
the International Court of Justice to designate an arbitrator to hear and determine both 
disputes (1973,1974). 130 
The Libyan Government not only refused to designate an arbitrator, it rejected 
the need for arbitration, on the grounds that Article (28)131 of the Deeds of Concession 
considers arbitration as a last resort in dispute settlement, yet amicable methods had not 
yet been exhausted. Libya's objection was sent to the president of the International 
Court of Justice on 26 July 1974.132 However, the president rejected Libya's claim and 
appointed Professor R. J. Dupuy as a sole arbitrator. Following this episode, Libya did 
not participate in the arbitration proceedings. The arbitrator began by examining his 
jurisdiction over the dispute. 133 On 27 November 1975 the arbitrator rendered an interim 
award in which he declared his jurisdiction over the dispute. 134 
(c) Applicable law 
The claim which was submitted by the Companies to the tribunal focused 
primarily on the argument that the Deeds of Concession were binding upon the parties 
128 This law also nationalised seven other petroleum companies, 53 ILR 390 (1979). 
129 53 ILR 390 (1979). 
130 Ibid., at 390. 
131 See Art. 28 (1) supra note 98. 
132 53 ILR 390 (1979). 
133 Ibid., at 391. 
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and that therefore the Libyan Decrees of 1973 and 1974, as well as subsequent Libyan 
action, breached Libya's obligations. They asked that Libya be held to perform the 
Deeds of Concession and fulfil their terms. 135 
In determining the applicable law, the arbitrator began by examining the nature 
of the Deeds of Concession, asking "whether the legal acts through which plaintiffs 
obtained concessions from the Libyan state are contracts? "t36 The arbitrator concluded, 
based on the general principles of law and the teaching of comparative law, that the 
deeds were in fact contracts. 137 The arbitrator then turned to the question of which law 
should govern these contracts, and whether the contracting parties have the right to 
choose in accordance with the doctrine of party autonomy. Professor Dupuy argued that 
"it seems desirable to establish a distinction between the law which governs the contract 
and the legal order from which the binding nature of the contract stems. s138 He also 
added that the judgement of the Permanent Court of International Justice in the Serbian 
Loans case was no longer relevant, 139 because the trends of contractual practices meant 
increasing delocalisation of the contract between a state and a foreign company. 140 He 
stated 
For the time being, it will suffice to note that the evolution which has occurred in 
the old case law of the Permanent Court of International Justice is due to the fact 
that, while the old case law viewed the contract as something which could not 
come under international law because it could not be regarded as a treaty 
between states, under the new concept treaties are not the only type of 
agreements governed by such law. And it should be added that, although they are 
not to be confused with treaties, contracts between states and private persons can, 
under certain conditions, come within the ambit of a particular and new branch of 
international law: the international law of contracts. 14' 
134 Ibid., at 418-419. 
135 Ibid., at 437. 
136 Ibid., at 438. 
137 For more detail see ibid., at 438-441. 
138 Ibid., at 443. 
139 Serbian Loans case, [1929] PCIJ Series A. no. 20, at. 41 140 53 ILR 445-447 (1979). 
141 Ibid., at 449. 
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Thus, Professor Dupuy concluded that 
The reference which is made mainly to the principles of international law and, 
secondarily, to the general principles of law must have as a consequence the 
application of international law to the legal relations between the parties. 142 
Hence, Professor Dupuy, ignored the Libyan law which had been cited in Article 
28 (7) and interpreted this clause as primarily a choice of public international law. 143 
2.4.3. Libyan American Oil Company (LIAMCO) v. the Government of the 
Libyan Arab Republic 
(a) The facts 
The Libyan American Oil Company (LIAMCO) was granted three concession 
agreements in 1955 by the Government of Libya (nos. 16,17, and 20) after it met the 
144 
requirements of the Libyan Petroleum Law of 1955. LIAMCO was given the 
exclusive right for fifty years, renewable for an additional ten years to search for, extract 
and sell petroleum from specified areas of Libya. '45 Amendments of these concessions 
took place between 1955 and 1968.146 In exchange, Libya would receive an annual 
rent, 147 royalties'48 and annual taxes. 149 All these Concessions contained an arbitration 
clause, Clause 28.150 
142 Ibid., at 450. 
143 Christopher Greenwood, "State Contracts in International Law - The Libyan Oil Arbitrations", supra 
note 92, at 46. 
144 62 ILR 141 (1982); for more details on the Libyan petroleum law see supra note 98. 
145 62 ILR 141 (1982). 
146 For more details on the amendments see ibid., at 152-155 and 159-160. LIAMCO assigned part of its 
interests in the concessions to other companies, retaining only a 25.5% share by 1973, ibid. at 156. 
147 Under Clause (6) LIAMCO would pay for each 100 square kilometres of concession territory, as 
follows: 
- Ten Libyan pounds yearly for the first eight years; 
- Twenty Libyan pounds for each of the next seven years, or until petroleum is discovered in 
commercial quantities, whichever date shall come first; 
- 2500 Libyan pounds for each year thereafter, ibid., at 158. 
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(b) The nature of the dispute 
The dispute arose in the same process of Libyan nationalisation of foreign 
petroleum companies. On 1 September 1973 the Libyan Government issued law no. 66, 
article (1) of which nationalised 51 % of the concession rights of a number of petroleum 
companies, including LIAMCO. 151 As mentioned above, the Libyan Government 
offered compensation to all petroleum companies. 152 In the same vein, the Libyan 
Government nationalised the remaining 49% of the rights and assets of LIAMCO, on 11 
February 1974 under law no. 10/1974.153 This law provided identical methods of 
compensation to those which had been provided by law no. 66/1973 above. 
Reaction to the Libyan act came not only from LIAMCO but also from the 
United States. On 4 September 1973 the State Department of the United States protested 
against the Libyan action, arguing that Libya should fulfil all its international obligations 
and respect all the rights of the petroleum companies operating in Libya. 
154 On 20 June 
1974 the State Department addressed another note to the Libyan Government, this time 
alleging that the Libyan action was only political retaliation. The American allegation 
read as follows 
Under the principles of international law, measures taken by a state against the 
interests of foreign nationals, which are motivated not by reason of public utility, 
but of political retaliation against the state of which those nationals are citizens, 
are invalid and are not entitled to recognition by other states... [and the 
Department calls on Libya to] discharge its responsibilities under international 
law, including the payment of prompt, adequate and effective compensation for 
tss the interests affected by the Decree of February 11,1974. 
148 Under Clauses 7 and 9 the royalties were 12.5% of the value of field production of petroleum to be paid 
quarterly, ibid., at 158. 
149 See Clause 8, ibid., at 158. 
150 See supra notes 94,98-101. 
151 62 ILR 140,162 (1982). 
Ise See 6 YBCA 91 (1981). 
153 62 ILR 140,163 (1982). 
154 Ibid., at 164. 
iss Department of State File no. D74 0146-1148, Digest of United States Practice in International Law, 
1975, at 490. It could be argued that the American allegation that Libyan nationalisation was only 
political retaliation was inaccurate, because Libyan nationalisation affected many petroleum 
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LIAMCO directly invoked the arbitration clause, but Libya rejected the need for 
arbitration. Hence, LIAMCO initiated arbitration proceedings and addressed a letter to 
the president of the International Court of Justice on 2 July 1974. Another letter dated 17 
January 1975 to the president asked him to nominate a sole arbitrator to determine the 
dispute. 156 On 27 January 1975 the president of the International Court of Justice 
appointed Dr. Sobhi Mahmassani, Counsellor-at-law of Beirut, as a sole arbitrator to 
hear and determine the matters of the dispute. '57 
The arbitrator began his task by convoking the parties. Libya did not appear at 
the arbitration proceedings. However, LIAMCO requested the arbitrator to declare that 
the Libya's nationalisation laws constituted a fundamental breach of the concessions and 
they were ineffective to transfer rights under the concessions. It also requested the 
restoration of its rights under the concessions. Alternatively, LIAMCO claimed damages 
or compensation. '58 
(c) Applicable law 
In order to determine the applicable law, the arbitrator first, examined the nature 
of petroleum concession agreements in general and Libyan petroleum agreements in 
particular: that their parties normally consist of a state and a foreign company; that the 
subject matter of petroleum agreements is a long-term exploitation of natural resources; 
that although these contracts are a combination of public and private legal character, 
they still maintain their contractual nature. 159 The arbitrator concluded that where the 
contracting parties are from different nationalities and their legal systems are different, it 
is unfair to rely on one system and ignore the other unless the parties had already agreed 
to do so. Therefore, he argued that the tribunal's task is to seek guidance from the 
general principles governing the conflict of laws in private international law. 160 The 
arbitrator stated that 
companies, see for instance ibid., at 161-162; see also BP Exploration Company (Libya) Limited v. 
Government of the Libyan Arab Republic, 53 ILR 297 (1979). 
156 62 ILR 146-147 (1982). 
157 Ibid., at 148. 
158 Ibid., at 142; see also 6 YBCA 89,91-92 (1981). 
159 See 62 ILR 140,169 (1982). 
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The proper law governing LIAMCO's Concession Agreements, as set forth in the 
amended version of said Clause 28, Para. 7, is in the first place the law of Libya 
when consistent with international law, and subsidiarily the general principles of 
law. Hence, the principal proper law of the contract in said Concession is Libyan 
domestic law. But it is specified in the Agreements that this covers only "the 
principles of law of Libya common to the principles of international law". Thus, 
it excludes any part of Libyan law which is in conflict with the principles of 
international law. 161 
After the arbitrator had analysed the principles of Libyan law which are in fact 
mostly derived from Islamic law, he pointed out that "Libyan law in general and Islamic 
law in particular have common rules and principles with international law, and provide 
for the application of custom and equity as subsidiary sources". 
162 He further stated that 
since these principles are consistent and in harmony with the proper law that has been 
chosen by the parties in Clause 28 (7), the said agreements are governed primarily by 
principles of Libyan law "as are common to the principles of international law". 
163 As 
noted above, Paragraph (7) provides for "the general principles of law as may have been 
applied by international tribunals", where Libyan law and international law conflict. 
164 
The arbitrator last concluded 
These general principles are usually embodied in most recognised legal systems, 
and particularly in Libyan legislation, including its modern codes and Islamic 
law. They are applied by municipal courts and are mainly referred to in 
international and arbitral case law. They, thus, form a compendium of legal 
precepts and maxims, universally accepted in theory and practice. Instances of 
such precepts are, inter alia, the principles of the sanctity of property and 
160 Ibid., at 171. 
161 Ibid., at 173; Clause 28 (7) reads "this concession shall be governed and interpreted in accordance with 
the principles of law of Libya common to the principles of international law, and in the absence of 
such common principles then by and in accordance with the general principles of law as may have 
been applied by international tribunals", see supra note 86. 
162 Ibid., at 175. 
163 Ibid., at 175. 
164 Ibid., at 175. 
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contracts, the respect of acquired vested rights, the prohibition of unjust 
enrichment, the obligation of compensation in case of expropriation and 
wrongful damage, etc. 165 
It is clear that the arbitrator gave significant consideration to Libyan and Islamic 
law, and he concluded that Libyan law was sufficient to be the applicable law however, 
he did not apply Libyan law. 166 
Concluding remarks 
Has our discussion of the Libyan cases BP v. Libya, Texaco and California 
Asiatic v. Libya and Libyan American Oil Co. (LIAMCO) v. Libya, shed any light on the 
dilemma of applicable law in petroleum disputes? The three Libyan cases were exactly 
the same in their facts and circumstances, but the conclusion of each arbitrator was 
completely different. Furthermore, all three Concession Agreements specified the choice 
of Libyan law explicitly (and where Libyan law conflicted with international law, then 
the general principles of law). 
However, Judge Gunnar Lagergren, in the BP v. Libya case, noted that this 
provision excludes the application of any municipal legal system, so without 
justification he excluded Libyan law. He finally concluded that general principles of law 
should govern the dispute. 
In the Texaco and California Asiatic v. Libya case, Professor Dupuy went a little 
further because after he had asked whether the contracting parties have the right to 
determine the applicable law, he argued that under a new concept of international law 
contracts between states and private aliens, contracts should be delocalised or 
internationalised in the sense of being subject to public international law. He also 
reported that Clause 28 (7) refers to "principles", not "rules" of Libyan law, and the 
application of principles of Libyan law does not rule out the application of international 
'6S Ibid., at 175-176. 
166 See 6 YBCA 89-118,94 (1981). 
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law principles. 167 He concluded that public international law should govern the dispute, 
also without given any consideration to the law of Libya. 
In the Libyan American Oil Co. (LIAMCO) v. Libya case, Dr. Mahmassani, after 
a considerable analysis of Libyan and Islamic law principles, and after determining the 
meaning of the term "principles of international law" with reference to Article 38 of the 
Statute of the International Court of Justice, reached the conclusion that Libyan law and 
international law both apply custom and equity, and that general principles are embodied 
in Libyan legislation and Islamic law, including the principles of the sanctity of property 
and contracts, respect for acquired vested rights, a prohibition of unjust enrichment and 
the obligation to pay compensation for expropriations. Although of all these principles 
which are embodied in Libyan and Islamic law, and which are sufficient to govern the 
dispute, the arbitrator did not apply Libyan law, but he was convinced that the 
provisions of the agreement could govern the dispute. In other words, the arbitrator held 
that the governing law of the contract was the law of Libya, where it was not in conflict 
with the principles of international law. 
An analysis of these decisions seems to reveal a considerable degree of 
protection of foreign petroleum companies irrespective of any juridical principles. The 
clear intention of clause 28 (7) was that the concession agreements should be governed 
by the principles of the law of Libya, 168 but "if this was the intention, it was not 
fulfilled". 169 Fatouros stated in his analysis of the Texaco/Calasiatic award that 
[To better] to understand the Texaco/Calasiatic award, one must put it in 
historical perspective. It reflects a significant doctrinal (and to a far lesser extent 
practical) trend which started in the 1950s and peaked sometime in the mid- 
1960s, based in major part, but by no means exclusively, on the concern of 
167 See R. Doak Bishop, "International Arbitration of Petroleum Disputes: The Development of A Lex 
Petrolea", 23 YBCA 1131-1210,1149 (1998). 
168 Alan Red fern/ Martin Hunter, Law and Practice of International Commercial Arbitration, supra note 9, 
at 106. 
169 Ibid., at 106. 
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western ("First World") lawyers for the protection of foreign investors in 
developing countries. 170 
170 A. A. Fatouros, "International Law and the Internationalised Contract", 74 American Journal of 
International Law 13-141,140 (1980). 
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2.5. Government of the State of Kuwait v. the American Independent Oil Company 
(AMINOIL) 171 
(a) The facts 
On 28 June 1948 the American Independent Oil Company (Aminoil), a Delaware 
corporation was granted a petroleum concession agreement for the exploration and 
exploitation of petroleum and natural gas for sixty years172 by the Ruler of Kuwait in the 
Kuwaiti part of the Neutral Zone between Kuwait and Saudi Arabia. Article 2 of the 
Agreement specified the Company's obligation to conduct its operations in a 
workmanlike manner and using appropriate scientific methods. 173 In exchange, the Ruler 
was granted royalties. According to Article 3, the Company shall make an immediate 
payment to the Ruler of a sum of US $ 625,000, followed after thirty days by a sum of 
US $ 7.25 million. Moreover, the ruler would receive an annual royalty of US $ 2.5 
dollars for every ton of petroleum that have been won and saved by Aminoil, subject to a 
minimum annual royalty of US $ 625,000.174 Article 11 authorised the Ruler to 
terminate the Agreement in any of three specified cases: failure by the Company to 
perform its obligations in accordance with aforesaid Article 2; failure by the Company to 
make any of the payments due under Article 3; and if the Company is in default under 
the arbitration provisions of Article 18.175 However, Article 17 prevented the Ruler from 
annulling this Agreement except as provided for in the previous Article, nor could he 
171 See the complete text of the Agreement in: Selected Documents of the international Petroleum 
Industry: Iraq and Kuwait, Pre-1966 (hereinafter Documents), (Vienna: OPEC 1974), at 127; see also, 
(1982) 21 ILM 976-1053; (1984) 66 ILR 519-627; (1984) 6 YBCA 71-96; see also Pierre-Yves 
Tschanz, "The Contribution of the Aminoil Award to the Law of State Contracts" 18 International 
Lawyer, 245-281 (1984); Fernando R. Teson, "State Contracts and Oil Expropriations: The Aminoil- 
Kuwait Arbitration", 24 Virginia Journal of International Law 323-358 (1984). 
172 Art. (1) "the period of this Agreement shall be sixty (60) years from the date of signature", Documents, 
supra note 171, at 127; 66 ILR 547 (1984). 
1" Art. 2 (c) clearly provided that "the Company shall conduct its operations in a workmanlike manner 
and by appropriate scientific methods and shall take all reasonable measures to prevent the ingress of 
water to any petroleum-bearing strata and shall duly close any unproductive holes drilled by it and 
subsequently abandoned. The Company shall keep the Sheikh and His Foreign Representative 
informed generally as to the progress and result of its drilling operations but such information shall be 
treated as confidential", Documents, supra note 171, at 128; 66 ILR 547 (1984). 
174 Documents, supra note 171, at 128-129. This is just an example of inconsiderable amounts host states 
received from petroleum companies. 
175 Ibid., at 137; 66 ILR 548 (1984). 
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make any amendments to the Agreement's terms without the Company's consent. 176 The 
Agreement also contained an arbitration clause, Article (18), referred to arbitration to 
solve any difference or dispute between the parties concerning the interpretation or 
execution of the Agreement. 177 
Negotiation between the Government of Kuwait and Aminoil to revise the 1948 
Agreement was immediately initiated after Kuwait became independent in 1961. The 
negotiation led to the signing of a Supplemental Agreement on 29 July 1961.178 
Financial clauses of the 1949 Agreement were mainly amended as well as the Company 
was subjected to Kuwait Income Tax Law. 179 A new article substituted Article 11 of the 
1949 Agreement; paragraph (A) of the new Article 11 gave the Ruler the right to 
terminate the Concession in the event of a default by the Company on its payments. 180 
(b) The nature of the dispute 
After Kuwait became independent it began its efforts to gain control over its 
economic resources especially the petroleum sector. The Supplemental Agreement 
outlined above was a part of this process, and the Kuwaiti Constitution which was 
promulgated on 11 November 1962 asserted the importance of natural resources, that 
natural wealth and resources are the property of the state. 181 Moreover, Article 152 of 
the new Constitution determines that "any concession for the exploitation of a natural 
resource or of a public utility shall be granted only by law and for a determinate period". 
Other negotiations between the Kuwaiti Government and Aminoil led to the 
signing of a draft agreement on 16 July 1973. The draft agreement introduced significant 
modifications to the 1949 and 1961 agreements; 182 especially in terms of tax rates, and 
the inclusion of a choice of law clause and a new arbitration clause. 183 The draft 
agreement has not been ratified, although it was modified three times in 1974. In the 
same period, some petroleum countries begun discussing resolutions that had been 
16 Documents, supra note 171, at 136 
'77 Ibid., at 137. 
178 Ibid., at 243. 
179 66 ILR 549 (1984); see Art. 1 of the Supplemental Agreement, Documents, supra note 171, at 244-246. 
180 Ibid., at 252, see the complete Article in Documents, at 252-253. 
181 Art. (21), "all of the natural wealth and resources are the property of the state. " 182 66 ILR 554 (1984). 
183 Ibid., at 553. 
116 
issued by the Organisation of the Petroleum Exporting Countries (OPEC); the `Abu 
Dhabi Formula' was one of these resolutions. 184 Kuwait informed the Company about 
the new policies concerning the tax rate, but the Company denied ever having received 
advice from the Government. 185 The new policies on tax rates were not accepted by 
Aminoil and negotiations between Aminoil and the Government commenced, but no 
agreement was reached. Therefore the Government appointed on 27 March 1977 a 
committee to complete all negotiations on pending matters between the parties. 186 'Me 
Company's profits and how much it should it pay to the Government were the disputed 
issues. In spite of efforts by both parties to reach an agreement, the new negotiations 
failed. Hence, on 19 September 1977 the Government of Kuwait terminated the 1948 
Aminoil Concession Agreement. '87 All interests, funds, assets, facilities and operations 
of the Company according to Article 2 of the decree, reverted to the state, in exchange 
for fair compensation to be paid to the Company, for which a special committee would 
be set up by the Minister of Oil. 188 The Kuwait Government stated that the take-over of 
Aminoil was necessary for the national interest because the latter failed to agree to the 
Government's terms. 189 
The Company protested against the take-over and notified the Government that it 
would invoke Article 18 of the Concession Agreement of 1948, initiating arbitration 
proceedings. Eventually, agreement was reached by the parties to hold an ad hoc 
arbitration, and an arbitration agreement was concluded on 12 July 1979.190 
184 At the 42nd (Vienna) meeting of OPEC (12 and 13 December 1974) the following decision was 
adopted: "the Conference... decided to adopt a new pricing system based on the financial effect of the 
decision taken on the 10 and I1 November 1974, in Abu Dhabi. In accordance with this decision the 
average government take from the operating oil companies will be $10.12 per barrel for the market 
crude", 9 YBCA 71-96,76 (1984). 
185 66 ILR 555 (1984). 
186 Ibid., at 555. 
187 The Kuwait Government issued on 19 September 1977 Decree Law No. 124, "[T]erminating the 
Agreement between the Kuwait Government and Aminoil", Article (1) of the Decree provided that 
"the Concession granted to the American Independent Oil Company in accordance with the 
aforementioned Agreement dated 28 June 1948 shall be terminated", ibid., at 558. 
188 Art. (3) provided "a committee named the Compensation Committee shall be set up by a decision of the 
Minister of Oil whose task it will be to assess the fair compensation due to the Company as well as the 
Company's outstanding obligations to the State or other parties. It shall decide what each party owes 
the other in accordance with this assessment. The state or the Company shall pay what the Committee 
decides within one month of being notified of the Committee's decision", ibid., at 558. 
189 Explanatory Memorandum accompanying Decree Law no. 124, ibid., at 558. 
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(c) Applicable law 
The parties agreed to solve all differences and disagreements between them 
amicably, 191 therefore they turned to transnational arbitration and concluded an 
Arbitration Agreement. The Agreement provided that the tribunal should consist of three 
members; two of whom would be appointed by each party and the third member who 
would act as president would be appointed by the president of the International Court of 
Justice. 192 The Arbitration Agreement left designation of the substantive law to the 
discretion of the tribunal. Article 3 Paragraph (2) provided that 
The law governing the substantive issues between the parties shall be determined 
by the tribunal, having regard to the quality of the parties, the transnational 
character of their relations and the principles of law and practice prevailing in the 
modem world. 193 
Concerning determination of the applicable substantive law, the tribunal in the 
first instance observed that the law of Kuwait applied to many matters, "over which it is 
the law most directly involved. "94 Hence, the tribunal only observed the objective 
criteria in the dispute. In which in the absence of a choice of the applicable law, the law 
which has the most connected factors to the dispute should be applied. The tribunal later 
considered the choice of law in other Kuwait petroleum concessions. 195 However, the 
tribunal did not pay any attention to the Kuwait argument that international law was part 
of the law of Kuwait. Finally, the tribunal concluded that the contract was an 
international agreement and should be governed by the application of international 
law. 196 
190 Ibid., at 559. 
191 Art. I of the Arbitration Agreement, ibid., at 532. 
192 Art. II, ibid., at 532; the tribunal consisted of Sir Gerald Fitzmaurice, Prof. Named Sultan, and as a 
chairman, Prof. Paul Reuter. 
193 Ibid., at 533. 
194 Ibid., at 560. 
195 See for instance the Offshore Concession Agreement of the Arabian Oil Company; see also the Oil 
Concession Agreement with the Kuwait National Petroleum Company and Hispanica de Petroleos. 
196 See for instance, A. F. M. Manniruzzaman, "State Contracts and Arbitral Choice-of-Law Process and 
Techniques: a Critical Appraisal", 15 (3) J Int'l Arb 65-92 (1998). 
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Concluding remarks 
The decisions of the arbitrators in these cases concerning the applicable law to 
the merits of the dispute were in summary: 
In the Abu Dhabi case, the Umpire at first excluded the application of Abu Dhabi 
law due to two reasons. First, the apparent insufficiency of Islamic law to govern 
modern commercial instruments. Second, that the parties had based their contract on 
"good will and sincerity of belief'. So the clause required as the Umpire interpreted, 
"principles rooted in the good sense and common practice of the generality of civilised 
nations". However, this conclusion seems artificial since all contracts join common 
principles and are in theory based upon good will and sincerity of belief. 197 Hence, Lord 
Asquith resorted to a non-municipal law as Maniruzzaman stated, to "deal with the 
matters in hand. " 198 
In the Qatar case, the referee came to the same conclusion as Lord Asquith, that 
Qatar law, which is based on Islamic law, is inadequate for the new commercial 
contracts, especially petroleum contracts. Moreover, he thought that the (contracting) 
parties, at the time of contracting, had no intention of applying Islamic law. 
In the Aramco case, the tribunal followed the same reasoning, arguing that no 
national law was adequate to govern petroleum contracts. 
The arbitrators' decisions in the Libyan cases were the strangest. These three 
cases were exactly the same in their facts and circumstances but the decisions were 
completely different. 199 
In the Aminoil case, the tribunal in the first instance agreed that the law of 
Kuwait applied on the basis that, among other things, it was the law most directly 
involved. However, the tribunal subsequent realised the internationalisation of the 
contract by the application of international law. 
Unfortunately, in all these cases the determination of the applicable law has had 
two considerable flaws. First, arbitrators abused the principles of private international 
law which determines that in the absence of explicit or implied choice of law by the 
contracting parties, arbitrators to some extent are required to apply the principles of the 
197 Ibid., at 73. 
198 Ibid., at 73. 
199 See Libyan cases above. 
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conflict of laws rules. In other words arbitrators in all these cases chose (vole directe) 
method which should only be activated falling a choice of law by parties. Second, there 
was a complete disregard of the will of the parties, since the contracting parties in some 
cases (e. g. Libyan cases) had already chosen the applicable law. However, arbitrators 
deliberately ignored this choice which simply means that they ignored the doctrine of 
party autonomy. The rationale for these flaws was just an attempt to avoid the 
application of the host state's law. This may be a consequence of the lack of knowledge 
of that law, or just an attempt to protect the benefit of petroleum companies irrespective 
of legality or illegality of these decisions. However, it is also a serious blow to party 
autonomy. 
It could be argued that it is a considerable matter that arbitrators are required to 
respect and apply the law which has been chosen by the parties whether national or 
international. Therefore, it is unjustified to ignore the national law and start looking for 
another law or rules when that law is capable to govern the dispute. 
Thus, do these decisions illuminate any legal principles in the sphere of 
petroleum arbitration? 20° To some extent it may be argued that these decisions cannot 
and should not be considered as a dogma in petroleum arbitrations, as all these decisions 
as stated above were just an attempt to consider the interest of petroleum companies. 
Furthermore, all those concession agreements were concluded during the period of 
colonisation. So it is easy to argue that the will of the host state was diminished if not 
null and void. Kuwait, for instance, amended its contract with Aminoil once it became 
independent. In addition, it was argued by tribunals that all Arab Countries during that 
era lacked an advanced legal infrastructure suitable for dealing with new commercial 
agreements, especially petroleum agreements. Hence, if this allegation was correct, it is 
unfair to quote literally decisions were given in a dark time (if this description is 
accurate) and apply them now in an environment that has achieved advanced elements 
especially these which related to laws sphere. Moreover, most members of these arbitral 
tribunals were only trying to avoid any resort to the host state's law, though that law had 
already been designated as the applicable law in most of these agreements, and there 
200 See Fernando R. Teson, "State Contracts and Oil Expropriations: The Aminoil-Kuwait Arbitration", 
supra note 171, at 324. 
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were some votes which said of applicability of the national law to govern the dispute. 0' 
Consequently, it may be impartiality the adherence to the speech which said "western oil 
companies operating in the Middle East, were driven by political and economic 
consideration, generally without even an attempt to fit them into international legal 
doctrine. , 202 
201 See for instance, the opinion of Milliot in Qatar case; see also opinions of Abu Zahra, Anderson and 
Joseph Schacht in Aramco case; supra note 87. 
202 Andreas F. Lowenfeld, International Economic Law, (Oxford: Oxford University Press 2002), at 407. 
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Chapter Two: The Theories Examined 
Introductory remarks 
This chapter discusses the problem of applicable law in international arbitration 
in general, and in petroleum disputes specifically, from a theoretical perspective, by 
giving thorough analysis of approach or mechanisms that have being used in the way of 
determining the applicable law to the substance of a dispute. 
1.1. Determination of the Applicable Law 
1.1.1. Determination of the applicable law by the parties (party autonomy) 
Contracting parties are familiar with their contractual rights and obligations of at 
least their expectations; therefore, they are generally capable of determining all aspects 
that arise in their contract especially the law which will govern their relationship and any 
dispute that may arise during its course. If the parties have determined the applicable law 
they can freely exercise this right at any time even after a dispute has arisen or before the 
arbitral tribunal. The aforesaid freedom of the contracting parties is known as party 
autonomy or the will of the parties. This simply means that the parties of a contract are 
free to shift their contractual obligations from the supervision under a national court to 
an arbitral tribunal, at the time of contracting as well as at any other time and subject it 
to the law of their choice. 
The doctrine of party autonomy has been widely accepted in most modem laws 
and rules, as well as in the major international conventions. The first example of party 
autonomy can be seen in the Geneva Protocol on Arbitration of 1923, which was 
prepared under the auspices of the League of Nations. This Convention gives the 
contracting states the right to submit their differences to arbitration. ' Then came Geneva 
Convention of 1927, which aimed to extend the mission of the previous Protocol in 
1 See Art. I of the Protocol. 
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terms of enforcing the arbitral awards. 2 The Washington Convention of 1965 on the 
Settlement of Investment Disputes between States and Nationals of Other States, which 
established the International Centre for Settlement of Investment Disputes (ICSID), 
asserted the doctrine of party autonomy. Article 42 (1) provides that "the tribunal shall 
decide a dispute in accordance with such rules of law as may be agreed by the parties. s3 
This doctrine was also confirmed by the Institute of International Law in its resolution 
on arbitration between states, state enterprises or state entities, and foreign enterprises, 
which was adopted at the Institute Santiago de Compostela Session on 12 September 
1989. Article 6 of that resolution clearly states that "the parties have full autonomy to 
determine the procedural and substantive rules and principles that are to apply in the 
arbitration. s4 
This doctrine has been asserted in numerous contemporary laws in developed as 
well as in developing countries. Section 46 (1) of the 1996 English Arbitration Act for 
instance, provides that 
The arbitral tribunal shall decide the dispute: 
a) in accordance with the law chosen by the parties as applicable to 
the substance of the dispute, or 
b) if the parties so agree, in accordance with such other 
considerations as are agreed by them or determined by the 
tribunal. 
The same situation is also found in some developing countries, for instance, the 
Omani Law of Arbitration in Civil and Commercial Matters, 5 which is based on the 
UNCITRAL Model Law, and provides in Article 6 (1) that "the arbitration parties have 
the autonomy to determine the law that arbitrators apply to the dispute's matter. " 
Moreover, party autonomy is well established in all modern arbitration institutions. The 
Rules of the GCC Commercial Arbitration Centre (Bahrain) for instance, provide in 
2 See the Geneva Convention on the Execution of Foreign Arbitral Awards of 1927. 
3 ICSID Basic Documents, 1985, International Centre for Settlement of Investment Disputes, at 22. 
4 See the resolution and comments by Von Mehren in 16 YBCA 233-239 (1991). 
5 This Law was issued on 28 June 1997, and it was published in the Gazette no. 602 (1997). 
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Article 12 that "the parties shall have the liberty of deciding the law, which the 
arbitrators shall apply to the issue in dispute [... ]. s6 The Centre seems to have followed 
the rules of the leading institutions, such as the rules of the International Chamber of 
Commerce (ICC), 7 the London Court of International Arbitration (LCIA), 8 and 
UNCITRAL Rules Article 33. 
(a) How the parties choose the law 
The contracting parties, as previously stated, can practice their freedom in terms 
of choosing the applicable law in two ways. First, they can make an express choice, in a 
written contract at the time of contracting or after, or can express their choice before the 
arbitral tribunal. The Rome Convention, Article 3, emphasises that the parties have the 
right to choose any law at any time. 9 
The second method of choice of law by the parties is in the form of an implied or 
a tacit choice of law, and this form may be expressed in words or actions, which 
illustrate that the parties have chosen a specific law as an applicable law to govern their 
relations. 10 Several factors play a significant role in terms of manifesting the intention 
and expectation of the parties' choice of a specific law. Lew argues that there are two 
forms of implied choice of law, which are: "implied autonomy on the basis of 
surrounding facts and implied autonomy on the basis of the language used. s11 
However, the implied choice of law is not always clear to the arbitrators and can 
cause conflict or disagreement between the parties and arbitrators. The following cases 
6 See these rules in the Directory of Lawyers & Jurists in the GCC States, supra note 3, at 9 (the English 
Section). 
7 ICC Rules, Art. 17 (1) provides that, "the parties shall be free to agree upon the rules of law to be applied 
by the Arbitral Tribunal to the merits of the dispute [.... ]. " 
8 LCIA Rules, Art. 22 (3) states that, "the Arbitral Tribunal shall decide the parties' dispute in accordance 
with the law(s) or rules of law chosen by the parties as applicable to the merits of their dispute [... ]'; see 
also the WIPO Arbitration Rules (effective from 1 October 2002), Art. 59; AAA Arbitration Rules 
(amended and effective on 1 July 2003), Art. 28. 
9 Convention on the Law Applicable to Contractual Obligations, opened for signature in Rome on 19 June 
1980. 
10 For more details on party autonomy in general see Julian D. M. Lew, Applicable Law in International 
Commercial Arbitration: A Study in Commercial Arbitration Awards, (Dobbs Ferry, New York: Oceana 
Publications 1978), at 71-210; see also Julian D. M. Lew/ Loukas A. Mistelis/ Stefan M Kroll, 
Comparative International Commercial Arbitration, (The Hague: Kluwer Law International 2003), at 
413-424. 
ll Julian D. M. Lew, Applicable Law in International Commercial Arbitration: A Study in Commercial 
Arbitration Awards, ibid.,, at 184 -204. 
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demonstrate the necessity for an express choice of law by the parties. 
In an award made on 23 October 197912, the respondent argued that in the 
absence of any explicit clause in the text of the Risk Exposure Bank Guarantee, the 
guarantee is governed by Belgian law. In this case, fortunately, the claimant at the 
hearing had not expressed any opposition to the application of Belgian law, otherwise it 
could not have been possible to have agreement upon the applicable law. 
In the interim award of Case no. 4650 of 1985, there was no express choice of 
law in the agreements, and an argument about the applicable law arose between the 
parties. 13 The claimant argued that the law of the state of Georgia, USA, should be 
applied, since all significant work would be provided there, but the claimant submitted 
the Swiss substantive law of the lexfori. The respondent contended that Saudi Arabian 
law should be applied because the obligations were to be wholly performed in Saudi 
Arabia. 
In a contract between a buyer from Mozambique and a seller from the 
Netherlands, the contract contained an arbitration clause stating that, 
Both parties undertake to fulfil this contract in good faith. Any dispute arising in 
consequence thereof, or in connection therewith [.... ], must finally undertake to 
submit the matter according to the regulation for agreement and arbitration of the 
International Chamber of Commerce to one or more arbitrators as per the said 
laws. The arbitration will take place in Switzerland, the law applicable is that 
known in England. 
The controversial issue before the arbitral tribunal after a dispute had arisen was 
the meaning and effect of the words "the law applicable is that known in England". 
Another example illustrates necessity of an express choice of law. In a partial 
award in Case no. 7319 of 199215 between two parties, a French manufacturer (the 
12 ICC Case no. 3316 (1979) between Mexican Construction Company v. Belgian Bank, Collection of ICC 
Awards, (1974-1985) at 87, reprinted in (1980) 107 Journal de Droit International (Clunet), 970-974. 
13 ICC Case no. 4650 (1985) between American Architect v. Saudi Arabian company, Collection of ICC 
Arbitral Awards, (1986-1990), at 67. 
14 Preliminary award of ICC Case no. 5505 (1987), Collection of ICC Arbitral Awards (1986-1990), at 
142. 
15 See the award in 24 YBCA 141 (1999). 
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claimant) and an Irish distributor (the respondent), the arbitrator referred to the 
agreement between them which contained an arbitration clause stating, "this Agreement 
shall be construded (sic) in accordance with and governed by laws and regulations 
applying to members of the European Economic Community. " After the dispute had 
arisen the issue of the applicable law was among disputed issues before the arbitral 
tribunal. ' 6 
However, is it possible for the parties to choose a hypothetical law? Or to choose 
conflict laws or rules of a given legal system? Or should their choice always refer to a 
substantive law of that system? Furthermore, can the parties choose a non-national law? 
It has been argued that the parties must choose a specific law and not merely a 
hypothetical one. '7 Moreover, according to this argument, the parties' choice of 
applicable law is concerned with the substantive law of a given legal system, not the 
conflict of laws rules of that system (exclusion of renvoi). 18 This understanding has been 
endorsed in many laws such as the 1996 English Arbitration Act, 19 and the UNCITRAL 
Model Law, Article 28 (1) of which provides that 
.... Any designation of the 
law or legal system of a given state shall be construed, 
unless otherwise expressed, as directly referring to the substantive law of that 
state and not to its conflict of laws rules. 
This position has been accepted in many Arab countries which have already 
adopted the UNCITRAL Model Law, such as Oman. 20 Furthermore, it is generally 
agreed that the parties can govern their dispute with a non-national law, such as lex 
mercatoria or UNIDROIT Principles. The parties can also choose more than one law, 
i. e. they can choose different laws to govern different aspects of their contract known as 
16 24 YBCA 142 (1999). 
17 Julian D. M. Lew, Applicable Law in International Commercial Arbitration: A Study in Commercial 
Arbitration Awards, supra note 10, at 71-210; see also Julian D. M. Lew/ Loukas A. Mistelis/ Stefan M 
Kroll, Comparative International Commercial Arbitration, supra note 10, at 415. 
1e Ibid., at 416. 
" Art. 46 (2) provides that, "for this purpose the choice of the laws of a country shall be understood to 
refer to the substantive laws of that country and not its conflict of laws rules. " 
20 The Omani Arbitration Law in Civil and Commercial Matters, supra note 5, Art. 39 (1). 
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"depecage. "21 This also has been well accepted in international conventions 22 as well as 
before tribunals. 23 
Finally, are there any limitations (statutory or other) to party autonomy? 
(b) Limitations to party autonomy 
Generally, arbitrators should respect and consider the choice of the parties in 
terms of determining the applicable law. However, it is possible to find certain 
exceptions to the doctrine of party autonomy. A number of circumstances have been 
suggested where arbitrators can limit or reject the parties' choice of law. 24 Fouchard 
Gaillard divides these circumstances into two groups, unsatisfactory restrictions of the 
effectiveness of the parties' choice of governing law, 25 and legitimate restrictions of the 
effectiveness of the parties' choice of governing law. 26 These theories will not be 
discussed here, since they have already been analysed in detail by scholars such as 
Fouchard Gaillard 27 and Lew. 8 
However, one aspect is particularly relevant here: the theory of "incompleteness 
of the law chosen by the parties" raises the question of the yardstick for such judgement, 
i. e. what requirements must a given law satisfy to be considered as a perfect or at least 
comprehensive law? Certain states insist upon applying their law(s) in certain contracts 
21 Gaillard Emmanuel! Savage John, (eds. ), Fouchard Gaillard Goldman on International Commercial 
Arbitration, (The Hague: Kluwer Law International 1999), para. 1436 at 794; Julian D. M. Lew, 
Applicable Law in International Commercial Arbitration: A Study in Commercial Arbitration Awards, 
supra note 10, at 71-210; see also Julian D. M. Lew/ Loukas A. Mistelis/ Stefan M Krbll, Comparative 
International Commercial Arbitration, supra note 10, at 418. 
22 The Rome Convention on the Law Applicable to Contractual Obligations of 1980, Art. 3 (1) states that, 
".... by their choice the parties can select the law applicable to the whole or a part only of the contract. " 
23 This method was used in the famous petroleum arbitration (ARAMCO) between Saudi Arabia v. 
Arabian American Oil Company (ARAMCO), (1963) 27 ILR 177; also used in the Channel Tunnel 
contract clause 68, Channel Tunnel Group Ltd and France Manche S. A. v. Balfour Beatty Construction 
Ltd. and others [1993] AC 334; 2 Lloyd's Rep 7 (1992). 
24 See Gaillard Emmanuel/ Savage John, (eds. ), Fouchard Gaillard Goldman on International 
Commercial Arbitration, supra note 21, para. 1511 at 842. 
25 This group contains three theories: a) the theory of the incompleteness of the law chosen by the parties, 
ibid., para. 1512 at 842-844; b) the extensive interpretation of international trade usages, ibid., para. 
1513 at 844 - 846; c) the theory of international mandatory rules "lois de police", ibid., para. 1515 at 
847 - 859. 26 This group comprises two theories, ibid., paras. 1529-1536 at 859-864 and these theories are: a) scope 
of the law chosen by the parties; b) international public policy. 
27 Ibid., para. 1511 at 842. 
28 Julian D. M. Lew, Applicable Law in International Commercial Arbitration: A Study in Commercial 
Arbitration Awards, supra note 10, at 102. 
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such as investment contracts. 29 Unfortunately, most laws which have been regarded as 
insufficient in the past were those of developing countries, especially of Arab countries. 
In this context, this suggests that complete law is considered as western law. This 
conclusion would seem to be supported by an examination of arbitration awards. In 
Petroleum Development Ltd. v. the Sheikh of Abu Dhabi, 30 despite the fact that the law 
of Abu Dhabi was the law which had been chosen by the parties, Lord Asquith regarded 
this law as insufficient and rejected it. 31 The same rationale can be found in the Aramco 
case. 32 Moreover, in a dispute between Southern Pacific Properties (Middle East) 
Limited (Hong Kong) and Southern Pacific Properties Limited (Hong Kong) v. The Arab 
Republic of Egypt, the tribunal decided after it had heard the argument concerning the 
applicable law that the law of Egypt is incomplete; the arbitral tribunal stated that, "the 
law of the ARE [Arab Republic of Egypt], like all municipal legal systems, is not 
complete or exhaustive. 
03 However, the situation has changed slightly because of 
increased regulations. 
In order to complete the discussion of party autonomy it is necessary to examine 
this doctrine in Islamic law (Shari'ah). 
(c) Party autonomy in Islamic law (Shari'ah) 
It may be worth mentioning that Islamic law is drawn from two principal 
sources, the Qura'an, the holy book which was sent to Prophet Mohammed by God 
(Allah), and the Sunna, which is the speech and practice of the Prophet Mohammed. 
There are other secondary sources such as Ijma'a, the consensus of Moslem legal 
scholars regarding a legal issue and Alquias (analogy). 
(i) Party autonomy in Shari'ah 
In fact, Islam gives complete authority to Muslims to conclude contracts unless 
these contracts are forbidden by Islamic rules, since the origin in Islam is the permission 
29 Marc Blessing, "Choice of Substantive Law in International Arbitration", 14 (2) J Int'l Arb 40 (1997). 
30 Petroleum Development Ltd. v. Sheikh ofAbu Dhabi, (1951) 18 ILR 144. 
31 Ibid., at 149. 
32 Saudi Arabia v. Arabian American Oil Co. (ARAMCO), (1963) 27 ILR 177. 
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(ebahah). All the conditions agreed upon by the Muslims are upheld except a condition 
which allows what is prohibited or prohibits what is lawful. At the same time, Islam 
obliges Muslims to fulfil their obligations, "successful indeed are the believers... who 
are shepherds of their pledges and their covenant. 9934 Prophet Mohammed also said, 
"Muslims are bound by their stipulations. "35 He also reported, "Allah says, I will be 
against three persons on the Day of Resurrection [one of these is he] who makes a 
covenant in My Name, but he proves treacherous. 936 However, Shari 'ah does not build a 
theory of contract, because the development of the contracts system in Shari 'ah is based 
on jurists, who "categorised each contract into classes of nominate contracts with their 
own distinctive rules. s37 
Furthermore, Islamic Law and the Holy Qura'an both emphasise the maxim of 
pacta sunt servanda as a direct order which cannot be derogated from, "0 ye who 
believe, fulfil all obligations. "38 However, the understanding on interpretation of this 
maxim is varied among Muslim scholars. On the one hand, some Muslim scholars 
believe that this maxim is limited to the tolerance of parties' autonomy only to conclude 
the contract (i. e. offer and acceptance), while others believe that it also includes the 
substance of the contract such as the legal rules and the legal results which are governed 
33 Award of 20 May 1992 in case no. ARB/84/3 (ICSID), 19 YBCA (1994), at 51-104; see the opinion of 
Georges R. Delaume, on this award "The Pyramids Stand - The Pharaohs Can Rest in Peace, " 8 ICSID 
Review: Foreign Investment Law Journal, 231-263 (1993). 
34 Sura XXIII, verses 1. 
35 Sahih Al-Bukhari. 
36 Sahih Al-Bukhari, vol. 3, book 34, no. 325. 
37 S. E. Rayner, The Theory of Contracts in Islamic Law, (London: Graham & Trotman 1991), at 86; see in 
general Noel J Coulson, Commercial Law in the Gulf States: The Islamic Legal Tradition, (London: 
Graham & Trotman 1984); Abd El-Wahab A. El-Hassan, "Freedom of Contract, the Doctrine of 
Frustration, and Sanctity of Contracts in Sudan Law and Islamic Law", 1 (1) Arab Law Quarterly 51- 
59 (1985); Mahdi Zahraa, "Characteristic Features of Islamic Law: Perceptions and Misconception", 
15 (2) Arab Law Quarterly 168-196 (2000); Muhammad W. Islam, "Dissolution of Contracts in 
Islamic Law", 13 (3) Arab Law Quarterly 336-368 (1998); Nabil Saleh, "Freedom of Contract: What 
does it mean in the Context of Arab Laws? " 16 (4) Arab Law Quarterly 346-357 (2001); Nabil Saleh, 
"Origin of the Sanctity of Contracts in Islamic Law", 13 (3) Arab Law Quarterly 252-264 (1998); 
Parviz Owsia, Sources of Law under English, French, Islamic and Iranian Law: A Comparative 
Review of Legal Techniques", 6 (1) Arab Law Quarterly 33-67 (1991). 
38 Surra v, verse 1; it was stated that "according to the strict sanctity of valid contracts in Muslim law, a 
national Islamic state has no vested right to cancel or alter a contract by unilateral action, whether such 
action takes the form of an administrative, judicial or even legislation act. Similarly, Muslim law does 
not discriminate against foreigners or non-Muslim in matters of contract, and apart from certain 
exceptions dictated by the state of war, the Muslim community has a duty to respect its contractual 
obligations towards aliens and non-Muslims", S. E. Rayner, The Theory of Contracts in Islamic Law, 
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by the legislature. 9 Thus, parties cannot modify any established rule except when such 
modification is explicitly or tacitly allowed by the legislature itself. 40 On the other hand, 
there are Muslim scholars who reject this view, believing in the flexibility of the 
contract 4' 
It is clear that party autonomy in Islamic law is not restricted except when it is 
inconsistent with Islamic rules, therefore the contracting parties have full freedom to 
stipulate in their contracts laws or rules, irrespective whether these laws or rules are 
national or foreign. 2 However, public policy under Islamic law is considered to be the 
most significant obstacle to party autonomy. Public policy in Islamic law is divided into 
two groups. 
The first contains the rules which have been cited in the divine sources (Qura'an 
and Sunnah). These rules cannot be violated or changed at any time or under any 
circumstances, and must be obeyed by all Muslim societies, by individual, courts and 
even by governments. 3 These rules include for example those which prohibit 
intoxicants and gambling, 44 usury, 45 and prostitution 46 The second group of rules are 
those which are developed by society. As Al-Samdan47 stated, divine law tolerates the 
fact that these values and notions developed, replaced, modified following the 
development in thinking of people due to time or place, 48 an example of these rules are 
those which are related to slavery. 49 
ibid., at 87; see also Muhammad Hamidullah, Conduct of State, (Revised ed., Lahore: Ashraf 1945), at 
130,145. 
39 Abu -Zahra, Ibn-Hanbal, (no date), Cairo at 385, (in Arabic), quoted by Ahmed D. Al-Samdan, 
Contracts' Conflict Rules in Arab Private International Law: A Comparative Study on Principles of 
Islamic and Civil Legal Systems, (1981), A PhD. Dissertation, School of Law, Duke University, at 63. 
40 Ibid., at 64. 
41 Ibid., at 65. 
42 Ibid., at 66; see also S. E. Rayner, The Theory of Contracts in Islamic Law, supra note 37, at 91. 
43 Ahmed D. AI-Samdan, Contracts' Conflict Rules in Arab Private International Law: A Comparative 
Study on Principles of Islamic and Civil Legal Systems, supra note 39, at 122. 
44 "Oh ye who believe, intoxicants and gambling.. . are an abomination, of Satan's handiwork. Eschew 
such abomination, that ye may prosper, " Surah v, verse 90 (Qura'an). 
45 "God has permitted trade and forbidden usury, " Surah II, verse 275, verse 278 in the same Surah asserts 
this prohibition "0 ye who believe, fear God, and give up what remains of your demand for usury, if 
ye are indeed believers. " 
46 "Nor come nigh to adultery for it is a shameful deed and an evil, opening the road to other evils, " Surah 
XVII, verse 32 (Qura'an). 
47 See Ahmed D. Al-Samdan, Contracts' Conflict Rules in Arab Private International Law: A Comparative 
Study on Principles of Islamic and Civil Legal Systems, supra note 39, at 122. 
48 Ibid., at 122. 
49 Ibid., at 123,124. 
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(ii) Conflict of laws (party autonomy) in Arab codifications 
A significant shift occurred in the legal system of Arab countries from the 
beginning of the 20th century. Egypt first and then throughout most of the Arab world 
imported western ideas were introduced, among them was ideas and principles of private 
international law. 50 As stated above most Arab countries have enacted new laws inspired 
by Shari 'ah as well as western laws, which widen the freedom of contractual 
relationships. sl In addition, these laws are not the same, as Shari 'ah, although some 
believe that they are. 52 
The following examples are evidence enough concerning the nature of new laws 
in Arab countries in terms of party autonomy. Article 126 of the United Arab Emirates 
Federal Civil code, for instance provide that a contract may contain several incidents and 
in general "any other thing which is not prohibited by a provision of the law and is not 
contrary to public order or morals. "53 
Similarly, Article 175 (1) of Kuwait Civil Code provides that 
The contract may contain any stipulation acceptable to both contracting parties 
provided it is not prohibited by the law or is in contravention of the public order 
or good manners (morality). 54 
Article 2 of Bahrain Commercial Code also upheld the party autonomy by stating 
that "there shall apply to commercial matters that which the two contracting parties have 
agreed upon provided that such agreement does not conflict with mandatory legislative 
provisions. "ss 
In the sphere of arbitration, most Arab countries have enacted new laws most of 
which were based on the Model Law and party autonomy is well respected in these 
so Ibid., at vi. 
51 Rayner for example argues that "recent assimilation of civil law contracts into modem Islamic codes is 
evidence enough that this is the common point of view throughout the Muslim world today", S. E. 
Rayner, The Theory of Contracts in Islamic Law, supra note 37, at 96. 
52 Nabil Saleh, "Freedom of Contract: What does it mean in the Context of Arab Laws? " 16 (4) Arab Law 
Quarterly 346-357,357 (2001). 
53 United Arab Emirates Federal Law of Civil Transactions, UAE Official Gazette, no. 158 (Dec. 1985). 
sa Decree Law no. 67 of 1980 enactment of the Civil Code, 1 December 1980. 
55 Law no. 7 of 1987. 
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laws. 56 
Hence, it could be argued that there is a wide range of discretion in the new Arab 
laws in terms of concluding contracts, as long as they do not contradict (like in other 
jurisdictions) with public policy or morals. 
(d) Concluding remarks 
It could be argued that the doctrine of party autonomy exists in the sphere of 
private parties, where all the contracting parties are on an equal footing in terms of 
bargaining power. However, the situation of contractual relationships between states and 
private parties, especially in the petroleum industry may not always be one of equality. 
Apart from the debatable sovereign immunity of the contracting state, there may be 
some political and financial pressures on the contracting state which lead it to 
compromise its autonomy. Article 24 of the Omani Standard Petroleum Exploration and 
Production Sharing Agreement for instance, provides for arbitration as a mechanism for 
settling any dispute which may arise between the contracting parties during the course of 
the agreement. The clause reads 
Any dispute which may arise between the Parties in respect of any clause of this 
Agreement or the obligations resulting therefrom during or after the term of this 
Agreement will be submitted to the International Centre for Settlement of 
Investment Disputes (ICSID) for arbitration by three (3) arbitrators pursuant to 
the Convention on the settlement of Investment Disputes between States and 
Nationals of other States. In the event ICSID declines to take jurisdiction of the 
dispute, then the matter will be finally settled by arbitration in accordance with 
the Rules of Arbitration of the International Chamber of Commerce by three (3) 
arbitrators appointed in accordance with such rules. The decision of the 
$6 See for instance, Kuwait Civil and Commercial Procedure Code no 30 of 1980, Article 173 which 
provides that "agreement may be made on arbitration in a specific dispute and on arbitration in all 
disputes arising from the implementation of a certain contract"; see also Qatar Civil and Commercial 
Procedure Code Chapter 13 (Arbitration) Article 190 which contains the same provision. Also, Oman 
Arbitration Act in Civil and Commercial Matters of 1997, Article 6 provides that (1) "[A]arbitration 
parties have the right to choose the law which will be applied by the arbitrators to the matter of the 
dispute. " (2) "[I]f the arbitration parties have agreed to subject their legal relationship to the provisions 
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arbitrators shall be final and judgment may be entered in any court having 
jurisdiction. 57 
An oral interview was conducted by the writer on 15 August 2001 concerning the 
reasons for the Omani party's consent to this article, the answer was simply because "we 
have to accept all the requirements of petroleum companies or we would not have any 
investment in the petroleum sector. " In such circumstances, party autonomy is a fragile 
concept. 
It may be that a contract in a vital national sector such as the petroleum sector 
bears no comparison to goods contract which is normally agreed between a seller and a 
buyer. Consequently, the state party might find itself compelled to accept some terms 
and conditions which maybe unsatisfactory. 
1.1.2. Determination of the applicable law by the arbitrators 
(a) Introductory remarks 
Contracting parties to a large extent have the authority to choose the law which 
they consider appropriate to govern their contractual obligations and rights. However, 
occasionally the parties do not utilise this right, which results in their contract lacking 
guidance on the matter of applicable law. There are several reasons for this. Lew 
suggests that this aspect of law may not be considered important by businessmen, and 
therefore is left to lawyers or legal advisors. 58 Lawyers themselves sometimes render the 
agreement void of any clause reflecting the applicable law. 59 It may also happen that the 
contracting parties, after a long period of negotiation and in the happiness of the moment 
of agreement, do not pay any attention to issues with which they are not so familiar, or 
indeed are not critical to the main argument such as the applicable law. 
laid down in a standard contract or international treaty or any other document, the provisions of such a 
document shall be applicable including the provisions relating to the arbitration. 
57 The Omani Standard Petroleum Exploration and Production Sharing Agreement, (unpublished). 
58 See Julian D. M. Lew, Applicable Law in International Commercial Arbitration: A Study in Commercial 
Arbitration Awards, supra note 10, at 221. 
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When the contracting parties have failed to choose the law which will govern 
their contract for whatever reason, the task of determining the applicable law is 
transferred to the arbitrators. Important questions here are: What methods or 
mechanisms do arbitrators follow to determine the applicable law? Do arbitrators always 
apply the conflict of laws system, and if yes, then how do they choose which one? 
Moreover, can arbitrators override the conflict of laws system and directly apply any 
given national law, or non-national law, i. e. "vole directe"? If yes is the host state's law 
prioritised when the dispute concerns a sovereign resource such as petroleum? Is there 
any limitation on the arbitrators' choice? These questions will be discussed in depth 
below. 
(b) How the arbitrators choose the applicable law (the methods) 
Fouchard Gaillard argues that arbitrators can be guided by the memoranda that 
have been exchanged by the parties. 60 He adds that guidance may also be found in the 
provisions that have been chosen by the parties, for example, in the UNCITRAL 
Arbitration Rules Article 33 (1) is clear and direct in this regard . 
61 An identical provision 
can also be found in the Rules of the Cairo Regional Centre for International 
Commercial Arbitration, 62 and also in the Rules of the GCC Commercial Arbitration 
Centre (Bahrain), 63 both of which cite Article 33 (1) of the UNCITRAL Arbitration 
Rules. 
However, the situation is changing with the new rules of major institutional 
arbitration. There is an increasing tendency towards `harmonisation' of arbitration rules 
and procedures removing arbitration from its locality. This attempted universality 
appears to be part of the package of globalisation process. The recourse64 to conflict of 
59 Carlo Croff, "The Applicable Law in an International Commercial Arbitration: Is it Still a Conflict of 
Laws Problem? " 16 International Lawyer 613-645,633 (1982). 
60 Gaillard Emmanuel/ Savage John, (eds. ), Fouchard Gaillard Goldman on International Commercial 
Arbitration, supra note 21, para 1538, at 865. 
61 Art. 33 (1) expressly states that "[T] he arbitral tribunal shall apply the law designated by the parties as 
applicable to the substance of the dispute. Failing such designation by the parties, the arbitral tribunal 
shall apply the law determined by the conflict oflaws rules which it considers applicable. 
62 Art. 33 (1). 
63 Art. 28 (2) provides that "failing any designation by the parties, the arbitral tribunal shall apply the law 
determined by the conflict of laws rules which it considers applicable. " 
6a Gaillard Emmanuel/ Savage John, (eds. ), Fouchard Gaillard Goldman on International Commercial 
Arbitration, supra note 21, para. 1538, at 865. 
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laws rules in order to select a law or rules is no longer required in the new Rules of ICC 
1998, LCIA 1998, AAA 2003, and the Rules of the Stockholm Chamber of Commerce 
of 1999. Article 17 of the ICC Rules states 
The parties shall be free to agree upon the rules of law to be applied by the 
arbitral tribunal to the merits of the dispute. In the absence of any such 
agreement, the arbitral tribunal shall apply the rules of law which it determines to 
be appropriate. 
This simply means that arbitrators are no longer bound to apply the conflict of 
laws rules in order to determine the applicable law, instead they can go directly to the 
rules of law that they believe are applicable 65 Other institutions have followed the path 
of the ICC in rejecting the requirement of the application of the conflict of laws rules to 
determine the applicable law. 66 Hence, how do arbitrators determine the applicable 
substantive law which they consider appropriate? 
There are certain processes or theories which may be followed in this regard. 
Although these theories have already been analysed in depth by many scholars and 
commentators, 67 we will briefly examine them before turning to our main issue of 
petroleum disputes. 
65 See Yves Derains/ Eric A Schwartz., A Guide to the New ICC Rules ofArbitration, (The Hague: Kluwer 
Law International 1998), at 217. 
66 AAA Rules Art. 28 (1) states that "... failing such a designation by the parties, the tribunal shall apply 
such law (s) or rules of law as it determines to be appropriate. " LCIA Rules Art. 22 (3) provides that, 
"... if and to the extent that the Arbitral Tribunal determines that the parties have made no such choice, 
the Arbitral Tribunal shall apply the law (s) or rules of law which it considers appropriate"; The Rules 
of the Arbitration Institute of the Stockholm Chamber of Commerce, Art. 24 (1) states that, "... in the 
absence of such an agreement, the Arbitral Tribunal shall apply the law or rules of law which it 
considers to be most appropriate. " 
67 See for instance, Julian D. M. Lew, Applicable Law in International Commercial Arbitration: A Study in 
Commercial Arbitration Awards, supra note 10, at 233; Gaillard Emmanuel! Savage John, (eds. ), 
Fouchard Gaillard Goldman on International Commercial Arbitration, supra note 21, at 867; Carlo 
Croff, "The Applicable Law in International Commercial Arbitration: Is it Still a Conflict of Laws 
Problem? " supra note 59, at 621; Mark Blessing, "Choice of Substantive Law in International 
Arbitration", supra note 29, at 48; see also in general Horacio A. Grigera Nadn, Choice-of-Law 
Problems in International Commercial Arbitration, (Tubingen: J. C. B. Mohr (Paul Siebeck) 1992), at 
83-151; Horacio A. Grigera Nabn, "Choice-of-Law Problems in International Commercial 
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1) The lexfori as a guide in the determination of the applicable law 
The first traditional guidance can be found in the theory of the seat of arbitration 
lex fori or siege d'arbitrage. This theory was inspired by Professor Hall Sauser, who 
maintained that "arbitrators must resort to the private international law rules of the place 
where the arbitration tribunal has its seat. "68 The statement perceives arbitration and the 
award as similar to the national court judgement, where the arbitrator replaces the judge 
of a national court; consequently, the arbitrator should apply the conflict of laws system 
of the country where he is sitting, as a national judge usually does. 69 
Yet, when the contracting parties have not specified the seat of arbitration, how 
would this theory be applied? Even if the seat of arbitration is not a contention issue, 
what is the connection between the seat of arbitration, Geneva for instance, and a dispute 
between two parties one from Oman and another from England? What if the arbitration 
proceedings take place in more than one location? These and many other critical 
questions are provoked by this theory. 70 
2) Application of the conflict of laws system of the country which would 
have had jurisdiction in the absence of an arbitration clause 
This theory was promulgated by a distinguished Italian scholar, Dionisio 
Arbitration", 289 Recueil des Cours: Collected Courses of the Hague Academy of 
International Law 13-395,229-230 (2001). 
68 Quoted by Julian D. M. Lew, Applicable Law in International Commercial Arbitration: A Study in 
Commercial Arbitration Awards, supra note 10, at 245; Grigera Naön may be considered one of the 
contemporary proponents to the theory of lexfori in terms of determining the applicable law. He argues 
that, "even today, international commercial arbitrators occasionally look at the private international law 
of the place of arbitration as the exclusive source of the conflict-of-laws rule they seek to apply 
although the legal system of the place of arbitration does not require the mandatory application of its 
conflict rules by arbitral tribunal sitting in the jurisdiction. " Then he later concluded that "by arbitral lex 
fort it is then meant a combination of factual and legal circumstances, inherent in international 
commercial arbitration, moulding arbitral choice-of-law determinations along lines that are unique to 
this form of dispute resolution. " He believes that this "conclusion is inductive. " Grigera Nabn also 
determines the characteristics of arbitral lexfori compared to the juridical or national lex fori. For more 
details, see Horacio A. Grigera Naön, "Choice-of-Law Problems in International Commercial 
Arbitration", ibid., at 229-230,373-376. 
69 See Beda Wortmann, "Choice of Law by the Arbitrators: The Applicable Conflict of Laws System", 14 
Arbitration International 106 (1998). 
70 For more details on the critiques of this theory, see Julian D. M. Lew, Applicable Law in International 
Commercial Arbitration: A Study in Commercial Arbitration Awards, supra note 10, at 252; Gaillard 
Emmanuel/ Savage John, (eds. ), Fouchard Gaillard Goldman on International Commercial 
Arbitration, supra note 21, at 867,868; see also Carlo Croff, "The Applicable Law in International 
Commercial Arbitration: Is it Still a Conflict of Laws Problem? " supra note 59, at 620. 
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Anzilotti, based upon the assumption that the conflict of laws system of the country 
which would have had jurisdiction over the dispute, if the parties had not chosen 
arbitration as a mechanism to solve their dispute should be applied. 7' 
However, this theory has been criticised on two grounds. 72 First, it abandons the 
major advantages of international arbitration "the avoidance of uncertainty and 
inconvenience related to international conflicts of jurisdiction", despite the fact that the 
parties chose to insert an arbitration clause into their contract. Consequently, arbitrators 
have the difficult task of determining the national court which would have had 
jurisdiction if parties had not submitted their dispute to arbitration. 73 The second 
criticism is the difficulty of applying this theory because of its circular nature. 
Arbitrators have to choose a conflict of laws system to determine which country would 
have had jurisdiction. 4 
3) Application of the closest connection rules either to the parties 
or to the arbitrator(s) or to the place of enforcement 
Based on this theory several suggestions have been made in terms of the method 
for choosing the applicable law to the merits of a dispute. One of these is the application 
of the conflict of laws system of the contracting parties. However, in practice this can be 
a difficult task. The contracting parties in international arbitration come from different 
countries and different jurisdictions; if this method is applied which jurisdiction would 
arbitrators choose and why? 
A second suggestion is that of applying the conflict of laws system or rules of the 
arbitrators. In this case similar difficulties arise as in the previous suggestion. Where 
there is a sole arbitrator this method may be useful, but when the tribunal consists of 
more than an arbitrator, which conflict of laws system should be chosen and why? 
The third suggestion is applying the conflict of laws system of the state where 
the arbitral award would be enforced. Although this solution is workable in that 
arbitrators are always expected to render an enforceable award, the main objection to 
71 Carlo Croff, ibid., at 620. 
72 Ibid., at 620. 
73 Ibid., at 620. 
74 Ibid., at 620. 
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this suggestion is the difficulty of enforcing some arbitral awards. Furthermore, if the 
award is to be enforced in more than one country, which conflict of laws system should 
arbitrators apply? Another obstacle that may arise here is the application of certain 
doctrines such as mandatory rules or public policies in order to hinder the enforcement 
of that award. 75 Therefore, it could be argued that this choice-of-law mechanism may be 
unsatisfactory for some parties and may lead to several obstacles to arbitration. 
4) Cumulative application of relevant conflict of laws rules (Tronc commun) 
The use of more than one conflict of laws systems from more than one 
jurisdiction to determine the law applicable to dispute by arbitrators is known as a 
cumulative choice of law. 76 In this method, arbitrators search all relevant jurisdictions 
that may guide them to the solution of applicable law. 77 
The arbitration clause in the Channel Tunnel contract, 78 clearly reflects the above 
method, therefore it provides a useful example of how the Tronc Commun doctrine can 
play a real role in determining the applicable law to the substance of a dispute. 9 The 
clause provides that 
The construction, validity and performance of the contract shall in all respects be 
governed by and interpreted in accordance with the principles common to both 
English law and French law and in the absence of such common principles by 
such general principles of international trade law as have been applied by 
national and international tribunals. Subject in all cases, with respect to the works 
to be respectively performed in the French and in the English part of the site, to 
the respective French or English public policy (order public) provisions. 80 
75 See for example Art. 5 of the New York Convention; for more details on this theory see Carlo Croff, 
ibid., at 622. 
76 Gaillard Emmanuel/ Savage John, (eds. ), Fouchard Gaillard Goldman on International Commercial 
Arbitration, supra note2l, para. 1547 at 872. 
77 Ibid., at 872. 
78 Channel Tunnel Group Ltd and France Manche S. A. v. Balfour Beatty Construction Ltd. and others 
[1993] AC 334; 2 Lloyd's Rep 7 (1992). 
79 Rubino-Sammartano Mauro, "The Channel Tunnel and the Tronc Commun Doctrine", 10 (3) J Int'l Arb 
59-65 (1993). 
80 Clause (68) of the Channel case, Channel Tunnel Group Ltd and France Manche S. A. v. Balfour Beatty 
Construction Ltd. and others [1993] AC 334; 2 Lloyd's Rep 7 (1992). 
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5) Application of the conflict of laws system established by the arbitrators 
The nature of arbitration is, for the most part, neutral, independent, based on the 
will and consent of the contracting parties, and there is no national jurisdiction over the 
arbitrators. When the parties choose arbitration as an alternative method to solve any 
dispute, they distance their contract from the jurisdiction of any national court, as 
arbitration generally provides a more flexible approach 81 Consequently, the parties 
choose arbitration because they trust the arbitrators as capable of rendering a satisfactory 
award by using the most appropriate conflict of laws system. 82 In other words, according 
to this method, when the parties fail to choose the applicable law to their contract, `no 
one particular conflict of laws system must be followed' but the arbitrators should 
choose the closest and most appropriate system to the dispute. 83 
6) Application of general principles of private international law 
The application of general principles of private international law by the 
arbitrators in order to determine the applicable law is widely endorsed in international 
conventions. 84 Therefore, arbitrators normally search for the principles of private 
international law in international conventions as well as in the arbitral case law. 85 
7) The direct application of a substantive national law (vole directe) 
Arbitrators from time to time overtake any conflict of laws system and directly 
apply a specific substantive national law or national rule as an applicable law to the 
merits of a dispute. In other words, arbitrators may apply a substantive law of a country 
which they believe is "appropriate" without having recourse to any conflict of laws 
system. The freedom to choose an applicable law or rules in this way, as Goldman 
argues, was first included in the 1981 French decree on international arbitration (Art. 
81 Julian D. M. Lew, Applicable Law in International Commercial Arbitration: A Study in Commercial 
Arbitration Awards, supra note 101 at 299. 
92 Carlo Croff, "The Applicable Law in International Commercial Arbitration: Is it Still a Conflict of Laws 
Problem? " supra note 59, at 623. 
83 Ibid., at 623. 
84 The 1980 Rome Convention on the Law Applicable to Contractual Obligations for instance; see also 
Gaillard Emmanuel! Savage John, (eds. ), Fouchard Gaillard Goldman on International Commercial 
Arbitration, supra note 21, para 1549, at 874. 
85 For more details see Julian D. M. Lew, Applicable Law in International Commercial Arbitration: A 
Study in Commercial Arbitration Awards, supra note 1, at 229-369. 
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1496 of the New Code of Civil Procedure) followed by the 1986 Netherlands Arbitration 
Statute (Art. 1054(2) of the Code of Civil Procedure). 86 In terms of guidance for 
arbitrators, Goldman argues that the determination may be based upon connections 
between the case and the chosen law, or may be because of the modernity of the given 
law. Furthermore, the arbitrators may consider the drafting of the contract in order to 
avoid applying a law which may lead the contract to be considered void. 87 Interestingly, 
this method has been practised in two different ways. First, when there is a false conflict 
of laws, and second, when there is a true conflict of laws. 
88 
8) Application of a non-national law standard 
The arbitrators, in the absence of an express choice by the parties, have the 
authority to select applicable law from a wide variety of sources. 89 In direct contrast to 
the above method, one of these sources is rules which have no connection to any 
national law or any conflict of laws system. Here, the arbitrators exclude the dispute 
from any national jurisdiction and subject it to a set of rules that have no relevance to 
any national law, 90 such as the lex mercatoria and UNIDROIT Principles of International 
Commercial Contracts. The following chapter will discuss these rules. 
(c) Limitations on arbitrators' choice 
It has been argued that arbitrators have much freedom in determining the 
applicable law to the substance of a dispute 
91 They are not confined to a given conflict 
of laws system, and may look to other principles such as the trade usages, or "depecage" 
86 See Gaillard Emmanuel/ Savage John, (eds. ), Fouchard Gaillard Goldman on International 
Commercial Arbitration, supra note 21, para 1552, at 876. 
87 Ibid., at 876; see for example ICC Award no. 4145 (1984), Establishment of Middle East country v. 
South Asian construction company, (1987) 12 YBCA 97. 
88 For more details see Julian D. M. Lew, Applicable Law in International Commercial Arbitration: A 
Study in Commercial Arbitration Awards, supra notelO, at 373,378; Carlo Croff, "The Applicable 
Law in International Commercial Arbitration: Is it Still a Conflict of Laws Problem? " supra note 59, at 
624,625. 
89 Gaillard Emmanuel/ Savage John, (eds. ), Fouchard Gaillard Goldman on International Commercial 
Arbitration, supra note 21, para 1554, at 878. 
90 Carlo Croff, "The Applicable Law in International Commercial Arbitration: Is it Still a Conflict of Laws 
Problem? " supra note 59, at 626. 
91 See for example Julian D. M. Lew/ Loukas A. Mistelis/ Stefan M Kröll, Comparative International 
Commercial Arbitration, supra note 10, at 425; the ICC Rules for instance, give authority to arbitrators 
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doctrine. 2 The only limitations on arbitrators are such principles relating to mandatory 
rules. 93 However, are there more limitations where a state is one of the contracting 
parties? 
1.1.3. Determination of the applicable law by the arbitrators in 
petroleum disputes 
Disagreements regarding the applicable law are often observed in contracts 
between states and private parties, especially in natural resources agreements, no doubt 
in part due to a conflict of interests. 4 If we examine both old and new petroleum 
agreements we find constant conflict. For example, all petroleum agreements concluded 
in the United Arab Emirates between 1939 and 1981 contained no reference to the 
applicable law. 95 The same situation is also found in Iran. Since 1954, the Iranian 
government has concluded four petroleum agreements with foreign petroleum 
companies, and the question of the applicable law was much debated in all these 
to determine the appropriate rule of law without recourse to conflict of laws system, see Article 17 of 
the 1998 ICC Arbitration Rules. 
92 Gaillard Emmanuel/ Savage John, (eds. ), Fouchard Gaillard Goldman on International Commercial 
Arbitration, supra note 21, para 1557, at 882. 
93 See for example ICC Award no. 6500,1992, Lebanese Traders Distributors & Consultants v. Reynolds 
Tobacco International, 119 Clunet 1015 (1992). 
94 A. F. M. Maniruzzaman, "Conflict of Laws Issues in International Arbitration: Practice and Trends", 9 
Arbitration International 371-403 (1993); Böckstiegel argues that "in the kind of arbitration that we are 
dealing with here, which is characterised by one of the parties being a state or a state controlled 
corporation, the determination of the applicable law plays a much greater role also in the practice of 
arbitration. Especially in investment disputes"; Karl-Heinz Böckstiegel, "The Legal Rules Applicable 
in International Commercial Arbitration Involving States or State-Controlled Enterprises", in 
International Arbitration 60 Years of ICC Arbitration, A Look at the Future, 94 Gaillard Emmanuel/ 
Savage John, (eds. ), Fouchard Gaillard Goldman on International Commercial Arbitration, supra note 
21, para 1554, at 878. 
94 Carlo Croff, "The Applicable Law in International Commercial Arbitration: Is it Still a Conflict of Laws 
Problem? " supra note 59, at 626. 
90 See for example Julian D. M. Lew/ Loukas A. Mistelis/ Stefan M Kröll, Comparative International 
Commercial Arbitration, supra note 10, at 425. 
94 Gaillard Emmanuel Savage John, (eds. ), Fouchard Gaillard Goldman on International Commercial 
Arbitration, supra note 21, para 1557, at 882. 
94 See for example ICC Award no. 6500,1992, Lebanese Traders Distributors & Consultants v. Reynolds 
Tobacco International, 119 Clunet 1015 (1992). 
94 A. F. M. Maniruzzaman, "Conflict of Laws Issues in International Arbitration: Practice and Trends", 9 
Arbitration International 371-403 (1993); Böckstiegel argues that "in the kind of arbitration that we are 
dealing with here, which is characterised by one of the parties being a state or a state controlled 
corporation, the determination of the applicable law plays a much greater role also in the practice of 
arbitration. Especially in investment disputes"; Karl-Heinz Böckstiegel, "The Legal Rules Applicable 
in International Commercial Arbitration Involving States (Paris: ICC 1984), at 149. 
95 See Mana Saeed Al-Otaiba, The Petroleum Concession Agreements of the United Arab Emirates 
vols. 1 &2, (London: Croom Helm 1982). 
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contracts. 96 Some of the new generation of petroleum contracts also contained no 
reference to the applicable law. 97 So the task of determination of the applicable law 
becomes more difficult in state contracts than in any other contracts. In this situation, 
can arbitrators apply the same criteria to contracts involving a state party as they do to 
contractual relationships between private parties, or are there specific criteria which 
must be considered in these contracts? The following discussion will analyse three 
theories explicitly related to state parties. 
(a) Delocalisation theory 
Delocalisation theory has been introduced by western scholars who assume that 
foreign companies which conclude long-term contracts with developing states need 
protection from the intervention of the host state. When these contracts are delocalised 
or internationalised, the laws which may be applicable to these contracts are not that of 
the host state's law. In other words "these contracts are necessarily rooted in some form 
of "delocalised" law which precludes unilateral alteration of the obligations by the 
state. s98 In the context of applicable law, Hermann argues that "if it is the domestic law 
of the host country, the foreign company has lost its case. " Therefore, in Hermann's 
opinion if a company wants a chance of winning a dispute, public international law, or, 
the law of another state must be applied-99 Dupuy, the sole arbitrator in the Texaco 
case, '°° followed the same rationale when he argued that state contracts, especially 
petroleum contracts, must be automatically delocalised in terms of substantive law, even 
if the parties to such contracts did not state this, because they must have intended to do 
96 Rouhollah K. Ramazani, "Choice-of-Law Problems and International Oil Contracts: A Case Study" 11 
ICLQ 503-518,504 (1962). 
97 See for instance, the Omani Exploration and Production Sharing Agreement (unpublished). 
98 See Stephen J. Toope, Mixed International Arbitration: Studies in Arbitration between States and 
Private Persons, (Cambridge: Grotius Publications Limited 1990), at 53; Texaco Overseas Petroleum 
Company and California Asiatic Oil Company v. The Government of the Libyan Arab Republic, 53 
ILR 389 (1979); 17 ILM 1 (1978); 4 YBCA 177 (1979); see also Amoco International Finance Corp. 
v. The Government of the Islamic Republic of Iran (1987) 15 Iran-US CTR 189 (Champer 3), where 
the claim was rejected. 
99 A. H. Hermann, "Disputes between States and Foreign Companies", in: Julian D. M. Lew (ed. ), 
Contemporary Problems in International Arbitration, (1987 the Netherlands: Martinus Nijhoff 
Publishers), 250-263,258. 
10° Texaco Overseas Petroleum Company and California Asiatic Oil Company v. The Government of the 
Libyan Arab Republic, 53 ILR 389 (1979); 17 ILM 1 (1978); 4 YBCA 177 (1979). 
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SO. 
101 
The notion of delocalisation or internationalisation, as Lipstein102 argues, has 
been employed to assist arbitral tribunals in determining the contractual rights and 
obligations of the parties, by relying on international law or general principles of 
international law as the sole source or in conjunction with municipal law. 103 As far as the 
applicable law is concerned, a variety of suggestions have been made, such as that a 
contract itself can provide, in effect, its own law with which to govern the relationships 
between the parties, without recourse to any legal system. 104 This is the so called 
vacuum theory. However, the latter theory has been rejected by some scholars. Mann for 
instance, insists that any contract should be governed by a given law, 105 therefore he 
suggests public international law as an applicable law in state contracts. 
106 Hence, this 
theory is based upon assumption that the host state's law is incapable to govern state 
contracts and therefore other rules of law should be applied in this regard i. e. lex 
mercatoria, general principles of law, public international law or ex aeque et bono. 
(b) Localisation theory 
Localisation theory is based upon the rationale that the contract should be 
governed by the law which has the closest connection to that contract, or what is 
normally called the `centre of gravity' or `the proper law of the contract', 
107 and the 
101 Ibid. 
102 K. Lipstein, "International Arbitration between Individuals and Governments and the Conflict of 
Laws", in: Bin Cheng/ E. D. Brown (eds. ), Contemporary Problems of International Law: Essays in 
honour of George Schwarzenberger on his eightieth birthday, (1988 London: Stevens & Sons 
Limited), 177-195. 
103 Ibid., at 178-179. 
104 See for instance, Derek William Bowett, "State Contracts with Aliens: Contemporary Developments on 
Compensation for Termination or Breach", LIX BYIL 49-74,50; see also Alfred Verdross, "Quasi- 
International Agreements and International Economic Transactions", 18 The Yearbook of World 
Affairs 230-247,231(1964); and also Mahmsani decision in Libyan American Oil Company (LIAMCO) 
(USA) v. The Government of the Libyan Arab Republic, 62 ILR 140 (1982); 20 ILM 20 (1981); 6 
YBCA 89 (1981). 
105 He added that "every contract by whomsoever made must be subject either to a national system of law 
or to public international law, for these are the only legal orders known to us", F. A. Mann, "The 
Theoretical Approach Towards the Law Governing Contracts Between States and Private Persons", 11 
Revue Beige de Droit International 562-594,563 (1975). 
106 "It is possible, however, for contracts between parties only one of whom is an international person to 
be subject to public international law", F. A. Mann, "The Proper Law of Contracts Concluded by 
International Persons", 35 BYIL 34-56,43 (1959). 
107 A. F. M. Maniruzzaman, "Conflict of Laws Issues in International Arbitration: Practice and Trends", 
supra note 94, at 377. 
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assumption that all legal disputes relate to a national law. Therefore, when determining 
the applicable law, the law of the place which had the `most significant relationship' 
with the transaction should be concerned. 108 Where petroleum contracts are concerned it 
would seem that this theory is in favour of the host state's law, as the place where the 
contract is concluded is the host state, the place where the contract is performed is the 
host state and the subject matter of the contract is a vital resource for the host state. 
The Institute of International Law adopted at its Athens Session in 1979 a 
Resolution on the Proper Law of the Contract in Agreements between a State and a 
Foreign Private Person. The Resolution reads, inter alia: 
Article 1: Contracts between a state and a foreign private person shall be 
subjected to the rules of law chosen by the parties, or, failing such a choice, to 
the rules of law with which the contract has the closest link. 
Article 5: In the absence of any choice by the parties, the proper law of the 
contract shall be derived from indications of the closest connection of the 
contract. '09 
In the same vein, the Rome Convention of 1980 gives an important role to the 
principle of closest connection. 110 Moreover, the Convention on the Settlement of 
Investment Disputes between States and Nationals of Other States (ICSID), Article 42 
(1), clearly provides that the law of the contracting state should be applied to the dispute 
when there is no agreement between the contracting parties upon the applicable law. 
III 
108 Luther L. McDougal III/ Robert L. Felix/ Ralph U. Whitten, American Conflicts Law, (5th ed., Ardsley/ 
New York: Transnational Publishers 2001), at 336. 
109 Resolution adopted at the institute session in Athens, 4- 13 September 1979. 
110 Convention on the Law Applicable to Contractual Obligations, opened for signature in Rome on 19 
June 1980. Art. 4 (1) provides that "to the extent that the law applicable to the contract has not been 
chosen in accordance with Article 3, the contract shall be governed by the law of the country with 
which it is most closely connected. Nevertheless, a separable part of the contract which has a closer 
connection with another country may be way of exception be governed by the law of that other 
country"; see also Richard Plender/ Michael Wilderspin, The European Contracts Convention The 
Rome Convention on the Choice of Law for Contracts, (2"d ed., London: Sweet & Maxwell 2001), at 
109,264. 
111 Art. 42 (1): "the tribunal shall decide a dispute in accordance with such rules of law as may be agreed 
by the parties. In the absence of such agreement, the Tribunal shall apply the law of the Contracting 
State party to the dispute (including its rules on the conflict of laws) and such rules of international law 
as may be applicable. " In this regard see for instance, Wena Hotels Ltd v. Arab Republic of Egypt, 
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In the United States, according to the Second Restatement of Conflict of Laws of 
the United States of America, 1971, Section 188, the rights and duties of the contracting 
parties are determined by the local law of the state which has the most significant 
relationship to the transaction and the parties. "2 
The same approach can be found in the case law. Lord Simmonds in Bonython v. 
Commonwealth ofAustralia expressed that 
The substance of the obligation must be determined by the proper law of the 
contract, i. e. the system of law by reference to which the contract was made or 
that with which the transaction has its closest and most real connexion 
[connection]. ' 13 
In the United States, the leading case in this regard is Babcock v. Jackson, where 
the court concluded that the governing law would be that of "Ontario" because it has the 
"most significant relationship. "' 14 Likewise, in Denmark, a contract was concluded 
between a woman resident in Denmark and a German institute. The Qstre Landsret held 
that the contract was governed by German law because all the contract's aspects were 
connected with Germany! is The same approach has been articulated in France by the 
Court of Appeal of Paris, in the case of Jansen v. Ste' Heurty, which held that "in the 
absence of an express choice of a governing law, a contract is governed by that of the 
place with which it is most closely connected. "' 
16 In an interim award in the ICC Case 
no. 6560 of 1990, the tribunal came down in favour of the law of the place of 
performance of the majority of the contractual obligations: "I consider that respondent's 
Case no. Arb/ 98/ 4 (ICSID), where the tribunal has found that Egyptian law is applicable to the 
dispute, 41 ILM 896-932,911 (2002). A complete study on the ICSID Convention will be provided in 
part three of this thesis. 
112 See for instance Luther L. McDougal III/ Robert L. Felix/ Ralph U. Whitten, American Conflicts Law, 
supra note 108, at 337; see in general Eugene F. Scoles/ Peter Hay/ Patrick J. Borchers/ Symeon C. 
Symeonides, Conflict of Laws, (3rd ed., ST. Paul/ Minn: West Group 2000); see also the Final Award 
in the ICC Case no. 6283 of 1990,17 YBCA 178-185,179 (1992). 
113 [1951] AC 201 at 219. 
14 191 N. E 2d 279 (1963); see also Luther L. McDougal III/ Robert L. Felix/ Ralph U. Whitten, American 
Conflicts Law, supra note 108, at 336-337. 
115 Henricksen v. Muchener Heilpraktiker Kollgeium, Qstre Landsret, 30 March 1988, quoted by Richard 
Plender/ Michael Wilderspin, The European Contracts Convention The Rome Convention on the 
Choice of Law for Contracts, supra note 110, at 109. 
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approach is fundamentally correct, namely that regard must primarily be had, to the 
place where the contractual obligations were to be performed. "' 17 
It has been argued that the "most significant relationship test could be easily 
reframed [sic] as a policy-weighing approach to choice of law. "' 18 However, at the same 
time it may be argued that "most significant relationship lacks exact definition. "119 This 
may be true in the context of other agreements, however, in petroleum agreements most 
significant relationships is very clear, i. e. the subject matter of the contract, loci 
contractus; the place of the performance, loci solutionis and the place of the contracting, 
loci actus, are most connected to the law of the host state. Hence, the law of the host 
state is the law which has the closest connections to the contract, and which is 
subsequently, the proper law to that dispute. This approach has already been upheld by 
experts such as Ramazani, 120 who concluded in his study of a case between the National 
Iranian Oil Company (NIOC) and the Pan American Petroleum Corporation that Iranian 
law is the applicable law because all the connected factors were in favour of Iranian 
law. ' 21 
However, although this theory (localisation theory) may be more appropriate to 
govern petroleum disputes, it could be argued that determination of the applicable law to 
the merits of a petroleum dispute needs additional consideration, as it will be discussed 
hereinafter. 
116 Jansen v. Ste' Heutry, Court d'Appeal, Paris 27 January 1995, quoted in ibid., at 110. 
'" The Interim Award in the ICC Case no. 6560 of 1990,17 YBCA 226-229,228 (1992). 
118 Luther L. McDougal III/ Robert L. Felix/ Ralph U. Whitten, American Conflicts Law, supra note 108, 
at 337. 
119 Ibid., at 338. 
120 Rouhollah K. Ramazani, "Choice-of-Law Problems and International Oil Contracts: A Case Study" 
supra note 96, at 503-518. 
121 He justified his conclusion by applying four major "objective" tests that he considered to be generally 
recognised by students and practitioners of conflict of laws. These tests are: 1) the sovereignty of one 
of the parties (Iran in this respect); 2) the nationality of the agent, since the parties have formed a joint 
stock company to be called Iran Pan American Oil Company (IPAC); 3) the place where the contract 
was concluded, lax loci contractus; 4) the place of performance, which was Iran. He later added that 
"other tests such as the nature of the subject-matter and the place where it is situated, lex loci rei sitae, 
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(c) Semi-localisation theory 
As stated above, delocalisation theory has been created for a sole aim i. e. 
provides a considerable protection to the investor, whereas localisation theory is based 
upon the rationale that the contract should be governed by the closest connection to that 
contract. In the petroleum industry there is no doubt that these connecting factors are in 
favour of the host state's law. Hence, it could be concluded that reliance of foreign 
companies upon laws or rules other than those of the host state was only found to 
provide protection to their transactions from the intervention of the host state. 
Nowadays, this line of reasoning is no longer tenable, since most developing 
countries (host states) particularly Arab petroleum countries have achieved advanced 
legal systems as well as they have enacted new laws particularly for the encouragement 
of foreign investment. 
The fact that foreign companies should rely their relationships with developing 
countries on laws such as international law was clearly vocalised during the drafting of 
the ICSID Convention. The last part of Article 42 (1) is established to facilitate this 
desire. However, can such a view be accepted in the sphere of a contract between a state 
and a foreign company when such law (international law) is only the law which 
regulates the relationships between international bodies (states and international 
organisations)? Proponents of this view i. e. Broches has suggested that an investor 
"would have the same rights before an ICSID tribunal as if his government has espoused 
his case and brought an international claim. " 122 In fact this argument contradicts Article 
27 of the ICSID Convention itself. The latter Article obviously, prevents contracting 
states from giving diplomatic protection. 123 The Report of the Executive Directors 
clearly summarise the idea underlying the exclusion of diplomatic protection in this 
Article as follow 
would also indicate the same because the subject-matter is Iranian petroleum located within the Iranian 
domain", ibid., at 506-509. 
122 See the Convention on the Settlement of Investment Disputes between States and Nationals of Other 
States (History), vol. 2, at 259,267,400,420; see also Christoph H. Schreuer, The ICSID Convention: 
A Commentary, (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press 2001), at 619. 
123 Art. 27 (1) clearly provides that "[N]o contracting state shall give diplomatic protection, or bring an 
international claim, in respect of a dispute which one of its nationals and other contracting state shall 
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When a host state consents to the submission of a dispute with an investor to the 
Centre, thereby giving the investor direct access to an international jurisdiction, 
the investor should not be in a position to ask his state to espouse his case and 
that state should not be permitted to do so. Accordingly, Article 27 expressly 
prohibits a contracting state from giving diplomatic protection, or bringing an 
international claim, in respect of a dispute which one of its nationals and another 
contracting state have consented to submit, or have submitted, to arbitration 
under the Convention, unless the state party to the dispute fails to honour the 
award rendered in that dispute. 424 
Therefore, the above reasoning which considers the investor as having the same 
rights before an ICSID tribunal as if his government has espoused his case is disputed. 
However, the reasoning which may be promoted here to elevate contracts 
between states and foreign companies in petroleum contracts is the significance of the 
petroleum industry for both host states and industrial nations. This industry is an 
international industry and it affects the daily life of all nations. Furthermore, it is a mix 
of legal and political industry. Consequently, its disputes affect the interests of both 
national and international parties. Therefore, the applicable law which should govern its 
disputes needs to be determined in a particular method. 
Undoubtedly, international law governs the relationships between states and 
therefore it governs disputes which arise between them. 125 However, in disputes between 
a host state and petroleum company or companies it could be argued that arbitrators in 
their task to determine the applicable law to the merits of a dispute should take into 
consideration the following facts: 
have consented to submit or shall have submitted to arbitration under the Convention [... ]", see 
<www. worldbank. or icsid> last visited 21 January 2004. 
124 The Report of the Executive Directors, para 33,4 ILM 524 (1965). 
12$ See for instance, recent statement of Kuwait's Energy Minister concerning the potential dispute 
between Kuwait and Iran about the Dorra gas field. He stated that Kuwait may take the dispute with 
Iran over this field to international mechanism which governs such disputes including the International 
Court of Justice if bilateral talks fail. "[T]he dispute dates back to the 1960s, when Iran and Kuwait 
each awarded an offshore concession, the first to the former Anglo-Iranian Petroleum Company, which 
became part of BP, and the latter to Royal Dutch/Shell. The two concessions overlapped in the 
northern part of the field. " See 
<www. stoiy. news. yahoo. com/news? tmpl=story&u=/af, /kuwait iran saudi gas> last visited 23 
November 2003. 
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First, they should recognise the doctrine of party autonomy, and therefore 
arbitrators should apply the law which has been chosen by the parties whether national 
or international. Second, when there was no choice of a law by the parties arbitrators 
should look first at the host state's law and this law should be applied to the dispute 
unless this law was found completely inadequate to govern the dispute. At this time, 
arbitrators should set aside this law and apply directly other law or rules which they 
consider applicable without any recourse to the conflict of laws rules i. e. (voie 
directe). 126 If the host state's law was partially inadequate to govern a part or some parts 
of the dispute, in this case arbitrators should complete this lacuna in the host state's law 
by applying this law (the host state's law) to the part or parts which is capable to govern 
and apply other laws or rules to other parts of the dispute. 
This suggestion which I promote here is different from what is usually called 
"concurrent laws" 127 because this method suggests that the priority in petroleum disputes 
is to the host state's law which in fact has the most closely connected factors to the 
dispute. Hence, it is the law which should govern these disputes unless this law is 
inadequate to do so. Similarly, it differs from Article 42 (1) of the ICSID Convention 
since this latter applies the national law in conjunction with international law. 
Having discussed different methods of determining applicable law, we will now 
turn to examine types of applicable law. 
1.2. Applicable Substantive Law 
Introductory remarks 
The peculiarity of the petroleum contract manifests itself in several ways when 
applying substantive law to the merits of a dispute. The question emerges which law 
should be applied and why is more complex. Is it the national law of the host state which 
has the closest connection, or should the tribunal apply other laws or rules, as has 
126 The point here is to avoid conflict of laws and to arrive to international standard. 
127 See Alan Redfern/ Martin Hunter, Law and Practice of International Commercial Arbitration, (Student 
Edition, London: Sweet & Maxwell 2003), at 104. 
149 
happened in many petroleum arbitrations irrespective of the party's will. '28 
1.2.1. Public international law 
It has been argued that any contract between states and a private entity should be 
governed by public international law in order to provide protection to the foreign 
investor. 129 Mann was the first, to advocate the theory of internationalisation of the state 
contract. 130 He stated that "the real justification" for "internationalisation" of the 
substantive law of a state contract "is provided by the requirements of international 
intercourse", and he emphasised that only public international law is "practicable", 131 
because these contracts are similar to international treaties between states. 132 However, 
Mann later admitted that a state is not usually ready to accept laws other than its laws, 
and at the same time a private company often refuses to submit its contract to the law of 
the contracting state. 133 Thus, how useful is public international law? 
(a) The notion of public international law 
Public international law has been defined as "a system of rules and principles 
that govern the international relations between sovereign states and other institutional 
subjects of international law such as the United Nations. s134 Or "international law 
prescribed rules governing the relations of nation-states (or "states", as they are called in 
128 See for instance Petroleum Development Ltd. v. Sheikh of Abu Dhabi, 18 ILR 144 (1951), reprinted in 
I ICLQ 247-261 (1952); The Ruler of Qatar v. International Marine Oil Co., 20 ILR 534 (1953; and 
BP Exploration Company (Libya) Limited v. The Government of the Libyan Arab Republic, 53 ILR 
297 (1979); 5 YBCA 143 (1980); Texaco Overseas Petroleum Company and California Asiatic Oil 
Company v. The Government of the Libyan Arab Republic, 53 ILR 389 (1979); 17 ILM 1 (1978); 4 
YBCA 177 (1979); Libyan American Oil Company (LIAMCO) (USA) v. The Government of the Libyan 
Arab Republic, 62 ILR 140 (1982); 20 ILM 20 (1981); 6 YBCA 89 (1981). 
129 See part one, chapter one of this thesis. 
130 Toope stated that, "the first authoritative advocate of international law as a potential proper law for 
state contracts was Dr. Mann. Although his preference has been for the application of a "system of 
municipal law chosen by the parties", Stephen J. Toope, Mixed International Arbitration; Studies in 
Arbitration between States and Private Persons, supra note 98, at75. 
131 F. A. Mann, "The Proper Law of Contracts Concluded by International Persons", supra note 106, at 46. 
132 Ibid., at 43, he added that "according to the theory referred to, a contract could be `internationalised' in 
the sense that it would be subject to public international law stricto sensu; that, therefore, its existence 
and fate would be immune from any encroachment by a system of municipal law in exactly the same 
manner as in the case of a treaty between two international persons. " 
133 Ibid., at 46. 
134 Martin Dixon, Textbook on International Law, (3`d ed., Glasgow: Bell and Bain Ltd. 1996), at 2. 
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the vocabulary of international law). "135 This means that public international law 
regulates only the relationships between sovereign states or between sovereign states and 
international organisations, accordingly, individuals in their contractual relationships 
with states are not bodies of public international law. 
(b) Are petroleum agreements international treaties? 
Bowett has argued that an investment contract between a state and individuals 
not only is not a treaty "but cannot even be regarded as analogous to a treaty". 136 Before 
expressing any opinion about this statement it is worth examining both treaties and 
petroleum contracts. First, treaties are invariably concluded between sovereign states, 
whether between two states (a bilateral treaty) or between more than two states (a 
multilateral treaty) to regulate relations of concern to the states themselves or the 
international community, unlike petroleum agreements which are normally concluded 
between a state and a private entity or entities in order to exploit a vital resource in the 
host state. Hence, the treaty as Lord McNair defined it is "a written agreement by which 
two or more states or international organisations create or intend to create a relation 
between themselves operating within the sphere of international law. "137 Although there 
are some similarities in the method of concluding treaties and petroleum contracts i. e. 
intention, negotiation and consent of the parties, there still remain several differences 
between them, especially in the manner of ratifying treaties. 138 
The second difference between treaties and petroleum agreements concerns the 
manner in which they enter into force. While petroleum agreements do not need any 
13s Barry E. Cater/ Phillip R. Trimble, International Law, (3d ed., New York: Aspen Law and Business 
1999), at 1-2. 
136 Derek William Bowett, "State Contracts with Aliens: Contemporary Developments on Compensation 
for Termination or Breach", supra note 104, at 54, Derek states that "there is a world of difference 
between an agreement under international law between two equal, sovereign states and a contract 
between a state and a private party governed prima facie by the state's own law. Obviously, with a 
treaty one state cannot use its own municipal law to vary its treaty obligations towards another state. 
But it is by no means obvious why, with a private law contract, the state party should not assert that 
right. " 
137 Lord McNair, The Law of Treaties, (Oxford: Clarendon Press 1961), at 4. 
138 Ian Brownlie argues that "the ratification of treaties involves two distinct procedural acts: the first is the 
act of the appropriate organ of the state, which is the Crown in the United Kingdom, and may be called 
ratification in the constitutional sense; the second is the international procedure which brings a treaty 
into force by a formal exchange or deposit of the instruments of ratification, " Ian Brownlie, Principles 
of Public International Law, (6th ed., Oxford: Clarendon Press 2003), at 582-583. 
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type of deposit or registration to enter into force, treaties require certain procedures in 
order to be effective. 139 
The third and the most important difference between treaties and petroleum 
contracts is the principle of `reservation', whereby a state may not accept particular 
provisions in a treaty, so that they do not become binding upon it. 140 Article 2 (1) (d) of 
the Vienna Convention on the Law of Treaties between States and International 
Organisations of 1986 defines a reservation as 
A unilateral statement, however phrased or named, made by a state, when 
signing, ratifying, accepting, approving or acceding to a treaty, whereby it 
purports to exclude or to modify the legal effect of certain provisions of the 
treaty in their application to that state. 
This type of exclusion of certain provisions by contracting parties is not available 
in petroleum contracts. Another point of difference between treaties and petroleum 
contracts is that treaties cannot be terminated unilaterally, i. e. by one of the parties, 
whereas in petroleum contracts termination of the contract by one of the parties is more 
likely. "' 
Hence, it could be argued that there are significant differences between treaties 
and state contracts in general, and petroleum contracts in particular, and therefore state 
contracts cannot be dealt with in the same way as treaties, so public international law is 
not necessarily applicable to the disputes arising out of state contracts. 
139 "After a treaty is concluded, the written instruments, which provide formal evidence of consent to be 
bound by ratification, accession, and so on, and also reservations and other declarations, are placed in 
the custody of a depositary, who may be one or more states, or an international organisation. The 
depositary has functions of considerable importance relating to matters of form, including provision of 
information to the time at which the treaty enters into force. The United Nations Secretariat plays a 
significant role as depositary of multilateral treaties. 
Article 102 of the Charter of the United Nations provides that: 
- Every treaty and every international agreement entered into by any Member of the United 
Nations after the present Charter comes into force shall as soon as possible be registered with the 
Secretariat and published by it. 
- No party to any such treaty or international agreement which has not been registered in 
accordance with the provisions of paragraph I of this Article may invoke that treaty or agreement 
before any organ of the United Nations", ibid., at 588. 
Sao Malcolm N. Shaw, International Law, (4's ed., Cambridge: Cambridge University Press 1997), at 642. 
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The above conclusion was supported by the judgement of the International Court 
of Justice in the Anglo-Iranian Oil Co. case of 1952.142 In this case the Court 
acknowledged the principle that petroleum contracts are merely contracts between states 
and foreign corporations. It clearly stated 
The Court cannot accept the view that the contract signed between the Iranian 
Government and the Anglo-Persian Oil Company has a double character. It is 
nothing more than a concessionary contract between a government and a foreign 
corporation. 143 
The United Kingdom attempted to draw analogy between this case144 and the 
Free Zones of Upper Savoy and the District of Gex case, '45 and cited the Order made by 
the Permanent Court of International Justice on 6 December 1930 in order to show that 
the concessionary contract of 1933 "laid down what was to be the law between the 
United Kingdom and Iran. s146 However, the International Court of Justice concluded 
The Court does not see any analogy between the two cases. The subject-matter of 
the dispute in that part of the Free Zones case which has been relied upon by the 
United Kingdom related to customs matters, which were of direct concern to the 
two countries, while the subject-matter of the dispute between the United 
Kingdom and Iran in 1932 and 1933 arose out of a private concession. The 
conclusion of the new concessionary contract removed the cause of a complaint 
141 Stephen J. Toope, Mixed International Arbitration: Studies in Arbitration between States and Private 
Persons, supra note 98, at 74. 
'42 Anglo-Iranian Oil Co case (jurisdiction), Judgment of 22 July 1952, ICJ Reports 1952, at 93. 
143 Ibid., at 112. 
144 ICJ Pleadings, Anglo-Iranian Oil Co. case, at 76,77. 
145 The decision read as follows "as this assent given by His Majesty the King of Sardinia, without any 
reservation, terminated an international dispute relating to the interpretation of the Treaty of Turin; as, 
accordingly, the effect of the Manifesto of the Royal Sardinian Court of Accounts, published in 
execution of the sovereign's orders, laid down, in a manner binding upon the Kingdom of Sardinia, 
what the law was to be between the Parties; as the agreement thus interpreted by the Manifesto confers 
on the creation of the zone of Saint-Gingolph the character of a treaty stipulation which France is 
bound to respect, as she has succeeded Sardinia in the sovereignty over that territory", quoted by Lord 
McNair, The Law of Treaties, supra note 137 at 13. 
146 Anglo-Iranian Oil Co. case (jurisdiction), Judgment of 22 July 1952, ICJ Reports 1952, at 113. 
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by the United Kingdom against Iran. '47 
(c) The approach in practice 
Although the applicability of public international law to state contracts is 
uncertain, this law has nonetheless been widely accepted as an applicable law to the 
merits of disputes in many arbitrations, especially in petroleum disputes, 148 although 
with applicability of the host state's law. One example is the ICC Court of Arbitration's 
award in the arbitration between S. P. P. (Middle East) Limited, Southern Pacific 
Properties v. the Arab Republic of Egypt, the Egyptian General Company for Tourism 
and Hotels, on 11 March 1983.149 In this case, there was no agreement between the 
parties about the applicable law. Egypt argued that "in view of the circumstances of the 
case the relevant domestic law is that of Egypt. s150 However, the claimants insisted that 
no rules or principles drawn from Egyptian law should be allowed to override the 
principles of international law. '5' At the same time, the defendant rejected the claimants' 
argument, which was an attempt to internationalise the applicable law, concluding that 
"the law governing the substantive issues could be nothing but the Egyptian legal 
system. " 52 
The arbitral tribunal closely examined the question of applicable law, taking into 
account different theories in this regard, and also consulting the opinion of several 
Egyptian scholars about the adequacy of Egyptian law. '53 However, the tribunal, after 
expressing the opinion that Egyptian law is the governing law, since the Agreements 
were both made and performed in Egypt, concluded 
147 Ibid., at 113. 
148 See the previous chapter. 
149 See 22 ILM 752-784 (1983). 
150 Ibid., at 768. 
15' Ibid., at 769. 
152 Ibid., at 769. 
153 "Claimant's argument in the affirmative are supported by the opinion of Egyptian law specialists aimed 
at demonstrating that principles of international law such as "pacta sunt servanda" and "just 
compensation for expropriatory measure " are not incompatible with the Egyptian legal system. These 
legal opinions rendered by Dr. Gamal el Oteifi and Mr. Hamed Mansour [... ] together with the opinion 
of Professor Fouad Riad [... ]. Both Dr. Oteifi and Mr. Mansour point out that these principles are 
deeply rooted in the Egyptian legal tradition, characterised by the general rule of "siyadat el Kanoun", 
i. e. supremacy of the law, " ibid., at 770. 
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For the foregoing reasons we find that reference to Egyptian law must be 
construed so as to include such principles of international law as may be 
applicable and that the national laws of Egypt can be relied upon only in as much 
as they do not contravene said principles. '54 
Certain scholars argue that the gap between national law and public international 
law is closing, and is no longer as great as at the time of the Serbian Loans case 155 So 
public international law may be applicable to commercial contracts, particularly state 
contract. '56 However, many continue to believe that these rules are uncertain and 
unclear: "to subject the contract to international law appears presently impossible, due to 
the absence of precise rules to regulate the contractual relations between states and 
individuals. " 157 Others argue that public international law simply does not contain rules 
that are applicable to the regulation of complex private contractual relationships. '58 
Furthermore, public international law does not have any rules of contract at present, '59 
nor is it mature enough to answer specific legal questions. 160 Even scholars who support 
the possibility of `internationalisation' admit that "international law is ill-adapted to the 
hazards of commercial activity. "16'Moreover, by subjecting foreign businesses to public 
international law, the foreign corporation can invoke diplomatic protection of its own 
154 Ibid., at 771. 
155 See the Serbian Loans Case, [1929] PCIJ Series A, no 20, at 41, in this case it was stated that "any 
contract which is not a contract between states acting in their capacity as subjects of international law, 
is based on the municipal law of some country. " 
156 Julian D. M. Lew/ Loukas A. Mistelis/ Stefan M Krö11, Comparative International Commercial 
Arbitration, supra note 10, at 466. 
157 Verhoeven, "Contrats entre Etats et ressortissants d'autres Etats", in Le contrat e'conomique 
international, (Brussels: Bruyland 1975), at 14o, quoted by Julian D. M. Lew, Applicable Law in 
International Commercial Arbitration: A Study in Commercial Arbitration Awards, supra note 10, at 
404. 
iss Stephen J. Toope, Mixed International Arbitration: Studies in Arbitration between States and Private 
Persons, supra note 98, at 78. 
159 Derek William Bowett, "State Contracts with Aliens: Contemporary Developments on Compensation 
for Termination or Breach", supra note 104, at 54. 
160 Delaume argues that "... international law has not matured to the point of supplying an answer to 
specific legal issues which, in the process of adjudication, may require a definite and positive answer", 
Georges R. Delaume, Transnational Contracts, (Dobbs Ferry/ New York: Oceana Publications 1976), 
vol. 1 para 1.13; see also Julian D. M. Lew, Applicable Law in International Commercial Arbitration: 
A Study in Commercial Arbitration Awards, supra note 10, at 474. 
16' D. P. 0' Connell, International Law, (2"d ed., London: Stevens 1970), at 976. 
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government, 162 which is completely in conflict with the sovereign immunity of the host 
state. Furthermore, it has been argued that as a matter of theory, to apply international 
law to state contracts is to equate foreign private parties with states. 163 
Finally, it should be noted that reference to public international law in contracts 
does not make foreign corporations "subjects" of international law: "this is only a 
choice-of-law clause, adopted for convenience or other purposes. s1M 
1.2.2. Transnational law (or lex mercatoria) 
It may be argued that the terminology of transnational law constitutes more than 
lex mercatoria e. g. UNIDROIT Principles. Here we are concerned only with lex 
mercatoria; UNIDROIT Principles will be discussed later in this chapter. Opinions on 
lex mercatoria are divided into two groups. The first considers lex mercatoria as a set of 
rules suitable to govern international economic relations, 165 whereas the second group 
condemns lex mercatoria as an enigma 
The lax mercatoria is in fact an enigma created by a paradox that placed many 
investors in a dilemma. The paradox has in turn created a quandary from which 
the only way out was to arrive at the enigma by way of a fallacy. '66 
Given that it is used by arbitral tribunals, if exist sufficiently for us to discuss its 
applicability to petroleum disputes, since the question of the existence or non-existence 
162 Lord McNair, "The General Principles of Law Recognised by Civilised Nations", 33 BYIL 1-19,10 
(1957). 
163 Stephen J. Toope, Mixed International Arbitration: Studies in Arbitration between States and Private 
Persons, supra note 98, at 78. 
164 Jean-Flavien Lalive, "Contracts between a State or a State Agency and a Foreign Company, Theory 
and Practice: Choice of Law in a New Arbitration Case", 13 ICLQ 987-1021,999 (1964). 
165 Berthold Goldman, "The Applicable Law: General Principles of Law - The Lex Mercatoria", in: Julian 
D. M. Lew (ed. ), Contemporary Problems in International Arbitration, (1987 the Netherlands: 
Martinus Nijhoff Publishers), 113-125,113. 
166 Keith Highet, "The Enigma of the Lex Mercatoria", 63 Tulane Law Review 613-628,616 (1989), 
reprinted in: Thomas E. Carbonneau (ed. ), Lex Mercatoria and Arbitration, (1998 Dobbs Ferry/ New 
York: Transnational Juris Publishing), at 133-142; Lord Mustill clearly stated that "with all deference 
to those who support it, we find this idea hard to accept", Michael J. Mustill/ Stewart C. Boyd, 
Commercial Arbitration: The Law and Practice of Commercial Arbitration in England, (2nd ed., 
London: Butterworths 1989), at 81. 
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of the lex mercatoria has been widely discussed by many scholars. 167 
(a) The notion of lex mercatoria 
What does lex mercatoria mean or refer to? Gerard Malynes defined lex 
mercatoria as the "customary law of merchants. , 168 Whereas Goldman described these 
rules as an "autonomous source of law proper to the economic relations (commercium) 
between citizens and foreigners (peregrine)", 169 noting that "this customary 
transnational law had an illustrious precursor in the Roman ius gentium. 170 Goldman also 
labelled it "the law proper to international economic relations", 171 and "a set of general 
principles and customary rules spontaneously referred to or elaborated in the framework 
of international trade, without reference to a particular national system of law. " 172 
Goldman suggests that the successive Hague (1954) and Vienna Convention (1980) for 
the International Sale of Goods "would be part of lex mercatoria. s173 Redfern and 
Hunter have described lex mercatoria as "rules of law which have been developed by 
167 See for example, Berthold Goldman, Lex Mercatoria, Forum International, no. 3 (Deventer: Kluwer 
Law and Taxation Publishers 1983); Thomas E. Carbonneau (ed. ), Lex Mercatoria and Arbitration: A 
Discussion of the New Law Merchant, (1998 Dobbs Ferry/ New York: Transnational Juris Publishing); 
Klaus Peter Berger, The Creeping Codification of the Lex Mercatoria, (The Hague, the Netherlands: 
Kluwer Law International 1999); Klaus Peter Berger (ed. ), The Practice of Transnational Law, 
(London: Kluwer Law International 2001); Christoph W. O. Stoecker, "The Lex Mercatoria: To what 
Extent does it Exist? " 7 (1) J Int'l Arb 101-125 (1990); Lord Justice (Michael J. ) Mustill, "The New 
Lex Mercatoria: The First Twenty-five Years" 4 Arbitration International 86-119 (1988); Andreas F. 
Lowenfeid, "Lex Mercatoria: An Arbitrator's View", 6 Arbitration International 133-150 (1990); 
Vanessa L. D. Wilkinson, "The New Lex Mercatoria Reality or Academic Fantasy? " 12 (2) J Int'l Arb 
103-117 (1995); Paul Freeman, "Lex Mercatoria: Its Emergence and Acceptance as a Legal Basis for 
the Resolution of International Disputes", [1997] The Arbitration and Dispute Resolution Law Journal 
289-300; Ole Lando, "The Lex Mercatoria in International Commercial Arbitration" 34 ICLQ 747-768 
(1985); Leon E. Trakman, "The Evolution of the Law Merchant: Our Commercial Heritage", 12 
Journal of Maritime Law and Commerce 153-182 (1981); Georges R. Delaume, "Comparative 
Analysis as A Basic of Law in State Contracts: The Myth of the Lex Mercatoria", 63 Tulane Law 
Review 575-611 (1989); Keith Highet, "The Enigma of the Lex Mercatoria", 63 Tulane Law Review 
613-628 (1989). 
168 Gerard Malynes 
, 
Consuetudo Vel Lex Mercatoria: or, the Ancient Law-Merchant (London: printed by 
J. Redmayne for T. Basset 1685), at 1. 
169 Berthold Goldman, Lex Mercatoria, supra note 167, at 3. 
170 Ibid., at 3. 
171 Berthold Goldman, "The Applicable Law: General Principles of Law - The Lex Mercatoria", supra 
note 165, at 113. 
172 Ibid., at 116. 
173 Ibid., at 113. 
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the international business community so as to regulate commercial activities within that 
community. "lea 
Those in favour of the lex mercatoria have argued that it is often an ideal 
motional to solve any controversy between contracting parties over choice of the 
applicable law, especially in contracts between a state and a private entity, where "no 
state law is likely to be ideal. "175 It can also avoid the resort to national legal systems 
with which a party may be unfamiliar. 176 
However, application of lex mercatoria has not been widely accepted, even in 
the sphere of the sale of goods. During the discussion of "the 1985 Hague Convention 
on the Law Applicable to Sales", efforts to adopt the lax mercatoria to govern the 
contract met with fierce resistance from several delegates who spoke out violently 
against it; one called the lex mercatoria "the law of Mickey Mouse. "177 
(b) Does the lex mercatoria constitute a genuine legal system? 
Let us now examine the capability of these rules to govern petroleum disputes. 178 
It is generally accepted that lex mercatoria principles for instance, include trade 
usages. According to this parties are obliged to comply with any usages to which they 
have agreed, and also by any practice they may have established between themselves. 
179 
As far as the petroleum industry is concerned, the history of the petroleum industry is 
not sufficiently long to establish usages which must be respected by the parties, and it is 
difficult to establish any custom in this industry since it is monopolised by a limited 
number of actors and these actors are not traders but concessionaries. Other provisions 
174 Alan Redfern/ Martin Hunter, Law and Practice of International Commercial Arbitration, (3"a ed., 
London: Sweet & Maxwell 1999) at 118. 
175 David W. Rivkin, "Enforceability of Arbitral Awards Based on Lex Mercatoria", 9 Arbitration 
International 67-84,67 (1993). 
176 Ole Lando, "The Lex Mercatoria in International Commercial Arbitration" 34 ICLQ 747-768,748 
(1985). 
17 See Ole Lando, "The 1985 Hague Convention on the Law Applicable to Sale", 51 Rabels Zeitschrift 
60-85,66 (1987). 
"$ See these rules in Central List of lex mercatoria principles, rules and standards, 
<www. jus. uio. no/lm/private. international. commercial. law/contract. principles. html> last visited 6 July 
2002; <www. tldb. de/> last visited 16 December 2003; see also the same rules with some different in 
order in Klaus Peter Berger, The Creeping Codification of the Lex Mercatoria, supra note 167, at 278- 
311. 
179 No. 1.3 - Trade usages "the parties are bound by any usages to which they have agreed and by any 
practice which they have established between themselves... " 
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such as (no damage claim in case of consent, presumption of professional competence of 
parties and specialised laws prevail over general laws) are general principles that may be 
found in any law, and are not specific to lex mercatoria. 
Other provisions also repeat what already exists in many legal systems. 
Provisions concerning "rights and duties of the parties under 'FOB', `FAS', 'CIF', AND 
`C"2180 provide a considerable proof that these rules are more suitable for trade 
particularly carriage of goods rather than other vital industries such as the petroleum 
industry. Hence, this provision underlines the `trade and goods' nature of these rules, 
and their lack of relevance to the petroleum industry. 
Although another provisions concerns "compensation for expropriation" appears 
from the first sight that it may relevant to the petroleum industry, a close look reveals its 
inadequacy. The provision seems hastily thought through in the way it roughly 
determines situations in which a state has the right to nationalise or expropriate foreign 
private investment, and also the type of compensation which should be paid by the state 
in these situations. This provision came alone in these rules and it does not have any 
support or background from other provisions. Therefore, it may be argued that laws or 
rules which should govern and determine the rights and obligations of parties in a crucial 
industry like the petroleum industry should be as a complete system of rules, not only a 
single provision in rules applicable to another industry. Use of this provision would be 
more logical, to determine the liability of a carrier or an exporter, but not a state, since 
the entire rules deal only with the rights and obligations of merchants. Generally, some 
scholars have doubted the applicability of the lex mercatoria: 
Broadly speaking, the problems associated with the new lex mercatoria may be 
divided into three categories. First, there is no clear consensus on its sources, 
although a number of sources have been identified with some consistency in the 
180 "If the parties have agreed on a sale "FOB", "FAS", "CIF", or "CF", the respective rights and duties of 
the parties under the contract are to be determined according to the latest version of the International 
Commercial Terms (INCOTERMS) issued by the International Chamber of Commerce (ICC) unless 
the parties have indicated that a different meaning is to be attributed to the term used. " 
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literature and elsewhere. Second, it is unclear when the new lex will be applied. 
Third, the new lex mercatoria is simply lacking in content. '8' 
(c) The approach in practice 
The lack of enthusiasm for the lex mercatoria is not only in the literature but also 
in arbitral practice. In a case between claimant sellers from `Korea' v. defendant buyer 
from `Jordan' 182 the arbitral tribunal was not persuaded that the application of the lex 
mercatoria would be feasible under the circumstances of the case. 183 The facts of the 
case are that the claimant and defendant entered into three sales contracts to the purchase 
of 1,200,000 units of goods, to be delivered in instalments; the Jordanian buyer had 
already contracted to deliver the same goods to an Iraqi buyer. All these three contracts 
contained an identical arbitration clause (clause 11) reading 
Any dispute with regards to this contract will be solved cordially; otherwise by 
two arbitrators appointed by each side. In an eventual non-agreement it will be 
governed by the laws and regulations of the International Chamber of Commerce 
in Paris whose ruling should be final. 
A delay in delivery was the disputed matter between the parties, whether the 
final instalments were shipped in time or not. When negotiation between the parties did 
not succeed, arbitration proceedings commenced before the ICC in Paris, which 
designated an arbitral tribunal after the refusal of the defendant to appoint an arbitrator. 
The question of the applicable law of the contract arose. Although the claimant agreed 
that the application of Korean law would be impracticable and that the arbitrator should 
therefore apply lex mercatoria, 1 84 "the arbitral tribunal ... came to the conclusion that 
it 
Philip D. O'Neil Jr/ Nawaf Salam, "Is the Exceptio non Adimpleti Contractus Part of the New Lex 
Mercatoria", in: Emmanuel Gaillard (ed. ), Transnational Rules in International Commercial 
Arbitration, (1993 ICC Publication no. 480/4), 147-159,149. 
182 Interim Award in ICC Case no. 6149 of 1990,20 YBCA 41-61 (1995). 
183 Ibid., at 56. 
184 [51] "Claimant had argued that the application of Korean law would be impracticable and that the 
arbitrators should therefore directly choose the law to be applied to the contract. Such choice, 
according to claimant, should lead to the application of the "so-called lex mercatoria which, in its turn, 
would essentially meant the application of the Vienna Convention on the International Sale of Goods 
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has to apply Korean substantive law to the subject-matter of this arbitrations185, because 
the three sales contracts are most closely connected to the Republic of Korea (seat of 
seller and place of contracting). ' 86 
Another dispute arose between Deutsche Schachtbau-und Tiejbohrgesellschaft 
m. b. H. (D. S. T. ) and Ras Al Khaimah National Oil Co. (Rakoil)187 under a petroleum 
exploration agreement dated 1 September 1976. The Agreement contained an 
International Chamber of Commerce (ICC) arbitration clause (Article 21 of the 
contract), reading 
1. All disputes arising in connection with the interpretation or 
application of this agreement shall be finally settled under the 
Rules of Conciliation and Arbitration of the International Chamber 
of Commerce by three arbitrators appointed in accordance with the 
Rules. 
2. The arbitration shall be held in Geneva, Switzerland and shall be 
conducted in the English language. 188 
In March 1979, D. S. T referred its claims to an arbitral tribunal sitting in Geneva; Rakoil 
on the other hand, instituted proceedings in the court of Was Al-Khaimah in April 1979. 
Neither party took any part in the proceedings instituted by the other. On 4 July 1980, 
the arbitral tribunal awarded D. S. T the sum of US$ 4,635,664, whereas Rakoil had 
already been granted a judgment on 3 December 1979, in which that D. S. T were held 
liable to pay Rakoil the sum of US$ 1,424,891.23.189 Neither of these judgements were 
enforced, since neither party could find a way to do so. In June 1986, D. S. T discovered a 
business relationship between Rakoil and Shell International Petroleum Co. Ltd. (Shell) 
which is in fact an English subsidiary of the Anglo-Dutch group, therefore D. S. T set 
of 11 April 1980; and that, where said Convention would be silent, French law subsidiary would have 
to be applied as the law in effect at the seat of the arbitration", ibid., at 56. 
185 Ibid., at 53. 
186 Ibid., at 53. 
187 Deutsche Schachtbau-und Tiefbohrgesellschaft m. b. H. v. Ras Al Khaimah National Oil Co., Same v. 
Same (Shell International Petroleum Co. Ltd. `Intervening'), 3 WLR 1023-1041 (1987). 
lag Ibid., at 1029. 
'89 Ibid., at 1026. 
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about trying to satisfy its award from Rakoil, and on 2 July 1986 D. S. T submitted an 
application to an English Court pursuing enforcement of the Geneva arbitration award 
"in the same manner as a judgment. "190 The Court refused to grant D. S. T its application 
and the appeal was dismissed. The judge concluded 
The conclusion which I draw from those judgments is that it is the policy of the 
law in this country that, in the conduct of arbitrations, arbitrators must in general 
apply a fixed and recognisable system of law, which primarily and normally 
would be the law of England, and that they cannot be allowed to apply some 
different criterion such as the view of the individual arbitrator or umpire on 
abstract justice or equitable principles, which, of course, does not mean `equity' 
in the legal sense of the word at all. 191 
Hence, it can be concluded that lex mercatoria is a set of rules that has evolved 
through custom and the usage of merchants and traders, and that these rules are not the 
law of any state. The relevant question here is whether these rules can be applied to the 
petroleum industry. 
The primary obstacle in this regard appears to be that the application of non-host 
state law, such as lex mercatoria to petroleum disputes is less logical than in the field of 
commerce. This is because petroleum contracts normally exist between states and 
foreign companies, because this type of business plays a crucial role in the life of many 
nations and their citizens, and because the petroleum industry is so firmly connected to 
its host country. 
Furthermore, lex mercatoria has been criticised as an autonomous body of law 
for its very native, that it is not legitimated by a legislative authority and has no 
appropriate methodological base. It has also been criticised for its lack of coherence and 
its vagueness. 192 
190 Ibid., at 1026. 
191 Ibid., at 1033. 
192 Gesa Baron, "Do the UNIDROIT Principles of International Commercial Contracts form a new Lex 
Mecatoria", <www. cisg lý aw. pace. edu/cisg/biblio/baaron. html> last visited 11 March 2001; see also 
the same article in 15 (2) Arbitration International 115-130 (1999). 
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Given that there is not complete acceptance of lex mercaloria even in the sphere 
of commerce, its application to petroleum disputes is even more limited and disputed. It 
is worth quoting Delaume's conclusion regarding the application of lex mercatoria to 
state contracts 
For the draftsman of state contracts, the foregoing survey leads to several 
conclusions, none of which is supportive of the existence of the lex mercatoria 
[... ] the draftsman must now be conscious that there is ample evidence that the 
conditions which, decades ago, might have been responsible for the advocacy of 
the lex mercatoria have now disappeared. The time is no longer when it could be 
argued that the law of certain developing countries could not "reasonably be said 
to exist. " Today modern statutes enacted by third-world countries are perfectly 
capable of providing major categories of state contracts with a sophisticated legal 
framework. 193 
In the sphere of Shari 'ah the term Custom or urf in Arabic replace lex 
mercatoria. However, Custom is a controversial issue in Shari'ah and it is only 
considered as a subsidiary resource, as long as it is not contrary to Shari 'ah principles. 194 
1.2.3. General principles of law recognised by civilised nations195 
A special legal system, as McNair has argued, is required to regulate stat 
contracts and to settle any disputes, because these contracts have special characteristics, 
i. e. a `foreign element' or `international element. ' However, the word `international' as 
McNair described it is not used in the sense of `interstate' which must be governed by 
`public international law', it refers to the type of contracts in which the parties belong to 
two different countries. One of these parties is generally a state from the poorer southern 
193 Georges R. Delaume, "Comparative Analysis as a Basis of Law in State Contracts: The Myth of the 
Lex Mercatoria", supra note 167, at 609-611. 
194 See for example Mohammed K. Emam, Tareekh Al-Fekeh Al-Islami (The History of Islamic 
Jurisprudence), (Alexandra: Munsha 'at Al-Ma'arif 2000), 145-157; Yousif Qasim, Ossol Al-Ahkaam 
Al-Shari'ah (The Origin of Shari'ah Law), (3`d ed., Cairo: Al-Nesr Al-Zahabi 2001), 238-244; W. M. 
Ballantyne, "The States of the GCC: Sources of Law, the Shari'ah and the extent to which it Applies", 
1 (1) Arab Law Quarterly 3-18,6 (1985). 
195 See the Statute of the International Court of Justice, Article 38 (1) (c). 
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part of the world, and the other is a corporation generally from the richer western part of 
the world "owing its legal existence to the laws of a foreign state and deriving its capital 
primarily from nationals of that state. "196 Lord McNair suggests that the system which 
should govern these contracts is `the general principles of law recognised by civilised 
nations. ' 197 His conclusion is 
The answer to these questions is not that these contracts are governed by public 
international law stricto sense, for this system is an inter-State [interstate] system 
jus inter gents. It is true that a corporation operating in a foreign country can be 
said to be under the protection of public international law because it can invoke 
the diplomatic protection of its own Government if it should meet with wrongful 
treatment at the hands of the Government of the country in which it is operating; 
but that is not the same thing as saying that the contract is governed by public 
international law. My submission is that in contracts of this type the parties, if 
they specify no particular legal system, intend that their contracts should be 
governed by the general principles of law recognised by civilised nations. 198 
Lord McNair examined clauses from certain agreements, such as the concession 
agreement between the Persian Government and the Anglo-Persian Oil Company (29 
April 1933) which contained an arbitration clause to solve any dispute that may arise 
between the parties. McNair reported that 
These contracts belong to a somewhat unfamiliar legal system; these contracts 
contain an arbitration clause which itself affords some, but not conclusive, 
evidence of the parties' belief in the inadequacy of the national law of either of 
them; these contracts frequently contain a provision for requesting some 
international authority, such as the President of the International Court of Justice 
at the Hague, to appoint an umpire or referee; they frequently contain provisions 
of a semi-political type [... ] prohibit the company or its officials from interfering 
196 Lord McNair, "The General Principles of Law Recognised by Civilised Nations", supra note 162, at 3. 
197 Ibid., at 9. 
198 Ibid., at 10. 
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with the administrative, political or religious affairs of the country in which it is 
operating. 199 
Before examining further the conclusion of Lord McNair, let us briefly turn to 
the notion of the general principles of law. 
(a) The notion of the general principles of law 
What are these general principles of law recognised by civilised nations, which 
have been advocated by Lord McNair? Unfortunately, Lord McNair did not list these 
principles, he only mentioned the doctrine of `respect for acquired rights' commenting 
that, "this is a legal doctrine which can be said to have already attained a large measure 
of recognition as a general principle of law . s20° However, he stated that, he would not 
propose a list of these principles, since they can be developed both by contracting parties 
and tribunals. 201 
However, Lord Asquith of Bishopstone in the Abu Dhabi case contemplated 
these principles "rooted in the good sense and common practice of the generality of 
civilised nations -a sort of modem law of nature. 99202 Whilst Judge Cavin considered 
these principles as "rules of positive law, common to civilised nations, such as are 
"ZO3 formulated in their statutes or are generally recognised in practice. 
The general principles of law recognised by civilised nations have been 
encompassed in the Statute of the International Court of Justice, Article 38 (1) (c) which 
reads 
The Court, whose function is to decide in accordance with international law such 
disputes as are submitted to it, shall apply: international conventions, whether 
general or particular, establishing rules expressly recognised by the contesting 
states; international custom, as evidence of a general practice accepted as law; 
199 Ibid., at 9. 
200 Ibid., at 16. 
201 Ibid., at 15. 
202 Petroleum Development Ltd. v. Sheikh of Abu Dhabi, 18 ILR 144-164,149 (1951). 
203 Sapphire International Petroleum Ltd. v. National Iranian Oil Company, (1967) 35 ILR 136-192,175, 
reprinted in (1970) 9 ILM 1118. 
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the general principles of law recognised by civilised nations; subject to the 
provisions of Article 59, judicial decision and the teachings of the most highly 
qualified publicists of the various nations, as subsidiary means for the 
determination of rules of law. This provision shall not prejudice the power of the 
Court to decide a case ex aequo et bono, if the parties agree thereto. 
An examination of the above Article reveals that these principles are considered 
as a source of law, not as a system of law stricto sensu. 204 Also, this Article as Jennings 
points out is "enigmatic" and it should be the last source of law. 205 Indeed, the general 
principles of law have been classified as a third source of law, following treaties and 
customary law in order of priority. 206 
(b) Do these principles constitute an independent legal system? 
Toope argues that Lord McNair and Lalive considered these principles as a 
system of law. 207 Lord McNair suggested that any contract between a state and a private 
entity should be subjected to the general principles of law recognised by civilised 
nations, he clearly argued 
It is submitted that the legal system appropriate to the type of contract under 
consideration [state contracts] is not public international law but shares with 
public international law a common source of recruitment and inspiration, namely, 
`the general principles of law recognised by civilised nations'. 208 
204 Alan Redfern/ Martin Hunter, Law and Practice of International Commercial Arbitration, supra note 
174, at 114. 
205 Robert Y. Jennings, "What is International Law and how do we tell it when we see it? " 37 Annuaire 
Suisse de Droit International 59-88,71 (1981). 
206 Johan G. Lammers, "General Principles of Law Recognised by Civilised Nations", in: Frits Kalshoven/ 
Pieter Jan Kuyper/ Johan G. Lammers (eds. ), Essays on the Development of the International Legal 
Order, (1980 Rockville/ Maryland: Sijthoff & Noordhoff), at 53. 
207 Stephen J. Toope, Mixed International Arbitration: Studies in Arbitration between States and Private 
Persons, supra note 98, at 69. 
208 Lord McNair, "The General Principles of Law Recognised by Civilised Nations", supra note 162, at 6. 
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The same approach has also been articulated by Lalive, who concluded that 
contracts between states and private companies are subject to the general principles of 
law (a new system of law) or as he called them "transnational law. " 
It is therefore likely that all these facts point to the emergence of a new system of 
law, somewhat half-way between international law stricto sensu and domestic 
law. This is transnational law. 209 
However, the application of the general principles of law recognised by civilised 
nations to state contracts is not always welcomed. Professor Bowett argues that a 
contract should be subjected to a detailed body of rules, and the theory of vacuum is 
criticised theoretically and practically. 210 In the same vein, Redfern and Hunter argue 
that although the general principles of law may be considered as an important source of 
law, both in the public and in the private domain, these principles "do not constitute a 
developed code of law sufficient to deal with the complexities of modem business 
transactions. "211 Other scholars perceive these rules as a weak system of law which must 
not be applied unless put to a strict test 212 Mann has gone further by asserting that the 
general principles of law are "not a legal system at all". 213 Sornarajah cites the Soviet 
writer, Tunkin, who has warned against the desire to use these principles. 214 Tunkin 
209 Jean-Flavien Lalive, "Contracts between a State or a State Agency and a Foreign Company, Theory 
and Practice: Choice of Law in a New Arbitration Case", supra note 164, at 1008. 
210 Derek William Bowett, "Claims between States and Private Entities: The Twilight Zone of 
International Law", 35 Catholic University Law Review 929-942,930 (1986); Professor Bowett has 
reiterated his view in, "State Contracts with Aliens: Contemporary Developments on Compensation 
for Termination or Breach", supra note 104, at 50. 
211 Alan Redfern/ Martin Hunter, Law and Practice of International Commercial Arbitration, (2"d ed., 
London: Sweet & Maxwell 1986), at 86; this point has been omitted in the (1999) edition and 
substituted by the follow "unfortunately, the way in which they have been used [the general principles 
of law] by international arbitrators has lead to much-deserved criticism. " Alan Redfern/ Martin Hunter, 
Law and Practice of International Commercial Arbitration, supra note 174, at 114. 
212 For example, Michael Akehurst, "Equity and General Principles of Law", 25 ICLQ 801-825,818 
(1976), here he stated "there is only one reliable way in which general principles of law can be proved, 
and that is by examining the laws of different states. Such an examination may reveal that a general 
principle of law exists; in other cases, however, it may reveal such a divergence that no general 
principle of law can be said to exist. The existence of a general principle of law cannot be assumed; it 
must be proved. " 
213 F. A. Mann, "The Proper Law of Contracts Concluded by International Persons", supra note 106, at 45. 214 M. Somarajah, International Commercial Arbitration: The Problem of State Contracts, (Singapore: 
Longman Publishers (Pte) Ltd 1990), at 135; Somarajah cited "Tunkin, warned against the desire to 
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states that "this kind of "principle" is not normative and does not establish rights and 
duties. "215 
Bearing the inadequacies of the general principles of law in mind, let us now 
examine Lord McNair justification for advocating such a system. He argued that 
One of the difficulties that arises in finding a system of law appropriate to the 
type of contract under discussion arises from the fact that many of the countries 
which requires skill and capital from outside for the development of their natural 
resources are governed by some system of law which has not been developed to 
deal with this particular type of transaction. It is believed that the provision, for 
instance, of the Islamic law respecting economic development agreements are 
very inadequate, if indeed there are any at all. Moreover, the content of Islamic 
law differs according to the particular school of law whose teachings are to be 
216 followed. 
There is no evidence that Lord McNair had any familiarity with the legal systems 
to which he was referring. A thorough examination of Islamic law reveals that it 
contains many principles which respect economic transactions, principles which are very 
similar (if not identical) to the general principles of law. In fact, the issue of economic 
relationships is considered highly important in Islamic law. Hence, the Holy Qura'an 
emphasises this issue by citing a direct order to the believers to observe and fulfil their 
engagements. It says, "oh you who believe, observe your covenants" or "be faithful to 
your engagements. s, 217 A scholar familiar with Islam would know that there is no 
difference in the main principles of the different Islamic schools, only in some divisions 
which do not affect Muslim obligations. 
use 'general principles of law' in order to proclaim the principles of the bourgeois legal system to be 
binding on all. " 
215 G. I. Tunkin, Theory of International Law, Translated by William E. Butler, (London: George Allen & 
Unwin Ltd. 1974), at 200. 
216 Lord McNair, "The General Principles of Law Recognised by Civilised Nations", supra note 162, at 4. 217 Surah, V. verse 1; For more details, see J. N. D. Anderson/ N. J. Coulson, "The Moslem Ruler and 
Contractual Obligations", 33 New York University Law Review 917-933 (1958); see also K. V. S. K. 
Nathan, "Who is Afraid of Sharia? - Islamic Law and International Commercial Arbitration, 59 
Arbitration 125-131 (1993). 
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Moreover, McNair relies on the nature of many petroleum contracts (such as that 
they frequently contain an arbitration clause, and a clause prohibiting the company from 
interfering in the affairs of the country in which it is operating) as evidence of the lack of 
faith of the parties in the adequacy of the national law of either of them, and therefore 
argued that non-national law is required. 218 
What could be said about these two points is, first, it is not necessarily that any 
contract contains an arbitration clause must be governed by the general principles of 
law, since many of these contracts are governed by other legal systems. Second, 
prohibition which is normally imposed upon any foreign company or its officials from 
any intervention in national affairs in which it is operating, is considered as a basic norm 
of a state sovereignty and it is not only imposed upon these companies but also upon any 
foreigner lives in that state. 
Underlying his support of the general principles of (international) law is his 
recognition of westerners' distrust of developing countries laws, and his belief that this 
distrust is well-founded. Yet, this distrust, if not well founded and a consequence of 
prejudice is not sufficient justification of a weak system of law. 
(c) The approach in practice 
It is therefore argued that arbitral tribunals which have supported the application 
of the general principles of law (either alone or in conjunction with an international or a 
national law) to state contracts, must be judged as weak and unpersuasive, 
219 and indeed 
such decisions have led to considerable criticism220 In fact, these principles have been 
applied in some significant petroleum cases, for instance Sapphire International 
Petroleum Ltd. v. National Iranian Oil Company, 221 Petroleum Development Ltd. v. 
Sheikh of Abu Dhabi222 and Texaco Overseas Petroleum Co. v. Libya223. Since the latter 
218 Lord McNair, "The General Principles of Law Recognised by Civilised Nations", supra note 162 at 9. 
219 Stephen J. Toope, Mixed International Arbitration: Studies in Arbitration between States and Private 
Persons, supra note 98, at 70. 
220 Alan Redfern/ Martin Hunter, Law and Practice of International Commercial Arbitration, supra note 
174, at 114. 
221 Sapphire International Petroleum Ltd. v. National Iranian Oil Company (NIOC), (1967) 35 ILR 136, 
reprinted in (1970) 9 ILM 1118. 
222 Petroleum Development Ltd. v. Sheikh of Abu Dhabi, (1951) 18 ILR 144; reprinted in (1952) 1 ICLQ 
247-261. 
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cases will be fully discussed in chapter two, discussion here will be limited to the former 
case (the Sapphire case). 
A dispute arose in the Sapphire case out of an agreement signed on 16 June 1958 
between the National Iranian Oil Co. Ltd. (NIOC) and Sapphire Petroleum Ltd. in which 
both parties became partners in a joint structure relationship. 24 The aim of this 
agreement, as cited in the preamble, was that Sapphire would provide the technical 
competence, the financial ability and the organisation necessary to meet the NIOC desire 
to expand the production and exportation of Iranian petroleum resources. The parties 
agreed to perform their agreement in a spirit of good faith and reciprocal good will 
225 
Each of the parties was bound by several obligations. 226 The agreement contained 
different mechanisms to settle any dispute that might arise between them. Article 39 of 
the agreement, for instance, provides that any dispute between the parties should be 
referred to a special committee in which a friendly solution should be sought. Article 40 
provides that a dispute between the parties concerning technical or accountancy 
questions should be referred to an expert or a board of three experts. If the parties did 
not agree upon the said committee solution or if the committee could not reach a 
solution, the dispute was to be referred to arbitration according to Article 41 of the 
agreement 227 
Article 41 comprises several provisions concerning the proceedings of 
arbitration, i. e. the appointment of the arbitrators and the umpire (Paragraph 1), who 
may be appointed (if the arbitrators do not agree upon any one within four months) by 
the president of the Swiss Federal Tribunal at his complete discretion (Paragraph 4); 
each party shall have the right to apply to the president of the Swiss Federal Tribunal to 
appoint a sole arbitrator, if one of the parties does not appoint its arbitrator (Paragraph 
2), Paragraph 3 gives authority to each party to ask the president or equal judge of the 
highest court of Denmark, Sweden or Brazil to appoint an arbitrator. The award shall be 
given by a majority in the case of an arbitration board, at all times the parties shall 
223 Texaco Overseas Petroleum Company and California Asiatic Oil Company v. The Government of the 
Libyan Arab Republic, (1979) 53 ILR 389; (1978) 17 ILM 3; (1979) 4 YBCA 177. 
224 Article 2 of the agreement, Sapphire International Petroleum Ltd. v. National Iranian Oil Company 
(NIOC), (1967) 35 ILR 136,137. 
225 Ibid., at 137. 
226 Ibid., at 137-139. 
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comply in good faith with the award of the arbitration board or the sole arbitrator 
(Paragraph 6). Furthermore, the place and procedure of arbitration must be determined 
by the parties (Paragraph 7). It is worth mentioning that the agreement was written in 
Persian and English, and in case of any divergence between these two texts, the English 
version would prevail (Article 44). However, there was no determination of the 
applicable law. 
On 25 August 1958, Sapphire Petroleum Ltd. transferred all its rights and 
obligations under the agreement to Sapphire International Petroleum Ltd., under Article 
36 of the agreement 228 Hence, both parties contributed equal capital and formed a 
company named Iran-Canada (IRCAN) which was to conduct the subject-matter of the 
agreement. However, the relationship between the contracting parties did not work 
smoothly, and disputes arose. 229 On 28 September 1960, Sapphire Petroleum Ltd. sent a 
letter to NIOC indicating that the dispute between them could not be settled amicably 
(according to Article 39) and that it required immediate arbitration. It appointed the 
Denver lawyer, Mr. Tippit, as an arbitrator and invited NIOC to appoint its arbitrator in 
accordance with Article 41 of the agreement. 230 The disputed matter raised in Sapphire's 
letter was that on the one hand, NIOC, by refusing to carry out its obligations, had 
violated the agreement, and on the other hand, NIOC had refrained from releasing the 
bank letter guarantee for the sum of $ 350,000 in accordance with section two of the 
letter dated 16 June 1958231 NIOC refused to appoint its arbitrator on the grounds that 
Sapphire Petroleum Ltd. had assigned their rights to Sapphire International Petroleum 
Ltd. 
Consequently, Sapphire International requested the president of the Swiss 
Federal Court to apply Article 41 of the agreement and appoint a sole arbitrator. He 
appointed Federal Judge Pierre Cavin, of Lausanne, as a sole arbitrator. 232 
227 
e 39 (1 & 2), ibid., at 140. 228 Ibid., at 144. 229 Ibid, at 140-56. 230 Ibid., at 161. 231 See Iranian Court Decision (the Court of First Instance of Teheran) on Arbitral Award in Dispute between Sapphire International Petroleums Ltd. and the National Iranian Oil Company, 1 December 1963; 9 ILM 1118- 1124,1119 (1970); Petroleum Ltd. v. National Iranian Oil Company (NIOC), 
232 
967) 35 IR 136,137. 
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The arbitral hearing took place on 18 October 1962; our only concern here is the 
determination of the applicable law to the substance. In this regard Judge Cavin 
examined the applicability of lexfori, but he disregarded this choice, as the parties had 
not directly agreed upon the seat of arbitration. Since the agreement contained no 
express choice of law, the arbitrator had complete discretion to determine the applicable 
law. The arbitrator then examined the law of the contracting place and performance of 
the agreement and he stated 
Since the contract was concluded in Teheran and was due to be performed for the 
most part in Iran, the lex loci contractus and lex loci executions both point to the 
application of Iranian law. However, though these two connecting factors, and 
particularly the second, are important, they are not necessarily decisive. 233 
He also concluded that the agreement was not a commercial agreement, as its 
aim was to grant Sapphire long-term exploitation of natural resources on Iranian 
territory, and this exploitation involves an obligation to undertake important investment 
and to establish permanent installations. He added that this agreement "creates rights 
which are not merely `contractual' but are concessions giving Sapphire, for the time 
being, possession and, to a certain extent, control over the territory [a kind of 
colonialism]. "234 Moreover, he argued that these concessions characterised this 
agreement as an agreement lying partly in public law and partly in private law. Hence, 
the arbitrator concluded that the rights of Sapphire "could not be guaranteed to them by 
outright application of Iranian law, "235 and he stated 
It is quite clear from the above that the parties intended to exclude the application 
of Iranian law. But they have not chosen another positive legal system, and this 
omission is on all the evidence deliberate. All the connecting factors cited above 
point to the fact that the parties therefore intended to submit the interpretation 
and performance of their contract to the principles of law generally recognised by 
233 Ibid., at 171. 
234 Ibid., at 171. 
235 Ibid., at 171. 
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civilised nations, to which Article 37 of the agreement refers, this being the only 
clause which contains an express reference to an applicable law. 236 
The arbitrator justified his decision by referring to several aspects of the contract, 
such as that the agreement contains an arbitration clause; that the parties' intention as 
expressed in the agreement was that the parties should carry out their provisions in good 
faith and good will; that Article 37 (2) states that `force majeure' as used in the 
agreement should be defined according to the principles of international law. 237 Finally, 
the arbitrator awarded Sapphire a claim of $ 350,000 and interest at the rate of 5%; as 
well as $ 2,650,874 and 5% interest, as damages for failure to perform the agreement of 
16 June 1958, in addition to the decision that the cost of arbitration should be paid by 
NIOC. 238 
Most relevant here is how the arbitrator came to the conclusion that the parties 
had already intended to exclude the application of Iranian law, and apply the general 
principles of law. What complicates this issue further is that the arbitrator acknowledged 
that if he had applied Iranian law, the rights of Sapphire would not have been 
guaranteed. He openly said, "this could not be guaranteed to them by the outright 
application of Iranian law. " Thus, it could be argued that rather than seeking the most 
appropriate applicable law by just neutral standards, Cavin determined the applicable 
law according to who would benefit. This award was highly criticised. Toope, for 
instance, remarked that "the justifications for his holding were distinctly idiosyncratic, 
not to say untenable .,, 
239 He added, "indeed, it is fair to say that none of these arbitral 
[one of them was the Sapphire case] authorities are strongly persuasive on the point at 
issue 19240 Hence, it is not surprising that this award was set aside by an Iranian court. 
The court stated 
2'6 Ibid., at 175. 
237 Ibid., at 172-175. 
238 Ibid., at 191. 
239 Stephen J. Toope, Mixed International Arbitration: Studies in Arbitration between States and Private 
Persons, supra note 98, at 70. 
240 Ibid., at 71. 
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... In the view of the court [the award was] incorrect. The view adopted with 
regard to this matter by the aforesaid was contrary to the standard of justice and 
the opinion of legal writers. 241 
The court added, after it citing Article 968 of the Iranian Civil Code, 242 that 
Therefore, taking account of the foregoing premises, Mr. Cavin's reasoning in 
denying the jurisdiction of the Law of Iran over the agreement is overruled, and 
the conclusion that the principles of another law operate in the interpretation and 
performance of the agreement is invalid and hereby rejected. 43 
1.2.4. Quasi-international agreements 
As a way of excluding a state contract with a foreign company from the 
jurisdiction of the host state's law, it has been argued that state contracts in general and 
investment contracts in particular are neither governed by the municipal law of states nor 
international law, but that they constitute a new type of contract which may be regarded 
as "quasi-international agreements. "244 Verdross considers that an agreement concluded 
between a state and a foreign company was only analogous agreement to an international 
agreement, 
We cannot consider a contract concluded between a state and a foreign national 
in the form of an international agreement inter pares, as an international contract 
stricto sensu. It is only possible and necessary to treat it by analogy to such a 
contract. 45 
241 See Iranian Court Decision (the Court of First Instance of Teheran) on Arbitral Award in Dispute 
between Sapphire International Petroleums Ltd. and the National Iranian Oil Company, 1 December 
1963,9 ILM 1118- 1124,1123 (1970). 
242 This Article provides that "obligation arising from contracts are subject to the law of the place of 
conclusion of the contract unless both the parties are of foreign nationality and have either expressly or 
impliedly made it subject to another law, " ibid., at 1123. 
243 Ibid., at 1123. 
244 Alfred Verdross, "Quasi-International Agreements and International Economic Transactions", supra 
note 104, at 231. 
245 Ibid., at 233. 
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He suggested that the most important group of these contracts is development 
contracts. 246 However, the proponents of this method of applicable law to state contracts 
have based their suggestions upon a sample of agreements which bear little relation to 
petroleum agreements and indeed may no longer exist. One of these agreements quoted 
by Verdross for instance was an agreement concluded in the 19th century between 
European countries and African tribes. 247 
(a) The notion of quasi-international agreements 
The concept of quasi-international agreement, which was developed by Verdross, 
is based upon the idea that the contract itself represents the legal order, 248 or the contract 
itself constitutes its own legal order and proper law. 249 This means that the contracting 
parties not only choose the legal system suitable to their contract, but also create their 
own legal system. 250 Verdross's argument is based upon three assumptions. First, 
development agreements which are normally concluded between a state and a foreign 
company, are not concluded under the supervision of the host state's law, but in the form 
of an international agreement inter pares and on the basis of the principle pacta sunt 
servanda and other general principles of law. Second, a quasi-international agreement 
creates a new positive legal order, which according to Verdross is the lex contractus 
regulating the relations between the contracting parties. Third, these agreements 
normally contain an arbitration clause, considered to be the only method to solve any 
prospective disputes between the parties. 251 Based on these assumptions, Verdross 
concluded 
All this makes it clear that such an agreement inter pares is not a contract 
governed by the legal order of a state, but a new legal order established by the 
246 Ibid., at 233. 
247 Ibid., at 231. 
248 Wolfgang Peter, Arbitration and Renegotiation of International Investment Agreements (2nd ed., 
London: Kluwer Law International 1995), at 148. 
249 Okezie Chukwumerije, Choice of Law in International Commercial Arbitration, (London: Quorum 
Books 1994), at 148. 
250 F. A. Mann, "The Proper Law of Contracts Concluded by International Persons", supra note 106, at 49. 
251 Alfred Verdross, "Quasi-International Agreements and International Economic Transactions", supra 
note 104, at 234. 
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common will of the parties on the basis of the principles pacta sunt servanda and 
other general principles of law governing contracts. 
However, this theory has been criticised for aiming to "place the provisions of 
the contract beyond the legislative and executive competence of the state party. , 252 
Therefore, any attempt by the state party to alter the provisions of the contract would be 
impossible. 253 
(b) The approach in practice 
Lord McNair, who promoted `the general principles of law recognised by 
civilised nationsi254 stated that no contract can exist in a vacuum, without being subject 
to a legal system. 255 Mann has gone further in his critique describing this theory of 
quasi-international agreements as "so unattractive", "so impracticable", "so subversive 
of public international law", "so dangerous from the point of view of legal policy" and 
"so unnecessary that its novelty will not cause surprise. , 256 Mann also emphasised the 
importance of subjecting any legal relationship in general and every contract in 
particular to a legal system, "[It] must of necessity be governed by a system of law and 
is otherwise unthinkable". Chukwumerije has summarised his objections to this theory 
on two grounds: theoretical and practical. Theoretically, Chukwumerije has argued 
along similar lines to Mann, that it would be pure fallacy to accept that contracting 
parties could own an agreement, acting outside any given legal system. 257 Practically, he 
argues that "no contract, however elaborately drafted, can contain the entire complex 
body of rules necessary for the resolution of the range of disputes that could arise 
i258 between the contracting parties. 
It would therefore seem that the concept of quasi-international agreements is not 
appropriate to govern petroleum disputes, since this concept contains theoretical and 
252 Okezie Chukwumerije, Choice of Law in International Commercial Arbitration, supra note 249, at 148. 
253 Ibid., at 148. 
254 Lord McNair, "The General Principles of Law Recognised by Civilised Nations", supra note 163. 
25$ Ibid., at 7. 
256 F. A. Mann, "The Proper Law of Contracts Concluded by International Persons", supra note 106, at 49. 257 Okezie Chukwumerije, Choice of Law in International Commercial Arbitration, supra note 249, at 149. 
259 Ibid., at 150. 
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practical obstacles and the petroleum industry invariably in need to a smooth legal 
system in view of its significance and rapid change in its functions. 
1.2.5. UNIDROIT Principles 
The idea of codifying principles to govern international contracts was submitted 
by the Secretariat of UNDROIT in 1971, when they presented their idea for the drafting 
of general principles of international contract law in them report to UNCITRAL on 
"progressive codification of the law of international trade. s259 The aim was to find 
combined efforts to develop principles and rules of international contract law which 
could serve as a reference point for creating private contracts and international 
conventions without need for recourse to domestic law, 260 as well as to facilitate the 
global need for international trade relationships261 In 1994, the UNIDROIT Principles 
were published; now these principles are considered as a source of "the general 
principles of law", in that they may be applied even if a contract does not refer to 
them. 262 However, what are these principles and rules? Can these principles and rules 
govern the relationship between the contracting parties in petroleum contracts, and 
thereafter be applied as an applicable law to any dispute arising between them? 
(a) What are UNIDROIT Principles? 
The UNIDROIT Principles are a set of rules especially tailored to the needs of 
259 Klaus Peter Berger, The Creeping Codification of the Lex Mercatoria, supra note 167, at 133; see also 
Michael Joachim Bonell, An International Restatement of Contract Law: The UNIDROIT Principles of 
International Commercial Contracts, (2"d ed., New York: Transnational Publishers 1997), at 19-59. 
260 Klaus Peter Berger, The Creeping Codification of the Lex Mercatoria, supra note 167, at 133. 
261 Michael Joachim Bonell, An International Restatement of Contract Law: The UNIDROIT Principles of 
International Commercial Contracts, supra note 259, at 5. 
262 Michael Joachim Bonell, "The UNIDROIT Principles and Transnational Law" 
<www. unidroit. or en lQ ish/publications/review/articles/2000-2. htm> last visited 1 ii' Marchr 2001; 
Professor Julian D. M. Lew, has argued that "they are to apply not only where expressly chosen, but 
also to influence and be applied where general principles of law or lex mercatoria are applicable and 
where there is no clear rule of law. They are also intended to influence the interpretation and 
development of national and international law, " Julian D. M. Lew, "The Principles as Lex Contractus 
Chosen by the Parties and in the Absence of an Explicit Choice-of Law Clause", a paper was 
submitted to the UNIDROIT/ ICC Seminar "The Use of the UNIDROIT Principles of International 
Commercial Contracts in International Commercial Arbitration", Paris, 27 April 2001, published in 
ICC International Court ofArbitration Bulletin (Special Supplement), 2002, at 85. 
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international commercial transactions. 63 The aim of these principles is to establish a 
comprehensive set of rules that may be used throughout the world irrespective of legal, 
economic or political conditions. 264 The UNIDROIT Principles were published in 1994 
by the International Institute for the Unification of Private Law (UNIDROIT)265 These 
Principles comprise a Preamble and 120 Articles, relating to the formation, validity, 
interpretation and performance/non-performance of international contracts. 266 Although 
these principles cover contracts in general, they do not contain specific rules for each 
type of contract. 267 The preamble states that these principles are general rules for 
international commercial contracts and shall be applied when the parties have agreed to 
subject their contractual obligations to "general principles of law", the "lex mercatoria" 
or the like. 268 
(b) The approach in practice 
In a number of international commercial cases, the tribunal has been requested 
by the contracting parties to base its decision on the UNIDROIT Principles alone or in 
conjunction with a specific domestic law. 269 In the ICC Award no. 7375270 in which the 
case concerned a contract for the supply of goods between a United States seller and a 
buyer in a Middle Eastern country, the claimant claimed damages with interest in 
connection with the delayed delivery of the goods. As the contract contained no choice- 
of-law clause, the arbitral tribunal concluded 
The Court decided that the contract should be governed by general legal rules 
and the rules of law applicable to international contractual obligations, which had 
gained broad recognition and international consensus in the international 
263 See UNIDROIT Principles of International Commercial Contracts-Introduction, 
<www. unidroit. org/en lg ish/principles/intro-l. htm> last visited 23 April 2001. 
264 Ibid. 
265 UNIDROIT, "Principles of International Commercial Contract", Rome 1994. 
266 Hans Van Houtte, "The UNIDROIT Principles of International Commercial Contracts", 11 Arbitration 
International 373-390,374 (1995). 
267 Ibid., at 374. 
268 For more details see < www. unidroit. orv-/enp-lish/12ringiples/> last visited 23 April 2001. 
269 Michael Joachim Bonell, "The UNIDROIT Principles and Transnational Law" 
<www. unidroit. or en Ig ish/publications/review/articles/2000-2. htm> last visited 1lfMarc1>M00I; 
270 ICC Award no. 7375 of June 1996: 11 Measley's International Arbitration Report (1996), A-I et seq; 
N. S. 2 Revue De Droit Uniforme (Uniform Law Review) (1997), at 598. 
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business community, including concepts regarded as belonging to the lex 
mercatoria, and to take into account the UNIDROIT Principles as far as they 
could be considered to reflect generally accepted principles and rules. The Court 
held that the UNIDROIT Principles [... ] contained in essence a restatement of 
those principles directeurs which had enjoyed universal acceptance and 
moreover were at the heart of those most fundamental notions which had 
consistently been applied in arbitral practice. 7' 
In a case concerning a sale contract between a Russian and an English party, the 
International Arbitration Court of the Chamber of Commerce and Industry of the 
Russian Federation rendered an award on 25 January 2001. The arbitral tribunal referred 
to Article 7.4.13(2) of the UNIDROIT Principles, according to which the agreed sum to 
be paid in case of failure to perform may be reduced if it turns out to be grossly 
excessive in relation to the harm resulting from the non-performance and to other 
circumstances. 272 
In another case, the arbitral tribunal based its decision on Chinese Law and on 
"international practice, including UNIDROIT Principles. " This case concerned an 
agreement between a Chinese company and an Eastern European car manufacturer for 
the provision and organisation of after sales service for vehicles delivered by the former. 
The dispute arose after the parties accused each other of having failed to comply with 
their obligations under the contract. Since the agreement contained no choice-of-law 
clause, the parties agreed that Chinese law was the applicable law to the merits of the 
dispute. However, at the same time they requested the arbitral tribunal to apply the 
UNIDROIT Principles as well as an expression of international practice. In this case, the 
arbitral tribunal rejected the claimant's request for punitive damages and in so doing it 
pointed out that the concept of punitive damages was not known in Chinese contract law 
271 Ibid., at 598-600. 
272 See abstract of the case in: <www. unilex. info/dynasite. cfm? dssid=2377&dsmid=13618&x=1 (2001)> 
last visited 8 August 2002. 
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nor had it found any international trade principle authorising the award of punitive 
damages. 273 
(c) Can these Principles govern petroleum contracts? 
However, the issue remains as to whether the UNIDROIT Principles can govern 
petroleum contracts and be applied to any dispute which may arise between the 
contracting parties. Although it may be agreed that UNIDROIT Principles "[have] 
gained a broad recognition and international consensus in the international business 
community", and that these principles are "becoming recognised and generally accepted 
as rules of international commercial law", 
274 there remains doubt regarding applicability 
of these principles to govern petroleum contracts. According to the Preamble to the 
Principles, these rules may be applied when the parties have agreed to apply them either 
by a direct reference to the Principles or by agreeing that "their contract be governed by 
general principles of law, the lex mercatoria or the like. " Hence, these principles are 
only considered as general principles of law or lex mercatoria, which are not applicable 
to petroleum contracts as previously stated. Moreover, these principles may suit certain 
law jurisdictions i. e. civil law jurisdiction, more than others. 275 As petroleum contracts 
are not limited to one jurisdiction only, the adequacy of UNIDROIT Principles to govern 
these contracts is doubtful. 
In fact, the main point of criticism against UNIDROIT Principles in terms of 
governing petroleum contracts is similar to that against lex mercatoria, that these 
principles are merchant law. In other words, these principles are tailored to serve trade 
and commerce matters, and are therefore less suitable to govern petroleum contracts, as 
which are of an entirely different nature. 
Z" ICC Award No. 10114 of March 2000, in: 
<www. unilex. info/dvnasite. cfm? dssid=2377&dsmid=13618&x=1 (2000)> last visited ßf'Augustrß002. 
274 Julian D. M. Lew, "The Principles as Lex Contractus Chosen by the Parties and in the Absence of an 
Explicit Choice-of Law Clause", a paper submitted to the UNIDROIT/ ICC Seminar "The Use of the 
UNIDROIT Principles of International Commercial Contracts in International Commercial 
Arbitration", Paris, 27 April 2001, published in ICC International Court of Arbitration Bulletin 
(Special Supplement), 2002, at 85. 
180 
1.2.6. National law 
When we speak of national law in relation to a petroleum dispute, this can in 
theory include the law of the host-state, of the home state of a foreign company, or a 
third state. In the Iran-Pan-American Petroleum contract for instance, there was a 
possibility of choosing more than one applicable law to govern their contractual 
relationship, i. e. Iranian law, United States law and the law of a third state. 276 
(a) Which national law 
However, here, by national law we mean the law of the host state, the law where 
the contract was concluded and performed, and the law which has the closest 
connections to the contract. This derives its authority from the well known doctrine in 
private international law of the `closest connection' or `centre of gravity' or `most 
significant relationship'. The doctrine has been entirely upheld by the PICJ in the 
Serbian Loans case277 and ICJ in Anglo-Iranian Oil Co. case 278 
Some scholars279 argue that there is a difficulty in applying national law to the 
substance of a dispute, and this difficulty arises from the uncertainty of which national 
law should be applied i. e. is it the law of the place where a transaction is concluded, lex 
loci contractus, the law of the place of performance, lex loci solutionis, the law of the 
place of arbitration, lex loci arbitri, or the law of the habitual residence of the parties. 
However, in petroleum disputes, especially those which are between the Arab petroleum 
producing countries and foreign petroleum companies, this difficulty should not arise 
because all the criteria above exist in the host state. 
Other scholars have argued that choosing national law can be difficult in a 
27 Detlev F. Vagts, "Arbitration and the UNIDROIT Principles" 
<www. cis . 
1g aw. pace. edu/cisg iblio/vaats. html> last visited 11 March 2001. 
276 Rouhollah K. Ramazani, "Choice-of-Law Problems and International Oil Contracts: A Case Study", 
supra note 103, at 504. 
277 See Serbian Loans Case, [1929] PCIJ Series A, no. 20, at 41. 
278 See the Anglo-Iranian Oil Co. case (1952) (jurisdiction) Judgment of 22 July 1952 ICJ Rep at 93. 
279 Professor Julian D. M. Lew for instance, argues that "the major difficulty in applying a national legal 
standard to the substance of a dispute is deciding which to apply: the lex loci contractus, the lex loci 
solutionis, the law of the place of arbitration, the law of the place where the plaintiff or the defendant 
has his habitual residence or main place of business, etc. " Julian D. M. Lew, Applicable Law in 
International Commercial Arbitration: A Study in Commercial Arbitration Awards, supra note 10, at 
373. 
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federal state. 280 However, the states which are the subject of this thesis are not federal 
states for the most part, and in the United Arab Emirates petroleum contracts are 
concluded between local government and petroleum companies. 8' 
There are many examples of the applicability of the national law of the host state 
In Aminoil case282, for instance, the law of Kuwait was found applicable to govern the 
dispute. 283 An Ad Hoc arbitration held in The Hague concluded that the law of Qatar is 
the applicable law. The dispute arose out of an `Exploration and Production Sharing 
Agreement - Qatar Offshore' (EPSA) signed on 10 April 1976 between claimants: 
Wintershall A. G. (FR Germany), International Ocean Resources, Inc. (formerly Koch 
Qatar, Inc. ) (US), Veba Oel A. G. (FR Germany); Deutsche Schachtbau-und 
Tiefbohrgesellsellschaft mbH (FR Germany), and Gulfstream Resources Canada Ltd. 
(Canada) and respondent the Government of Qatar. 284 The dispute arose as a 
consequence of the failure to find commercial quantities of petroleum in the contract 
area, and the Ruler of Qatar, due to a boundary dispute with Bahrain, refused to allowed 
the claimant to drill in the `Structure A' area which the claimant regarded as the most 
likely aria to contain crude petroleum. In the Partial Award on Liability the arbitral 
tribunal concluded that the law of Qatar was the applicable law to the substance of the 
dispute. It provided that 
By ... its Order of 8 March 1987, the Tribunal provided that `in the absence of a 
280 See for instance, Gaillard Emmanuel/ Savage John, (eds. ), Fouchard Gaillard Goldman on 
International Commercial Arbitration, supra note 21, at 791; see also Julian D. M. Lew/ Loukas A. 
Mistelis/ Stefan M Kröll, Comparative International Commercial Arbitration, supra note 10, at 445. 
281 For more details about petroleum agreements from 1939 until 1981 in the United Arab Emirates see 
Mana Saeed Al-Otaiba, The Petroleum Concession Agreements of the United Arab Emirates, supra 
note 95. 
282 See the Government of the State of Kuwait v. the American Independent Oil Company (AMINOIL), 
(1982) 21 ILM 976-1053; (1984) 66 ILR 519-627; (1984) 6 YBCA 71-96. 
283 See the next chapter. 
284 The fact of this case as cited in the Award was that "parties entered into "Exploration and Production 
Sharing Agreement - Qatar Offshore" (EPSA) on 10 April 1976 whereby the Government of Qatar 
granted to the claimants "the exclusive right to explore for, drill for and produce petroleum in a 
defined area offshore of Qatar (the `Contract Area') and the right to store, to transport and sell 
petroleum for use in Qatar or for export, and to export or otherwise dispose of petroleum" (Arts. I and 
II EPSA). Petroleum was defined in Art. I EPSA to include liquid crude oil, gas, and all other 
hydrocarbon substances in the Contract Area. The "Effective Date" of the EPSA was 18 June 1973 the 
date of the Concession Agreement which the EPSA substituted (Art. I EPSA), and it was to run for a 
term of 30 years (Art. 4). " See 15 YBCA 30-62,31,32 (1990); see also the Partial award of 5 February 
1988 and Final award of 31 May 1988,28 ILM 795-841 (1989). 
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controlling choice of substantive governing law clause and in consideration of 
the close links of ... the EPSA... to Qatar, the governing substantive 
law should 
be the law of Qatar and, in case the Tribunal should determine that it is relevant 
to an issue, public international law'. The Tribunal, after reviewing the deposited 
authorities on public international law, has determined that public international 
law is not independently relevant to the issues before the Tribunal in this Partial 
Award on Liability, and that the governing substantive law on those issues is the 
law of Qatar. 285 
In another example, the concept of the closest connection to the contract in terms 
of the applicable law has upheld. In ICC Case no. 6283 of 1990 the arbitral tribunal 
decided that Belgian law is the applicable law, since this law has the most significant 
relationship to the transaction and the parties. 
286 
Nowadays, most Arab countries, particularly petroleum exporting countries have 
developed advanced legal system and enacted new laws most of which were guided by 
western laws mainly of civil law origin. Therefore, it should be understood that the 
operative legal system in these countries is a hybrid system and consists of the Shari 'ah 
and the civil law. Egypt may be the first of Arab countries which adopted a civil code, 
followed by other Arab countries such as Kuwait, Bahrain, United Arab Emirates, Qatar 
and Oman. 87 However, the adoption of civil code in Arab countries was varied, and 
therefore the Shari 'ah is still considered as a national law in that it is the source of law 
in some Arab petroleum countries such as Saudi Arabia and the main source of law in 
other countries288 
285 15 YBCA 30-62,34 (1990). 
286 See the Award in [1997] the Collection ofICCArbitral Awards 1991-1995,100-107. 
287 See in general Maren Hanson, "The Influence of French Law on the Legal Development of Saudi 
Arabia", 2 (3) Arab Law Quarterly 272-291(1987); B. A. Roberson, "The Emergence of the Modern 
Judiciary in the Middle East: Negotiating the Mixed Courts of Egypt", in: Chibli Mallat (ed. ), Islam 
and Public Law, (London: Graham & Trotman 1993), 107-139; Ahmed D. Al - Samdan, Contracts' 
Conflict Rules in Arab Private International Law: A Comparative Study on Principles of Islamic and 
Civil Legal System, supra note 47, at Preface; see also Butti S Al-Muhairi, "Islamisation and 
Modernisation within the UAE Penal Law: Shari 'ah in the Modern Era, 11 (1) Arab Law Quarterly 
34-68,35 (1996). 
288 Art. 2 of Kuwait Constitution of November 1962; Art. I of Qatar Constitution of April 1970; the 
United Arab Emirates constitution of 1971, Art. 7 provides that "the Islam is the official religion of the 
Union and the Shari 'ah law is the main resource of legislation", also the Omani Basic Statute of the 
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It may be asked which part of national law i. e. public or private law should 
govern petroleum contracts and any disputes which may arise out of them. The answer 
may be achieved by analysing the nature of petroleum contracts in which they regulate 
transactions with a public nature and at the same time with economic and commercial 
features. Accordingly, any part of national law may govern these contracts. However, 
public law may be more relevant than private law, since the former normally regulates 
the relationships between public authorities and private persons, and the primacy in this 
law is always to the public interest, whereas private law regulates the relationships 
between private persons. 289 Moreover, the time is ripe for the enactment of new 
petroleum laws in Arab petroleum countries to regulate all aspects concerning the 
petroleum industry and these laws should be considered a part of public law. 
(b) Shari'ah as national law 
The Shari 'ah contains principles that may be applicable to international 
arbitration, 29° such as (a) the observation of covenants or fulfilment of engagements: "oh 
you who believe, observe your covenants. "291 This principle is exactly the same as pacta 
sunt servanda; (b) "except those of the polytheists with whom you have entered into a 
covenant, and who shall have afterwards in no way failed you, nor aided anyone against 
you. So perform your covenant with them, until its term is complete, for God loveth the 
State of November 1996 states in Art. 2 that "the religion of the State is the Islam and the Islamic 
Shari'ah is the basis of legislation. " 
289 See for instance, Samir A. Tanaghu, A-Nazariyat Al-Ammah Li Al-Qanoon (The General Theory of 
Law), (Alexandria: Munsha'at Al-Ma'arif 1974), at 553-592; see also Amr A. Shalakany, "Arbitration 
and the Third World: A Plea for Reassessing Bias under the Specter of Neoliberalism", 41 Harvard 
International Law Journal 419-468 (2000); Dinesh D. Banani, "International Arbitration and Project 
Finance in Developing Countries: Blurring the Public/ Private Distinction", 41 Columbia Journal of 
Transnational Law 355-400 (2003); the above argument may uphold by new Russian Production 
Sharing Act Section 1.3 which provides that "those rights and obligations of the parties to a Production 
Sharing Agreement, that have a private law character, are regulated by the Production Sharing Act and 
by Russian private law. " Moss has commented on this Section stating that "Section 1.3, therefore, 
quite clear implies that some rights and obligations under a Production Sharing Agreement have not a 
private law character and are not regulated by Russian private law. These rights and obligations have, 
consequently, a public law character, and are regulated by Russian public law", Giuditta Cordero 
Moss, "National Rules on Arbitrability and the Validity of an International Arbitral Award: The 
Example of Disputes Regarding Petroleum Investment in Russia", Stockholm Arbitration Report 1-24, 
13 (2001). 
290 See for instance, the opinions of Abu Zahra, Anderson and Joseph Schacht on the applicability of 
Islamic law in the Aramco case, especially the memorial ofAramco, in the next chapter. 
291 Sura, V, 1. Qura'an. 
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righteous"292; (c) "give full measure and full weight, in justice. We tax not any soul 
beyond its power. If you give your word, do justice thereunto, even though against a 
kinsman; and fulfil the covenant of God"293; (d) "successful indeed are the believers, 
who are shepherds of their pledges and their covenant. s294 
Other principles have been extracted from the practice of the Prophet 
Mohammed: he said that Muslims are bound by their stipulations; 295 Allah (God) says, I 
will be against three persons the day of Resurrection: one who makes a covenant in my 
name, but he proves treacherous; 296 give the employee his salary (wages) before his 
sweat becomes dry. 297 
Although Shari 'ah has not yet been codified between two covers of one book, it 
is in fact, not a mere religion or ethics, it is a harmonious system which includes "a just 
economic order, a well-balanced social organisation, and codes of civil, criminal as well 
as international law. s298 It is noteworthy that it is hard to speak of Shari 'ah as a single 
legal system, since the application of Shari 'ah differs from a specific Islamic country to 
another depending on the official Islamic school of the country. 299 However, this 
application nowadays is limited to a large extent in several Arab countries to the 
292 Sura XV11,34,36 Qura'an. 
293 Sura VI, 151,153, Qura'an. 
294 Sura XXIII, 1-8, Qura'an. 
295 Sahib Al Bukhari, III, 187. 
296 Sahib Al Bukhari, III, 34. 
297 Sonan Ibn Maja'h 2443. 
298 Qutub Mohammed, Islam, The Misunderstood Religion, (Lahore: Islamic Publication 1972), at Preface, 
quoted by Walied M. El-Malik,, Minerals Investment under the Shari'a Law, (London: Graham & 
Trotman 1993), at 3; "since the Islamic law reflects the will of ALLAH rather than the will of a human 
lawmaker, it covers all areas of life and not simply those which are of interest to state or society", 
Konrad Zweigert/ Heinz Kötz, Introduction to Comparative Law, translated from the German by Tony 
Weir, (3d ed., Oxford: Clarendon Press 1998), at 304. The idea of codifying the Shari'ah is 
considerably old. It could be referred to the first era of Islamic state, particularly to the orthodox caliph 
Omar bin Alkahattab, then the idea enhanced with the caliph Omar bin Abd - Alaziz, who attempted to 
collect the opinion of the Companions of the Prophet and the opinions of jurists in Madianh to be 
followed and employed by judges in the Islamic state's territories. For more details see Mishari Al - 
Zaidi, "Takneen Shar'ah" (Codification of the Shar'ah), 1086 Al- Majalla (The International 
Magazine of the Arabs) 8-19 (2000). The significant effort in this regard was found in the Majellah 
during the Ottoman era, and it specifically focused on the Islamic principles of contracts. However, the 
latter as Rayner argues could not provide a precise theory governing obligations and contracts. S. E. 
Rayner, The Theory of Contracts in Islamic Law, supra note 37, at 89. 
299 See for example, Ann Elizabeth Mayer, "Laws and Religion in the Middle East", 35 American Journal 
of Comparative Law, 127-184,154 (1987); see also Walied M. El-Malik, Mineral Investment under 
the Shari 'ah Law, ibid., at 4. The latter argues that, "there are as many expressions of Islamic law as 
there are states in the Muslim world. Islamic law remains the core and focal point and common law of 
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personal status of the Muslim people and do not extend to other issues 300 
1.2.7. Concluding remarks 
The level of disagreement regarding the applicable law to the merits of a dispute 
appears to be higher in the context of state contracts, particularly in natural resources 
contracts such as petroleum contracts between a state and a foreign private company. 30' 
This disagreement may be a natural result of the conflict in interest between these 
parties, i. e. the contracting state on the one hand struggles to ensure at least an average 
level of income from its mineral resources (i. e. petroleum resources) to meet some of its 
citizens' needs, whereas on the other hand the foreign company seeks to gain as much 
profit as possible from its operations in a given country. 
The conflict regarding the applicable law normally arises when a choice of 
applicable law has not been made by the contracting parties in their contract. The task is 
then transferred to the arbitrators. When there is an express or an implied choice by the 
parties of a particular law, arbitrators are bound to apply that law. This is simply a 
consequence of what is known in arbitration as party autonomy, which is considered a 
cornerstone in arbitration. However, the sanctity of party autonomy has not always been 
fully respected by most arbitrators, who have argued that the host state's law is 
incapable of governing such contracts even if host state law was chosen as applicable 
law, 302 or parties had intended (even if they did not say so) to exclude the application of 
national law in favour of supranational system. 303 These assertions and others, such as 
that a foreign company requires protection from any possible change in the host state's 
Muslim countries, but, in practice, Islamic law of Egypt differs from that in Pakistan, which both differ 
from that in Malaysia, and so on", ibid., at 4. 
300 At least from a personal experience, all the GCC Countries except Saudi Arabia have established a 
modem legal system and enacted new laws in different aspects and therefore Shari 'ah is limited to the 
personal status of Muslim people or even no-Muslim who wishes to recourse to Shari'ah. I had a 
personal experience where I represented a non-Muslim husband to divorce his non-Muslim wife before 
an Omani court according to Shari 'ah rules. 
301 A. F. M. Maniruzzaman, "Conflict of Laws Issues in International Arbitration: Practice and Trends", 
supra note 94, at 371. 
302 See Petroleum Development Ltd. v. Sheikh of Abu Dhabi, (1951) 18 ILR 144, reprinted in (1952) 1 
ICLQ 247-261. 
303 Texaco Overseas Petroleum Company and California Asiatic Oil Company v. The Government of the 
Libyan Arab Republic, (1979) 53 ILR 389; (1978) 17 ILM 1; (1979) 4 YBCA 177. 
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laws, 304 shaped the new trends of arbitral practice. As a consequence, arbitral tribunals 
tend to apply law or rules other than that of the host state's law. In petroleum disputes 
the situation is the same generally, though there is a "prevailing opinion" that "the law 
applicable to petroleum agreements is the national law of the state, which also happens 
"3os to be the law of the place of performance of these contracts. 
In terms of determining the applicable law to the substance of a dispute in 
general and petroleum in particular, we looked to the principles of private international 
law. There are two dominant theories 
The twin theories which underlay the proper law were therefore the subjective 
theory, which looked to the intentions of the parties, and the objective theory, 
which sought to localise the contract. 306 
Private international law principles answer the dilemma of the proper law or the 
applicable law in favour of the objective theory, which relies upon the doctrine of "the 
closest connection factors. " This theory is widely accepted in common law systems 
especially in England, where it was reported that "the objective test of `closest and most 
connection' was adopted by the Privy Council in 1950 in Bonython v. Commonwealth of 
Australia. s307 The same approach was also used in Amin Rasheed Shipping Corporation 
v. Kuwait Insurance Co. 308, where again the English Conflict of Law Rules clearly 
3°4 Lillich argued that "many foreign investors, either uncertain as to the law of the state with which they 
are contracting or concerned about a possible ex post facto change in that law or some other exercise of 
state sovereignty that might alter or cancel the contract to their detriment, " Richard B. Lillich, "The 
Law Governing Disputes Under Economic Development Agreements: Reexamining the Concept of 
`Internationalisation', in: Richard Lillich/ Charles N. Brower (eds. ), International Arbitration in the 
21" Century: Towards "Judicialisation" and Uniformity? Twelfth Sokol Colloquium, (1994 New York: 
Transnational Publishers), 61-114,63. 
305 M. Somarajah, International Commercial Arbitration: The Problem of State Contracts, supra note 214, 
at 158; see also in general, Hasan S. Zakariya, "New Directions in the Search for and Development of 
Petroleum Resources in the Developing Countries", 9 Vanderbilt Journal of Transnational Law 545- 
577(1976). 
306 Peter North/ J. J. Fawcett, Cheshire and North's, Private International Law, (13th ed., London: 
Butterworths 1999), at 534. 
307 Adrian Briggs/ Jonathan Hill/ J. D. McClean/ C. G. J. Morse (eds. ), Dicey & Morris On the Conflict of 
Laws, vol. 2 (13th ed., London: Sweet & Maxwell 2000), at 1197; "the substance of the obligation must 
be determined by the proper law of the contract, i. e. the system of law by reference to which the 
contract was made or that with which the transaction has its closest and most real connexion", 
Bonython v. Commonwealth ofAustralia, [1951] AC 201, at 219. 
308 Amin Rasheed Shipping Corporation v. Kuwait Insurance Co, (1983) 3 WLR 241. 
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provided that a contract is governed by the law with which it is most closely 
connected. 309 The prevailing view on the applicable law in the United States is similar to 
that of England, 
The prevailing view in the United States came to be (and is) that, in the absence 
of a choice of law by the parties, the applicable law is the law which has the most 
significant relationship to the transaction and the parties. 310 
The (1980) Rome Convention on the Law Applicable to Contractual Obligations 
follows the same approach 31 t 
In the sphere of the petroleum industry, not only are all the connected factors, i. e. 
place of contracting, place of performance, the subject matter of the contract, in favour 
of the host state's law, but also the intention of the parties, since the choice of the 
applicable law in most petroleum agreements which have been mentioned above was in 
favour of the host state's law. 312 That both theories should be taken into account is 
indeed frequently asserted. Ramazani, for instance, in his study on the problem of the 
choice of law in the contract between Iran and the Pan American Petroleum 
Corporation, 313 argued that not only should both theories (objective and subjective) be 
taken into account to determine the applicable law, but a third theory could be adopted, 
"the eclectic nature of this theory takes account of both the objectivist and subjectivist 
methods in ascertaining the applicable law to a contract. 014 Furthermore, he noted four 
major `objective' tests which are generally recognised by students and practitioners of 
conflict of laws in order to prove the link between the contract and the host state's law. 
The first test was that of the sovereignty of one of the parties, which in these contracts, is 
309 Rule 174-(1) provides that "to the extent that the applicable law has not been chosen in accordance 
with Rule 173, a contract is governed by the law of the country with which it is most closely 
connected. " 
310 Restatement, s. 188; Scoles and Hay, Chap. 18; quoted in Dicey and Morris, supra note 307, at 1196. 
31 Article 4 provides that "... the contract shall be governed by the law of the country with which it is 
most closely. " 
312 See for instance, Libyan cases, AMINOIL Case and Sapphire case. 
313 Rouhollah K. Ramazani, "Choice-of-Law Problems and International Oil Contracts: A Case Study" 
supra note 96, at 503-518. 
314 Ibid., at 505. 
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the host state. 315 The second test was the nationality of the agent, the third was the place 
where the contract was concluded, lex loci contractus, and the fourth test was the place 
of performance. He later added a fifth test, the nature of the subject matter and the place 
where it is situated (Iranian petroleum located within the Iranian domain). 316 
Consequently, it could be argued that the insistence of most western scholars and 
practitioners on applying law or rules other than host state's law may be driven for the 
most part by a desire to provide a considerable level of protection to foreign companies 
irrespective of judicial procedure. Moreover, a lack of knowledge of the host state laws 
may also lead the arbitrators to exclude this law. 
Now that we have examined the theoretical issues regarding the applicable law to 
the substance of a dispute, especially those surrounding the applicability of a host state 
law. The next chapter will examine the practical approach in this regard by discussing a 
number of significant petroleum disputes in Arab countries. 
315 Ibid., at 506. 
316 Ibid., at 508-509. 
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PART THREE 
THE NEW TRENDS CONCERNING 
PETROLEUM ARBITRATION 
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Chapter One: Doctrinal Background: Sovereign Immunity and 
Public Policy 
Introductory remarks 
In the realm of state contracts with private corporations, especially in the 
petroleum industry, certain significant issues must be taken into account in the 
process of determining the applicable law to the merits of a dispute. The most 
significant issues are the doctrine of sovereign immunity and the doctrine of 
public policy. In the petroleum industry, state involvement has become extremely 
controversial, particularly the question of whether state involvement is a public 
act so that the state is immune from any judicial proceedings, or whether this 
involvement is simply a private act which is normally undertaken by private 
persons, and thus the state is not immune from interference by the courts of other 
states. Moreover, the doctrine of public policy also plays a considerable role in 
determining the applicable substantive law, because arbitrators are obliged to 
consider the "various levels" of this doctrine. ' Hence, this chapter discusses these 
two doctrines in their nexus with petroleum arbitration. 
1. Sovereign immunity 
Undoubtedly, a state, 2 which is a subject of international law, 3 requires 
much freedom in order to fulfil its national and international duties. The doctrine 
of sovereign immunity4 is the cornerstone of this freedom, in which a state is 
, Julian D. M. Lew, Applicable Law in International Commercial Arbitration: A study in 
Commercial Arbitration Awards, (Dobbs Ferry/ New York: Oceana Publications 1978), at 536. 
2 Fox notes that the term `state' has many uses. In general conversation it can be used as a 
synonym for `country', `people', or 'government'. It may be used as a compendium term to 
cover all the activities of modem government, such as cabinet decisions, departmental circulars, 
and acts of subordinate officials, Hazel Fox, The Law of State Immunity, (Oxford: Oxford 
University Press 2002), at 23; the Montevideo Convention on Rights and duties of States, 1933 
Art. (1) provides that, "the state as a person of international law should possess the following 
qualifications: (a) a permanent population; (b) a defined territory; (c) government; and (d) 
capacity to enter into relations with other states. " 
3 Ibid. at 23-24. 
4 For a historical background see Sompong Sucharitkul, State Immunities and Trading Activities in 
International Law, (London: Stevens & Sons Limited 1959), at 3-19; Gamal Moursi Badr, State 
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immune from the adjudication of courts other than its owns Hence, when disputes 
arise "a state or a state agency may prevent their adjudication in another state's 
court by pleading state immunity. ,6 The roots of this doctrine are based on two 
concepts: sovereign equality, 7 "Pari parem non habet imperium, which means 
that "no state could be expected to submit to the laws of another"; and the dignity 
of a state i. e. that a state may be offended by being forced to submit to the 
jurisdiction of another state. 8 Others have referred to this doctrine in terms of the 
need to maintain good relations with power, 9 as well as the international comity 
which is due from one sovereign to another. '° 
Fox considers the doctrine of sovereign immunity as "a plea relating to the 
adjudicative and enforcement jurisdiction of national courts which bars the 
municipal court of one state from adjudicating the disputes of another state", " 
and therefore it must be understood that `the plea' is "a bar against one state from 
sitting in judgement on another state; it excludes one state from even addressing, 
let alone deciding or enforcing, a claim brought in its local courts against another 
state. "12 Sovereign immunity is normally understood to mean both immunity from 
jurisdiction, and immunity from execution, 13 although these have to be looked at 
separately. 
Immunity: An Analytical and Prognostic View, (The Hague: Martinus Nijhoff Publishers 1984), 
at 9-19; L. Ali Khan, The Extinction of Nation-State: A World without Borders, (The Hague: 
Kluwer Law International 1996), at 13-42; R. P. Anand, International Law and the Developing 
Countries, (Dordrech/ Boston/ Lancaster: Martinus Nijhoff 1987), at 73-102; about the 
American approach on sovereign immunity, see Richard B. Lillich, "The Proper Role of 
Domestic Courts in the International Legal Order", 11 Virginia Journal of International Law 9- 
50 (1970). 
S Hazel Fox, The Law of State Immunity, supra note 2, at 1. 
6 Ibid., at 1. 
7 Rosalyn Higgins, Problems and Process: International Law and How to Use it, (Oxford: 
Clarendon Press 1994), at 78. 
Ibid., at 79. 
It was stated that "the doctrine of sovereign immunity is of an ancient vintage. It was established 
in this country as an absolute protection of an armed vessel in the service of a friendly 
sovereign", Flota Maritima de Cuba, Sociadad Anonima v. Motor Vessel Ciudad De La 
Habana, (1964, CA4 Md) 335 F 2d 619. 
10 See Thomas Oehmke, International Arbitration, (New York: Clark Boardman Callaghan 1990), 
at 224. 
11 Hazel Fox, The Law of State Immunity, supra note 2, at 1. 
12 Ibid., at 4. 
13 Pieter Sanders, Ouo Vadis Arbitration? -Sixty Years of Arbitration Practice-, (The Hague: 
Kluwer Law International 1999), at 189; it was reported that "traditionally, primary 
consideration has been given to immunity from judicial and enforcement jurisdiction, " Louis 
Henken/ Richard Crawford/ Oscar Schachter/ Hans Smit, International Law: Cases and 
Materials (3rd ed., ST. Paul/ Minn: West Publishing Co. 1993), at 1126. 
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The doctrine of sovereign immunity has altered over time starting with the 
doctrine of the absolute immunity of states. 14 This model, which prevailed until 
the end of the 19th century, 15 rejected any distinction between public acts and 
private acts. 16 However, since the beginning of the 20th century, as states have 
become involved in private activities, the restrictive model, which distinguishes 
between public acts or the sovereign capacity (jure imperii) of a state, and those 
which are more private business, or commercial in nature (jure gestionis) has 
prevailed. 17 According to this model, a state cannot plea sovereign immunity 
while it is conducting private activities. This approach has been welcomed by 
many jurisdictions, 18 such as Europe in 1972 (the European Convention on State 
Immunity and Additional Protocol (ECSI)), the United States in 1976 (Foreign 
Sovereign Immunity Act (FSIA)), and the United Kingdom in 1978 (State 
Immunity Act (SIA)). 
However, the distinction between public and private activities is not 
always easy. Toope states 
The distinction between that which is commercial and that which 
manifests sovereignty is not always easy to draw, and whether one should 
look at the "purpose" of a transaction or at its "nature" remains a moot 
point. 19 
More specifically, is state involvement in the petroleum industry a public 
activity or a private activity? Moreover, at what stage can a state no longer invoke 
the sovereign immunity plea? Is it at the time of proceedings which is known as 
`immunity from jurisdiction' or at the time of enforcing the award i. e. `immunity 
from execution'? A discussion of these questions follows. 
14 For a historical background of this model, see Gamal Moursi Badr, State Immunity: An 
Analytical and Prognostic View, supra note 4, at 34-40. 
15 Rosalyn Higgins, Problems and Process: International Law and How to Use it, supra note 7, at 
79. 
16 Gamal Moursi Badr, State Immunity: An Analytical and Prognostic View, supra note 4, at 34. 
17 Thomas Oehmke, International Arbitration, supra note 10, at 226; Louis Henken/ Richard 
Crawford/ Oscar Schachter/ Hans Smit, International Law: Cases and Materials, supra note 13, 
at 1126-7; for a historical background of this model, see Gamal Moursi Badr, State Immunity: 
An Analytical and Prognostic View, supra note 4, at 21-34. 
18 Hazel Fox, The Law of State Immunity, supra note 2 at 2. 
19 Stephen J. Toope, Mixed International Arbitration: Studies in Arbitration between States and 
Private Persons, (Cambridge: Grotius Publications Limited 1990), at 139. 
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1.1. Immunity from jurisdiction 
Challenging the jurisdiction of a foreign court, whether national or 
international, is the first step in pleading sovereign immunity. 20 This can be used 
by a state to challenge a suit brought by a foreign investor. 21 
The shift in sovereign immunity from the absolute to the restrictive 
doctrine, as states became increasingly involved in private activities, and the 
distinction between public and private acts became increasingly apparent over the 
course of the 20th century. This led courts to focus on the act itself rather than the 
actor. 22 In the United States in 1952, for instance, following the "Tate Letter", the 
legal advisor to the State Department clearly announced that "his department 
would not expect American courts to avoid jurisdiction over commercial disputes 
involving foreign states. s23 The same shift is clear in England after the judgement 
of the Court of Appeal in Trendtex Trading Corporation v. Central Bank of 
Nigeria24 when Lord Denning rejected the plea of sovereign immunity by the 
bank because of the commercial nature of the bank transactions. 
As stated before, the restrictive doctrine of immunity has achieved 
considerable acceptance in several jurisdictions, such as the European Convention 
on State Immunity and Additional Protocol of 1972,25 which entered into force in 
1976. This states in Chapter I, Articles 1-14 the cases in which immunity from 
jurisdiction is not granted to a contracting state. 26 The United States enacted rules 
concerning sovereign immunity at a similar time, 27 the Foreign Sovereign 
Immunities Act of 1976 (FSIA). 28 This law is a comprehensive legal regime 
which specifies when a foreign state is entitled to sovereign immunity. 29 The 
FSIA embraces the restrictive doctrine of sovereign immunity, and therefore 
states engaging in commercial activities are not immune from jurisdiction. 
20 Hazel Fox, The Law of State Immunity, supra note 2, at 17. 
21 David Frisch/ Raj Bhala, Global Business Law: Principles and Practice, (North Carolina: 
Carolina Academic Press 1999), at 538. 
22 Hazel Fox, The Law of State Immunity, supra note 2, at 4. 
23 M. Sornarajah, International Commercial Arbitration: The Problem of State Contracts, 
(Singapore: Longman Singapore Publishers Ltd 1990), at 200. 
24 [1977] Q. B. 529; [1977] 2 WLR 356; [1977] 1 Lloyd's Rep 581. 
25 See the Convention and its additional Protocol in "Explanatory Reports on the European 
Convention on State Immunity and the Additional Protocol", Council of Europe - Strasbourg 
1972, reprinted in 11 ILM 470 (1972). 
26 Ibid. 
27 Mark B. Feldman, "The United States Foreign Sovereign Immunities Act of 1976 in 
Perspective: A Founder's View", 35 ICLQ 302-319,303 (1986). 
28 15 ILM 1388 (1976). 
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Chapter 97 Section 1605 (a) (2) of the FSIA determines three cases in which a 
state is considered acting commercial activities. 30 
The United Kingdom followed with the State Immunity Act of 1978 
(SIA). 31 This act clearly provides in Part 1 Article 3 that a state is not immune 
from proceedings relating to a commercial transaction. 32 Other countries such as 
Singapore (State Immunity Act 1979)33 and Pakistan (State Immunity Ordinance 
1981)34 followed in the same vein. 
1.2. Does submission to arbitration constitute a waiver of immunity? 
In the context of arbitration, where arbitrators normally derive their 
authority from the arbitration agreement only, the generally accepted view is that 
a state may not claim immunity from jurisdiction once it has signed an arbitration 
agreement. Delaume argues that a state by signing an arbitration agreement has 
implicitly waived jurisdictional immunity. 35 He also states that 
Decisions of international and domestic tribunals, treaty and statutory 
provisions found in the Europe convention and modern western statutes, 
all concur that a state party to an arbitration agreement is precluded from 
asserting its immunity in order to frustrate the purpose of the agreement. 36 
29 [1976] U. S. Code Congressional and Administrative News, at 6605. 
30 Sec. 1605 provides: General exception to the jurisdictional immunity of a foreign state [... ] (2) 
in which the action is based upon a commercial activity carried on in the United States by the 
foreign state; or upon an act performed in the United States in connection with the activity of the 
foreign state elsewhere; or upon an act outside the territory of the United States in connection 
with a commercial activity of the foreign state elsewhere and that act causes a direct effect in the 
United States. 
31 17 ILM 1123 (1978). 
32 Article 3 provides: (1) A state is not immune as respects proceedings relating to: 
(a) a commercial transaction entered into by the state; or 
(b) an obligation of the state which by virtue of a contract (whether a commercial transaction or 
not) falls to be performed wholly or partly in the United Kingdom. 
33 Part II (5) a state is not immune as respects proceedings relating to: (a) a commercial transaction 
entered into by the state [... ]; see the act in Gamal Moursi Badr, State Immunity: An Analytical 
and Prognostic View, supra note 4, at 203. 
34 Article 5 (1) a state is not immune as respects proceedings relating to: (a) a commercial 
transaction entered into by the state [... ]; see the Act in ibid., at 211. 
35 Georges R. Delaume, Transnational Contracts: Applicable Law and Settlement of Disputes, re- 
issue (1985), vol. 2, Ch. 11,30-1; see also by the same author, "State Contracts and 
Transnational Arbitration", 75 AJIL 784-819 (1981); and "Foreign Sovereign Immunity: 
Impact on Arbitration", 38 (2) The Arbitration Journal 34-47 (1983). 
36 Georges R. Delaume, "Sovereign Immunity and Transnational Arbitration", 3 Arbitration 
International 28-45,30 (1987), reprinted in: Julian DM Lew (ed. ), Contemporary problems in 
International Arbitration, (1987 the Netherlands: Martinus Nijhoff Publishers), at 
313-321. 
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The above statement has been adhered to by most western jurisdictions. 
The European Convention on State Immunity and Additional Protocol of 1972 
provides in Article 12 that the plea of immunity from jurisdiction cannot be raised 
when a contracting state agreed in writing to submit a dispute which has arisen or 
may arise out of a civil or commercial matter to arbitration. 37 The same principle 
is also found in the United Kingdom SIA Section 9 which states clearly that 
where a state has agreed in writing to submit a dispute which has arisen, or may 
arise, to arbitration, the state is not immune as respects proceedings in the courts 
of the United Kingdom. 38 In the United States, the FSIA took a different view. 
This law made no specific reference to arbitration, although Section 1605 (a) (1) 
provides that a state may have waived its immunity "either explicitly or by 
implication. "39 However, the FSIA was amended in 1988 to rectify this gap, and 
now a foreign state is not immune from the jurisdiction of the American courts 
where the action is brought either to enforce an arbitration agreement entered into 
by a state with a private party or to confirm an award made according to such 
agreement. 0 The Canadian State Immunity Act, which came into force on 15 July 
1982, is silent concerning the issue of arbitration. However, it provides in Article 
4 (1) that "a foreign state is not immune from the jurisdiction of a court if the state 
waives the immunity, " and it defines in subsection (2) and (4) of the same article 
the cases in which a foreign state is not entitled to immunity from jurisdiction 
before the Canadian courts. 1 In contrast, the Australian Foreign Sovereign 
Immunities Act of 1985, which came into force on 1 April 1986, clearly provides 
that a foreign state is not immune from jurisdiction where it is a party to an 
arbitration agreement. 42 
37 Article (12) provides: 1. where a contracting state has agreed in writing to submit to arbitration a 
dispute which has arisen or may arise out of a civil or commercial matter, that state may not 
claim immunity from the jurisdiction of a court of another contracting state [.... ], reprinted in 
11 ILM 470 (1972); see also Julian D. M. Lew/ Loukas A. Mistelis/ Stefan M. Kröll, 
Comparative International Commercial Arbitration, (The Hague: Kluwer Law International 
2003), Chapter 27, at 733-759. 
38 17 ILM 1123 (1978). 
39 It was argued that "the legislative history mentions as an example of implicit waiver the case 
where a foreign state has agreed to arbitration in another country", see House of Representative 
Report no. 94-1487,94th Con., 2nd Sess. 18, reprinted in (1976) U. S. Code Congressional and 
Administrative News, at 6604,6617. 
ao Amendment to Foreign Sovereign Immunities Act, (28 U. S. C. Secs. 1602-1611), ICCA HB 
(1987) 
41 See the law in 21 ILM 798 (1982). 
42 Australia: Foreign Sovereign Immunities Act of 1985 Art. (17), 25 ILM 719 (1986). 
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In the literature of international conventions we see a very similar picture. 
In 1982, the International Law Association produced a Draft for a Convention on 
State Immunity. Article 3 (2) provides that a state cannot invoke the plea of 
immunity from jurisdiction when the state agreed in writing to submit a dispute 
which has arisen or may arise to arbitration. 43 In 1991 the International Law 
Commission adopted a Draft on State Immunity. Article 17 states that a state 
enters into a written agreement with a foreign natural or juridical person to submit 
any dispute relating to a commercial transaction to arbitration, that state cannot 
invoke immunity from jurisdiction before a court of another state. 4 The New 
York Convention of 1958 is silent regarding the doctrine of sovereign immunity. 
Delaume has argued that the ICSID Convention is unique in that "consent to 
ICSID arbitration constitutes an irrevocable waiver of immunity from 
jurisdiction. s45 
Arbitral case law would seem to support the lack of sovereign immunity. 
In the Ipitrade v. Nigeria case for instance, the United States Court held that an 
agreement of a foreign state to arbitrate constitutes an implicit waiver of 
sovereign immunity according to the legislative history of section 1605 (a) 
FSIA. 46 However, this conclusion was not widely welcomed. Toope for instance, 
stated that 
There is nothing in the applicable sections of the Foreign Sovereign 
Immunities 
Act [28 USC 1605 (a) (1)] which renders this judicial decision a cas d'espece. 
Moreover, the Ipitrade decision by no means stands alone. 7 
The following case was also in the vein of the Ipitrade v. Nigeria case. 
The dispute between M. B. L. International Contractors, INC. and Alves 
Contracting Company Limited (the petitioners) v. the Republic of Trinidad and 
"Report of the ILA Conference Montreal 1982 (London 1983), 6-10. 
as For the text see 30 ILM 1563 (1991), see also European Convention on International 
Commercial Arbitration of 1961, Article 2. (1). 
45 Georges R. Delaume, "Foreign Sovereign Immunity: Impact on Arbitration", supra note 35, at 
36. 
46 Ipitrade International, S. A. v. Federal Republic of Nigeria, 465 F. Supp. 824; 1978 U. S. Dist. 
LEXIS 15325; reprinted in 17 ILM 1395 (1978). 
47 Stephen J. Toope, Mixed International Arbitration: Studies in Arbitration between States and 
Private Persons, supra note 19, at 146. 
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Tobago (the respondent), concerned a contract to repair airfield pavements at 
Piarco International and Crown Point Airport in Trinidad and Tobago 48 After the 
dispute arose in the course of the performance of the contract, the parties agreed 
to solve the dispute by final and binding arbitration, and therefore they agreed on 
3 September 1985 to appoint Selby Wooding as a sole arbitrator. On 17 
November 1988 the arbitrator made his decision in favour of the petitioners. The 
respondent refused to obey the arbitral award, and consequently the petitioners 
filed a petition before the U. S. District Court of the District of Columbia in order 
to confirm the arbitration award as the first step in enforcing that award against 
the respondent in the United States pursuant to the New York Convention. 49 The 
respondent protested the petitioners' action on the ground that sovereign 
immunity precludes this court's exercise of subject matter and personal 
jurisdiction over the respondent. The petitioners contended that the respondent 
implicitly waived its sovereign immunity by agreeing to submit the dispute to 
arbitration. The respondent rejected this contention, pleading that "there was no 
waiver on the ground that the arbitration agreement provides that the law of 
Trinidad and Tobago governs the arbitration of the dispute. s50 Finally, the court 
denied the respondent's motion and confirmed the arbitral award. 
To sum up, the prevailing opinion that, once a state has agreed to arbitrate, 
it is no more entitled to immunity from jurisdiction. However, the situation is 
different concerning immunity from execution. 
1.3. Immunity from execution 
Badr argues that waiver of immunity from jurisdiction does not always 
entail waiver of immunity from execution. 51 He supports this conclusion with two 
reasons 
48 M. B. L. International Contractors, INC. v. Republic of Trinidad and Tobago, 725 F. Supp. 52; 
1989 U. S. Dist. LEXIS 13806. 
49 Ibid., at 2. 
50 mid., at 2. 
51 Gamal Moursi Badr, State Immunity: An Analytical and Prognostic View, supra note 4, at 107; 
in the same vein Emmanuel and Edelstein have argued that, "the act of entering into an 
arbitration agreement and thereby waiving immunity from jurisdiction, will not be considered 
sufficient to constitute a waiver, on the part of the state party, of its immunity from execution, 
as least insofar as concerns the assets used to perform its sovereign activities", Emmanuel 
Gaillard/ Jenny Edelstttein, "Recent Developments in State Immunity from Execution in 
France: Creighton v. Qatar", 15 (10) Mealey's International Arbitration Report 14 (2000); 
Lew, Mistelis and Kröll also state that, "the fact that a state cannot claim immunity from 
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a) that forcible execution on the property of a foreign state would create 
more problems for the state of the forum and would adversely affect 
its relations with the foreign state more than the mere subjection of the 
foreign state to the jurisdiction of the forum, and 
b) that the property of the state of the forum itself being immune from 
forcible execution, it would be more difficult to justify execution on 
the property of the foreign state than to justify denial to it of immunity 
from suit. The assimilative approach would operate here in favour of 
immunity from execution for the foreign state. 52 
It is understood from the above overview that a state is entitled to invoke 
immunity from execution. Therefore, this fact is eminent in the literature of a 
number of conventions as well as in the case law. Execution against a state's 
property is prohibited under the 1972 European Convention on State Immunity 
without the advance written consent of that state. 53 The same approach is 
articulated by the Draft Convention on State Immunity of 1991, Article 18 
sa 
Under the ICSID Convention, although Article 53 (1) provides that the award 
shall be binding on the parties and shall not be subject to any appeal or to any 
other remedy except those provided for in this Convention, immunity from 
execution still constitutes an obstacle to enforcement of ICSID awards. 
55 This fact 
derives its rationale from Article 55 of the ICSID Convention which reads 
jurisdiction does not necessarily mean that the state is not immune from the actual execution of 
the award", Julian D. M. Lew/ Loukas A. Mistelis/ Stefan M. Kröll, Comparative International 
Commercial Arbitration, supra note 37, at 750. 
52 Gamal Moursi Badr, State Immunity: An Analytical and Prognostic View, supra note 4, at 107. 
53 Art. 23 states that "no measures of execution or preventive measures against the property of a 
contracting state may be taken in the territory of another contracting state except where and to 
the extent that the state has expressly consented in writing in any particular case", European 
Convention on State Immunity and the Additional Protocol of 1972, supra note 25. 
54 Art. 18 "no measure of constraint, such as attachment, arrest and execution, against property of 
a state may be taken in connection with a proceeding before a court of another state unless and 
except to the extent that: (a) the state has expressly consented to the taking of such measures. ". 
ss Sornarajah for instance, argues that "despite these innovations as to enforcement which makes 
the ICSID award far superior to awards made against states or state entities by other tribunals, 
sovereign immunity continues to be a hurdle to the enforcement of ICSID awards", M. 
Sornarajah, International Commercial Arbitration: The Problem of State Contracts, supra note 
23, at 227. 
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Nothing in Article 54 shall be construed as derogating from the law in 
force in any contracting state relating to immunity of that state or of any 
foreign state from execution. 56 
The view expressed has also been recognised by a considerable number of 
court decisions. In the well known LIAMCO v. Libya case for instance, LIAMCO, 
after being granted an arbitral award57 against Libya, started seeking enforcement 
of the award in different countries. LIAMCO sought enforcement of the arbitral 
award before the Switzerland court, and therefore it applied for attachment of all 
financial assets of Libya in banks in Zurich. On 13 February 1979, the District 
Court of the canton of Zurich granted the attachment, but the Swiss Federal 
Supreme Court vacated the attachment 58 Similarly, the Court of First Instant of 
Paris (France) vacated the attachment of Libya's assets in France. 59 LIAMCO also 
sought recognition and enforcement of the award under the New York 
Convention of 1958 in the United States before the District Court of Columbia. 
Libya contended that the court was without jurisdiction, and it added that should 
the court find jurisdiction, it should refrain from enforcing the award under the 
New York Convention because of the act of state doctrine. The court accepted 
Libya's contention and rendered a decision on 18 January 1980, in which it 
refused the recognition and enforcement of the arbitral award. 60 
According to the doctrine of restrictive immunity, it is evident that a state 
cannot invoke immunity from jurisdiction, particularly, while it is conducting 
private or commercial activities. However, a state is still entitled to immunity 
from execution. 
Our concern here is whether the involvement of a state in the petroleum 
industry is considered as a private act and therefore a state cannot invoke the 
doctrine of sovereign immunity. Or this act is a public act and consequently, a 
state can invoke the doctrine of absolute immunity when the interests of its 
citizens are at risk. Before answering this question it is worth discussing the 
56 <www worldbank. org/icsid/basicdoc/9. htm> last visited 13 February 2003. 
57 See a thorough discussion of this arbitral award in the previous chapter. 
58 See 6 YI3CA 151 (1981). 
59 See the French decision in 106 Journal du Droi International 875-866 (1979). 
60 Libyan American Oil Company v. Socialist People's Libyan Arab Jamahiriya, 482 F. Supp. 
1175; 1980 U. S. Dist. LEXIS 9839. 
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distinction between a public act and a private act as understood in certain court 
decisions. 
1.4. Distinction between a public act and a private act 
As stated above, due to the involvement of states in trade and private acts, 
there was a major shift regarding sovereign immunity. The doctrine of absolute 
immunity was gradually replaced by another doctrine which distinguishes 
between public and private state acts. Therefore, numerous western countries 
moved to limiting immunity, making it unavailable for private acts or commercial 
activities. 61 However, how do these jurisdictions distinguish between a public act 
and a private act, and what type of criteria do they follow? 
The United States Foreign Sovereign Immunities Act (FSIA) Section 1603 
(d) provides that "[A] `commercial activity' means either a regular course of 
commercial conduct or a particular commercial transaction of act", then it 
expressly states that the commercial character of an activity should be determined 
by reference to the nature of its conduct, rather than by reference to its purpose. 
62 
According to the House of Representatives Committee on the Judiciary, the 
definition indicates that 
Goods or services to be procured through a contract are to be used for a 
public purpose is irrelevant; it is the essentially commercial nature of an 
activity or transaction that is critical. Thus, a contract by a foreign 
government to buy provisions or equipment for its armed forces or to 
construct a government building constitutes a commercial activity. The 
same would be true of a contract to make repairs on an embassy building. 
Such contracts should be considered to be commercial contracts, even if 
their ultimate object is to further a public function 63 
61 Rosalyn Higgins, Problems and Process: International Law and How to Use it, supra note 7, at 
81; see also Kuwait Airways Corporation v. Iraqi Airways Company and Republic of Iraq, 
[1995] 2 Lloyd's Rep. 317; Kuwait Airways Corporation v. Iraqi Airways Co, [2002] 2 A. C. 
883. 
62 Sec. 1603 (d) provides that "[A] `commercial activity' means either a regular course of 
commercial conduct or a particular commercial transaction of act. The commercial character of 
an activity shall be determined by reference to the nature of the course of conduct or particular 
transaction or act, rather than by reference to its purpose", 28 U. S. C. (1982). 
63 See H. R. Rep. no. 94-1487,94`h Cong., 2nd Sess., reprinted in (1976) U. S. Code Congressional 
and Administrative News, at 6604-6635,6615. 
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On the other hand, the Committee stated that foreign state participation in 
foreign assistance is a public or a governmental act in its nature. Hence, the 
distinguishing feature of an act here is the nature of the act not its purpose, even if 
the ultimate objective of an act is to further a public function. 4 Determining the 
nature of an act is the task of the courts, "the courts would have a great deal of 
latitude in determining what is a `commercial activity' for the purposes of this 
bill . s65 In fact, the FSIA leaves much to the discretion of the 
judiciary. 66 
The English law (SIA) of 1978 gives examples of contracts in order to 
illustrate the meaning of a commercial act or transaction. 67 The International 
Commission's Draft followed the same method, listing a number of activities 
which are considered commercial in nature. Article 2 (1) (c) provides that 
"commercial transaction" means: any commercial contract or transaction for the 
sale of goods or supply of services; any contract for loan, other transaction of any 
financial nature; or any other contract or transaction of a commercial, industrial, 
trading or professional nature. 68 Paragraph (2) follows the American definition of 
a commercial activity in which the nature of the transaction should be primary. 
However, the Draft also gives consideration to the purpose of the contract. It 
states that 
In determining whether a contract or transaction is a "commercial 
transaction" under Paragraph 1 (c), reference should be made primarily to 
the nature of the contract or transaction, but its purpose should also be 
taken into account if, in the practice of the state which is a party to it, that 
64 Ibid.; see also Mark B. Feldman, "The United States Foreign Sovereign Immunities Act of 1976 
in Perspective: A Founder's View", supra note 27, at 308; see also L. Weatherly Lowe, "The 
International Law Commission's Draft Articles on the Jurisdictional Immunities of States and 
Their Property: The Commercial Contract Exception", 27 Columbia Journal of Transnational 
Law 657-678,661 (1988-1989). 
65 H. R. Rep. no. 94-1487,94`s Cong., 2°d Sess., reprinted in (1976) U. S. Code Congressional and 
Administrative News, at 6604-6635,6615. 
66 Georges R. Delaume, "Economic Development and Sovereign Immunity", 79 AJIL 319-346, 
320 (1985). 
67 Sec. 3 (3) provides that "in this section 'commercial transaction' means: 
- (a) any contract for the supply of goods or services; 
- (b) any loan or other transaction for the provision of finance and any guarantee or 
indemnity in respect of any such transaction or of any other financial obligation; and 
- (c) any other transaction or activity (whether of a commercial, industrial, financial, 
professional or other similar character) into which a state enters or in which it engages 
otherwise than in the exercise of sovereign authority. " 
68 See the text in 30 ILM 1563 (1991). 
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purpose is relevant to determining the non-commercial character of the 
contract or transaction. 69 
In determining the nature of an activity, the United States Court of 
Appeals for the Eighth Circuit in a case between McDonnell Douglas 
Corporation v. the Islamic Republic of Iran, rejected Iran's contention that 
"McDonnell's action is barred by sovereign immunity. , 70 The court reported that 
the "FSIA recognises that sovereign immunity is the exception, rather than the 
rule", and this exception, as it later added "should be confined to a foreign 
sovereign's truly governmental acts and not extended to strictly commercial 
activities. 9971 
Hence, it appears from the examples above that a commercial act or 
transaction is that which might be practiced by a private person or corporation, 
and therefore when a state is involved to such a transaction it is no longer entitled 
to sovereign immunity. These commercial transactions include the construction of 
a government building, or even undertaking repairs on an embassy building. The 
question which is raised here is whether is it logical to compare the petroleum 
industry with other commercial transactions. In the following section we will 
argue that it is not. 
1.5. Is the petroleum industry a commercial activity? 
To answer this question we must first recall the importance of the 
petroleum industry to the countries which are the subject matter of this thesis, as 
well as compare the importance of petroleum to previous activities which are 
considered commercial activities such as construction of a governmental building 
or even an embassy. Undoubtedly, petroleum is the life artery of these countries 
and it plays a crucial role in their citizens' daily life. It constitutes more than 70% 
69 Ibid., at 1566. 
70 McDonnell Douglas Corporation v. the Islamic Republic of Iran, the Ministry of Defence of the 
Islamic Republic of Iran and the Islamic Republic of Iran Air Force, 758 F. 2d 341; 1985 U. S. 
App. LEXIS 29895. 
71 Ibid; the same approach has recently been maintained by the Cour de Cassation (France) in 
Creighton v. Qatar. The Court concluded that "although immunity from execution of states is 
the rule when such immunity has not been waived, the immunity does not cover assets intended 
for private economic or commercial activities", Creighton Ltd v. Qatar, the Cour de Cassation, 
6 July 2000,127 Cluent 1054 (2000); 15 (9) Mealy's IAR A-1 (2000). 
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of annual income in some countries. 72 This is the first and the most significant 
feature of the petroleum industry, which, will be argued here, precludes this 
industry from being a commercial activity. Furthermore, this industry inherently 
involves the state since nothing "can be carried out in its territory without its 
authorisation and under its strict control and supervision. "73 Moreover, petroleum 
contracts have a specific character which distinguishes them from other business 
contracts and gives them "a definite imprint that places them in a class of their 
own. s74 Apart from the fact that these contracts are long-term; contain a mixture 
of contractual and statutory or regulatory provisions (the legal nature of petroleum 
agreements) and that the state is always, directly or indirectly, involved in them, 75 
the most significant aspect of petroleum contracts in our view is the subject matter 
of these contracts. Basically, these contracts regulate the relationship between the 
owner of the natural resources (petroleum) which is a state and a company or 
companies, in order to exploit this resource in favour of citizens of that state. 
Thus, the state here performs a public act not a private act, because this act is 
confined to the benefit of its citizens. 
The importance of the petroleum industry to the developing petroleum 
countries nowadays, is comparable to the importance of vessels in previous 
centuries. In the 19th century for instance, when vessels played a crucial role in 
trade as well as in war, these vessels were granted immunity in foreign ports and 
territorial waters. 76 The United States Supreme Court was the first to apply the 
principles of state immunity to (public) ships. 77 Sucharitkul stated that 
The principles of state immunities as applied to public ships were first 
adopted by the United States Supreme Court at the time when America 
72 For example, petroleum income constitutes 71% of the Omani annual budget for the year 2003, 
Al-Wotan Newspaper, no. 7110,2 January 2003. 73 A. Z. EL Chiati, "Protection of Investment in the Context of Petroleum Agreements", 4 Recueil 
des Cours: Collected Courses of the Hague Academy of International Law 13-169,26 (1987). 74 Ibid., at 26; see also part one, chapter two of this thesis. 'S Ibid., at 26; the Omani Basic Statute of the State of 1996 Art. 11 (4) provides that "all natural 
resources and revenues therefrom shall be the property of the state which will preserve and 
utilise them in the best manner taking into consideration the requirements of the state's security 
and the interests of the national economy [... ]"; Petroleum Act of 1998 (UK) Part 1 (2) (1) 
provides that "Her Majesty has the exclusive right of searching and boring for and getting 
petroleum to which this section applies. " 76 Sompong Sucharitkul, State Immunities and Trading Activities in International Law, supra note 4, at 51. 
77 Ibid., at 51. 
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was yet a newly born state, still conscious of her sovereignty and 
independence. 78 
The Marshall C. J decision is a remarkable decision in this regard, because it laid 
down, for the first time, the principles of state immunity in general and the 
immunity of United States men-of-war in particular. 79 Marshall C. J. observed 
that 
A clear distinction is to be drawn between the rights accorded to private 
individuals or private trading vessels, and those accorded to public armed 
ships which constitute a part of the military force of the nation [... ] it 
seems, then, to the court, to be a principle of public law, that national 
ships of war, entering the port of a friendly power open for their reception, 
are to be considered as exempted by the consent of that power from its 
jurisdiction. 80 
Years later, the Court of Appeals for the Fifth Circuit in the Josefina 
Najarro de Sanchez v. Banco Central de Nicaragua case found that the sale by 
the Nicaraguan Central Bank of foreign exchange was a sovereign act. 81 In the 
same vein, the Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit in the Mol, Inc v. the 
Peoples Republic of Bangladesh, 82 case found Bangladesh to be engaged in a 
public act. Here when Bangladesh terminated a contract with Mol Inc an Oregon 
corporation, to capture and export rhesus monkeys, and Mol Inc sued Bangladesh, 
the court concluded that 
Bangladesh was terminating an agreement that only a sovereign could 
have made. This was not just a contract for trade of monkeys. It concerned 
Bangladesh's right to regulate imports and exports, a sovereign 
prerogative. [... ] In short, the Licensing agreement was a sovereign act, 
78 Ibid., at 51-52. 
79 Ibid., at 52. 
80 The Schooner Exchange v. M'Faddon and Others, 11 U. S. 116; 3 L. Ed. 287; 1812 U. S. LEXIS 
377; 7 Cranch 116; see also Sompong Sucharitkul, State Immunities and Trading Activities in 
International Law, supra note 4, at 51. 
81 Josefina Najarro de Sanchez v. Banco Central de Nicaragua, a Foreign Banking Corporation , 
U. S. Court of Appeals for the Fifth Circuit, 77 F. 2d 1385; 1985 U. S. App. LEXIS 23225. 
82 Mol, Inc v. the Peoples Republic of Bangladesh, 736 F. 2d 1326; 1984 U. S. App. LEXIS 
20862; 14 ELR 20656. 
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not just a commercial transaction. Its revocation was sovereign by nature, 
not commercial. Bangladesh has sovereign immunity from this suit. [... ] 
Because the act complained of was not a commercial activity and 
Bangladesh has sovereign immunity. 83 
In another case, Samuel E. Friedar v. the Government of Israel, 84 Samuel 
E. Frieda, a citizen of New York, brought an action under 28 U. S. C. Sections 
1330,1605 against the Government of Israel alleging that he was injured while 
serving in the Israeli army in 1948, and the Government refused to compensate 
him, despite an agreement do so. The District Court for the Southern District of 
New York decided that the Israeli Government was immune from the jurisdiction 
of the court under 28 U. S. C. Section 1604. The court concluded that the 
Government was entitled to sovereign immunity under 28 U. S. C. Sections 1604- 
1607, stating that 85 
A determination regarding veterans' benefits in the United States is 
precluded from judicial review. 38 U. S. C. Section 211. It would be 
presumptuous for a United States court to review a foreign state's internal 
administrative activity, especially when identical activity by the United 
States government would not be subject to judicial review. I find this suit 
inappropriate for adjudication by United States court. I further note that 
the difficulty of trying this case in United States courts would justify a 
dismissal on forum non convenience grounds. Accordingly, the 
Government's motion to dismiss is granted. 86 
In a case between International Association of Machinists and Aerospace 
Workers (IAM) v. the Organisation of the Petroleum Exporting Countries 
(OPEC), the United States Court of Appeal of Ninth Circuit concluded that 
83 Ibid. 
84 Samuel E. Friedar v. the Government of Israel, Ministry of Defence of Israel, and the Consulate 
General of Israel in New York, 614 F. Supp. 395; 1985 U. S. Dist. LEXIS 17476. 
8s Ibid. 
B6 Ibid. 
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The act of state doctrine is applicable in this case. The courts should not 
enter at the will of litigants into a delicate area of foreign policy which the 
executive and legislative branches have chosen to approach with restraint. 
The issue of whether the FSIA allows jurisdiction in this case need not be 
decided, since a judicial remedy is inappropriate regardless of whether 
jurisdiction exists. [... ] The decision of the district court dismissing this 
action is affirmed. 87 
The above decisions illustrate certain acts which have been considered as public 
acts, providing immunity for the state involved. How does the petroleum industry 
compare? 
Is a petroleum transaction public in its nature or in its purpose? Compared 
to the above examples, it could be argued that the petroleum industry, as it 
exploits a national resource for the benefit of a nation, is a public activity in 
nature as well as in purpose, and that therefore a state is entitled to immunity 
when it is involved. This argument is especially significant as petroleum income 
is so crucial to the citizens of developing petroleum countries, and it is easy to say 
that it would be no any type of development in these countries without petroleum 
income. Hence, the allegation which says that the petroleum industry particularly 
in developing countries is just a commercial activity means either: lack of any 
type of knowledge concerning the role and impact of this industry in the 
developing countries compared to the same function in developed countries; or it 
is just a jump on the facts in order to establish a legal ground for self-benefit. 
87 International Association of Machinists and Aerospace Workers (JAM) v. the Organisation of 
the Petroleum Exporting Countries (OPEC), 649 F. 2d 1354; 1981 U. S. App. LEXIS 11740; 
1981-1 Trade Cas. (CCH) P64,143. 
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2. Public policy 
Introductory remarks 
The ease of enforcing an international arbitral award compared to 
enforcing a foreign judgment is considered a salient feature of international 
arbitration. However, the reality is more complex. Searching for grounds or 
defences in order to challenge the arbitral award is the principal concern of the 
losing party. The doctrine of public policy may be the most significant and the 
last defence in this regard. The Convention on the Recognition and Enforcement 
of Foreign Arbitral Awards of 1958 (hereinafter the New York Convention) is the 
basis of this doctrine in the context of international arbitration. 88 The drafters of 
the Convention realised that a state was unlikely to become party to a treaty 
which compelled that state to recognise and give effect to a foreign arbitral award 
unless "there was the possibility of challenging enforcement on at least a 
minimum of recognised grounds. "89 Van den Berg considers public policy one of 
the most traditional grounds for the refusal of enforcement of a foreign arbitral 
award or foreign judgment, as well as for the refusal to apply a foreign law. 
90 
Scholars introduced the notion of different levels of public policy to the 
debate, according to purpose, such as domestic and international public policies 91 
This distinction has been accepted in matters of arbitration. 92 Accordingly, it was 
argued that what might be considered to come under domestic public policy not 
necessarily fall into that of international public policy. 93 
88 Karl-Heinz Böckstiegel "Public Policy and Arbitrability", in: Pieter Sanders (ed. ), Comparative 
Arbitration Practice and Public Policy, 1986 ICCA Congress Series no. 3, (1987 the 
Netherlands: Kluwer Law and Taxation Publishers), 177-204,178. 
89 Christopher B. Kuner, "T he Public Policy Exception to the Enforcement of Foreign Arbitral 
Awards in the United States and West Germany under the New York Convention", 7 (4) J Int'l 
Arb 71-91,71 (1990). 
90 Albert Jan van den Berg, The New York Convention of 1958: Towards a Uniform Judicial 
Interpretation, (Netherlands: Kluwer Law and Taxation Publishers 1981), at 360. 
91 See for instance, Julian D. M. Lew, Applicable Law in International Commercial Arbitration: A 
Study in Commercial Arbitration Awards, supra note 1, at 531-532; Mauro Rubino- 
Sammartano, International Arbitration: Law and Practice, (2"d ed., the Netherlands: Kluwer 
Law International 2001), at 503- 531. 
92 Albert Jan van den Berg, The New York Convention of 1958: Towards a Uniform Judicial 
Interpretation, supra note 90, at 360. 
93 Ibid., at 360. 
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We will examine the nature of public policy and the role it can play in the 
sphere of international arbitration in general and in petroleum arbitration in 
particular. 
2.1. The notion of public policy 
Many have argued that public policy, is impossible to define due to the 
uncertainty and ambiguity of its content 94 It was stated that "public policy still 
remains too vague a concept. "95 In the same vein, Sir John Donaldson asserted 
that public policy "can never be exhaustively defined. "96 However, Lew states 
that 
It is clear that public policy reflects the fundamental economic, legal, 
moral, political, religious and social standards of every state or extra- 
national community. Naturally public policy differs according to the 
character and structure of the state or community to which it appertains, 
and covers those principles and standards which are so sacrosanct as to 
require their maintenance at all costs and without exception. 97 
In 1853, the British House of Lords described public policy as "principles 
of law which hold that no subject can lawfully do that which has a tendency to be 
injurious to the public, or against public goods. "98 The Court of Appeal of 
Hamburg gave in its judgement on 26 January 1989, in a case between a seller 
and a buyer of soybean flour, a helpful definition of public policy. It stated that 
Apart from the violations of basic civil rights, an infringement upon public 
policy will result from the violation of a rule concerning the fundamental 
principles of political or economic life. Public policy will also be infringed 
94 Julian D. M. Lew, Applicable Law in International Commercial Arbitration: A Study in 
Commercial Arbitration Awards, supra note 1, at 531-532. 
9s Oscar A. Ruiz Del Rio, "Arbitration Clauses in International Loans", 4 (3) J Int'l Arb 45-69,65 
(1987). 
96 Deutsche Schachtbau-Und Tiefbohrgesellschaft m. b. H. v. Ras Al Khaimah National Oil Co., 
3 WLR 1023-1041 (1987); 2 Lloyd's Rep 244,254. 
97 Julian D. M. Lew, Applicable Law in International Commercial Arbitration: A study in 
Commercial Arbitration Awards, supra note 1, at 532. 
9S Egerton v. Brownlow [1853] 4 HLC 1, quoted in the Report of International Law Association, 
the Committee on International Commercial Arbitration, London Conference (2000), at 4. 
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ýh 
upon when the arbitral award is irreconcilable with German concepts of 
justice. 99 
This statement highlights the way in which diversity among states is 
reflected in interpretations of public policy. Therefore, what is a part of public 
policy in one country may not be in another with different political, economic, 
religious or social norms reflected in a different legal system. 10° Of great 
importance here is the considerable role religions principles play in determining 
public policy in Islamic countries. 
2.2. The notion of public policy in Islamic law (Shari'ah) 
In Islamic law (Shari'ah) like other legal systems it is difficult to find a 
definite definition to public policy. However, there are two particular features of 
public policy in Islamic law i. e. stability and continuity and it is comparable to 
public policy in other systems. This is because principles of Islamic law 
(especially the main principles) are derived from the sacred sources of the 
Qura'an and the Sunnah, and therefore the doctrine of public policy in Islamic 
law is fixed. Where these principles concern, for instance, the protection of the 
human being, property or the family, they are stable and remain the same in any 
place and at any time. 
In fact, Shari 'ah not only determines the areas in which daily life of 
Muslims should be conducted according to divine law, "but it also defines, 
classifies and categorise the injunctions of the lawgiver in relation to Muslims. "101 
Hence, human activities are "classified on a scale of moral and ethical desirability 
from God's perspective. "102 This scale of religious qualifications which are 
known as the five qualifications (al-ahkam al-khamsa) are categorised as follow: 
obligatory duties (wajib), recommended (mustahab), permissible or discretionary 
(mubah), reprobated (makruh), and forbidden or prohibited (haram). Accordingly, 
the two extremes of obligatory and forbidden are binding duties and cannot be 
infringed or violated. Hence, contracts which contain usury (or interest) (riba), or 
99 Court of Appeal of Hamburg (Germany) 26 January 1989,17 YBCA 491,494 (1992). 
100 Karl-Heinz Böckstiegel, "Public Policy and Arbitrability", supra note 88, at 179. 
101 Ali Rahnema, "Islamic Jurisprudence and Public Policy", in: Sohrab Behdad/ Farhad Nomani, 
International Review of Comparative Public Policy: Islam and Public Policy, vol. 9 (1997 
London: JAI Press Ltd. ), 103-122,106. 
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contracts of hazard (gharar) are considered against the Shari 'ah principles. The 
other three as Rahnema states are left to individual choice and discretion, though 
each one has different weight in terms of moral desirability from the viewpoint of 
the lawgiver. 103 He also argues that 
The five qualifications represent the width and scope of Islam's concern 
and preoccupation with individual and social acts. It reflects the degree to 
which it is a thoroughly interventions religion. [... ] For Muslims, the 
commands and preferences of Islamic law should constitute the sole 
correct and acceptable code of moral conduct, assuring them of felicity in 
this world and salvation in the hereafter. '°4 
However, this does not mean that public policy in Islamic law is 
inflexible. 105 In fact, the implementation of this doctrine is flexible especially in 
circumstances which concern the protection of private interests, whether in terms 
of recognition or organisation of these interests, 106 as long as there is no 
derogation from the major principles of Islamic law. 107 In other words, the 
doctrine of public policy in Islamic law is based upon respect for the general spirit 
of sacred sources, and also upon the principle that persons must respect their 
obligations, unless they authorise what is forbidden. ' 08 Hence, any foreign law or 
award must not be contrary to these principles. 
The Riyadh Arab Convention on Judicial Cooperation for instance, upheld 
the idea of respecting principles of Islamic law in any foreign judgment by 
providing in Article 30 (a) that "the recognition of a judgment may be refused in 
the following cases: (a) if it is contrary to the provisions of the Muslim Shari'ah 
[... ]". Article 37 (e) also provides that 
102 Ibid., at 106. 
103 Ibid., at 106-107. 
104 Ibid., at 107-108. 
105 Said Ali Yehya/ Mohammed Al Sheekh Omar/ Nabeel Ibrahim Sa'ad, Mabadi Alganoon: 
Almadkhal lilkanoon wa Nazariat Al Eltizam (Principles of Law: An Introduction to the Law 
and the Theory of Obligation), (2"d ed., Jiddah: Dar Okaz for printing and Publishing 1990), at 
48. 
106 Ibid., at 48. 
107 See in this regard, Abd Alhadi Al Ataafi, Masader Al Eltizam (sources of obligations), at 240. 
108 See for instance, part two, chapter two of this thesis. 
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The judicial authorities of this state can only refuse enforcement of the 
award in one of the following cases: [... ] (e) if the award is contrary to the 
Muslim Shari'ah, public policy or good morals of the signatory state 
where enforcement is sought. 109 
A foreign arbitral award must conform with Islamic law in order to be 
enforced in Saudi Arabia for instance. "" The concept of "profit" in contracts is 
the most controversial issue in Islamic law, since courts in some Islamic countries 
refuse to enforce any award which contains this concept. 
However, nowadays, the concept of public policy in modem laws in Arab 
countries is more flexible, and concepts such as usury for instance, have found 
their way in most of these laws. " 
Apart from diversity in opinions upon the notion of public policy, it is also 
divided into different levels and its role is not always the same in each level. Lew 
for instance, divided public policy into three levels: (a) national public policy, (b) 
community public policy and (c) international public policy. 112 Or domestic and 
international public policy as others argued. ' 13 However, before discussing the 
levels of public policy it is worth discussing first its role. 
2.3. The role of public policy 
It could be said that public policy functions as a brake on the rules of 
private international law, 114 i. e. it is a limit to the application of foreign law within 
the territory of a state: public policy "does not just operate to oust the law that 
10' Riyadh Arab Convention on Judicial Cooperation, signed on 6 April 1983, which came into 
force in October 1985. 
110 See Abdul Hamid El-Ahdab, "Saudi Arabia Accedes to the New York Convention", 11 (3) J 
Int'l Arb 87-91,89 (1994). 
11, See for instance, Farhad Nomani, "The Problem of Interest and Banking in Islamic Public 
Policy", in: Sohrab Behdad/ Farhad Nomani, International Review of Comparative Public 
Policy: Islam and Public Policy, supra note 101, at 277-310. 
112 Julian D. M. Lew, Applicable Law in International Commercial Arbitration: A Study in 
Commercial Arbitration Awards, supra note 1, at 533. 
13 See for instance, Albert Jan van den Berg, The New York Convention of 1958: Towards a 
Uniform Judicial Interpretation, supra note 90, at 360; by the same author, "Refusals of 
Enforcement under the New York Convention of 1958: The Unfortunate Few", in: Arbitration 
in the Next Decade, (1999 Special Supplement: ICC Bulletin), at 86; see also Mauro Rubino- 
Sammartano, International Arbitration: Law and Practice, supra note 91, at 505. 
114 Pierre Lalive, "Transnational (or Truly International) Public Policy and International 
Arbitration", in: Pieter Sanders (ed. ), Comparative Arbitration Practice and Public Policy in 
Arbitration, ICCA Congress Series no. 3, supra note 88, at 261. 
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would normally be applicable, but to exclude the application of foreign laws in a 
predetermined field in any circumstances. "' 15 So, it is a shield with which to 
oppose recognition and enforcement of foreign judgments and arbitral awards. 
However, this is a negative role of public policy, ' 16 whereas imposing the 
application of the law of the forum is the positive function of public policy 
according to Lalive. "7 In the English legal system, the private international law, 
Chapter 5 (2) provides that 
English courts will not enforce or recognise a right, power, capacity, 
disability or legal relationship arising under the law of a foreign country, if 
the enforcement or recognition of such right, power, capacity, disability or 
legal relationship would be inconsistent with the fundamental public 
policy of English law. 118 
A similar provision is also found in the Italian legal system which 
provides 
... in no case will the laws and acts of a foreign state, the by-laws and the 
acts of any institutional body and private agreements have any effect on 
the territory of the state, when they conflict with public policy or bonos 
mores. t 19 
In some countries the court can annul the arbitral award if the award is 
contrary to public policy. The Law of Arbitration in Civil and Commercial 
Matters of 1997 in Oman for instance, clearly provides that 
115 Yves Derains, "Public Policy and the Law Applicable to the Dispute in International 
Arbitration", in: Pieter Sanders (ed. ), ibid., at 227-256,228. 
116 Sammartano describes this role as a negative role of public policy. He states that "the 
traditional, or negative, role of public policy consists in acting as a limit to the application of 
foreign law or to the recognition of foreign judgments", Mauro Rubino-Sammartano, 
International Arbitrating: Law and Practice, supra note 91, at 504; see also Pierre Lalive, 
"Transnational (or Truly International) Public Policy and International Arbitration", supra note 
114, at 261. 
Pierre Lalive, "Transnational (or Truly International) Public Policy and International 
Arbitration", ibid., at 263. 
118 For more details see Adrian Briggs/ Jonathan Hill/ J. D. McClean/ C. G. J. Morse (eds. ), Dicey 
& Morris on the Conflict of Laws, (130' ed., London: Sweet & Maxwell 2000), at 81-88. 
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A court adjudicating upon an action for annulment shall of its own motion 
annul the arbitral award if there is anything in it contrary to public order in 
the Sultanate of Oman. 120 
The same law also provides in Article 58 (2) (b) that any foreign 
judgement or order should not contain "anything in it contrary to public order in 
the Sultanate of Oman. " The new Civil and Commercial Procedural Law of 2002 
is stricter concerning the principle of public policy. It requires that any foreign 
judgement or arbitral award is not contrary to any judgement or order that has 
already been taken by a court in Oman, nor contains anything contrary to 
morals. 121 
The doctrine of public policy is not only enshrined in national legislations, 
it is also found in several international conventions. The New York Convention of 
1958 is a key convention which requires conformity with public policy in any 
arbitral award. Article 5 (2) (b) provides 
Recognition and enforcement of an arbitral award may also be refused if 
the competent authority in the country where recognition and enforcement 
is sought finds that: 
(b) The recognition or enforcement of the award would be contrary to the 
public policy of that country. 
Although the Convention does not introduce an autonomous concept of 
public policy, it considers breach to such principles is a ground for refusal of 
recognition and enforcement of foreign arbitral awards. 
Prior to the above Convention, the Geneva Convention of 1927 also 
required that recognition or enforcement of an award be compatible with public 
policy. It stated that an award would be enforceable unless it was contrary to the 
public policy or to the law of the country which it is sought to be relied upon. 122 
19 Section 31, General Provisions Preliminary to the Civil Code of 1942 as amended. 
120 Art. 53 (2). 
121 Chapter 4 Art. 352 (h) of the Civil and Commercial Procedural Law, issued by decree no. 29 
of 2002 on 6 March 2002. 
122 Geneva Convention on the Execution of Foreign Arbitral Awards of 1927, Article I (e). 
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The UNCITRAL Model Law contains a similar provision in which public policy 
is a ground for setting aside an award by the courts at the seat of arbitration 
(Article 34) and also a ground for refusing recognition and enforcement of a 
foreign award (Article 36). Furthermore, the Brussels Convention on Jurisdiction 
and the Enforcement of Judgment in Civil and Commercial Matters of 1968 and 
Regulation 44/2001 considered public policy as a reason for refusal of recognition 
of a judgment. Article 27 (1) provides "a judgment shall not be recognised: (1) if 
such recognition is contrary to public policy in the state in which recognition is 
sought. " The Amman Arab Convention on Commercial Arbitration provides in 
Article 35 that 
The supreme court of each contracting state must give leave to enforce the 
awards of the arbitral tribunal. Leave may only be refused if this award is 
contrary to public policy. 123 
2.4. The levels of public policy 
Although functions of public policy can be understood in different ways, 
discussion here will focus on the notion of domestic public and international 
public policy, as well as substantive public policy and the way in which it 
overlaps with mandatory rules (or lois de police). 
2.4.1. Domestic public policy and international public policy 
When determining the applicable law to the merits of a dispute in order to 
render an enforceable award, arbitrators are expected to take into consideration 
several factors. One of these is the doctrine of public policy, since this can affect 
the choice of arbitrators, 124 or even the will of the parties. 
Some scholars such as BSckstiegel have argued that "legal rules restricting 
arbitrability need not necessarily be part of public policy. s125 However such 
123 This Convention was signed on 14 April 1987. 
124 Yves Derains, "Public Policy and the Law Applicable to the Dispute in International 
Arbitration", supra note 115, at 228. 
us Karl - Heinz Böckstiegel, "Public Policy and Arbitrability", supra note 88, at 183; it was 
reported that "to some observes a double standard seems to be creeping into American attitude 
towards investment arbitration. Arbitration is good when it corrects misbehaviour by foreign 
host states, but not so desirable when claims are filed for alleged wrongdoing by the United 
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restriction is a type of domestic public policy which cannot be ignored, because 
any ignorance to the concept of public policy may affect enforcement of the 
award. Some argue that domestic public policy operates only in internal domestic 
relationships. 126 Others, such as Lew, divide domestic (or national) public policy 
into two divisions: first, internal public policy which includes both national 
policies recognised in customary law and legislation enacted in order to regulate 
certain situations and which "cannot be avoided or by-passed by the parties. s127 
An example for such policy is found in several laws and legislations, Omani 
Labour Law of 1973 for instance, provide in Article 3 that "any condition which 
infringes the provisions of this law is null and void, [... ] unless the condition is of 
greater benefit to the worker. s128 Second, external public policy which is relevant 
to private international law, which includes legislation of either "an imperative 
character" or which gives effect to fundamental policies and standards of the 
state. "129 Van den Berg has drawn an important distinction between domestic 
public policy and international public policy. Accordingly, he thinks that what is 
considered relevant in domestic public policy, is not necessarily relevant in 
international public policy. ' 30 Hence, it could be stated that domestic public 
policy means a set of rules which cannot be ignored because the intention of the 
legislator is over the intention of the contracting parties. 131 This latter (domestic 
public policy) function only in internal domestic relationships. 132 
However, international public policy as Sammartano argues represents 
that part of public policy which is more crucial for the legal system, and its 
States. [... ] Recent trade legislation has significantly impaired the vigor [vigour] of future 
treaty-based arbitration of investment disputes, with the United States pursuing a course and a 
tone quite different from when negotiating NAFTA. Moreover, vocal opposition to investment 
arbitration has been expressed by important segments of the media and several non- 
governmental organisation", Guillermo Aguilar Alvarez! William W. Park, "The New Face of 
Investment Arbitration: NAFTA Chapter 11", 28 Yale Journal of International Law 365 
(2003). 
'26 Mauro Rubino-Sammartano, International Arbitration: Law and Practice, supra not 91, at 506. 
127 Julian D. M. Lew, Applicable Law in International Commercial Arbitration: A Study in 
Commercial Arbitration Awards, supra note 1, at 533. 
128 Oman Labour Law, issued in accordance with the Sultani Decree no. 34 of 1973. 
129 Julian D. M. Lew, Applicable Law in International Commercial Arbitration: A Study in 
Commercial Arbitration Awards, supra note 1, at 533-534. 
130 Albert Jan van den Berg, The New York Arbitration Convention of 1958, Toward a Uniform 
Judicial Interpretation, supra note 90, at 360. 
131 See Ashraf Abd Al'alim Al Rifa'ey, Dirasah fee Khada Altahkeem (A Study on Arbitration), 
(2"a ed., Cairo: Dar Alnahdah Alarabiah 1998), at 24. 
132 Mauro Rubino-Sammartano, International Arbitrating: Law and Practice, supra note 91, at 
506. 
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principles which are "more jealously adhered to and which cannot be affected by 
the access into that legal system of a foreign provision (or decision ) which 
conflicts with them. "133 
The Committee on International Commercial Arbitration of the 
International Law Association, after a six year study of public policy, introduced 
a recommendation at its New Delhi Conference in 2002. Recommendation 1 (d) 
suggests that 
The international public policy of any state includes: (i) fundamental 
principles, pertaining to justice or morality, that the state wishes to protect 
even when it is not directly concerned; (ii) rules designed to serve the 
essential political, social or economic interests of the state, these being 
known as "lois de police" or "public policy rules"; and (iii) the duty of the 
state to respect its obligations towards other states or international 
organisations. 
The same Committee has broken down international public policy into 
three categories: fundamental principles; lois de police; and international 
obligations! 34 Consideration of international public policy is increasingly referred 
to in legislations as well as court judgments. In France, for instance, Article 1502 
(5) of the New Code of Civil Procedure of 1981, specifies that "awards made 
outside France or in international arbitration in France must comply with 
international public policy. "135 Portugal also has a similar provision. 136 Reveals 
court decisions have upheld the notion of international public policy. For 
example, the Court of Appeal of Milan considered that the public policy referred 
to in Article 5 (2) (b) of the New York Convention is international public policy. 
In its decision dated 4 December 1992, the Court concluded that 
We must say that, where this consistency is to be examined, reference 
must be made to the so-called international public policy, being a body of 
133 Ibid., at 506. 
134 For further details, see the Report of the International Law Association, Committee of 
International Commercial Arbitration, New Delhi Conference 2002. 
135 Emmanuel Gaillard/ John Savage, Fouchard Gaillard Goldman on International Commercial 
Arbitration, (The Hague, the Netherlands: Kluwer Law International 1999), at 953. 
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universal principles shared by nations of similar civilisation, aiming at the 
protection of fundamental human rights, often embodied in international 
declarations or conventions. 137 
An eminent example of international public policy may be found in the 
award which was rendered by the French Cour de Cassation on 24 March 1998, in 
a case between Excelsior Film TV. Srl v. UGC - PHOA. The Court rejected the 
enforcement of the arbitral award on the grounds of lack of the impartiality of 
arbitrator, concluded that 
An arbitrator had been appointed by the same party in parallel arbitrations 
one taking place in France and the other in Rome, Italy. The arbitrator 
allegedly conveyed erroneous information to the Roman arbitral panel 
which influenced the tribunal's decision on jurisdiction. Excelsior Film 
TV, srl (Excelsior) sought to enforce the arbitral award rendered in Rome 
against UGC-PH. On 24 June 1994, the Court of Appeal in Paris refused 
enforcement on grounds of public policy for lack of impartiality of the 
arbitrator. Excelsior appealed to the Supreme Court, which denied the 
appeal and affirmed the lower court's decision. 138 
However, the distinction between domestic public policy and international 
public policy may not always be welcomed by courts. The Supreme Court of 
India, for instance, stated in its decision on 7 October 1993, in a case between 
Renusagar Power Co. Ltd. v. General Electric Co., that 
In view of the absence of a workable definition of 'international public 
policy' we find it difficult to construe the expression 'public policy' in 
Article 5 (2) (b) of the New York Convention to mean international public 
policy. In our opinion the said expression must be construed to mean the 
doctrine of public policy as applied by the courts in which the foreign 
award is sought to be enforced. Consequently, the expression 'public 
136 Article 1096 (f) of the Code of Civil Procedure (1986). 
137 See an excerpt of the decision in: 22 YBCA 725-726,726 (1997). 
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policy' in Section 7 (1) (b) (ii) of the Foreign Awards Act means the 
doctrine of public policy as applied by the courts in India. 139 
Finally, it is worth mentioning that international public policy is 
understood to be narrower than domestic public policy. 140 Mayer believes that this 
is because international public policy generally focuses upon the most 
fundamental norms. '4' 
2.4.2. Substantive public policy and its overlapping with mandatory 
rules 
Before proceeding to discuss substantive public policy it is worth 
mentioning that there is a distinction between substantive public policy and 
procedural public policy. The latter is normally found in procedural law, 142 and it 
refers to the process by which the dispute is adjudicated. 143 Rubino-Sammartano 
argues that procedural public policy "plays a role in arbitral proceedings which 
differs depending on the applicable procedural law. " He states that on the one 
hand, if the procedural law of the place of arbitration (lex loci arbitri) applies to 
the arbitration proceedings, the application of that law will undoubtedly consist in 
the application of its basic or fundamental principles. On the other hand, he 
argues that if the proceedings are governed by another national law, arbitrators are 
not only obliged to give consideration to the public policy of that procedural law, 
they are also obliged not to breach the rules of international public policy which 
normally apply in the place of arbitration. 
'44 A similar situation will arise "if a 
supranational set of arbitration rules is applicable. "las 
138 Excelsior Film TV. Srl v. UGC - PHOA, the French Cour de Cassation on 24 March 1998; see 
also Kuwait Airways Corporation v. Iraqi Airways Corporation, [2003] 1 Lloyd's Rep. 448. 
139 Renusagar Power Co. Ltd. v. General Electric Co., the Supreme Court of India, 7 October 
1993; see comments on this award by Lawrence F. Ebb, "Reflections on the Indian 
Enforcement of the Gel Renusagar Award", 10 Arbitration International 141-161 (1994). 
140 See the Report of International Law Association, the Committee on International Commercial 
Arbitration, New Delhi Conference, at 3. 
141 See the Report of International Law Association, the Committee on International Commercial 
Arbitration, London Conference (2000), at 6. 
142 Mauro Rubino-Sammartano, International Arbitration: Law and Practice, supra note 91, at 
507. 
143 See the Report of International Law Association, the Committee on International Commercial 
Arbitration,, London Conference (2000), at 17. 
144 Mauro Rubino-Sammartano, International Arbitration: Law and Practice, supra note 91, at 
511. 
145 Ibid., at 512. 
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(a) Substantive public policy 
It has been argued that substantive public policy (ordre public au fond), as 
opposed to procedural public policy, "goes to the recognition of rights and 
obligations by a tribunal or enforcement court in connection with the subject 
matter of the award. "lab The principles of good faith and prohibition of abuse of 
rights; prohibition against uncompensated expropriation; pacta sunt servanda; 
and prohibition against discrimination are examples of substantive public 
policy. 147 Hence, it is clearly imperative that arbitrators give full consideration to 
substantive public policy. National prohibition of governmental bodies entering 
into arbitration agreements without special permission, such as in Saudi Arabia 
falls into the category of substantive public policy. '48 
An interesting example of a court decisions concerning substantive public 
policy may be found in the National Oil Corporation v. Libyan Sun Oil Company 
case. '490n 20 November 1980, the National Oil Corporation (NOC), a Libyan 
state enterprise, and Sun Oil Company signed an Exploration and Production 
Sharing Agreement. The Agreement provided, inter alia, that Sun Oil Company 
was to carry out petroleum exploration in Libya. The Agreement contained an 
arbitration clause referring to the ICC. Two years later, in March 1982, the United 
States imposed sanctions against Libya. Consequently, no American citizens or 
technicians were allowed to enter Libya. Accordingly, the Sun Oil Company 
stopped its activities in Libya and in late June 1982, it notified the NOC that "it 
was claiming the export regulations as an additional event of force majeure. " The 
NOC rejected this claim and referred the dispute to arbitration. 
On 31 May 1985 the arbitral tribunal rendered a first award on the issue of 
force majeure. The tribunal held that there had been no force majeure within the 
meaning of the agreement because other American companies had continued to 
provide services to Libya by hiring non-American staff, and that Sun Oil 
146 See the Report of International Law Association, the Committee on International Commercial 
Arbitration, London Conference (2000), at 17. 
147 See the Report of International Law Association, the Committee on International Commercial 
Arbitration, New Delhi Conference (2002), at 6-7. 
148 Kingdom of Saudi Arabia: Arbitration Rules and Codes Art. 3 provides that "government 
agencies may not have recourse to arbitration for settlement of their disputes with third parties 
except with the approval of the President of the Council of Ministers [... ], Saudi Arbitration 
Rules and Code, issued by the Royal Decree no. M 46, on 25 April 1983. 
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Company had a Canadian subsidiary which was fit to take over performance. The 
final arbitral award was rendered on 23 February 1987, in favour of the NOC. '5° 
NOC sought enforcement of the award, initiating proceedings before the United 
State, District Court of Delaware. Sun Oil Company claimed that the award was 
contrary to public policy. However, the court rejected Sun's claim and awarded 
the NOC its petition. '5' 
A second example examines whether recognition of a foreign award 
violates French public policy. In a case between Societe Grands Moulins de 
Strasbourg v. Cie Continentale France, 152 the claimant argued that the award 
could not be enforced, on the grounds that it was contrary to a ministerial order 
according to which import compensations are to be paid to importers. The 
background of the case is that on 12 March 1982, Grands Moulins de Strasbourg 
(GMS) purchased durum wheat imported by Continentale. The contract contained 
an arbitration clause in London before the Grain and Feed Trade Association 
(GAFTA). On 3 June 1982, the parties signed an addendum to the contract. The 
addendum provided that any compensation or duty due in connection with the 
transaction would be for Continentale's account, the relevant date being the day of 
arrival of the ship carrying the durum wheat at Le Havre. 
The purchase price was paid by GMS on 11 June 1982. On 12 June, the 
French franc was devalued as part of EEC currency adjustment measures. Price 
adjustment measures were also announced. On 14 June, a French Ministerial 
Order blocked all prices on the French market as of 11 June 1982. The Order 
provided inter alia 
When compensation is granted in France in application of EEC Regulation 
no. 974-71 as modified, the amount of the compensation shall be deducted 
from the purchase price of the products benefiting from the compensation. 
149 National Oil Corporation v. Libyan Sun Oil Company, United States District Court, District of 
Delaware, 15 March 1990 733 F Supp. 800; 1990 U. S. Dist. LEXIS 3419, reprinted in (1991) 
16 YBCA 651-663. 
150 The tribunal reported that "on the question of whether Sun Oil could have found non-US 
technicians on the oil market, the tribunal relies upon the testimony of Mr. Blom. [he was in 
charge of Occidental's Libyan operations] he testified that Occidental Oil Corporation was 
able to continue its Libyan production and exploration operation", see 16 YBCA 54-78 (1991). 
'S' Ibid., at 651-652. 
152 Societe Grands Moulins de Strasbourg v. Cie Continentale France, Court of Appeal of 
Versailles, 2 October 1989, reprinted in (1991) 16 YBCA 129-133. 
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Importers benefiting from the compensation after invoicing the goods 
shall-if they have not deducted the compensation from the purchase price - 
pay to the buyer a sum equivalent to the compensation. '53 
GMS refused to pay the compensation to Continentale, consequently, the 
latter initiated arbitration proceedings in London. On 2 December 1983, the 
GAFTA rendered an award according to which GMS should pay to Continentale 
the sum which it had received as compensation on Continentale's behalf. The 
award was affirmed in appellate proceedings. The award also granted 
enforcement in France by the president of the Court of First Instance of Paris and 
it was also affirmed by the Court of Appeal of Paris. The Supreme Court 
remanded the parties to the Court of Appeal of Versailles, which granted 
enforcement of the award on 2 October 1989. The Court reported that 
French international public policy is not violated by the enforcement of an 
arbitral award which attributes the compensation to Continentale without 
concretely and effectively affecting the intended aims and goals of a 
French regulation pertaining to public policy. Only if this were the case - 
leaving aside a purely formal violation of the regulation - would the 
intended monetary and economic balance be sufficiently affected to hold 
that French international public policy has been violated. ' 54 
(b) Mandatory rules 
Mandatory rules ((lois de police) (imperative or prohibitive) are every 
legal rule which cannot be agreed oppositely to its provision nor agreed in their 
contracts to apply provisions other than those of its provisions. 155 Mayer has 
described mandatory rules as 
An imperative provision of law which must be applied to an international 
relationship irrespective of the law that governs that relationship. To put it 
another way: mandatory rules of law are a matter of public policy (ordre 
153 Ibid., at 129-130. 
154 Ibid., at 132. 
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public), and moreover reflect a public policy so commanding that they 
must be applied even if the general body of law to which they belong is 
not competent by application of the relevant rule of conflict of laws. 156 
He gives examples of some mandatory rules, such as competition laws; 
currency controls; environmental protection laws and measures of embargo, 
blockade, or boycott. He asserts that "in matters of contract", the outcome of a 
mandatory rule of the law of a given state is to oblige arbitrators to respect this 
rule and to apply it irrespective of whether the contracting parties have expressly 
or implicitly chosen a law of another state. 157 In other words, the discretion of the 
arbitral tribunal is beyond the will of the parties. 158 Others have also argued that 
the mandatory rules of the lex contractus "should be applied by the arbitrators, 
whether or not invoked by the parties. "159 Guedj describes mandatory rules as 
Rules of substantive internal law that provide for their own application 
without having been selected by the normal choice-of-law rule of the 
forum. Their intended sphere of spatial operation is determined by 
reference to their object or their purposes. The reference may be express 
or implicit only, in which case it will be determined by judicial 
interpretation or construction. Such rules, at least when they emanate from 
the forum, must apply to all situations stated as being within the rule's 
scope without any importance being attached to foreign elements which 
might be present and which would otherwise trigger the operation of the 
forum's conflict rules. 160 
'55 Khalid Abdullah Eid, Madkhal Liderasit Alkanoon (An introduction to Study of Law: The 
Theory of Law), (Morocco: Altalib Library 1980), at 81. 
156 Pierre Mayer, "Mandatory Rules of Law in International Arbitration", 2 Arbitration 
International 274-293,275 (1986). 
157 Ibid., at 275. 
158 A. F. M. Maniruzzaman, "International Arbitrator and Mandatory Public Law Rules in the 
Context of State Contracts: An Overview", 7 (3) J Int'l Arb 53-64,62 (1990). 
u9 Serge Lazareff, "Mandatory Extraterritorial Application of National Law", 11 Arbitration 
International 137-150,138 (1995). 
ibo Thomas G. Guedj, "The Theory of the Lois de Police, a Functional Trend in Continental 
Private International Law -A Comparative Analysis with Modem American Theories", 39 
The American Journal of Comparative Law 661-697,665 (1991). 
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The existence and applicability of such rules has been found in legislations 
such as the American Restatement Second of Conflict of laws, 161 as well as in 
some conventions such as the European Convention on the Law Applicable to 
Contractual Obligations of 1980. The latter Convention expressly states 
When applying under this Convention the law of a country, effect may be 
given to mandatory rules of the law of another country with which the 
situation has a close connection, if and in so far as, under the law of the 
latter country, those rules must be applied whatever the law applicable to 
the contract. In considering whether to give effect to these mandatory 
rules, regard shall be had to their nature and purpose and to the 
consequences of their application or non-application. 162 
Hence, it may be argued that arbitrators, although they do not have lexfori 
which means that they do not have a national forum and all the mandatory rules 
are foreign, they are always requested to take into consideration mandatory rules 
of state contracting parties. The reason for this is that a state has undisputed 
territorial sovereignty, as well as the fact that a state, in its contracting, is in 
theory representing its people's interests and welfare. 163 Therefore, the state has 
authority to regulate and enact laws in the public interest. 164 This fact has already 
been accepted by all nations and supported by several resolutions of the United 
Nations. 165 There is some evidence in arbitration practice of support for this 
understanding of mandatory rules. In the Kuwait v. Aminoil case for instance, the 
arbitral tribunal observed, in the context of the concession, the superior position 
of the state when it reported that "the state thus became, in fact if not in law, an 
associate whose interests had become predominant. "166 The tribunal also added 
161 Restatement Second, Sec. 187 (2) (b). 
162 The European Convention on the Law Applicable to Contractual Obligation, Rome 1980, Art. 
7(l). 
163 A. F. M. Maniruzzaman, "International Arbitrator and Mandatory Public Law Rules in the 
Context of State Contracts: An Overview", supra note 158, at 59. 
164 Ibid., at 60. 
165 For more detail on these resolutions, see part one, chapter one of this thesis. 
"6 Government of the State of Kuwait v. The American Independent Oil Company (AMINOIL) 
(1982) 21 ILM. 976; see also A. F. M. Maniruzzaman, "International Arbitrator and 
Mandatory Public Law Rules in the Context of State Contracts: An Overview", supra note 158, 
at 59-60. 
224 
that "the general principles of law recognise the right of the state in its capacity of 
supreme protector of the general interest. s167 
(c) To what extent does public policy overlap with mandatory rules? 
The important question here is whether public policy and mandatory rules 
are two sides of the same coin. It can be argued that each has its own character, 
although they may have the same aim. There are certainly differences between the 
two: public policy, as noted above, is ambiguous and unclear, whereas mandatory 
rules are defined and specified, making it more difficult for contracting parties 
violate them. In other words, mandatory rules intervene directly, mainly at the 
early stage of the choice of law process, because they are the rules of the forum 
which must be respected and applied irrespective of the applicable foreign law. In 
contrast, public policy intervenes only at the ultimate stage of the choice of law 
process, and may be exactly after the normally applicable foreign law has been 
chosen and this law was contrary to the fundamental policy of the forum. 168 
Finally, mandatory rules are a tool for the operation of public policy and 
therefore it may be argued that the two are similar in aim but different in function. 
Concluding remarks 
It may be concluded that a state in its efforts to secure its public interest 
has a privileged attitude compared to a private party. Accordingly, a contracting 
state can invoke the doctrine of sovereign immunity in order to protect its 
citizens' interest, and therefore some state contracts particularly contracts 
concerning exploitation of national resources must be considered as a public act 
which has immunity especially from enforcement. Petroleum contracts are at the 
head of these contracts which deserve a special consideration due to the 
importance of this resource to the public interest. In return, a host state cannot 
threat the interests of the private contracting party by annulling a contract or 
amending its provisions unless in the requirements of public interest and just 
compensation be provided. 
16' Government of the State of Kuwait v. The American Independent Oil Company (AMINOIL) 
(1982) 21 ILM 976. 
168 Nelson Enonchong, "Public Policy in the Conflict of Laws: a Chinese Wall Around Little 
England? " 45 ICLQ 633-661,635 (1996). 
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Compensation in such circumstances may be determined according to the 
following criteria. An examination of petroleum agreements reveals that 
petroleum operations are normally divided into three stages. 169 First is the stage of 
"exploration and development . 
9'170 Exploration includes geological, geophysical, 
aerial and other surveys as may be necessary; drilling of shot holes, core holes, 
stratigraphic tests; and the purchase or acquisition of necessary supplies, materials 
and equipment. Development includes for example all the projects that are 
necessary to undertake the operations such as the development of roads, camps, 
hospitals and schools, or activities which are related to the transportation or 
storage of petroleum. 
Second is the stage of commercial discovery and cost recovery. This 
period normally begins after discovery of petroleum in one or more wells within 
the agreed contract area which are capable of producing an agreed quantity of 
petroleum (25,000 barrels per day in some petroleum agreements). 171 Petroleum 
agreements normally contain provisions which grant the right to the company to 
recover all costs incurred in operations such as exploration and development. 172 
The third stage is that of normal operation after the recovery of costs 
within the agreed contracting period. 
Hence, if the termination of a contract was as a consequence of the 
company breaching its obligations, the latter should not be entitled to any 
compensation. If the termination was due to a state's wishes, unlinked to a 
company's behaviour, the state should be obliged to pay compensation to the 
company as follows 
1) if the termination of the contract occurred during the first stage of 
169 For a thorough study concerning different types of petroleum agreements see in general Main 
Features and Trends in Petroleum and Mining Agreements: A technical paper, United Nations 
Centre on Transnational Corporations, (New York: United Nations 1983); Keith W. Blinn/ 
Claude Duval/ Honore Le Leuch/ Andre Pertuzio, International Petroleum Exploration and 
Exploitation Agreements: Legal, Economic and Policy Aspects, (London: Euromoney 
Publications PLC 1986); Martyn R. David (ed. ), Upstream Oil and Gas Agreements: with 
Precedents, (London: Sweet & Maxwell 1996). 
170 See for example Pecten Group Contract of 1985, for the Exploration, Development and 
Production of Petroleum between the Government of Syria and Syrian Petroleum Company, 
Pecten Ash Sham Company, Syria Shell Petroleum Development B. V., and Deminex 
Petroleum Syria GMBH (Ash Sham Area), Middle East Basic Oil Laws and Concession 
Contracts, supplement no. XCI (91), at 4. 
171 See for example Oman Exploration and Production Sharing Agreement, "definition of 
commercial discovery" (unpublished). 
172 See for example supra note 170 above. 
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"exploration and development", the host state should pay all expenses 
already incurred by the company, and the company would have the 
right to transfer all its tangible and intangible assets if the state was not 
interested in purchasing them. 
2) If it occurred during the second stage, the host state should be obliged 
to pay all expenses which have not yet been recovered. In addition, the 
state should also be obliged to pay compensation (sum or petroleum as 
agreed) equal to a month of petroleum extraction earnings as a period 
of notice or 20% of anticipated annual profits (one year only) which is 
higher. Moreover, the company would have the right to transfer all its 
tangible and intangible assets if the state was not interested in 
purchasing them. 
3) If the termination occurred during the last stage, the state must pay 
compensation to the company equal to a month petroleum production 
or 20% of anticipated annual profits (one year only) which is higher, 
after the deduction of any payment or tax for the state. The state 
should also pay salaries of the company's staff for a period of a month 
or more as a notice period, as is established in the law of the host state. 
In addition, the state should allow the company to transfer all its 
tangible and intangible assets if the state is not interested in purchasing 
them. 
At the same time, the doctrine of public policy may be considered as a 
weapon for challenging a foreign law and also a foreign arbitral award and a 
foreign judgement. However, whereas the function of the doctrine of sovereign 
immunity is only restricted to states, the doctrine of public policy especially, as a 
challenge of a foreign arbitral award or a judgement may be used by individuals. 
Hence, the need for finding a midway resolution between the state public interest 
and the private interest is significant. This significance becomes more obvious in 
the petroleum industry due to the global need for this resource in the first 
instance, and also due to the conflict of interests between the contracting parties 
in the second. 
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Chapter Two: The Solution of the International Centre for 
Settlement of Investment Disputes (ICSID) 
Introductory remarks 
The need to find a mechanism to protect international investments was the 
principal motive in the establishment of the International Centre for Settlement of 
Investment Disputes (hereinafter ICSID or the Centre), which was established by the 
Washington Convention (the Convention) in 1965.1 It is formally known as "the 
Convention on the Settlement of Investment Disputes between States and Nationals 
of other States. " 
The aim of ICSID according to Article 1 (2) is to provide facilities for 
conciliation and arbitration of investment disputes between contracting states and 
nationals of other contracting states. 2 It has been argued that prior to the Convention, 
the paths open to the private investor were limited. ' Moreover, foreign investment 
disputes may create considerable tensions and their resolution may be inappropriate 
either before the host state's courts, or before the national courts of the foreign 
investor. 4 It was also argued that creation of a forum whose mission is the settlement 
of disputes between host states and investors would improve the investment climate 
by decreasing the fear of political risks which normally hinder the flow of private 
foreign capitals The Convention, in its preamble, refers to the need for international 
cooperation for economic development; to the benefits of private international 
I Broches for example argues that "the Convention [... ] offers protection to aliens against the host 
state", Aron Broches, "The Convention on the Settlement of Investment Disputes between States 
and Nationals of Other States", 136 Recueil des Cours, 330-410,355 (1972); on the need for such 
an institution, see Phillipe Kahn, "The Law Applicable to Foreign Investments: The Contribution of 
the World Bank Convention on the Settlement of Investment Disputes", 44 Indiana Law Journal l- 
32,1-5 (1968). 
2 Washington Convention, Art. 1; for updated news on ICSID see <www. worldbank. or /ig icsid> last 
visited 15 April 2003. 
3 P. F. Sutherland, "The World Bank Convention on the Settlement of Investment Disputes", 28 ICLQ 
367-400,372 (1979). 
° Okezie Chukwumerije, "International Law and Article 42 of the ICSID Convention", 14 (3) J Int'l 
Arb 79-101,79 (1997). 
s Aron Broches, "The Convention on the Settlement of Investment Disputes between States and 
Nationals of Other States", supra note 1, at 343. 
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investment; and to the possibility that from time to time disputes may arise in 
connection with such investments between contracting states and nationals of other 
contracting states. Furthermore, it was argued that such international methods of 
settling disputes may be appropriate. 6 
Between 1961 and 1965, the staff of the International Bank for 
Reconstruction and Development (the World Bank) - the principal sponsor of ICSID 
- prepared the draft of the Convention. Aron Broches, on the General Council, was 
described by Schreuer as the ICSID Convention's principal architect. 7 On 18 March 
1965 the Executive Directors of the World Bank adopted a resolution approving the 
final text of the Convention. 8 This resolution instructed the president of the World 
Bank to submit a copy of both the text of the Convention and the Report of the 
Executive Directors to the Bank's members. 9 It was agreed that "the World Bank 
should become a signatory of the Convention to demonstrate that it consented to 
carry out the functions which it had been allotted under that document. "10 The 
Convention entered into force on 14 October 1966,30 days after the depositing of 
the twentieth ratification, pursuant to Article 68 (2). 11 
This chapter will examine: (i) the composition of ICSID; (ii) the jurisdiction 
of ICSID; the applicable substantive law for ICSID arbitration; (iv) why ICSID is 
unsuitable to solve petroleum disputes. 
1. Composition of ICSID 
Article 3 of the Convention provides that ICSID is composed of an 
Administrative Council, a Secretariat, a Panel of Conciliators and a Panel of 
6 Washington Convention, preamble. 
7 Christoph H. Schreuer, The ICSID Convention: A Commentary, (Cambridge: Cambridge University 
Press 2001), at 2; the drafting history is fully documented in a four volume collection: Convention 
on the Settlement of Investment Disputes between States and Nationals of Other States (hereinafter 
called History), vol. 1: Analysis of Documents Concerning the Origin and the Formulation of the 
Convention, (Washington, 1970); vol. 2 (in two parts): Documents Concerning the Origin and the 
Formulation of the Convention (in English) (Washington, 1986); vol. 3 (in French) (1968); and vol. 
4 (in Spanish) (1969); see also, Aron Broches, "The Convention on the Settlement of Investment 
Disputes between States and Nationals of Other States", supra note 1, at 342-350. 
8 History, vol. 2, at 1039; see also the Report of the Executive Directors, 4 ILM 524 (1965). 
9 History, vol. 2, at 1086. 
10 P. F. Sutherland, "The World Bank Convention on the Settlement of Investment Disputes", supra 
note 3, at 377. 
11 Christoph H. Schreuer, The ICSID Convention: A Commentary, supra note 7, at 4; 154 states have 
signed the Convention as of 26 November 2003, <www. worldbank. or /icsid>, last visited 19 
January 2004. 
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Arbitrators. Article 2 determines that the seat of the Centre shall be in Washington at 
the principal office of the World Bank. However, the seat of the Centre does not 
necessarily determine the place of conciliation and arbitration proceedings, since the 
parties can agree, according to Article 63,12 to choose another place. However, this 
requires consensual agreement between the parties, and must be arranged either 
under Article 63 (a) or with approval by the commission or the tribunal after 
consultation with the Secretary-General under Article 63 (b). 13 
1.1. Administrative Council 
ICSID is governed by the Administrative Council, which is comprised of one 
representative from each contracting state. 14 The Administrative Council is chaired 
by the President of the World Bank, who presides in an ex officio capacity but does 
not have any vote. '5 There was an initial suggestion to limit membership of the 
Administrative Council to member states of the World Bank, but this suggestion was 
rejected. 16 
Article 6 states the principal functions of the Administrative Council. These 
include, for instance, the adoption of administrative and financial regulations for the 
Centre; rules of procedure for the institution of conciliation and arbitration 
proceedings. In addition, the Administrative Council adopts the annual budget of the 
Centre. '7 The Administrative Council reaches decisions by a majority of votes cast, 
except in exceptional circumstances when a majority of two-thirds is required. 18 
1.2. Secretariat 
The second principal organ of ICSID is the Secretariat, which consists, 
according to Article 9, of a Secretary-General, one or more Deputy Secretaries- 
General and staff. The Secretary-General and any Deputy Secretary-General are 
appointed by election by the Administrative Council upon nomination by the 
12 Article 62 provides that "conciliation and arbitration proceedings shall be held at the seat of the 
Centre except as hereinafter provided. " 
13 See History, vol. 1, at 278-282; for further detail see Christoph H. Schreuer, The ICSID Convention: 
A Commentary, supra note 7, at 1251-1258. 
14 Convention, Art. 4 (1). 
'S Convention, Art. 5. 
16 Christoph H. Schreuer, The ICSID Convention: A Commentary, supra note 7, at 18. 
17 Convention, Art. 6 (a), (b), (c), and (f). 
'$ For those occasions when a two-thirds majority is required, see the Convention, Art. 2,6 (1), 7 (4), 
10 (1) and 67. 
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Chairman. Term of office is limited to a period of six years and re-election is 
permitted. 19 The Secretary-General is the legal representative and the principal 
officer of ICSID and is responsible for its administration, including the appointment 
of staff. Moreover, he performs the function of registrar, and therefore has the 
authority to authenticate arbitral awards rendered pursuant to the Convention. 20 
1.3. The Panels 
The Panel of ICSID, according to Article 3, is divided into two: a panel of 
conciliators and a panel of arbitrators, and they both consist of qualified persons. 21 
Appointments to each panel are made by the contracting states, which designate to 
each panel four people who should not be nationals of that state. The Chairman of 
the Administrative Council may also designate 10 people to each panel, each of 
whom must be of a different nationality. 22 Article 14 requires those on the panel to 
be of a "high moral character and recognised competence in the fields of law, 
commerce, industry or finance, who may be relied upon to exercise independent 
judgment. "23 Members of a panel may serve for a renewable period of six years, 24 
and a person is eligible to serve on both panels. 25 Articles 56-58 provide for the 
replacement and disqualification of conciliators and arbitrators. 26 
2. Jurisdiction of ICSID 
ICSID derives its jurisdiction from Article 25 (1) which reads 
The jurisdiction of the Centre shall extend to any legal dispute arising directly 
out of an investment, between a contracting state (or any constituent 
subdivision or agency of a contracting state designated to the Centre by that 
state) and a national of another contracting state, which the parties to the 
19 Convention, Art. 10 (1). 
20 Convention, Art. 11. 
21 Convention, Art. 12. 
22 Convention, Art. 13(l)(2). 
23 Convention, Art. 14 (1). 
24 Convention, Art. 15 (1). 
Z5 Convention, Art. 16 (1). 
26 See <www. worldbank. or /icsid> last visited 16 April 2003. 
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dispute consent in writing to submit to the Centre. When the parties have 
given their consent, no party may withdraw its consent unilaterally. 27 
The scope of the jurisdiction of ICSID encompasses conciliation and 
arbitration. 28 The jurisdiction is based upon three "postulates"29: the consent of the 
parties; the parties' identity; and the nature of the dispute. 
2.1. Consent of the parties 
Consent of the parties, which is stipulated by Article 25 (1), is considered by 
the Executive Directors' Report as "the cornerstone of the Centre. s30 Therefore, "no 
procedure can take place under the Centre's auspices unless both parties to the 
dispute have given their consent. "31 The Article specifies that the consent must be in 
writing. However, there is no particular form at to the consent nor is there a specific 
time in which it must be given, since it may be given before or after the dispute has 
arisen. 32 Broches states that the parties may give their consent in a single 
instrument, 33 it may also be found in an investment protection treaty with another 
state. 34 Or states may include their consent in their investment promotion laws. This 
27 See <www. worldbank. or /ig icsid> last visited 16 April 2003; on terminology, scope of jurisdiction 
see History, vol. 1, at 110-118; the Report of the Executive Directors provides that "the term 
Jurisdiction of the Centre is used in the Convention as a convenient expression to mean the limits 
within which the provisions of the Convention will apply and the facilities of the Centre will be 
available for conciliation and arbitration proceedings", the Report of the Executive Directors, 
supra note 8, para 22; see also, Christoph H. Schreuer, The ICSID Convention: A Commentary, 
supra note 7, at 94-101. 
28 For details on ICSID jurisdiction, see Christoph H. Schreuer, The ICSID Convention: A Commentary, 
supra note 7, at 82-344. 
29 Georges R. Delaume, "Convention on the Settlement of Investment Disputes Between States and 
Nationals of Other States", 1 International Lawyer 64-80,66 (1966-67). 
30 The Report of the Executive Directors, supra note 8, para 23. 
31 Aron Broches, "The Convention on the Settlement of Investment Disputes between States and 
Nationals of Other States", supra note 1, at 352. 
32 Ibid., at 353. 
33 Some of the Omani Exploration Production Sharing Agreements for instance, contain an arbitration 
clause in which any dispute which may arise between the parties will be submitted to ICSID for 
arbitration. 
34 Aron Broches, "The Convention on the Settlement of Investment Disputes between States and 
Nationals of Other States", supra note 1, at 353. Schreuer stated that consent through BIT has become 
accepted practice. However, BIT, in order to provide a basis for ICSID jurisdiction, must be in force 
at the relevant time. Schreuer reported that in some cases, such as Tradex v. Albania, the tribunal 
found that the alleged expropriation and the request for arbitration occurred before the entry into force 
of the BIT between Albania and Greece. Therefore, it was not possible to establish jurisdiction on the 
basis of that treaty. Tradex Hellas S. A. (Greece) v. Albania, Decision on Jurisdiction, 24 December 
1996,14 ICSID Review-Foreign Investment Law Journal 161-196,178-180 (1999). In CSOB v. 
Slovakia, the tribunal, while confirming the principle of consent to ICSID jurisdiction by way of a 
BIT, found that the BIT between the Czech and Slovak Republics had not entered into force, CSOB v. 
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practice of including consent in investment promotion laws has raised some 
controversial issues. One example is the Southern Pacific Properties (Middle East) 
Ltd and Southern Pacific Properties Ltd (Hong Kong) SPP v. Arabic Republic of 
Egypt case. 35 On 23 September 1974, "Heads of Agreement" were signed concerning 
a tourist village on the Pyramids Plateau (the Pyramid Oasis project) and a similar 
tourist resort at Ras-El-Hekma on the Mediterranean coast in Egypt. The parties to 
this agreement were SPP, the Government of Egypt - represented by its Minister of 
Tourism - and EGOTH (Egyptian General Organization for Tourism and Hotels), a 
public sector enterprise under the Minister of Tourism. The Heads of Agreement 
were entered into in accordance with certain Egyptian laws, including Law no. 43 of 
1974 concerning the Investment of Arab and Foreign Funds and the Free Zone. 
However, the law did not contain an arbitration clause. The Heads of Agreement was 
followed on 12 December 1974 by an agreement for the development of two 
international tourist projects in Egypt. The latter agreement was concluded only 
between SPP and EGOTH, and contained an arbitration clause. 36 
On 12 April 1975, the Board of Directors of the General Organisation for 
Investment of Arab Capital and Tax Free Zones approved the application for the 
establishment of a combined tourist company by EGOTH and SPP for the 
development of tourist areas at the Pyramids and Ras-El-Hekma sites. Furthermore, 
on 22 May 1975, the President of Egypt issued Decree no. 475, permitting the use of 
these sites for tourism purposes. Construction work began at the Pyramids site in 
July 1977. However, in late 1977 opposition to the Pyramid Oasis project developed 
in the Egyptian People's Assembly on environmental and archaeological grounds. 
By a Decree of 27 May 1978, the Minister of Culture declared the Pyramids 
area to be public property. On 28 May 1978, the General Organisation for 
Investments issued a resolution in which it decided "to drop its former issued 
agreement... concerning the Pyramids plateau". On 19 June 1978, Presidential 
Slovakia, Decision on Jurisdiction, 24 May 1999,14 ICSID Review-Foreign Investment Law Journal 
251-283 (1999); for further detail, see Christoph H. Schreuer, The ICSID Convention: A Commentary, 
supra note 7, at 210-212. 
35 Decision on jurisdiction, 27 November 1985,16 YBCA 16 (1991); 3 ICSID Rep. 102 (1995). The 
award, 8 ICSID Review - Foreign Investment Law Journal 328 (1993); 32 ILM 933 (1993), with 
correction at 32 ILM 1470 (1993); 19 YBCA 51 (1994) (excerpts); 3 ICSID Rep 189 (1995); for 
more details concerning the facts of the case see (1984) 9 YBCA 111-124. 
36 3 ICSID Rep 102 (1995). 
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Decree no. 267 cancelled Decree no. 475, and the area was eventually declared an 
"area of public interest" by the Prime Minister of Egypt on 11 July 1978. 
On 7 December 1978, SPP initiated ICC arbitration proceedings against both 
the Egyptian State and EGOTH. Egypt rejected the jurisdiction of the arbitrators, 
arguing that it was not a party to the December agreement which contained the 
arbitration clause. By an award dated 16 February 1983, the arbitrators held that 
Egypt was a party to the December agreement and ordered Egypt to pay to SPP US$ 
12,500,000 damages with interest at the rate of 5% from the date on which the 
request for arbitration was received by the Secretary of the ICC Court of Arbitration 
until payment. 37 On 28 March 1983, Egypt filed a petition to overturn the award. On 
12 July 1984, the Court of Appeal of Paris granted Egypt's petition and annulled the 
award essentially on the grounds that Egypt was not a party to the arbitration 
clause. 38 In response, SPP sought enforcement of the award, inter alia, in England 
and the Netherlands. It failed in England where the court refused to freeze Egyptian 
assets, 39 while it succeeded in the Netherlands. The President of the District Court of 
Amsterdam granted leave for enforcement, holding that Egypt was a party to the 
arbitration clause 40 By sheer coincidence, the enforcement decision was rendered on 
12 July 1984, on exactly the same day as the French annulment decision. SPP 
desisted from further proceedings in the Netherlands. 
On 6 January 1987, the French Supreme Court rejected SPP's recourse 
against the annulment decision of the Court of Appeal of Paris. 1 Almost four years 
earlier on 15 August 1983, SPP sent a letter to the Minister of Tourism stating 
Recognising that your government has taken the position that the ICC award 
was rendered without a jurisdictional basis, we hereby notify you that we 
accept and reserve the opportunity of availing ourselves of the uncontestable 
[incontestable] jurisdiction of the International Centre for the Settlement of 
Investment Disputes, under the auspices of the World Bank, which is open to 
37 See the ICC award, 9 YBCA 124 (1984). 
38 See 10 YBCA 113-122 (1985). 
39 See 10 YBCA 504-508 (1985). 
40 See 10 YBCA 487-490 (1985). 
41 See 13 YBCA 152-155 (1988). 
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us as a result of law no. 43 of 1974, Article 8 of which provides that 
investment disputes may be settled by ICSID arbitration. 2 
Article 8 of Egypt's law no. 43 of 1974, concerning the Investment of Arab 
and Foreign Funds and the Free Zone, provides that 
Investment disputes in respect of the implementation of the provision of this 
law shall be settled in a manner to be agreed upon with the investor, or within 
the framework of the agreements in force between the Arabic Republic of 
Egypt and the investor's home country, or within the framework of the 
Convention for the Settlement of Investment Disputes between States and 
nationals of other countries [States] to which Egypt has adhered by virtue of 
law no. 90 of 1971, where it (i. e., the Convention) applies 43 
On 24 August 1984, SPP filed a request for ICSID arbitration. Egypt 
contested ICSID's competence to hear the case, arguing that it had not consented to 
the jurisdiction of ICSID in its investment legislation. Specifically, Egypt claimed 
that the clause which referred to ICSID was not self-executing because it required a 
separate implementing agreement with the investor. Moreover, Egypt argued that the 
law offered a number of alternative methods of dispute settlement among which the 
parties had to choose in advance, and also that the Convention itself offers 
conciliation and arbitration as two possible methods of solving disputes 44 Egypt also 
argued that law no. 43 was only to inform investors that ICSID arbitration was 
among the dispute settlement methods available to investors in appropriate 
circumstances 45 
On 27 November 1985, the ICSID arbitrators rendered a first decision on the 
preliminary question of the jurisdiction of ICSID. They rejected some of Egypt's 
objections to their jurisdiction, and stayed the proceedings on Egypt's remaining 
objections, "until the proceedings in the French courts have finally resolved the 
question of whether the Parties agreed to submit their dispute to the jurisdiction of 
the ICC. " ICSID arbitration was resumed on the preliminary question of jurisdiction 
42 3 ICSID Rep 139 (1995). 
43 3 ICSID Rep 145 (1995). 
44 Ibid., at 122-124. 
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after the French Supreme Court, on 6 January 1987, affirmed the decision of the 
Court of Appeal of Paris, holding that the ICC award of 16 February 1983 was 
invalid because Egypt had not consented to submit the dispute to ICC arbitration. 
This was no longer a matter of SPP's case against Egypt, but of the place of the 
Centre arbitration in Egyptian investment law. On 14 April 1988 the tribunal rejected 
Egypt's contention by concluding that 
On the basis of the foregoing considerations, the tribunal finds that Article 8 
of law no. 43 establishes a mandatory and hierarchic sequence of dispute 
settlement procedures, and constitutes an express "consent in writing" to the 
Centre's jurisdiction within the meaning of Article 25 (1) of the Washington 
Convention in those cases where there is no other agreed-upon method of 
dispute settlement and no applicable bilateral treaty. 46 
Hence, it could be argued that consent to the jurisdiction of ICSID can take 
the form of. (i) a contract between a state or a state entity and a foreign national, 
which contains an arbitration or conciliation clause providing for ICSID jurisdiction; 
(ii) a bilateral or a multilateral investment treaty between states which refers any 
dispute between a state and a national of another state to ICSID arbitration; and (iii) a 
provision in domestic investment legislation providing for ICSID jurisdiction. 
Article 25 (4) gives the contracting state the right to limit their consent, by 
defining it in abstract terms, by excluding certain types of disputes or by listing the 
47 questions they are prepared to submit to the jurisdiction of ICSID. Article 25 (4) 
clearly provides that 
Any contracting state may, at the time of ratification, acceptance or approval 
of this Convention or at any time thereafter, notify the Centre of the class or 
classes of disputes which it would or would not consider submitting to the 
jurisdiction of the Centre. The Secretary-General shall forthwith transmit 
as Ibid., at 122-124. 
46 16 YBCA 16-40,38 (1991). 
47 C. F. Amerasinghe, "Submissions to the Jurisdiction of the International Centre for the Settlement 
of Investment Disputes" 5 Journal of Maritime Law and Commerce 211-250,220-222 (1973-74). 
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such notification to all contracting states. Such notification shall not 
constitute the consent required by paragraph (1). 48 
In practice, some contracting states have used the opportunity afforded by 
Article 25 (4). Jamaica, for instance, has excluded legal disputes "arising directly out 
of investment relating to minerals or other natural resources. s49 Saudi Arabia also 
notified the Centre on 8 May 1980 that "[T]he Kingdom reserves the right of not 
submitting all questions pertaining to oil and pertaining to acts of sovereignty to the 
"so [Centre] whether by way of conciliation or arbitration. 
In the same vein, China has also notified the Centre that 
Pursuant to Article 25 (4) of the Convention, the Chinese Government would 
only consider submitting to the jurisdiction of the International Centre for 
Settlement of Investment Disputes disputes over compensation resulting from 
st expropriation and nationalisation. 
Lastly, it is noted that consent to the jurisdiction of ICSID is conditional on 
further requirements, i. e. the identity of the parties (ratione personae) and the nature 
of the dispute (ratione materiae). 
2.2. Identity of the parties (ratione personae) 
According to Article 25 (1), the jurisdiction of ICSID is limited to: a 
contracting state or subdivision or agency designated by a contracting state and a 
national of another contracting state. Therefore, any dispute between any other 
parties such as, between two private parties or those which are wholly 
intergovernmental disputes (between two countries) are excluded from the 
jurisdiction of ICSID. 52 
48 See <www. worldbank. or /ig icsid> last visited 16 April 2003. 
491 ICSID Rep 210 (1993). 
50 Ibid., at 211. 
51 Amazu. A. Asouzu, International Commercial Arbitration and African States, (Cambridge: 
Cambridge University Press 2001), at 245. 
52 Aron Broches stated that "the services of the Centre would be available only for proceedings 
between a government on the one hand and a foreign national on the other. These services would 
therefore not be available in connection with disputes between private individuals, between a 
government and one of its own nationals or between governments", Paper prepared by the General 
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Schreuer argues that contracting states are those states which have accepted 
membership of ICSID by depositing their instrument of ratification, acceptance or 
approval in accordance with Article 68.53 Designated subdivisions of a state which 
also come under the jurisdiction of ICSID may include federated states, semi- 
autonomous dependencies, and municipalities 54 However, Article 25 (1) emphasises 
that the designation of a subdivision or agency should be conveyed to ICSID, 55 and 
therefore designation in an agreement with the investor is insufficient. 56 Furthermore, 
Article 25 (3) requires approval of the contracting state for the consent to ICSID 
jurisdiction by a constituent subdivision or agency, unless the state notifies ICSID 
that no such approval is required. 
The jurisdiction of ICSID also covers `a national of another contracting 
state', which Article 25 (2) (a) determines as any natural person who has the 
nationality of a contracting state other than the state party to the dispute. This 
jurisdiction, in accordance with Article 25 (2) (b), also covers any juridical person 
who has the nationality of a contracting state other than the state party to the dispute. 
Therefore, the jurisdiction of ICSID covers a private individual or corporation; states 
acting as investors have no access to ICSID in this capacity. 57 Granting direct access 
Council and transmitted to the members of the Committee of the Whole, SID/ 63-2 (18 February 
1963), History, vol. 2, at 78; see also, Aron Broches, "The Convention on the Settlement of 
Investment Disputes between States and Nationals of other States", supra note 1, at 354-361; 
Georges R. Delaume, "Convention on the Settlement of Investment Disputes between States and 
Nationals of other States", supra note 29, at 68-69; P. F. Sutherland, "The World Bank Convention 
on the Settlement of Investment Disputes", supra note 3, at 382-385; Amazu A. Asouzu, 
International Commercial Arbitration and African States, supra note 51, at 267-306; C. F. 
Amerasinghe, "Jurisdiction Ratione Personae under the Convention on the Settlement of 
Investment Disputes between States and Nationals of other States", 47 BYIL 227,230-234 (1974- 
75); Moshe Hirsch, The Arbitration Mechanism of the International Centre for the Settlement of 
Investment Disputes, (Dordrecht: Martinus Nijhoff Publishers 1993), at 62; K. V. S. K. Nathan, 
The ICSID Convention: The Law of the International Centre for the Settlement of Investment 
Disputes, (Yonkers, New York: Juris Publishing 2000), at 75-97; see also in general, Christoph H. 
Schreuer, The ICSID Convention: A Commentary, supra note 7, at 83. 
53 Christoph H. Schreuer, The ICSID Convention: A Commentary, supra note 7, at 141; Article 68 
provides that: (1) this Convention shall be subject to ratification, acceptance or approval by the 
signatory states in accordance with their respective constitutional procedures; (2) this Convention 
shall enter into force 30 days after the date of deposit of the twentieth instrument of ratification, 
acceptance or approval. It shall enter into force for each state which subsequently deposits its 
instrument of ratification, acceptance or approval 30 days after the date of such deposit 
<WWW. W0Tldbank. org/icsid> last visited 16 April 2003. 
54 C. F. Amerasinghe, "Jurisdiction Ratione Personae under the Convention on the Settlement of 
Investment Disputes between States and Nationals of other States", supra note 52, at 233. 
55 In the absence of such stipulation, according to Arts. 28 (3), 36 (3), the request may be rejected on 
the ground that there is lack of jurisdiction; see for instance, Klockner v. Cameroon, award, 21 
October 1983,2 ICSID Rep 9 (1994). 
56 Christoph H. Schreuer, The ICSID Convention: A Commentary, supra note 7, at 153. 
57 Ibid., at 159. 
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to non-state parties to an international forum was one of the Convention's "avowed 
purposes", in order to obviate the recourse to national courts. 58 
Schreuer reported that there was significant debate during the preparation of 
the Convention on the question of dual or multiple nationality, particularly where 
nationality of a non-contracting state was involved. The preliminary draft provided 
that a national of a contracting state "may possess concurrently the nationality of a 
state not party to this convention. , 59 This provision did not appear in the later draft, 
but no concern was expressed regarding such situations. 60 Broches asserts that "such 
dual nationality clearly does not affect a party's standing as a `national of another 
contracting state' any more than would dual nationality of two `other contracting 
state. v, 61 
However, the Convention was silent concerning the definition of juridical 
person. 62 There was only a reference in the preliminary draft to a "company", in 
which it was described as including "any association of natural or juridical persons, 
whether or not such association is recognised by the domestic law of the contracting 
state concerned as having juridical personality. , 63 So, it appears that the requirement 
here is that a juridical person must only have a legal personality under an existing 
system. 64 Broches asserts that this criterion only needs to be met on the date of 
consent, and therefore any subsequent changes of nationality as he later argues are 
irrelevant. 65 
However, some have argued that Article 25 (2) (b) is inherently 
controversial. 66 In Holiday Inns v. Morocco, 67 for instance (the first ICSID 
arbitration), Morocco contested the jurisdiction of ICSID on the ground that it had 
58 Ibid., at 159. 
59 Ibid., at 270; see also, History, vol. 1, at 122, vol. 2, at 170. 
60 Aron Broches, "The Convention on the Settlement of Investment Disputes between States and 
Nationals of Other States", supra note 1, at 357. 
61 Ibid., at 357-358. 
62 Christoph H. Schreuer, The ICSID Convention: A Commentary, supra note7, at 276. 
63 See History, vol. 1, at 122, vol. 2, at 170; see also, Christoph H. Schreuer, The ICSID Convention: 
A Commentary, supra note 7, at 276. 
64 Christoph H. Schreuer, The ICSID Convention: A Commentary, supra note7, at 276. 
65 Aron Broches, "The Convention on the Settlement of Investment Disputes between States and 
Nationals of Other States", supra note 1, at 358. 
66 AmaZu A. Asouzu, International Commercial Arbitration and African States, supra note 51, at 273; 
concerning the interpretation of Article 25 (2) (b) see C. F. Amerasinghe, "Interpretation of Article 
25 (2) (b) of the ICSID Convention, in: Richard B. Lillich/ Charles N. Brower (eds. ), International 
Arbitration in the 21" Century: Towards "Judicialisation" and Uniformity? (1994 Irvington, New 
York: Transanational Publishers), at 223-244. 
67 Pierre Lalive, "The First `World Bank' Arbitration (HOLIDAY INNS v. Morocco) - Some Legal 
Problems", 51 BYIL 123-161,125 (1980), reprinted in 1 ICSID Rep 645-681 (1993). 
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never consented to treat "H. I. S. A. companies" as "nationals of another state", and 
therefore it had never agreed to ICSID arbitration with respect to these companies. 68 
The same was in the Amco v. Indonesia case, where Indonesia also contested the 
jurisdiction of ICSID , 
69 and in a later case, between AUCOVEN v. Venezuela. 70 
Venezuela claimed that the conditions set forth in Article 25 (2) (b) were not 
fulfilled. First, AUCOVEN was in fact controlled by ICA Holding, a company 
incorporated under Mexican laws, as a consequence, AUCOVEN could not 
commence ICSID arbitration proceedings, since Mexico was not a contracting state 
of ICSID. Second, Venezuela asserted that it had not consented to treat AUCOVEN as 
a national of another state. 7' 
2.3. Nature of the dispute (ratione materiae) 
Article 25 (1) provides inter alia that the jurisdiction of ICSID shall extend to 
72 any legal dispute arising directly out of an investment. 
(a) Legal dispute 
The Convention asserts that the jurisdiction of ICSID extends to any "legal" 
dispute. Yet it does not define the term "legal dispute. "73 Broches notes, however, 
68 Ibid., at 139. 
69 Amco v. Indonesia, 1 ICSID Rep 389-568 (1993). 
70 Autopista Concesionada de Venezuela, C. A. (Aucoven) v. Bolivarian Republic of Venezuela, 
Decision on Jurisdiction, 27 September 2001,16 ICSID Review - Foreign Investment Law Journal 
469-514,483 (2001). 
71 Gabriela Alvarez Avila, Autopista Concesionada de Venezuela, C. A. (Aucoven) v. Bolivarian 
Republic of Venezuela (ICSID Case no. Arb/00/5) Introductory Note, ibid., at 466-467; see other 
cases on ICSID's jurisdiction such as: Scimitar Exploration Limited v. Republic of Bangladesh and 
Bangladesh Oil, Gas Mineral Corporation, 5 ICSID Rep 3 (2002); Ceskoslovenska Obchodni 
Bank, AS v. the Slovak Republic, 5 ICSID Rep 330 (2002); Emilio Agustin Maffezini v. the 
Kingdom of Spain, 5 ICSID Rep 387 (2002). 
72 See for example Aron Broches, "The Convention on the Settlement of Investment Disputes between 
States and Nationals of Other States", supra note 1, at 361; see also Georges R. Delaume, 
"Convention on the Settlement of Investment Disputes between States and Nationals of other 
States", supra note 29, at 69-70; P. F. Sutherland, "The World Bank Convention on the Settlement 
of Investment Disputes", supra note 3, at 385-386; Amazu A. Asouzu, International Commercial 
Arbitration and African States, supra note 51, at 235-266; Moshe Hirsch, The Arbitration 
Mechanism of the International Centre for the Settlement of Investment Disputes, supra note 52, at 
57; K. V. S. K. Nathan, The ICSID Convention: The Law of the International Centre for the 
Settlement of Investment Disputes, supra note 52, at 99-115; see also in general, Christoph H. 
Schreuer, The ICSID Convention: A Commentary, supra note 7, at 103-14 1. 
73 Aron Broches, "The Convention on the Settlement of Investment Disputes between States and 
Nationals of Other States", supra note 1, at 362; History, vol. 1, at 111-119. 
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that a distinction was made between "disputes of a legal character" and "political, 
economic or purely commercial disputes. 9974 
The Report of the Executive Directors stated that: first, the expression "legal 
dispute has been used to make clear that while conflicts of rights are within the 
jurisdiction of the Centre, mere conflicts of interests are not. "75 The purpose of this 
sentence, according to Broches, was to dispel the fears of some developing countries 
that "investors might request a host state to consent to conciliation proceedings with 
respect to disputes in which the investor did not even claim that any of his legal 
rights had been impaired. 06 Second, the dispute must "concern the existence or 
scope of a legal right or obligation, or the nature of extent of the reparation to be 
made for breach of a legal obligation. "77 
(b) Investment 
Clearly, the notion of investment "is central to the Convention. s78 However, 
the Convention does not define the term "investment. " In fact, the Working Paper's 
draft on jurisdiction did not even make any reference to the term "investment ,,, 
79 
80 since it was believed that a definition would limit the scope of the Convention. 
Furthermore, it was stated that it may be difficult to find a satisfactory definition 
which would not lead to "jurisdictional controversies. s81 Therefore, the Report of the 
Executive Directors, Paragraph (27), declares that 
No attempt was made to define the term "investment" given the essential 
requirement of consent by the parties, and the mechanism through which 
contracting states can make known in advance, if they so desire, the classes of 
74 Ibid., at 362. 
75 The Report of the Executive Directors, supra note 8, para 26. 
76 Aron Broches, "The Convention on the Settlement of Investment Disputes between States and 
Nationals of Other States", supra note 1, at 363. 
77 The Report of the Executive Directors, supra note 8, para 26. 
78 Christoph H. Schreuer, The ICSID Convention: A Commentary, supra note 7, at 121. 
79 Article 2 (1) of the Working Paper's draft read, [T]he provision of this Article shall apply to any 
undertaking in writing to have recourse to conciliation or arbitration pursuant to the provisions of 
this Convention for the resolution of any existing or future dispute between a contracting state and 
a national of another contracting state, History, vol. 2, at 22. 
80 Christoph H. Schreuer, The ICSID Convention: A Commentary, supra note 7, at 121; see also, 
History, vol. 2, at 22. 
81 Ibid., at 121-122. 
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disputes which they would or would not consider submitting to the Centre 
82 (Article 25 (4)). 
The ambiguity and uncertainty of the meaning of "juridical person" and 
"investment" proved to be obstacles to ICSID arbitration, providing a basis on which 
to contest the jurisdiction of ICSID. A recent case demonstrates this fact. 
On 29 July 1999, the Mihaly International Corporation v. Democratic 
Socialist Republic of Sri Lanka83 was submitted to ICSID, by Mihaly International 
Corporation (Mihaly USA or the claimant). The request for arbitration invoked the 
provisions of the 20 September 1991 Treaty between the United States of America 
and Sri Lanka concerning the Encouragement and Reciprocal Protection of 
Investment (the US-Sri Lanka BIT). In this case, Sri Lanka raised two objections to 
the jurisdiction of ICSID, on the basis of the identity of the parties and the nature of 
the dispute. For the first, Sri Lanka claimed that the claimant had a partnership 
registered under the laws of Canada which is not a party to the ICSID Convention. 
Sri Lanka also argued that the claimant had no standing before the tribunal, because 
of its partnership with Mihaly (Canada), and its capacity as an undisclosed assignee, 
therefore it denied any deal with the claimant. 84 The arbitral tribunal rejected this 
claim, but it accepted the second claim concerning the nature of the dispute. Here, 
the claimant argued that in the absence of any definition of the term "investment", it 
was appropriate to give the term "a broad interpretation to encourage a free flow of 
capital into developing countries. s85 Otherwise, the claimant suggested "the free flow 
of capital investment to developing countries would subside. " Sri Lanka rejected the 
idea of a broad definition of the term "investment, " claiming that developing 
countries would find it difficult to be members of the Convention if, by means of a 
broad interpretation. 
The arbitral tribunal concluded that on the one hand, it was asked to 
"consider whether or not, the undoubted expenditure of money, [... ] to obtain a 
contract constituted `investment' for the purpose of the Convention. " On the other 
hand, it was not asked and it cannot "consider in a vacuum whether or not in other 
s2 The Report of the Executive Directors, supra note 8, para 27. 
83 Mihaly International Corporation v. Democratic Socialist Republic of Sri Lanka, 17 (1) ICSID 
Review - Foreign Investment Law Journal 142 (2002). 84 Ibid., at 146-147. 
85 Ibid., at 152. 
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circumstances expenditure of monies might constitute an `investment'. s86 It added 
that undoubtedly the jurisdiction of ICSID is based upon the mutual consent of the 
parties to submit their dispute to ICSID. On examination of the three documents 
submitted by the claimant, the arbitral tribunal found that "none of these [documents] 
contain any binding obligation either on Sri Lanka or on the claimant. " Therefore, it 
concluded that these documents cannot be understood to signify acceptance by the 
host state (Sri Lanka) that such expenditures constitute "an investment within the 
sense of the Convention. , 87 Finally, the arbitral tribunal decided that "the tribunal is 
without jurisdiction to entertain the question submitted to it either in part or in 
whole. , 88 
2.4. Jurisdiction of ICSID under BITs 
ICSID leads other international instruments in this regard in which a 
considerable number of BITs contain a reference to ICSID. 89 In 1969 ICSID issued a 
set of "Model Clause Relating to the ICSID Convention for Bilateral Investment 
Treaties. "90 
Undoubtedly, ICSID derives its jurisdiction over BITs disputes from Article 
25 (1) and the consent of the BITs parties to refer any prospective disputes to 
ICSID. Treaty which was signed in 1979 between Sweden and Malaysia gives a 
suitable example of such consent. This treaty provides that 
In the event of a dispute arising between a national or a company of one 
contracting party and other contracting party in connection with an 
86 Ibid., at 155. 
87 Ibid., at 158. 
88 Ibid., at 160; see also an individual concurring opinion on the case by David Suratgar (the arbitrator 
appointed by the claimant), ibid., at 161. 
89 It was stated that "[I]n this connection, it should be pointed out that a number of current model 
treaties contain two variations of the investment dispute provision: one draft provision that 
provides exclusively for ICSID arbitration, and another provision that sets forth alternative forms 
of arbitration", Rudolf Dolzer/ Margrete Stevens, Bilateral Investment Treaties, (The Hague: 
Martinus Nijhoff Publishers 1995), at 129-130; see samples of model of these treaties in: Bilateral 
Investment Treaties in the Mid-1990s, (United Nations Publications 1998), at 219; Peterson has 
argued that "data available from ICSID leaves no doubt that arbitration under bilateral investment 
treaties is on rise. BITs cases accounted for 5 of 12 new arbitration in 2000,12 of 14 in 2001, and 
a striking 15 of 19 in 2002", Luke Eric Peterson, "Emerging Bilateral Investmnet Treaty 
Arbitration and Sustainable Development (Current as of August 2003)" 
<www. iisd. org/pdf/2003/trade bits disputes. pdf> last visited 12 December 2003. 
90 Antonio R. Parra, "ICSID and Bilateral Investment Treaties", <www. worldbank. org/icsid/news/n- 
17-1-7. htm> last visited 12 December 2003. 
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investment in the territory of that other contracting party, it shall upon 
agreement by both parties to the dispute be submitted for arbitration to the 
International Centre for Settlement of Investment Disputes. 91 
Other treaties contain in addition to the ICSID jurisdiction alternative 
mechanisms which may include litigation before the national courts. The treaty 
which was signed on 10 March 1999 between the United States and El Salvador 
provides an example to such type of treaties. Article 9 (2) of this treaty states that 
A national or company that is a party to an investment dispute may submit 
the dispute for resolution under one of the following alternatives: 
a) to the courts or administrative tribunals of the party that is a party to the 
dispute; or 
b)... 
c) in accordance with the terms of paragraph 3. 
3 (a) provided that the national or company concerned has not submitted the 
dispute for resolution under paragraph 2 (a) or (b), and that ninety days have 
elapsed from the date on which the dispute arose, the national or company 
concerned may submit the dispute for settlement by binding arbitration: 
i. to the Centre, if the Centre is available, [according to Article lthe Centre, 
means ICSID]. 92 
The relevance of Additional Facility Rules were developed in 1984 and 
reviewed in 2002 with view of accommodating non-ICSID cases. Many BIT disputes 
are administered under Additional Facility Rules. 
It was stated that from the vast number of cases which have been registered 
at the ICSID's Secretariat since 1998, three-quarters of these cases relying upon 
91 See Malaysia-Sweden BIT (1979), Art. 9 (1), quoted by Rudolf Dolzer/ Margrete Stevens, 
Bilateral Investment Treaties, supra note 89, at 132. 
92 Treaty between the government of the United States of America and the government of the 
Republic of El Salvador for the Encouragement and reciprocal Protection of Investment, signed on 
10 March 1999 <www. sice. oas. ore/bits/usasal e. asp> last visited 13 December 2003. 
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provisions of investment treaties. 93 However, it is worth mentioning that a BIT, in 
order to provide a basis for ICSID jurisdiction must be in force at the relevant time. 94 
3. The applicable substantive law 
Having discussed the jurisdiction of ICSID, we will now turn to the method 
by which ICSID tribunals resolve issues of the applicable substantive law, the most 
crucial issue in many arbitration proceedings. The relevant provision of the ICSID 
Convention in this regard is Article 42, which reads as follows 
(1) The tribunal shall decide a dispute in accordance with such rules of law as 
may be agreed by the parties. In the absence of such agreement, the tribunal 
shall apply the law of the contracting state party to the dispute (including its 
rules on conflict of laws) and such rules of international law as may be 
applicable. 
(2) The tribunal may not bring in a finding of non liquet on the ground of 
silence or obscurity of the law. 
(3) The provisions of paragraphs (1) and (2) shall not prejudice the power of 
the tribunal to decide a dispute ex aequo et bono if the parties so agree. 95 
Our concern here will be limited to the first paragraph of the article, since it is 
one of the most controversial issues in ICSID arbitration and the most relevant to our 
subject. The first sentence of the first paragraph deals with party autonomy; under 
this paragraph the contracting parties have freedom to subject their transaction to a 
legal system of their choosing. Hence, the arbitral tribunal is allowed to seek another 
legal system only in the absence of such choice by the parties, as is provided by the 
second sentence of this paragraph. 96 However, which law can the contracting parties 
choose? 
93 Antonio R. Parra, "Applicable Substantive Law in ICSID Arbitrations Initiated under Investment 
Treaties", <www. worldbank. org/icsid/news/n-17-2-5. htm> last visited 12 December 2003. 
94 Christoph H. Schreuer, The Convention: A Commentary, supra note 7, at 211. 
9' See <www, worldbank. org/icsid > last visited 16 April 2003. 
96 Kahn, for instance, argues that "by giving priority to the rules of law adopted by the parties, the 
drafters of the Convention were faithful to their general scheme of granting a primary role in the 
functioning of the arbitration to the will or consent of the parties", Phillipe Kahn, "The Law 
Applicable to Foreign Investments: The Contribution of the World Bank Convention on the 
Settlement of Investment Disputes", supra note 1, at 6; "[the Convention] gives primacy to the 
parties' choice of law", W. Michael Reisman, "The Regime for Lacunae in the ICSID Choice of 
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3.1. Which law can the contracting parties choose 
Scholarly opinions differ over the question of which law the contracting 
parties can choose, whether the law of the host state, the law of the investor home 
state, the law of a third state, or international law. On the one hand, Broches, for 
instance, argues that the contracting parties are free to choose between a national 
law, international law, or a combination of both. However, when a national law is 
chosen, ambiguities, which are not dealt with by the Convention, may complicate the 
issue. 97 The first question, as Broches notes, is whether a reference to the law of a 
certain country should be understood as a "reference to the law as in effect at the 
time of the agreement or as it may have been amended at the time when the tribunal 
is to apply. " He believes that the answer here is that "a mere reference to the law of a 
country" must be understood to be to that law which exists at the time of arbitration 
proceedings, although in his opinion Article 42 permits the parties to agree 
specifically on a particular law as it stands at the time of their agreement. 98 The 
second question, also noted by Broches, is whether the arbitral tribunal can apply 
international law where this law "is not in terms included in the rules of law agreed 
by the parties pursuant to the first sentence of Article 42 (1). "99 Broches argues that 
the application of international law rules by the arbitral tribunal is at least permissible 
to the extent that these "rules are the `law of the land', which is to say that they 
would presumably be applied by the national courts of the host state country. "loo 
On the other hand, Kahn states that the contracting parties must link their 
relations to a legal system, '°' and therefore he thinks that there is a presumption that 
"a contract to which a state is a party will be governed by the law of that state. "102 
Kahn divides investment into two categories: direct investment and loans. He argues 
that the direct investment contract should be governed by the host state's law, and 
therefore he claims that the application of a law "other than the host state's, even if 
such other law were chosen by the parties, would be most difficult. " In addition, 
Law Provision and the Question of its Threshold", 15 ICSID Review - Foreign Investment Law 
Journal 362-381,363 (2000). 
97 See Aron Broches, "The Convention on the Settlement of Investment Disputes between States and 
Nationals of Other States", supra note 1, at 389. 
98 Ibid., at 389. 
99 Ibid., at 389. 
100 Ibid., at 389. 
101 Phillipe Kahn, "The Law Applicable to Foreign Investments: The Contribution of the World Bank 
Convention on the Settlement of Investment Disputes", supra note 1, at 30. 
102 Ibid., at 12. 
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Kahn argues that the parties rarely choose the law of a state other than the host state. 
In contrast, he states that it may be common to choose a law other than the host state 
law in indirect investment contracts, such as a loan. 103 However, he notes that in a 
practical matter "rule of public international law may not be satisfactory, because [it 
is] developed principally to govern relations between states. "' 04 Furthermore, public 
international law "is poorly adapted to the role it is asked to play in investment; it has 
many lacuna and investment agreements were not a consideration in its 
evolution. "105 
Hence, although contracting parties are free to subject their contract to any 
legal system, the priority of the national law is so eminent in ICSID arbitration. 
In practice, contracting parties have chosen a range of applicable laws. In 
1982, the Government of New Zealand entered into an agreement with Mobil Oil NZ 
Ltd, to participate in a project for the conversion of natural gas into synthetic 
gasoline. '06 The Agreement provided for ICSID arbitration (Article 7 (2)), and the 
contracting parties chose the law of New Zealand to be applied by the tribunal 
(Article 7 (7)). In another agreement, between AGIP and Congo, the arbitration 
clause contained a choice of law, read "the law of the Congo, supplemented if need 
be by any principles of international law, will be applicable. "' 07 
3.2. Hierarchy of laws (national or international) 
The interpretation of Article 42 (1), in terms of the discretion that has been 
given to the arbitral tribunal to determine the applicable law (national or 
international) when the contracting parties left this mission to them, is considered the 
most controversial issue in ICSID arbitration. The Article determines that in the 
absence of agreement on choice of law by the parties, the arbitral tribunal "shall 
apply the law of the contracting state party to the dispute (including its rules on the 
conflict of laws) and such rules of international law as may be applicable. " 
Commentators acknowledged that the language of Article 42 (1) is ambiguous. 108 
103 Ibid., at 13. 
104 Ibid., at 17. 
105 Ibid., at 13. 
106 Attorney - General v. Mobil Oil NZ Ltd., New Zealand, High Court, 1 July 1987,4 ICSID Rep 
117,123 (1997). 
107 AGIP SpA v. the Government of the People's Republic of the Congo, 1 ICSID Rep 306,313 (1993). 
108 Okezie Chukwumerije, "International Law and Article 42 of the ICSID Convention", supra note 4, 
at 96. 
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During the period of drafting the ICSID Convention there was considerable debate 
regarding this Article. '09 A number of drafts were suggested before agreement upon 
the final text was reached. One of these drafts assigned the choice of law to the 
arbitral tribunal itself 
In the absence of agreement between the parties concerning the law to be 
applied [... ] the tribunal shall decide the dispute submitted to it in accordance 
with such rules of law, whether national or international, as it shall determine 
to be applicable. ' 10 
Indeed, in the final text, Broches asserts that "international law is 
hierarchically superior to national law under Article 42 (1). s111 He argues that 
The tribunal will first look at the law of the host state and that law will in the 
first instance be applied to the merits of the dispute. Then the result will be 
tested against international law. That process will not involve the 
confirmation or denial of the validity of the host state's law, but may result in 
not applying it where that law, or action taken under that law, violates 
international law. In that sense [... ] international law is hierarchically 
superior to national law under Article 42 (1). 112 
According to Broches, there are four situations where an ICSID arbitral 
tribunal can apply international law. These are: 
1) where the parties have so agreed; 
109 See in general, History, vol. 2; see also Aron Broches, "The Convention on the Settlement of 
Investment Disputes between States and Nationals of other States: Applicable Law and Default 
Procedure", in: Pieter Sanders (ed. ), International Arbitration: Liber Amicorum for Martin Domke, 
(1967 the Hague: Martinus Nijhoff), 12-19; Christoph H. Schreuer, The ICSID Convention: A 
Commentary, supra note 7, at 598-609; Aron Broches, "The Convention on the Settlement of 
Investment Disputes between States and Nationals of Other States", supra note 1, at 390; Phillipe 
Kahn, "The Law Applicable to Foreign Investments: The Contribution of the World Bank 
Convention on the Settlement of Investment Disputes", supra note 1, at 20-21; Ibrahim F. I. 
Shihata/ Antonio R. Parra, "Applicable Substantive Law in Disputes between States and Private 
Foreign Parties: The Case of Arbitration under the ICSID Convention", 9 ICSID Review - Foreign 
Investment Law Journal 183-213,191,192,193 (1994). 
110 See History, vol. I at 192. 
"' Ibid., at 392. 
112 Ibid., at 392. 
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2) where the law of the contracting state party to the dispute calls for the 
application of international law, including customary international law; 
3) where the subject-matter or issue is directly regulated by international 
law, for instance a treaty between the state party to the dispute and the 
state whose national is the other party to the dispute; and finally, 
4) where the law of the contracting state party to the dispute, or action taken 
under that law, violates international law. In this instance international 
law operates as a corrective to national law. 113 
Implicit in this opinion is the belief that the principal task of the arbitral 
tribunal is to find remedies for the foreign party, irrespective of the legality of the 
issue. Therefore, if the result which may be achieved by applying the host state's law 
is not in favour of the foreign investor, that law should be set aside in favour of 
another law which may better provide the desired remedies. Yet, self-evidently the 
objective of any legal system is to provide justice irrespective of the benefits of the 
parties. Reisman argues that 
If an ICSID tribunal takes the claimant's demand for a remedy as the 
framework of inquiry and assumes that if that remedy is not provided by the 
host state's law, the tribunal must then proceed to search for it in international 
law, the tribunal will subvert the purpose of the dispositive (sic) choice of law 
in Article 42 (1) and create a new regime: national law is applied insofar as it 
provides a particular remedy, but if it does not, international law is then 
searched for the remedy. 114 
Therefore, Article 42 (1), as Reisman argues, should not provide, by its own 
terms, "a broader dominating and displacing role of international law. " Reisman 
believes if there is a lacuna in the host state's law, Article 42 (1) does not authorise 
the arbitral tribunal automatically to resort to international law, because the law of 
the contracting state may itself provide for a method for dealing with lacuna. 115 
However, when there is a genuine lacuna, and the host state's law does not provide a 
"' Ibid., at 392-393. 
114W. Michael Reisman, "The Regime for Lacunae in the ICSID Choice of Law Provision and the 
Question of its Threshold", supra note 96, at 371. 
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method for dealing with this gap "the tribunal may turn to international law. " He 
argues that "it is plain that mere inconsistence between the contracting state's law 
and international law cannot mean ipso facto that international law prevails. " If that 
were the case, as Reisman notes "the choice of law component of Article 42 (1) 
would lose all of its meaning. "' 16 In the same vein, Chukwumerije holds that Article 
42 (1) requires the application of international law in only two cases, i. e. when there 
are gaps in the municipal law or the municipal law violates international 
principles. 1 17 
It may be argued that, although the language of Article 42 (1) is ambiguous 
and a literal reading of the Article "does not yield any solution to the problem of the 
hierarchy of the sources"118, the question of which law comes first may be solved by 
applying the principles of private international law, particularly the doctrine of the 
closest connection factors. This doctrine gives priority to factors such as the place of 
contracting and the place of enforcement in terms of choosing the appropriate law to 
govern the dispute. This doctrine, when applied to petroleum contracts, favours the 
national law of the host state. Such an approach is evident in practice. In Benvenuti 
and Bonfant SRL v. the Government of the Peoples Republic of the Congo, for 
instance, the arbitral tribunal applied the national law. 119 The same approach was 
also found in SOABI v. State of Senegal case. 120 
It may also be argued that the primacy of national law is encouraged by the 
vagueness and ambiguity which is inherent in international law. Scholars have urged 
lawyers to give consideration to national law. Moore, for instance argues that 
The Convention requires the tribunal to presume that the law of the state 
party is the applicable law in any agreement which is silent on the choice of 
law; therefore, a lawyer would be well advised to provide in the agreement at 
115 Ibid., at 374. 
116 Ibid., at 375. 
117 Okezie Chukwumerije, "International Law and Article 42 of the ICSID Convention", supra note 4, 
at 101. 
118 Ibid., at 96. 
119 Benvenuti and Bonfant SRL v. the Government of the Peoples Republic of the Congo, Award, 15 
August 1980,1 ICSID Rep 330,349 (1993). 
120 SOABI v. State of Senegal, Award, 25 February 1988,2 ICSID Rep 164,220 (1994). 
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the very least that the arbitral tribunal can apply only the state's law in effect 
at the time the agreement is signed. 121 
Finally, it is worth mentioning that "the rules of international law" referred to 
in Article 42 (1) refer, according to the Report of the Executive Directors, to those 
rules in Article 38 (1) of the Statute of the International Court of Justice. 122 
4. Why petroleum disputes should not fall directly under the 
jurisdiction of ICSID 
The most relevant question here is whether or not petroleum disputes should 
fall directly under the jurisdiction of ICSID. In other words does the jurisdiction of 
ICSID extend to petroleum disputes under Article 25 of the ICSID Convention? 
Article 25 (1) provides that "[T] he jurisdiction of the Centre shall extend to any 
legal dispute arising directly out of an investment. ""23 Reluctantly, it may be 
accepted that petroleum contracts are investment contracts. However, these contracts 
are sui generis investment contracts and therefore they have their own particular 
characteristics which differentiate them from normal investment contracts. 
The jurisdiction of ICSID according to Article 25 (1) extends to any legal 
dispute arising directly out of investment dispute. Here if we reluctantly accept that 
petroleum contracts are investment contracts and consequently ICSID has 
jurisdiction over any dispute which may arise out of these contracts, the question 
which arises here concern the legality of most of petroleum disputes. Although there 
is no doubt that most of petroleum contracts are based upon contractual relationships 
between host states and petroleum companies, a significant number of petroleum 
disputes invariably arise out of political reasons since the petroleum industry is a mix 
of legal and political industry. 124 Hence, petroleum disputes are not purely legal 
disputes and therefore the jurisdiction of ICSID according to Article 25 (1) is 
disputed, since this Article provides that a dispute in order to be submitted to ICSID 
121 Michael M. Moore, "International Arbitration between States and Foreign Investors - The World 
Bank Convention", 18 Stanford Law Review 1359-1380,1379 (1966). 
122 See the Article in History, vol. 2, at 962; see also the Report of the Executive Directors, supra note 
8, para 40. 
123 See <www. worldbank. or /icsid> last visited 16 April 2003. 
124 See for instance, the Libyan cases in part two, chapter two of this thesis; see also National Oil 
Corporation v. Libyan Sun Oil Company, United States District Court, District of Delaware, 15 
March 1990 733 F Supp. 800; 1990 U. S. Dist. LEXIS 3419; reprinted in 16 YBCA 651 (1991). 
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should have to be of a legal character. The Report of the Executive Directors spells 
out this fact by providing that the disputes which come under the jurisdiction of 
ICSID must concern the existence or scope of a legal right or obligation, or the 
nature or extent of the reparation to be made for breach of a legal obligation. 125 
The second reason which opposes the direct jurisdiction of ICSID over 
petroleum disputes is that ICSID is part of the International Bank for Reconstruction 
and Development group. The principal aim of the World Bank is to lend money 
almost at the same base as private lending institutions (e. g. commercial banks) to 
facilitate investments in a number of developing countries. Hence, the desire of a 
number of these countries to differentiate natural resources transactions from other 
investment transactions as well as scepticism and suspicion of these countries 
towards ICSID arbitration may be the reason for these countries to exclude natural 
resources transactions from the jurisdiction of ICSID. In practice terms, several 
countries used the right provides in Article 25 (4) to exclude any dispute from the 
jurisdiction of ICSID. 126 Consequently, these disputes should not be subjected 
directly to the jurisdiction of ICSID. 
In addition, the ICSID Convention was established at a time when most 
developing countries lacked a fully developed legal infrastructure. Nowadays, the 
situation has changed and these countries are encouraging foreign investments, 
therefore they have enacted legislation which guarantees the rights of investors. 127 
Furthermore, in practice there has been hesitation in accepting the jurisdiction 
of ICSID in petroleum disputes. From the establishment of ICSID to the present, 
only ten petroleum disputes have been registered at ICSID, only two of them 
continued the proceedings to the stage of rendering an award. Those cases were 
AGIP S. P. A. v. People's Republic of the Congo, which was registered on 4 
125 See the Report of the Executive Directors, supra note 8, para 26. 
126 See for instance supra notes, 49,50 and 51 above. 
121 See for instance, examples of such legislation in part three, chapter three of this thesis. Concerning 
the need for investment in some Arabic petroleum countries, Stevens argues that, "[in Saudi 
Arabia] the economy requires a flow of capital both from foreigners and from the estimated $ 600- 
700 billion held by Saudi nationals abroad. For example Saud Al Faisal, the Foreign Minister [... ] 
claimed at a press conference in May this year [2000] that the oil, gas, electricity, desalination and 
petrochemical sectors alone needed $ 200 billion of investment over the next 20 years", Paul 
Stevens, "Saudi Arabia and the Opening of the Hydrocarbon Sector to Foreign Companies" 
<www. dundee. ac. uk/cepmlp/journal/html/article7-10. html> last visited 16 June 2003. 
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November 1977, and the award was rendered on 30 November 1979,128 and Scimitar 
Exploration Limited v. Republic of Bangladesh and Bangladesh Oil, Gas and 
Mineral Corporation, which was registered on 3 November 1992, and the award was 
rendered on 5 April 1994.129 In the latter case, the arbitral tribunal found that ICSID 
had no jurisdiction over the case, therefore the arbitral tribunal rendered the 
following decision 
27. The question to be determined by the tribunal is whether the proceedings 
are within the jurisdiction of the Centre and the competence of the tribunal. 
28. The tribunal has reviewed the assertions of law and statements of facts 
contained in the submissions and observations presented to it and in the 
submissions of council. The tribunal has also examined the question of 
corporate authorisation under the law of the British Virgin Islands, which is 
that proceedings initiated by a corporation without proper corporate authority 
or authorisation are invalid. 
29. Based on the agreed positions of the parties and the uncontested evidence 
before the tribunal, the present proceedings were not initiated with proper 
authority or authorisation, and there is no evidence relied on by the claimant 
that the absence of such proper authority or authorisation has been remedied 
by any action subsequent to the commencement of the arbitration 
proceedings. In accordance with Arbitration Rule 41 (5), the tribunal 
therefore hereby renders an award that the dispute before the tribunal is not 
within the jurisdiction of the Centre and not within the competence of the 
tribunal. 130 
The proceedings of four of the other cases were discontinued due to amicable 
settlements reached by the parties or due to requests of the claimants. 13 1 There are 
128 A GIP S. P. A. v. People's Republic of the Congo <www. worldbank. org/icsid/cases/conclude. htm> 
last visited 13 January 2004; see English translations of French original in, 21 ILM 726 (1982); 8 
YBCA 133 (1983) (excerpts); 67 ILR 318 (1984); 1 ICSID Rep 306 (1993). 
129 Scimitar Exploration Limited v. Republic of Bangladesh and Bangladesh Oil, Gas and Mineral 
Corporation <www. worldbank. org/icsid/cases/conclude. htm> last visited 13 January 2004; 5 
ICSID Rep 4 (2002). 
130 Scimitar Exploration Limited v. Republic of Bangladesh and Bangladesh Oil, Gas and Mineral 
Corporation, 5 ICSID Rep 4 (2002). 
131 These cases are: Tesoro Petroleum Corporation v. Trinidad and Tobago (conciliation), registered 
on 26 August 1983, Occidental of Pakistan, Inc. v. Islamic Republic of Pakistan, registered on 7 
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four cases still pending at ICSID, i. e. Repsol YPF Ecuador S. A. v. Empresa Estatal 
Petroleos del Ecuador (Petroecuador) registered on 5 October 2001, F-W Oil, Inc. v. 
Republic of Trinidad and Tobago, registered on 29 November 2001, Plama 
Consortium Limited v. Republic of Bulgaria registered on 19 August 2003 and TG 
World Petroleum Limited v. Republic of Niger (conciliation), registered on 9 
December 2003.132 
Therefore, the involvement of ICSID in petroleum disputes has been limited. 
Indeed, some commentators argue that the jurisdiction of ICSID should not extend to 
other activities such as disputes in international civil engineering contracts. ' 33 Nathan 
for instance, argued that 
The submission of disputes in international civil engineering contracts to 
ICSID arbitration is in breach of the ICSID Convention for the reason that 
such contracts do not involve any net transfer of capital resources to a 
developing state and are, therefore, commercial sales of goods and services 
and cannot be characterised as investments within the meaning of the 
Convention. 134 
Thus, it may be argued that it is more appropriate for petroleum disputes to 
not fall under the direct jurisdiction of ICSID. This may shed light upon why, in the 
Energy Charter Treaty of 1994, which provides several mechanisms for the 
settlement of disputes, the jurisdiction of ICSID was listed as the last choice 
available to the parties. '35 
October 1987, Societe Kufpec (Congo) Limited v. Republic of Congo, registered on 27 January 
1997, and Mobile Argentina S. A. v. Argentine Republic, registered on 9 April 1999 
<www. worldbank. org/icsid/cases/cases/conclude. htm> last visited 13 January 2004. 
132 See <www. worldbank. org/icsid/cases/cases/pending htm> last visited 13 January 2004. 
133 See for example, Kathigamar V. S. K. Nathan, "Submission to the International Centre for 
Settlement of Investment Disputes in Breach of the Convention", 12 (1) J Int'l Arb 27-52 (1995). 
134 Ibid., at 52. 
135 These mechanisms, according to Article 26, are: 1) amicable settlement (if possible); 2) if such 
disputes can not be settled according to the provisions of paragraph (1) within a period of three 
months from the date on which either party to the dispute requested amicable settlement, the 
investor party to the dispute may choose to submit it for resolution: 
a) to the courts or administrative tribunals of the contracting party to the dispute; 
b) in accordance with any applicable, previously agreed dispute settlement procedure; or 
c) in accordance with the following paragraphs of this Article. ICSID comes under this category. 
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Concluding remarks 
As discussed above, ICSID is designed to facilitate the settlement of 
investment disputes between contracting states and investors of other contracting 
states. The jurisdiction of ICSID, according to Article 25 of the Convention, is based 
upon the following requirements: a legal dispute arising directly out of an investment 
between a contracting state and a national of another contracting state requiring 
written consent. 
However, there have only been a limited numbers of petroleum disputes 
submitted to ICSID, the majority of which were settled amicably without an ICSID 
award. This is no doubt in part because petroleum disputes are not typical investment 
disputes as well as most of petroleum disputes are not purely legal disputes.. 
This highlights the importance of establishing a specialised institution to 
undertake the settlement of disputes arising out of the petroleum industry. Hence, 
this thesis will present a suggestion for the form of such a forum or institute. The 
literature of OPEC, as discussed in the following chapter, provides the basis for this 
suggestion. 
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Chapter Three: Development of Host States Laws at National and 
International Level 
Introductory remarks 
In state contracts in general and petroleum contracts in particular, the state is 
always presumed to be subject to its national law. This perspective was fully supported 
by the United Nations' Resolutions in the 20th century, a number of cases, and the 
practice of Latin American countries when they refused in the 20th century to settle 
disputes in tribunals other than domestic courts. ' It was also endorsed by 1968 resolution 
of the Organisation of the Petroleum Exporting Countries (hereinafter OPEC). This 
resolution gives authority to the host state's courts to settle any petroleum dispute. 
Petroleum legislation and several petroleum agreements issued in Arab countries also 
applied national law to such disputes. This chapter will analyse OPEC's resolution, as 
well as examples of rules in some Arab petroleum countries which prioritise national 
law in petroleum transactions. 
However, we will begin with an overview of OPEC and its aims. At present, 
OPEC's future is, (according to some) in question, especially after the 2003 Iraq war. 
Walde for instance, asserted that "OPEC will in fact be finished. 192 Knipe wrote that 
"[despite the fact that] OPEC oil ministers are quick to dismiss any suggestion that the 
organisation's days of high influence on prices are numbered, [... ] OPEC's present [is] 
weakness. ,3 However, our concern here is limited to discussion of OPEC's 1968 
For more details see part one, chapter one of this thesis. 
2 Thomas W. Wälde, "An Iraqi Scenario: Impact of Fundamental Regime Change in Iraq on Acquired and 
new Contractual Titles in the Iraq Oil Industry", 1 (1) Oil, Gas & Energy Law Intelligence 3 (2003) 
<www. gasandoil. com/ouel/> last visited 10 May 2003; for more information about OPEC and its 
Member Countries see for instance, <www. opec. org> last visited 10 May 2003; 
<www. eia. doegov/emeu/cabs/opecrev. html> last visited 12 May 2003. 
Michael Knipe, "The Nightmare is Over as Oil Producers Learn to Embrace a New Respectability", The 
Time, (Focus on OPEC) Tuesday 12 March 2002; see also A. F. Alhajji, "International Organisations in 
the Energy Sector, no. 2: OPEC", 1 (2) Oil, Gas & Energy Law Intelligence 17 (2003) 
<www. gasandoil. com/o e1h last visited 10 May 2003; David G. Victor/ Nadejda M. Victor, "Axis of 
Oil? ", (March/ April 2003) Foreign Affairs, at 47; Ariel Cohen/ Geralad P. O'Driscoll, "The Road to 
Economic Prosperity for a Post-Saddam Iraq" <www. heritage. or Research/MiddleEast/bgl594. ffm> 
last visited 2 June 2003; Ekpen Omondude, "Oil Pricing in the 21" Century: Can OPEC Regain Control 
over Oil Prices? " <www. dundee. ac. uk/Cepmlp/Car/assets/ima eg s/Ekpea. pdf> last visited 12 May 2003; 
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resolution, which highlights the importance of creating a specialised institution to solve 
petroleum disputes. 
1. The Organisation of the Petroleum Exporting Countries (OPEC) 
1.1. The evolution of OPEC 
Efforts to establish some type of cooperation between petroleum exporting 
countries began in the first half of the 20th century, as a result of the excesses of 
petroleum companies 4 Venezuela, due to its experience in dealing with foreign 
petroleum companies, was the first to make initiatives to control petroleum incomes In 
1947, Venezuela took the first step toward establishing cooperation between petroleum 
exporting countries by initiating diplomatic contact with Iran, in order to integrate their 
petroleum policies. Two years later, Venezuela sent an official delegation to Iran, Iraq, 
Kuwait, and Saudi Arabia, to encourage an exchange of opinions on petroleum policies 
as well as to explore avenues for cooperation. 6 
The need for cooperation between these countries became more crucial in the 
1950s when petroleum companies unilaterally started reducing the posted price of 
petroleum, affecting Kuwait, Qatar, Iran and Venezuela. Consequently, in April 1959, 
the Arab petroleum countries met in Cairo and decided to establish the first Arab 
Petroleum Congress. Iran and Venezuela attended this Congress as observers. 8 Here, the 
delegations agreed upon Alfonzo Perez's suggestion to establish a specialised 
Emma Ukpanah, "OPEC as a Cartel: Can U. S. Antitrust Laws be Applied Extraterritorially? " 
<www. dundee. ac. uk/Cepmlp/Car/assets/ima¬es/Emma. pdf> last visited 12 May 2003. 
Sampson states that "they [petroleum companies] had already made one cut in the posted price in 
February 1959, of eighteen cents a barrel-a reduction which meant that the four major producing 
countries in the Middle East would receive about ten percent less in taxes, or $132 million dollars a 
year", Anthony Sampson, The Seven Sisters: The Great Oil Companies and the World they Made, 
(London: Hodder and Stoughton 1975), at 157. 
S Frank R. Wyant, The United States, OPEC, and Multinational Oil, (Lexington: Lexington Books D. C. 
Heath and Company 1977), at 66; General Information <www. opec. org > last visited 8 May 2003; see 
in general, Zuhayer M. Mikdashi, The Community of Oil Exporting Countries: A Study in Governmental 
Co-operation, (London: Allen and Unwin 1972); George Ward, Middle East Oil: A study in Political 
and Economic Controversy, (Nashville, Tenn.: University Press 1970). 
6 Frank R. Wyant, The United States, OPEC, and Multinational Oil, at 66. 
7 ibid., at 67 ; General Information <www. opec. org > last visited 8 May 2003. 
8 Zuhayer M. Mikdashi, The Community of Oil Exporting Countries: A Study in Governmental Co- 
operation, supra note 5, at 27-29; see also Frank R. Wyant, The United States, OPEC, and Multinational 
Oil, supra note 5, at 67. 
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consultation commission concerned with their common petroleum problems .9 Another 
reduction of petroleum prices by petroleum companies occurred in August 1960, which 
may have increased the urgency of the need for mutual cooperation. '° 
Hence, representatives of the governments of Iran, Iraq, Kuwait, Saudi Arabia 
and Venezuela met in Baghdad from 10-14 September 1960, and decided to establish 
OPEC as a "permanent intergovernmental organisation. "11 At this conference the 
representatives concluded 
That the Members are implementing much needed development programmes to 
be financed mainly from income derived from their petroleum exports; 
That Members must rely on petroleum income to a large degree in order to 
balance their annual national budgets; 
That petroleum is a wasting asset and to the extent that it is depleted must be 
replaced by other assets; 
That all nations of the world, in order to maintain and improve their standards of 
living, must rely almost entirely on petroleum as a primary source of energy 
generation; 
That any fluctuation in the price of petroleum necessarily affects the 
implementation of the Members' programmes and results in a dislocation 
detrimental not only to their own economies, but also to those of all consuming 
nations. 
12 
At the conference, the representatives adopted a number of resolutions. In the 
first resolution they announced their need for mutual cooperation, and they declared that 
they "can no longer remain indifferent to the attitude heretofore adopted by the oil 
companies in effecting price modifications. " They also requested that petroleum 
companies maintain petroleum prices free from all unnecessary fluctuations. If 
"petroleum companies intended to alter petroleum prices, they should consult with the 
9 Ibid., at 67. 
'° General Information <www. opec. org > last visited 8 May 2003. 
11 General Information <www. opec. ors > last visited 8 May 2003. 
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member or members affected in order to fully explain the circumstances. " They agreed 
that members should make any efforts available to them to maintain petroleum prices at 
the levels prevailing prior to the reductions, as well as to limit any modification in 
petroleum prices to serious circumstances. 
In addition, members declared their intention to formulate a system by which 
they could ensure the stabilisation of petroleum prices, with due regard to the interests of 
both the producing countries and the consuming countries. 
This resolution also prevented any member from accepting an offer of beneficial 
treatment from a petroleum company while sanctions were employed by a petroleum 
company against another member. It provided that 
If as a result of the application of any unanimous decision of this Conference any 
sanctions are employed, directly or indirectly, by any interested company against 
one or more of the Member Countries, no other Member shall accept any offer of 
beneficial treatment, whether in the form of an increase in exports or an 
improvement in prices, which may be made to it by any such company or 
companies with the intention of discouraging the application of the unanimous 
decision reached by the Conference. 
13 
In the second resolution the members announced the establishment of OPEC. 
The resolution provides that 
1. With a view to giving effect to the provisions of Resolution no. 1.1 [above] 
the Conference decides to form a permanent organisation called the 
Organisation of the Petroleum Exporting Countries for regular consultation 
among its Members with a view to co-ordination and unifying the policies of 
the Members and determining among other matters the attitude which 
Members should adopt whenever circumstances such as those referred to in 
12 OPEC Official Resolutions and Press Releases 1960-1983, (2nd ed., Oxford: Pergamon Press 1984), at 
1. 
13 See the entire text of the Resolution, ibid., at 1. 
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Paragraph 2 [reduction of petroleum prices] of Resolution no. 1.1 have 
arisen. 14 
The resolution defines the countries which attended this Conference as the 
Original Members of OPEC (Paragraph 2). The door was also kept open to any country 
with "a substantial net export of crude petroleum" to become a new member of OPEC, 
however, only after unanimous acceptance by the Original Members (Paragraph 3). 15 
Aside from the original members (Iran, Iraq, Kuwait, Saudi Arabia and 
Venezuela) and future `full members', OPEC allowed for `associate members' countries 
which do not qualify for full membership, but are nevertheless admitted under special 
conditions. 
16 
Today, OPEC consists of eleven members. In addition to the "Founder 
Members", they are Qatar, which joined OPEC in 1961; Indonesia, 1962; Socialist 
People's Libyan Arab Jamahiriya, 1962; United Arab Emirates, 1967; Algeria, 1969; 
and Nigeria, 1971. Ecuador became a Full Member in 1973, then suspended its 
membership with effect from 31 December 1992. Gabon, which became a Full Member 
in 1975, terminated its membership with effect from 1 January 1995. '7 
1.2. Principal aims of OPEC 
In accordance with Paragraph (4) of the second Resolution, the principal aim of 
OPEC is "the unification of petroleum policies for the Member Countries" as well as 
"the determination of the best means of safeguarding the interests of Member countries 
individually and collectively. i18 Also, OPEC seeks to develop ways and means to 
maintain the stabilisation of petroleum prices in international petroleum markets, in 
order to ensure the interests of the exporting countries in view of the necessity of 
securing a steady income for them. 19 
14 Ibid., at 1. 
is See OPEC's statute <www. opec. org > last visited 8 May 2003. 
16 OPEC's statute; see also, General information <www. opec. org > last visited 8 May 2003. 
"General information <www. opec. org> last visited 8 May 2003. 
18 Resolutions of the First OPEC Conference, Baghdad 10-14 September 1960, OPEC Official Resolutions 
and Press Releases 1960-1983, supra note 12, at 2. 
19 General information <www. opec. org> last visited 8 May 2003. 
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At the Conference of Sovereigns and Heads of State of OPEC Member 
Countries, which was held in Algiers, on 4-6 March 1975, OPEC's members stated that 
OPEC should seek, in consultation and cooperation with the other countries of 
the world, the establishment of a new international economic order based on 
justice, mutual understanding and a genuine concern for the well-being of all 
peoples. 20 
At the Second Summit of OPEC Heads of State and Governments which was 
held in Caracas, Venezuela, in 2000, members reaffirmed their commitment to the 
principles of OPEC. They also examined the role of petroleum in future world energy 
demand, they highlighted the considerable link between security of supply and the 
security and transparency of petroleum demand and they emphasised the need for better 
cooperation between petroleum countries and petroleum companies. 21 
1.3. Resolution of the 16th OPEC Conference (Resolution XVI. 90) 
On 24-25 June 1968, OPEC held its 16th Conference in Vienna and rendered 
Resolution no. 16. In this Resolution, OPEC determined the mechanism for settling any 
dispute arising out of a petroleum transaction between its members and petroleum 
companies. The rationale for such a Resolution was the awareness of these countries of 
the crucial role of petroleum income in the welfare of their nations: "[petroleum 
resources] in Member Countries are one of the principal sources of their revenues and 
foreign exchange earnings and therefore constitute the main basis for their economic 
development. , 22 
OPEC based this Resolution on principles of sovereign immunity over natural 
resources, principles which have been repeatedly reaffirmed by the General Assembly of 
20 General information <www. opec. org > last visited 8 May 2003; for the entire text of the Declaration 
(Solemn Declaration), see OPEC Official Resolutions and Press Releases 1960-1983, supra note 12, at 
130. 
21 General information <www. opec. org > last visited 8 May 2003. 
22 OPEC Official Resolutions and Press Releases 1960-1983, supra note 12, at 61. 
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the United Nations, especially in Resolution no 2158 of 25 November 196623 
Resolution 2158 provides that, "the natural resources of the developing countries 
constitute a basis of their economic development in general and of their industrial 
progress in particular. " It also reaffirms the inalienable right of all countries to exercise 
permanent sovereignty over their natural resources. Moreover, the Resolution states that 
national and international organisations set up by developing countries for the 
development and marketing of their natural resources, "play a significant role in 
ensuring the exercise of the permanent sovereignty of those countries in this field and 
should on that account be encouraged. "24 Regarding the settlement of disputes, the 16th 
OPEC's Conference Resolution provides that 
Except as otherwise provided for in the legal system of a Member Country, all 
disputes arising between the government and operators shall fall exclusively 
within the jurisdiction of the competent national courts or the specialised 
regional courts, as and when established. 5 
In other words, any dispute between the host state and a petroleum company 
shall exclusively be settled before the national court of the host state. Therefore, 
arbitration as a method of solving disputes was excluded. Consequently, the question of 
the applicable law was undoubtedly resolved in favour of lexfori. However, the second 
part of the provision is open to the possibility of the establishment of a specialised forum 
for settling such disputes, as it states "or the specialised regional courts, as and when 
established. " 
Since 1968, the year of this Resolution, no specialised forum has been 
established, and therefore it may be argued that it is now time to establish such a forum 
to deal with petroleum disputes, particularly as the tensions inherent in the issue of 
petroleum resources are currently so great. A suggestion for the form of such a forum 
will be made in the conclusion. 
23 General Assembly Resolutions (2158) (XXI) Permanent Sovereignty over Natural Resources, U. N 
General Assembly Resolution Adopted Session 15-22 1960- 68,21"' Session, at 29. 24 Ibid., at 29. 
25 OPEC Official Resolutions and Press Releases 1960-1983, supra note 12, at 63. 
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2. Rules of some Arab petroleum countries 
The discussion of applicable law in certain Arab petroleum countries will 
examine the issue from two perspectives: theoretically, in terms of legislation, as well as 
practically, in terms of petroleum agreements. 
2.1. Legislation 
Most of the laws enacted in Arab petroleum countries, especially where 
commercial law is concerned, are "a direct transposition of European law. , 26 In these 
laws, it is clear that national law is prioritised. 
In the field of foreign investment law for example, the Saudi Arabia Foreign 
Investment Law of 200027 provides in Article 13 that any dispute between the 
government and a foreign investor should first be settled in an amicable manner, or 
otherwise settled in line of regulations before national courts. Moreover, the law subjects 
all licensed foreign investments to Saudi Arabian national taxes, as well as requiring 
foreign investors to adhere to the systems, statutes and instructions in the country. 28 
Similarly, Kuwaiti foreign investment law provides for the application of the national 
law of the state. Article 17 of the investment law provides that 
In the absence of any specific provisions herein, the laws and regulations in force 
in the State of Kuwait, will be applied inasmuch as they are not inconsistent with 
the provisions hereof. 29 
26 Chibli Mallat, "Commercial Law in the Middle East: Between Classical Transactions and Modern 
Business", 48 American Journal of Comparative Law 81-141,81 (2000); it was argued that "as 
Muslim countries gained independence from western powers in this century [20" century], they 
usually adopted codes paying deference to Islamic law. Even these, however, remained close in form 
and substance to western codes", Frank E. Vogel/ Samuel L. Hayes III, Islamic Law and Finance: 
Religion, Risk, and Return, (The Hague: Kluwer Law International 1998), at 19; see in general Jane K. 
Winn, "Islamic Law, Globalisation and Emerging E-Commerce Technology", in: the International 
Bureau of the Permanent Court of Arbitration (ed. ), Strengthening Relations with Arab and Islamic 
Countries through International Law: E-Commerce, the WTO Dispute Settlement Mechanism and 
Foreign Investment, (2002 The Hague: Kluwer Law International), 27-42. 
27 The Kingdom of Saudi Arabia's System of Foreign Investment as formulated by Royal Decree of 11 
April 2000,16 Arab Law Quarterly 101-104 (2001). 
28 Ibid., Arts. 14,15. 
29 Decree Law no. 12 of 1999 Concerning Allowing persons other than Kuwaiti Nationals to own Shares 
in Kuwaiti Joint Stock Companies, enacted on 1 June 1999 and promulgated in Official Gazette, issue 
no. 414,6 June 1999, Nicola H. Karam, Business Laws of Kuwait, vol. 4, (London: Kluwer Law 
International 2000), at 4.34-1 
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Furthermore, Article 9 provides that 
This law will apply to existing foreign capital investments to the extent that 
realises the objectives of this law, provided that the privileges, exemptions and 
securities accorded them in pursuance of its provisions, will not be less than 
those previously accorded to them. 30 
However, this law grants a high level of security to foreign investments. For 
example, Article 8 prohibits any infringement of existing rights. 31 In addition, the law 
also allows the foreign investor to refer its dispute to local or international arbitration 32 
In the civil law arena, the civil law of the United Arab Emirates, which was 
issued in 1985,33 states in Section 3 Article 10 that the law of the United Arab Emirates 
is the authoritative source in determining relationships where there is a conflict of laws. 
Furthermore, amending law no. 1 of 1987 provides in Article 1 that "the attached law 
s3a shall apply in respect of civil transactions in the State of the United Arab Emirates. 
Civil Kuwaiti law also determines that when the contracting parties have failed 
to specify the applicable law, then the law of Kuwait should be applied when an 
arbitration takes place in Kuwait. 35 
In the field of company law, the national law of a state is also considered to be 
the applicable law. The United Arab Emirates Company Law for instance, provides that 
30 Ibid., Art. 9. 
31 Art. 8 provides that, (1) no foreign project, which has been licensed hereunder, may devolve upon the 
state, except in consideration of compensation equal to the market value thereof; 
(2) it is not permissible to cause injury to the rights and acquired (vested) privileges of the foreign 
investor, who has been licensed hereunder, except in consideration of compensation for said rights and 
privileges; see the other types of security granted to foreign investors in Arts. 10,11,12 and 16, ibid. 
32 Art. 15 provides that, (1) an agreement may be made providing for the referral to a local or international 
arbitration body of any dispute that may arise between the foreign investment projects and third parties; 
(2) for applying the provision of this Article, a third party is meant to be the Government authorities, 
and the public, or private, natural or juristic persons, ibid. 
33 The Law of Civil Transactions of the State of the United Arab Emirates, issued in Abu Dhabi on 15 
February 1985 and amended by law no. 1 of 1987. 
'a See The Civil Code of the United Arab Emirates, translated by James Whelan and Marjorie J Hall, 
(London: Graham & Trotman 1987), at 3.1 - I; see also Bryan Cave, Business Law of the Middle East: 
The United Arab Emirates, vol. 1, (London: Kluwer Law International 1999), at Fed. Law no. 5 (1985) 
-15. 35 Article 1 of the Civil Code; see also Abdul Hamid El-Ahdab, Arbitration with the Arab Countries, (2nd 
ed., The Hague: Kluwer Law International 1999), at 307. 
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any company incorporated in the United Arab Emirates will be considered as a national 
company and consequently it will be subject to the law of the United Arab Emirates. 36 In 
the same vein, the Law of Commercial Procedure of the United Arab Emirates states in 
Article 1 that "the provisions of this law shall apply to traders and to all commercial 
activity undertaken by any person even if he is not a trader. "37 
However, despite the fact that certain Arab petroleum countries have enacted 
several laws as stated above, legislation governing petroleum matters is still deficient. 
Some major petroleum producing countries, such as Saudi Arabia, the United Arab 
Emirates and Qatar, have not enacted any petroleum laws covering the detailed 
conditions of petroleum activities. 8 In a survey concerning relevant laws in the United 
Arab Emirates for instance, it was stated that "we note that there is no Federal special 
purpose legislation governing oil and gas matters in the United Arab Emirates. "39 
Although, the reason for this lack may be the nature of the relationship in petroleum 
transactions, in which each concession agreement contains detailed provisions 
concerning the rights and obligations of each party, the time is ripe to enact detailed 
laws regulate all petroleum activities. 
Libya was among the first Arab petroleum countries which enacted laws 
concerning petroleum activities. All Libyan petroleum laws, whether enacted before or 
after the revolution, contain specific provisions concerning the applicable law and the 
rights and obligations of petroleum companies. 40 
In 1973, Kuwait issued law no. 19 concerning the conservation of petroleum 
resources. 41 The law defines the term "petroleum" as all natural hydrocarbons whether in 
solid, liquid or gaseous form which are or can be produced from the surface of the 
36 Sabah M. Ali Mahmoud, United Arab Emirates Company Law and Practice, (3rd ed., London: Gulf 
Legal Services Ltd. 1997), at 113. 
37 The Law of Commercial Procedure of the United Arab Emirates, translated by Dawoud Sudqi El Alami, 
(London: Graham & Trotman 1994), at 28; see also Bryan Cave, Business Law of the Middle East: The 
United Arab Emirates, supra note 34, at Fed. Law no. 18 (1993) - 11. 38 Anis Al-Qasem, Principles of Petroleum Legislation: The Case of a Developing Country, (London: 
Graham & Trotman Limited 1985), at 8. 
39 Bryan Cave, Business Law of the Middle East: The United Arab Emirates, supra note 34, at introduction 
-23. 40 See in general, Anis Al-Qasem, Principles of Petroleum Legislation: The Case of a Developing 
Country, supra note 38, at 65-221. 
41 Law no. 19 of 1973 concerning the Conservation of Petroleum Resources, Selected Documents of the 
International Petroleum Industry 1973, (Vienna: OPEC 1975), at 117. 
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ground or from underground and all hydrocarbons or other kinds of fuels derived there 
from. It also defines the term "petroleum operation" to include a range of activities such 
as reconnaissance and exploration for petroleum, the development of fields, the drilling 
of wells and the production of petroleum. 2 Furthermore, the law subjects all petroleum 
operations to its provisions as well as its implementing regulations. 43 
In 1986, Algeria also issued a law pertaining to the exploration, exploitation and 
pipeline transportation of petroleum. 44 The objective of the law, as determined by 
Article 1, is to define the legal system of petroleum transactions, including the rights and 
obligations of petroleum companies. 45 The law determines in detail the rights and 
obligations of petroleum companies, such as supplementary rights, 46 and the tax 
system. 7 Article 63 of this law determines that Algerian laws are the applicable law in 
any dispute arising from the application of this law. This Article provides that 
Contestation and disputes arising from the application of this law and the 
documents taken for its application fall within the competence of the Algerian 
jurisdiction pursuant to the legislation in force. However, the contestation and 
disputes related to the association in the field of hydrocarbons may be previously 
submitted before a conciliation board according to the legislation in force. 8 
Outside the Arab world, Iranian petroleum law, for instance, determines the 
method of settling petroleum disputes. The Petroleum Act of 1974 provides in Article 23 
that 
Disputes arising between the National Iranian Oil Company and the parties to the 
contract, if not settled through amicable negotiations, as shall be prescribed in 
42 Ibid., Art. 1, at 117. 
43 Ibid., Art. 2, at 117. 
as Law 86-14 of August 19th 1986 concerning the Exploration, Exploitation and Pipeline Transportation of 
Hydrocarbons, Selected Documents of the International Petroleum Industry: Algeria, Indonesia, Libya, 
Saudi Arabia 1979-1989, (Vienna: OPEC 1993), at 1. 
as Ibid., at 3. 
46 Arts. 30-33, ibid., at 9-10. 
47 Arts. 34-60, ibid., at 10-16. 
48 Ibid., at 16. 
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each contract, shall be resolved through arbitration. Provisions shall be provided 
in an appropriate manner in each contract. The arbitration procedure shall 
conform to the laws of Iran, and the site of arbitration shall be Tehran, unless the 
parties to the contract agree on another venue after the dispute has arisen. The 
validity, interpretation and implementation of the contracts shall be subject to the 
laws of Iran 49 
Thus, Iranian law clearly determines the issue of the applicable law in favour of 
Iranian laws. This provision has been implemented, for example, in the service contract 
which was signed between the National Iranian Oil Company and Ultramar Company 
Limited, on 7 August 1974, Article 22 (11) provides that arbitrators should subject their 
decision to the law of Iran. 5° 
2.2. Practice 
In practice, before the Second World War there was no direct reference to the 
host state's law in petroleum agreements. 51 However, several agreements concluded 
since have contained a provision concerning the applicable law which refers to host 
state's law. The Libyan model of the exploration and production sharing agreement 
(EPSA III) of 1989, for instance, provides in Article 21 (governing law) that "this 
agreement shall be governed by and interpreted in accordance with the laws and 
regulations of the Socialist People's Libyan Jamahiriya, including, without limitation, 
the petroleum law. , 52 
These agreements also determine the rights and obligations of petroleum 
companies. In the Participation Agreement which was concluded between the 
Government of the Libyan Arab Republic, the National Oil Corporation, Amerada 
49 Iran, the Petroleum Act of 1974, Selected Documents of the International Petroleum Industry 1974, 
(Vienna: OPEC 1976), at 19,28. 
so Ibid., at 75. 
51 Ahmed Abdul Hamid Ashoosh, Qanoon An Naft (Petroleum Law: The New Trends in determining the 
Law Governing the International Economic Development Agreements), (Alexandra: Shabab Al Jamia'h 
Enterprise 1989), at 43,334. 
52 Selected Documents of the International Petroleum Industry: Algeria, Indonesia, Libya, Saudi Arabia 
1979-1989, (Vienna: OPEC 1993), at 167. 
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Petroleum Corporation of Libya,, Continental Oil Company of Libya and Marathon 
Petroleum Libya, Ltd on 11 August 1973, Article 9 provides that 
The rights, privileges and immunities provided for in the Petroleum Law, the 
Concessions and other agreements between the Government and Second Parties 
heretofore enjoyed by Second Parties shall continue in full force and effect 
unless amended by this Agreement, and the Corporation and Second Parties 
hereafter shall enjoy the same in proportion to their respective participation 
shares. 53 
Clearly however, relationships in the petroleum industry between the host state 
and petroleum companies are frequently fractions, especially since some host countries 
enacted rules which reduce the benefits of this relationship for petroleum companies. A 
prime example here is a regulation issued in Saudi Arabia forbidding state agencies to 
resort to arbitration. 4 The Arbitration law of 1983 upholds this regulation by providing 
in Article 3 that 
Government agencies may not have recourse to arbitration for settlement of their 
disputes with third parties except with the approval of the President of the 
Council of Ministers. This provision may be amended by a resolution of the 
Council of Ministers. 55 
The origin of this regulation dated from 1963, after the settlement of the Aramco 
case. 56 
53 See the Agreement in, Selected Documents of the International Petroleum Industry 1973, (Vienna: 
OPEC 1975), at 146,155. 
sa Decree no. 58 of 25 June 1963. 
55 Kingdom of Saudi Arabia: Arbitration Rules and Codes, issued by Royal Decree M 46,25 April 1983. 
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Concluding remarks 
It is clear that petroleum exporting countries were considerably concerned about 
the issue of the settlement of disputes arising out of petroleum transactions. National 
courts and national laws were the first choice of these countries in the event of a dispute. 
National law is prioritised in legislation in some petroleum countries, such as 
Algeria, Libya and Iran. As discussed above, most developing petroleum countries have 
enacted advanced laws and established a new legal infrastructure which is capable of 
governing sophisticated contracts such as petroleum contracts. Hence, the law of the 
host state is no longer insufficient to govern petroleum disputes. 
The establishment of a specialised institution to undertake the settlement of 
petroleum disputes, as suggested in OPEC's resolution, is timely and important. First, it 
would decrease the inherent and increasing tension between developing petroleum 
countries on the one hand and industrialised countries and petroleum companies on the 
other. Second, this is necessary because petroleum transactions are so different from 
those of other industries. 
The idea of a specialised institution to undertake the settlement of petroleum 
disputes will be discussed in depth in the conclusion of this thesis. 
56 See the case in part two, chapter one of this thesis. 
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Conclusion and Proposal 
The purpose of this study was to examine the past and present of petroleum 
arbitration, and to suggest a method to determine the applicable law to the merits of 
petroleum a dispute. The question of the applicable law in this field is highly 
controversial, no doubt as a consequence of the conflict of interests between the 
relevant actors, i. e. developing petroleum exporting countries on the one hand and 
petroleum companies of developed states (often multinational corporations) on the 
other hand. 
Developing petroleum countries presumably act from motives of enlightened 
national interest, pursuant to which they struggle to gain control over their own 
natural resources, especially petroleum, which provide crucial income to ensure a 
minimum standard of living for their citizens and to achieve a suitable level of 
development. Therefore, these countries have slowly, over the entire 20`h century 
been in the process of disentangling themselves from colonial relationships which 
served the western world's interests. 
Petroleum companies and their home states (predominately developed 
industrialised states) act to protect their interests in the petroleum industry and gain 
as much profit as possible from this sector, irrespective of the consequences for 
developing petroleum countries. To achieve this goal, petroleum companies, 
sustained by their home states, began at the beginning of the 20th century to tie up the 
natural resources sector of developing countries in chains of unequal contracts. 
Under such contracts, petroleum companies received the exclusive rights to explore, 
exploit, produce, sell and transport petroleum. These contracts were typically for a 
long period of time, and the royalties due to the host state were generally negligible 
not exceeding a few cents per barrel. At the same time, these contracts contained 
multiple clauses and provisions which aimed to provide a considerable level of 
security for the interests of petroleum companies, such as the stabilisation clause. 
Against this complex background, arbitration was implemented as a 
mechanism for solving disputes arising out of petroleum transactions. Unfortunately, 
in the beginning arbitration served only to protect petroleum companies' interests, 
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and was not implemented as a just method of settling disputes. The petroleum 
arbitrations of the last century provide evidence for this. Therefore, arbitration was 
not welcomed by developing countries, since these countries perceived international 
arbitration to be biased in favour of western petroleum companies. The Libyan 
petroleum arbitrations are considered as the most flagrant proof of bias in the arena 
of international commercial arbitration. The refusal of Latin American countries to 
settle disputes by tribunals other than domestic courts is the best example of 
developing countries' scepticism and suspicion towards international arbitration. For 
in general, the authority of the host state was dismissed, whether in terms of its 
courts' jurisdiction or its laws. The mostly self-serving belief which prevailed in the 
last century was that the host state's law was inadequate to deal with such 
sophisticated contracts, and that therefore the interests of petroleum companies 
would be threatened under the jurisdiction of the host state's court. 
Opinions on the nature of petroleum contracts and subsequently the 
applicable law are varied and no single one has gained overwhelming acceptance. In 
fact, western scholars competed in providing a description of the characteristics of 
petroleum contracts and subsequently the law which should govern these contracts. 
One opinion holds that foreign companies which conclude long-term contracts with 
developing states need protection from the intervention of the host state, and 
therefore these contracts should be delocalised in terms of substantive law. Others 
have argued that these contracts are international treaties which should be governed 
by international law and any violation of these contracts should be considered a 
violation of (public) international law. A third opinion states that these contracts have 
international elements and therefore should be governed by the general principles of 
law recognised by civilised nations. Others believe that these contracts are quasi- 
international agreements and accordingly that they themselves constitute their own 
legal order and proper law. Some have suggested that these contracts should be 
governed by transnational law such as lex mercatoria or UNIDROIT Principles. 
However, it could be argued that most of these opinions are based on old 
arbitration awards rendered in the middle of the 20th century, which presumed that 
petroleum exporting countries (host states) lacked a sophisticated legal infrastructure. 
Nowadays, these countries possess advanced legal systems, and many have enacted 
new laws (most of which were guided by western laws mainly of civil law origin) 
dealing with different aspects of national or international legal issues. Consequently, 
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the allegation that host states lack a comprehensive legal system appropriate for the 
settlement of disputes arising out of complicated contracts such as petroleum 
contracts is no longer tenable. 
Hence, it could be argued that the law of the host state may well be the 
applicable law to the merits of a dispute in petroleum arbitration. This opinion 
derives its authority from a number of facts, in addition to the point made above 
concerning the adequate sophistication of these countries' legal infrastructure. First, 
the doctrine of sovereign immunity provides that a country cannot be a subject of a 
law other than its national law without its consent. Second, in theory and in case law, 
developing countries possess authority to control their natural resources by applying 
their domestic laws. Third, the doctrine of private international law gives priority to 
the law of the closest connection or most significant relationship. In petroleum 
contracts there is no ambiguity regarding the most closely connected factors, since all 
these factors, the subject matter of the contract, the place of performance of the 
contract, take place within host state. Fourth, the intention of the host states, whether 
made clear in certain petroleum contracts, in the OPEC Resolution of 1968, or in 
petroleum laws issued subsequently, is in favour of host state law. Having said that 
and according to the suggested method (semi-localisation theory) if the host state's 
law is inadequate to govern the dispute, arbitrators can apply directly other law or 
rules which they consider applicable without any recourse to the conflict of laws 
rules i. e. (voie directe). 
It is an undisputed fact that the intention of the contracting parties or the 
doctrine of party autonomy is the cornerstone in arbitration, since as it has been 
argued the answer to every dispute is to be found prima facie in the contract itself. ' 
However, this doctrine exists in the sphere of private parties, where all the 
contracting parties are on an equal footing in terms of bargaining power. The 
contractual relationship between states and private parties, especially in the 
petroleum industry, may not always be one of equality because there may be some 
political and financial pressures on the state (particularly developing countries) 
Julian D. M. Lew, Applicable Law in International Commercial Arbitration: A Study in Commercial 
Arbitration Awards, (Dobbs Ferry, New York: Oceana Publications 1978), at 581; see also Julian D. 
M. Lew/ Loukas A Mistelis/ Stefan M Kroll, Comparative International Commercial Arbitration, 
(The Hague: Kluwer Law International 2003), at 411. 
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which lead it to compromise its autonomy. 2 Furthermore, this doctrine has been 
ignored in previous petroleum arbitrations, where the law of the host state was 
dismissed. 
Nonetheless, it is true that in certain ways host state law may be an 
inadequate method for dealing with disputes, and a specialised forum may be more 
appropriate. The Convention on the Settlement of Investment Disputes between 
States and Nationals of other States (ICSID) has been established to create a neutral 
international forum which on the one hand, provides facilities for conciliation and 
arbitration of investment disputes between contracting states and nationals of other 
contracting states, and on the other hand, provides a system for the enforcement of its 
awards. However, petroleum disputes should not fall directly under the ICSID 
Convention for several reasons. First, the petroleum industry is a mix of legal and 
political industry and petroleum contracts are sui generis investment contracts; 
second, the ICSID Convention allows its members to exclude certain disputes from 
its jurisdiction, and it appears that petroleum disputes are commonly excluded; third, 
the enforcement of ICSID awards in practice normally faces several obstacles 
because a state can invoke the doctrine of sovereign immunity in order to sidestep 
enforcement. Hence, awards which are rendered by ICSID tribunals are no different 
from awards made by other tribunals. 3 
Although national courts may seem to be the obvious alternative, there are 
many reasons why litigation before a national court is not always the proper way to 
solve petroleum disputes: the difference in legal status of the contracting parties; the 
fact that the national court may not always be qualified to solve such disputes; 
arbitration has become one of the most common methods of disputes resolutions 
especially between parties from different countries. The increase in disputes which 
have been resolved by arbitral tribunals is perhaps evidence of their effectiveness. 
2 It was argued that "such countries [developing countries] have often in the past been at a 
considerable disadvantage in negotiating contractual arrangements with foreign countries, because 
severe international asymmetries in the political and economic balance of power enabled the latter 
to impose restraints on a government's ability adequately to protect its own interests", Edith 
Penrose/ George Joffe/ Paul Stevens, "Nationalisation of Foreign-owned Property for a Public 
Purpose: An Economic Perspective on Appropriate Compensation", 55 Modern Law Review 351- 
367,353 (1992). 
3 M. Sornarajah, International Commercial Arbitration: The Problem of State Contracts, (Singapore: 
Longman Singapore Publishers (Pte) 1990), at 230; Gaillard for instance, argues that "article 55 of 
the ICSID Convention reserves states' immunity from execution. By accepting an ICSID arbitration 
clause, a state certainly waives its immunity from jurisdiction but not from execution", Emmanuel 
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Despite the scepticism of developing countries, towards international arbitration the 
establishment of a specialised institution by petroleum exporting and importing 
countries may create an acceptable framework for these countries. 
It has been argued that the petroleum industry has its own particular 
characteristics and that petroleum contracts are distinct from other types of 
investment contracts. Consequently, petroleum arbitration differs from normal 
international commercial arbitration. The petroleum industry is an international 
industry by nature, and political issues have more influence on this industry than any 
other; petroleum affects the daily life of all nations, whether the petroleum producing 
countries who are concerned about the availability of petroleum and their petroleum 
income, or the industrialised countries which are concerned about energy supply. 
Although the petroleum industry is high risk, it is also considerably profitable. 
Generally, investment agreements are time specific, namely they exist for an agreed 
time only, their scope is specified, and these agreements are based on feasibility 
studies which enable the investors to calculate their profits and also their losses. 
However, petroleum contracts typically extend over a longer period of time 
than other investment contracts. Petroleum companies have much power in terms of 
negotiation, which is reflected in the agreements, especially in the scope of the 
agreements such as the wide range of rights, or the size of the concession area. The 
third distinguishing characteristic of the petroleum industry is what is called "cost 
recovery", which simply means that all petroleum companies have the right to 
recover all their exploration costs once petroleum has been discovered. Accordingly, 
it could be argued that petroleum disputes require specific forms of dispute 
resolution because of the peculiarity of petroleum agreements, and the role and 
impact of the petroleum industry in the economy of many countries, especially 
developing countries. 
However, does the petroleum industry need a specialised forum or an 
arbitration institution for the settlement of disputes which arise out of its transactions 
of the sector? If the answer is positive, where should the institution should be located 
and what scope should it have? Moreover, what form should the institution take? 
Should it be established by a regional convention between the Arab petroleum 
countries, or by an international convention between all petroleum producing 
Gaillard, "The Enforcement of ICSID Awards in France: the Decision of the Paris Court of Appeal 
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countries? What is the position of petroleum companies in this framework? 
Furthermore, should this institution be as an inter-governmental institution such as 
the International Centre for Settlement of Investment Disputes (ICSID), or private, 
non-governmental institution? If it takes an inter-governmental form, is there any 
possibility of establishing a joint venture relationship between this institution and 
ICSID, or the Organisation of the Petroleum Exporting Countries (OPEC)? Or is 
there any possible involvement of the International Chamber of Commerce (ICC) or 
the World Trade Organisation (WTO) or the African -Asian Legal Cooperation in its 
activities? In addition, does this institution need special rules namely its own, or it 
may adopt other rules i. e. UNCITRAL Arbitration Rules? 
Having raised such questions, it could be argued that the establishment of a 
specialist institution to settle petroleum disputes may decrease the tensions between 
producing and consuming countries, by reassuring producing countries of its 
independence while protecting, within reason, the legitimate expectations of each 
party. At the same time, this institution may play a considerable role in terms of 
utilising petroleum for the mutual benefit of all principal actors i. e. producing 
countries, consuming countries and petroleum companies. 
Indeed, the time is ripe for the establishment of an international arbitration 
institution for the settlement of disputes which arise out of petroleum -or even more- 
out of all energy sector transactions. The petroleum dispute settlement institution 
which I propose here should take the form of an international convention between all 
petroleum producing and all consuming countries in order to attach to the institution 
global appeal, and the petroleum companies should come under the umbrella of their 
home states, since these latter cannot be a part of international convention. 
The convention should provide that, once it is ratified by a prescribed number 
of states (say major producing and major consuming countries) it shall come into 
force. In principal the convention should recognise the sovereign equality of all 
contracting parties. 4 Moreover, the convention should fill the gaps inherent in other 
in the SOABI Case", 5 ICSID Review-Foreign Investment Law Journal 69-72,70 (1990). 
4 See for instance, Charles N. Brower, "The Lessons of the Iran-U. S. Claims Tribunal Applied to 
Claims Against Iraq", in: Richard B. Lillich (ed. ), The United Nations Compensation Commission, 
(1995 Irvington/ New York: Transnational Publishers, INC), 15-27,16; Daniel Barstow Magraw, 
"The Tribunal in Jurisprudential Perspective", in: Richard B. Lillich/ Daniel Barstow Magraw 
(eds. ), The Iran-United States Claims Tribunal: Its Contribution to the Law of State Responsibility, 
(1998 Irvington-on Hudson/ New York: Transnational Publishers, INC), 1-46; Craig S. Bamberger, 
"An Overview of the Energy Charter Treaty", in: Thomas W. Wälde (ed. ), The Energy Charter 
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arbitration conventions, such as the New York Convention and the ICSID 
Convention, particularly those gaps which concern the enforcement of awards. 5 For 
example, the contracting states to this convention should consider decisions (other 
than final awards) rendered by tribunals in the context of this institution as a final 
and binding award. Furthermore, this award should be enforced in the same manner 
as local awards, without review by national courts. This simply means that a state 
cannot invoke the doctrine of sovereign immunity, even at the stage of enforcement. 
The convention should be guided by the following principles: 
1) It should recognise the principle of separability of arbitration agreements; 
2) It should also recognise the doctrine of pacta sunt servanda, and therefore 
a state cannot terminate a petroleum contract with a petroleum company, 
except in very limited circumstances and only for public purposes, in a non 
discriminatory manner, accompanied by payment of prompt, adequate and 
effective compensation; 
3) Nonetheless, the convention should take into account the extent to which 
petroleum companies consider the interests of host states while they perform 
their contracts, or the extent to which they practice any type of discrimination 
against the employees of the host state, etc; 
4) The performance of contracts by petroleum companies should be 
transparent and therefore petroleum companies should be responsible for any 
inaccurate information that they may provide to the host state, especially in 
terms of petroleum reserves. In cases of falsified information, the company 
should be fully responsible for paying just compensation to the host state. 
The institution which will be established pursuant to this convention should 
have its seat/ headquarters in a neutral place such as The Hague, for instance, and it 
may be as a sub-chamber, for example of the Permanent Court of Arbitration, 
because the latter already have permanent infrastructures and considerable 
experience. However, the detachment of this institution from any permanent judicial 
or arbitral forums would be more efficient in order to gain its own reputation. 
Treaty: An East-West Gateway for Investment and Trade, (1996 London: Kluwer Law 
International), 1-34. 
s See for instance, Albert Jan van den Berg, "Recent Enforcement Problems under the New York and 
ICSID Conventions", 5 Arbitration International 2-20 (1985), reprinted in 2 ICSID Review-Foreign 
Investment Law Journal 439-456 (1987). 
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The institution should provide facilities for arbitration as well as conciliation 
to all disputes arising out of petroleum transactions whether between petroleum 
countries or between a state and a petroleum company or petroleum companies. 
Hence, the jurisdiction of the institution should extend to any disputes arising out of 
petroleum transactions especially those which invariably arise out of exploitation and 
exploration agreements between petroleum producing countries and petroleum 
companies, and it may also extend to any other petroleum or energy i. e. gas disputes. 
The institution should have its own procedural rules for arbitration and 
conciliation, since the petroleum industry is considerably significant to the 
contracting as well as non-contracting parties and its disputes require urgent 
decisions, and therefore it is in need to its own rules 6 However, prior to the 
establishment of such rules and in parallel to having its own rules the institution may 
use the UNCITRAL Arbitration Rules. At the same time, the institution should apply 
host state law, but the tribunal would also have the right to decide a dispute with 
reference to international law, or transnational rules or ex aequo et bono if the parties 
so agree. 
The institution might be composed of a number of bodies, i. e. secretariat, a 
panel of arbitrators, a panel of conciliators and an arbitration court, which would 
contain people specialised in different fields, such as law, the petroleum sector 
(qualified petroleum engineers for example) and finance. This court would undertake 
a supervisory role in terms of arbitrators' tasks and decisions. Bearing in mind, the 
institution should have the right to review decisions to terminate a contract, or to 
adapt a contract and also to consider these decisions null and void, if the act of the 
state was not for public purposes or the compensation was inadequate. 
The suggested forum or institution would begin by applying the law of the 
host state. After the accumulation of a body of case law, the institution would 
introduce its own substantive rules by way of restatement, replacing host state law. 
However, it may be asked that whether as a practical matter there would be a 
sufficient number of disputes to justify establishing a new institution to settle 
petroleum disputes. Here, it could be argued that the case load of the International 
Chamber of Commerce (ICC) itself for instance, provides considerable evidence 
6 It was argued that "energy [petroleum is the most significant part of the energy sector] is the very 
fuel of society, and societies without access to competitive energy suffer", The Economist, 11 
February 2001. 
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concerning the annual increasing numbers of petroleum disputes. 7 
Furthermore, some would say that it is inevitable that such an institution 
would become politicised very quickly and still others would say that it would be just 
another bureauacracy, so not very useful or practical. The answer is opposite to these 
perspectives, since the petroleum industry is one of the most significant industries 
nowadays8 and it invariably relies in its development upon steady relationships 
between its all major actors. Therefore, it could be argued that the institution would 
not be politicised nor become another bureauacracy, since it would provide its 
facilities to both governmental and private bodies in which each party would do what 
ever necessary to protect its interests such as maintaining a smooth movement of the 
institution's procedures. 
The Energy Charter Treaty (ECT) may provide a successful model for 
regional arbitration in relation to energy. 9 However, it may be argued that the 
suggestion for establishment a new institution to undertake the mission of settling 
energy disputes in general and petroleum disputes in particular is unjustified in the 
existence of ECT. Here it could be stated that although this argument to some extent 
appears to be logical, the opposition to this opinion focuses on two reasons: First, the 
scope of the ECT to some extent is limited to the European territories. Second, the 
function of the ECT extends the mission of settling disputes to establishing a 
comprehensive system in all energy aspects. While the sole aim and function of the 
suggested institution is limited to undertake the mission of settling disputes which 
invariably arise out of energy (petroleum in particular) transactions disputes. Hence, 
7 According to ICC statistics the number of cases in energy sector during the last 4 years was as 
follow: 
1999 - 25 cases 
2000 - 43 cases 
2001 - 64 cases 
2002 - 58 cases. Source: the ICC Secretariat. A direct contact was conducted by the writer, on 21 
January 2003. 
It was argued that "the turnover of the global energy business approx. $1.8 trillion.... global 
investment in energy between 1990 and 2020 will total some $30 trillion at 1992 prices", The 
Economist, 11 February 2001. 
9 Wilde has stated that "the Energy Charter Treaty, signed in Lisbon on 17 December 1994, connects 
two significant strands of international economic policy and law: First, it is an attempt to commit 
the states which were formerly part of or under the control of the Soviet Union to a model of liberal 
international economic policy [... ]. Secondly, the Treaty is one link in a long chain of efforts to 
create an international investment and trade regime, [... ], Thomas W. Wilde, "Editor's Preface", in: 
Thomas W. Wilde (ed. ), The Energy Charter Treaty: An East-West Gateway for Investment and 
Trade, supra not 4, at xix; Art. 2 determines the purpose of the Treaty providing that "[T]his Treaty 
establishes a legal framework in order to promote long-term cooperation in the energy field, based 
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the suggestion may be well justified 
Finally, the question is whether this system i. e. international treaty or 
convention, secretariat and options for arbitration or conciliation can be used for 
petroleum disputes. The answer is yes. However, finding and maintaining an 
adequate and practical system by which petroleum disputes in particular and energy 
disputes in general can be settled, is undoubtedly dependent on the will of the 
international community to do so especially those countries which are highly 
concerned about the continuity of this industry. 
on complementarities and mutual benefits, in accordance with the objectives and principles of the 
Charter. 
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